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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the arbitration function of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
[ACAS] as one form of third party intervention in British industrial relations. It provides an
explanation for the apparent contradiction between the stance taken by Conservative governments post-
1979 to trade union reform on the one hand; and the survival of an agency which maintains many of
the attitudes and practices associated with the past on the other. In spite of government rhetoric and
changes which have occurred in the period examined, it is argued that the key attitudes and practices in
relation to arbitration have not altered significantly over time.
Questionnaire surveys of arbitrators and the parties to arbitration were conducted in conjunction with a
study of arbitration awards over the period 1942-1985. These revealed that many of the debates
relating to arbitration, including support for voluntarism and resistance to compulsion in the process,
the criteria for the appointment of arbitrators with appropriate skills and experience and the factors
which arbitrators should consider in making their awards, have their foundation in the early part of this
century: that the main focus of criticisms of arbitration surround issues of pay and terms and
conditions of employment and that they were unfounded: and that the majority of parties to arbitration
were satisfied with the service they received.
The practice of arbitration was located within the corporatist theory debate and it was contended that
elements of corporatist and pluralist relationships and networks within ACAS had survived the election
of a government openly hostile to both corporatism and quangos. Explanations for the survival of
ACAS and the arbitration service as one form of third party intervention can be found within the
corporatist and dualist debate and understood within the context of the role which arbitration has played
in the history of British industrial relations.
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CORPORATIST THEORY AND ARBITRATION PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
"Every beginning is difficult"
[Karl Marx]
The establishment of the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service [ACAS] by the Labour
government in 1974 marked a significant development in the form of the state's intervention in
industrial relations in Britain. ACAS is a product of the 1974-79 Labour administration and its
proposed role and remit can only be understood with reference to the context of the particular conditions
of the time. The service was set up in a period when the Labour government, under the premiership of
Harold Wilson, introduced legislation to extend the rights of working people. Legislation covered a
range of issues concerned with terms and conditions of employment, such as improvements in
employment protection, health and safety at work, equal pay and maternity rights1. The emergence of
the new agency coincided with a specific stage in the development of the relationship between the
Labour Party and the trade union movement; and a period of worsening economic conditions reflected
in slow growth and rising unemployment and inflation. Hiving-off the Industrial Relations Branch
from the Department of Employment group was interpreted as a response to the perceived conflict
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between the Department's dual role in implementing and enforcing the various incomes policies,
whether voluntary or statutory, of previous governments.
During its term of office, the Labour government attempted to manage the economy on the basis of
Keyncsian demand management policies - policies which had been pursued by both Conservative and
Labour governments as part of the so-called post-war social democratic consensus2. The main features
of the consensus were the acceptance of the role of government in maintaining a high and stable level
of employment and low inflation; in intervening in industry through nationalisation; in establishing
the welfare state; and in accepting an active role for trade unions in tripartite organisations [Kavanagh,
1987]. But attempts to manage the increasing demands made on government expenditure in the period,
combined with the effects of the world recession, put considerable strain on the Labour government's
ability to manage the economy effectively and meet its stated objectives. Before the end of its
administration, and under the new leadership of James Callaghan, the government made a significant
change in the emphasis of policy. Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that
public expenditure was to be cut by means of cash limits on the control of spending by departments
and local government. This change is argued to have been forced on Labour by the International
Monetary Fund as a condition of advancing a further loan to the government [Barnett, 1982;
Kavanagh, 1987],
The government was subject to heavy criticism both from its supporters and opponents for pursuing
the objective of public expenditure cuts. As cuts not only mean cuts in services or departmental
spending, but also mean less money to fund the wage demands of public sector workers, the Prime
Minister and his government soon ran into difficulty with the trade union movement when they tried to
restrict the level of wage rise in 1978 to 5% under the terms of the Social Contract between the Labour
Party and the unions. Throughout this period ACAS dealt with increasing numbers of industrial
relations problems through the advisory, conciliation, mediation and arbitration sectors of the service.
Although there is a rough correlation between the incidence of ACAS interventions in collective
disputes and trends in recorded stoppages, the level of third party interventions has been sustained in
spite of a reduction in the number of strikes in recent years [see Table 1.1]. The service was not,
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however, able to prevent the events of the so-called winter of discontent which is said to have been a
major contributor to the defeat of the Labour government at the 1979 general election3.
TABLE 1.1
Total number of Collective Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration Cases handled by ACAS 1975-1989
in relation to industrial stoppages
Conciliation 14] Mediation 12] Arbitration t3l Industrial stoppages
1975 2017 11 292 2,332
1976 2851 17 296 2,034
1977 2891 31 287 2,737
1978 2706 29 385 2,498
1979 2284 32 348 2,125
1980 1910 31 271 1,348
1981 1716 12 239 1,344
1982 1634 16 220 1,538
1983 1621 20 176 1,364
1984 1448 14 178 1,221
1985 1337 12 148 903
1986 1323 10 172 1,074
1987 1147 12 132 1,016
1988 1059 9 127 781
1989 1070 17 150 701
[1] Collective Conciliation - Completed Cases
[2] Single and Boards of Mediation
t3l Single and Boards of Arbitration
[Source : ACAS Annual Reports, 1975-1989 and Department of Employment Gazette, July 1990]
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When Labour lost the election to the Conservative Party with Margaret Thatcher as its leader, it was
believed that institutions such as ACAS could also disappear. On first examination ACAS appears to
be the embodiment of tripartist and corporatist relationships which some did not think would survive
the election of the new government which, at least in its rhetoric, was determined to break with the
post-war consensus and which offered the British people 'A New Beginning' [Conservative Party 1979].
Further the new government did not disguise its dislike for quangos [Pliatzky, 1989], and the influence
afforded to trade unions within such organisations. A product of the Labour administration, ACAS
had been criticised in some quarters for being pro-union and in some ways responsible for tilting the
balance of power in industrial relations in favour of the unions4 - a situation which the new
administration was keen to reverse:
"Between 1974 and 1976, Labour enacted a 'militants charter' of trade
union legislation. It tilted the balance of power in bargaining
throughout industry away from responsible management and towards
unions, and sometimes towards unofficial groups of workers acting in
defiance of their official union leadership."
[Conservative Party, 1979]
The Conservative government declared its intention to redefine the role of government in a mixed
economy. It rejected Keynesian demand management and advocated monetarist solutions to economic
problems (Grant and Nath, 1984). The priority objective was [and is still stated to be] the reduction of
inflation, although the means by which this was to be achieved have changed significantly over the
government's three administrations^. In addition the government wished to reduce government
spending and the role of government in economic affairs in order to free more of the economy to market
forces. Rejecting the belief, which had gained credence in the 1960s and 1970s, that the law could not
intervene in British industrial relations, another major aim of the government's new agenda was the
reform of industrial relations:
"Labour claim that industrial relations in Britain cannot be improved by
changing the law. We disagree."
[Conservative Party, 1979]
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Major changes in the activities and organisation of trade unions have resulted from the 1980 and 1982
Employment Acts, the 1984 Trade Union Act and the 1988 and 1989 Employment Acts [Mcllroy,
1988; Maclnnes, 1987; Taylor, 1989] in conjunction with major developments relating to other
aspects of labour market supply side policies [Brown, 1988a, 1988b; Brown and King, 1988], Yet
in spite of cutbacks in its budget and its reduced workload, ACAS has remained remarkably intact
during the past eleven years of Conservative control of government At first sight this may appear to
be a contradiction of the government's stated policy; and the continued existence of ACAS as an
unnecessary obstacle to the free functioning of the market. However, as the discussion on corporatism
illustrates, corporatist strategies are not necessarily excluded from a free market philosophy and may
indeed be employed in specific forms to improve the functioning ofmarket forces.
This thesis examines the work of ACAS with particular reference to its arbitration service and provides
an explanation for the apparent contradiction between the government's macroeconomic policy stance
and its continued support for an agency which appears to maintain attitudes, practices and values of the
past. Using the concept of corporatism as a theoretical framework, it will be argued that
notwithstanding the initial reduction in the number of cases referred to arbitration since 1979; the
withdrawal of the right of access to arbitration by the government from the terms and conditions of
employment of some public sector employees; and the adaptations which ACAS has made in response
to changing conditions; there is a surprising degree of continuity in the work of ACAS in terms of
state organised third party intervention in industrial relations in the post-war period.




The time for an obituary of corporatism seems a long way off
[Williamson, 1989, ix]
The post-war period in Britain and other industrialised countries, has been marked by the increasing
complexity and role of the state in economic affairs, both nationally and internationally. After 1945,
Conservative and Labour governments in Britain, operated within a framework of Keynesian demand
management and became more actively involved in economic policy making. At least until the mid-
1970s governments pursued the broad economic objectives of full employment, price stability,
economic growth, balance of payments equilibrium and a more equitable distribution of income and
wealth [Gamble andWalkland, 1984; Grant and Nath 1984],
During the post-war period and especially since the 1970s a large and diverse literature on state theory
developed in order to provide some explanation and theoretical framework for understanding the nature
and role of the state in the political and economic spheres. One particular strand of this literature
relates to the debate on corporatism, variously described as neo-, quasi, liberal or societal corporatism
[Grant, 1985]. Distinctions are made between state corporatism and societal corporatism [Schmitter,
1979]; between sectoral corporatism and corporate concertation [Lehmbruch, 1984]; between
corporatism and pluralism [Williamson, 1989]; and between corporatism and tripartism [Grant, 1985].
Distinctions are also made between corporatist arrangements at different levels of the economy - at the
macro or national level; the meso or regional/industry/policy community level; and the micro or
firm/plant/specific policy level. Grant describes the debates on the nature of corporatism as "an
attempt to understand the reciprocal relationships that have developed between the state and major
organised interests in Western countries in the post-war period." [Grant, 1985, p.l] The major
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organised interests which are of concern to this thesis are those which represent labour and capital in
British industrial relations.
The literature on corporatism has a long history and pre-dates the use of the term to describe post-war
conditions. Williamson summarises the use of the concept which preceded the rise of neo-corporatism
in the 1970s as follows:
"first, as a form of political culture; second, as a body of social and
economic thought that was prominent in many European countries in
the period approximately 1860-1940; and third, as the politico-
economic system established in a number of authoritarian regimes in
the twentieth century."
[Williamson, 1989, p.22]
Further Williamson argues that although "Schmitter's 1974 essay marked the beginning of serious
consideration of corporatism as a concept relevant to studying 'liberal democracies', he was not the first
to make the connection. Indeed, some of the most noted writers on pressure group politics of the
post-war period had discussed the development of corporatism in a number of European countries."
[Williamson, 1989, p.8] He refers to the work of Samuel Beer [1956], Eckstein [1960] and Shonfield
[1965] which relate to Britain; and the work of La-Palombara on Italy [1964], Rokkan on Norway
[1965], Ruin on Sweden [1974] and Lowi on the United States [1969] as examples to illustrate his
point.
I am mainly concerned with the revival of corporatist explanations and the development of the neo-
corporatist literature which relates to the politics of industrial relations in western capitalist
democracies. Before exploring the application of the concept of corporatism to a detailed analysis of
the operation of ACAS arbitration, it is necessary first to set out a brief history of the development of
the corporatist debate; the key features of corporatism which have been identified by different authors;
the main critiques of the corporatist literature; and the relevance of corporatist theory to post-war
conditions in Britain.
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i] The revival and development of corporatist theory
"Corporatism may best be conceived as a particular form of relationship
between the state and organised interests in which tripartite forums are
employed as a means of resolving interest conflict by bringing
opposing groups into the decision-making process, and giving them
some responsibility for policy outcomes."
[Moore and Booth, 1989, p. 14]
To some extent the revival of corporatist theory can be understood as a response to the perceived
limitations of pluralist interpretations of the relationship between interest groups and the state - "The
revival and recasting of corporatist explanations of these historical changes was a response to
widespread feeling among academics that conventional pluralist theories did not provide an adequate
apparatus to handle the changes that were taking place in the relationship between the state and interest
groups based on the division of labour in society" [Grant, 1985, p.l]. Pluralist explanations have been
criticised for the role assigned to the state as a neutral institution; for their failure to provide a
satisfactory understanding of the changing relationship between capital, labour and the state; for not
distinguishing between interest groups and governing institutions; for not understanding the key
distinction of intermediation; for their inadequate treatment of power in the policy making process;
and for using as a basis for their analysis the assumption that there is open competition between
interest groups and no barriers to entry into the competition [Grant, 1985; Williamson, 1989],
Different strands of pluralist theory view the state either as a neutral arbiter impartially mediating
between contending economic and political interests in society [arbiter theory]; or as actor in the
policy making arena [arena theory]. The distinction between the two approaches implies different roles
for the state. The arbiter theory allows for an interventionist role for the state and some control over
the recognition of legitimate groups in society and the balance of power between them. The arena
theory implies a participatory role for the state as only one of the actors in the policy making arena
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where the distribution of power in society is given [Grant and Sargent, 1987; Jordan and Richardson,
1987],
However, Williamson [1989] argues that it would be misleading to perceive the development of
corporatist debates solely as a response to criticism of pluralism as he considers that corporatist writers
in more recent times have also reacted against the other, longer-established alternatives to pluralism,
most notably Marxist and traditional elite models. He does concede, however, that "the argument with
the pluralists is by far the most prominent and heated." [p.4].
In his most recent work, Corporatism in Perspective, [1989], Williamson outlines and summarises
the main ideas put forward in corporatist theory:
"What I wish to establish is that corporatism provides a set of ideas and
general propositions which provide a valid and interesting way of
thinking about organized interests and their relationship to the state."
[Williamson, 1989, p.xi]
The development in corporatist theory post-1974 is divided into three 'generations' or time periods by
Williamson, although he acknowledges that the divisions may not be as distinct as the categories
imply.
In the 'first generation' [1974-1979] he includes the work of Schmitter and Lehmbruch and their edited
volume entitled Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, [1979]; and the contributions of Panitch,
[1979] and Jessop, [1979]. While there are differences between the various authors involved, central
issues can be identified:
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a] Schmitter's discussion of corporatism as a system of interest
intermediation, ie the relationship between organised interests and
public authorities;
b] Lehmbruch's analysis of the material conflict between capital and
labour in the form of incomes policy;
c] the development of a theory of the state by Panitch and Jessop;
<5 the differential development of corporatism in different polities; and
e] the need to theorize different components of the corporatist model.
In addition to the authors involved in the above - the 'Corporatist Internationale' as they described
themselves - Williamson cites the work of Alan Cawson [1978] which began the examination of the
uneven development of corporatism in a single polity; and Colin Crouch [1977 and 1979] which
identified the problem of distinguishing between pluralism and corporatism and the co-existence of the
two arrangements.
Commenting on phase one, Therborn [1987] considers the most significant contributions to the debate
to be the concept of intermediation introduced by Schmitter and the concept of concertation discussed
by Lehmbruch. Grant [1985] also cites the contribution of the distinction between state and societal
corporatism identified by Schmitter [1979]. He outlines the distinction as follows:
"State corporatism is imposed from above, whereas societal
corporatism grows from below. State corporatism is based on
dependent organisations penetrated by the state; societal corporatism
emerges from the full development of autonomously formed
organisations which reach a stage where they feel they can bargain with
government as nearly equal partners."
[Grant, 1986, p.36]
The distinction introduced by Lehmbruch between 'sectoral corporatism' and 'corporatist concertation' is
also summarised by Grant.
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"Sectoral corporatism is limited to specific sectors of the economy and
involves privileged access to government for particular interests.
Corporatist concertation involved agreement among potentially
antagonistic interests, such as capital and labour, about the
management of the economy."
[Grant, 1986, p.40]
Williamson argues that the 'second generation' [1980-1983] is best represented by two collected works -
one edited by Suzanne Berger, Organizing Interests in Western Europe [1981], and the other by
Lehmbruch and Schmitter, Patterns ofCorporatist Policy Making [1982], These works represented
both a consolidation of earlier discussions and the introduction of new issues. The key contribution of
the second phase can be identified as:
a] The recognition that the analysis was just beginning to come to terms
with the central issues and thus could be interpreted as a new research
agenda;
b] the identification of two distinct but linked usages - [i] interest
intermediation and [ii] policy making and implementation;
c] the development of the dual politics thesis [Cawson and Saunders]
where different types of intervention were associated with different types
of interest group politics and which concluded that intervention into
production was achieved through corporatism;
d] the argument that society may not just be constrained by organised
interests, but also shaped by them;
e] the introduction of the problem of govemability in the face of rising
demands on the political system [Schmidt];
f] comparative analysis of different polities; and
g] the development of the theory beyond the macro level to other levels of
policy making.
Finally, the 'third generation' [1984-1987] is stated by Williamson to be distinctive because of the
separation of the analysis between those authors such as Goldthorpe [1984] and Scholten [1987] whose
work is concerned with the national or macro level of policy; and Cawson [1985] who has continued
his work at the sectoral/meso level of analysis. One development of meso analysis relates to the
notion of 'private interest government' [Streeck and Schmitter, 1985], which refers to the application
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of corporatist theory to the changing relationship between private interest associations and the
community, the market and the state [Grant & Sargent, 1987] - to form a 'corporatist-associative order'.
"Thus parts of the economy, and the wider society, are regulated by
'private' associations performing a 'public' role, as opposed to being
regulated through either the market or the state bureaucracy.
[Williamson, 1989, p. 18]
A common feature of the studies in this period is the use of empirical data.
Although conceptualizing the development of corporatist theory into different time periods has
analytical advantages, Williamson is the first to admit that such summaries of the literature are
limited. Useful additions to his summary would be the work of Middlemas [1979, 1983 and 1986],
which pre-date Williamson's 'first generation'; and the contribution of Moore and Booth [1986 and
1989], which is a more recent development of the debate.
A historical perspective is taken by Keith Middlemas in his identification and analysis of the concept of
'corporate bias'. Middlemas traces the development of corporate bias to the inter-war period as a
strategy of crisis avoidance adopted by government whereby the two sides of industry, employers'
organisations and trade unions, are elevated to a new form of status, moving from interest groups to
what he describes as 'governing institutions'.
"Equilibrium was maintained because the governing institutions came
to share some of the political power and attributes of the state, itself
avid to admit representative bodies to its orbit rather than face a free-for
all with a host of individual claimants. I have called this process
corporate bias, but it should not be confused with the corporate state of
classical Fascism ..."
[Middlemas, 1979, p.20]
The association between government, trade unions and employers' organisations is viewed as operating
within a consensual framework [a theme which I shall explore in subsequent chapters] and involving a
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subordination of the role of parliament. By 1945, according to Middlemas, corporate bias had
replaced, for all practical purposes, classical democratic theory as that had been understood since 1911.
Middlemas's thesis has been criticised on the grounds that the relationships he describes as corporate
bias can be identified in the period before 1914 [Davidson in Smout, 1979]; and on the basis that trade
unions and employers' organisations did not determine principles of policy but were confined to
administration of policy [Lowe, 1980]. Nevertheless Middlemas has made a significant contribution
to the understanding of the relationship between the state and the two sides of industry which he has
developed in his later works [Middlemas 1983 and 1986].
A more recent contribution to the corporatist debate can be found in the work of Moore and Booth and
their application of corporatist theory to the politics of decision-making in Scotland. The basis of
their argument is that speculation about the death of corporatism is premature and that new forms of
bargaining and negotiation between interest groups and the state below the macro or national level have
developed and survived the administration of a so-called anti-corporatist Conservative government. In
arguing that corporatism and pluralism are both limited concepts, Moore and Booth develop their own
concept of 'negotiated order' which they place somewhere between corporatism and pluralism, or
between state imposed solutions and market forces6. Negotiated order comprises three key elements.
The first is the existence of an institution, either formal or informal, to articulate the interests of
organized interest groups; the second, is the indentification of the parties involved ("one side is
normally either a representative of the state or a surrogate who acts as an agent of the state ... On the
other side will be representatives of organized groups who have a particular self-interest to pursue" -
p.l 15]; and the third, is that the parties involved in such arrangements are responsible and accountable
for the attainment of agreed objectives. In distinguishing between the three concepts, Moore and
Booth argue that corporatism involves three key elements - representation, responsibility and control -
and can only be said to exist where these three elements are in existence. Pluralism is differentiated
because it involves representation of interests, but does not imply policy responsibility or control over
members; and negotiated order combines partial representation and a degree of policy responsibility,
although it lacks the necessary control element.
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While Moore and Booth have made an important addition to the debate by identifying the three
distinguishing features necessary in any definition of corporatism, their work is also open to criticism.
First, the key elements identified by them may be labelled differently by other authors. Second, it is
unclear whether their additional concept of 'negotiated order' clarifies or adds to the analytical confusion
surrounding definitions of corporatism.
A conceptually distinct approach to the corporatist debate is to be found in Marxist theory, where
analysis of corporatism developed in conjunction with debates in the Marxist literature on theories of
the state. The essential feature of a Marxist approach to a theory of the state is that the state is not
seen as neutral, rather the state, in a capitalist society, will ultimately represent the interests of the
dominant class, ie. the capitalist class. Different schools of Marxist theory of the state exist,
including the instrumental, structuralist, state monopoly capital, capital logic and the Frankfurt
schools. The essential difference between them centres on the role attributed to the law of value and
class struggle7. Kerry Schott provides a useful summary of Marxist theories of the state, although
she dismisses them rather too lightly because of the emphasis she gives to one aspect of Marxist
theory, namely that "their analysis does not allow for any real increase in the strength of the working
class." [Schott, 1984], Yet the work of Holloway and Picciotto, to which she refers, specifically
analyses the role of class struggle and the changing strength of the working class. However, Schott
does concede that
"If the state is not the public-interested and enlightened actor so often
assumed in basic economic policy models, and if individuals are not the
appropriate unit for analyzing state economic behaviour, then Marxist
analysis may clearly have insights to offer."
[Schott, 1984, p. 102]
A number of Marxists including Panitch, Jessop and Crouch have addressed the concept of
corporatism. Corporatist arrangements, which Panitch describes as:
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"the integration of central trade unions and business organisations in
national economic planning and incomes policy programmes and
bodies."
[Panitch, 1976]
are criticised on the grounds that such arrangements weaken the power of organised labour and displace
the conflict within the labour movement itself. For Panitch the integration or incorporation of trade
unions weakens labour, as the organisational body [in Britain the TUC] is also used by the state to act
as an agent of social control over its members especially in attempts to limit wage inflation in the
'national interest':
"What exactly is deemed to be in the national interest and what
sacrifices the working class is asked to bear in its name is conditioned
by the state of the British economy and the perception of the correct
national policy widely accepted by industrial, financial and political
leaders of the British upper class."
[Panitch, 1976]
For Jessop [1980] corporatism involves a decrease in parliamentary representation and an increase in
functional representation. In contrast, other non-Marxists such as Samuel Brittan have argued that,
rather than reducing the power of labour as argued by Panitch, corporatism has involved giving
excessive rights to organised interests, notably trade unions, which in turn has posed a threat to liberal
democracy [Brittan, 1975]. Finally, Colin Crouch has made a significant contribution to corporatist
debates. Crouch analyses corporatism as a strategy of domination in the area of industrial relations at
times when labour cannot be subordinated by other means. He contends, however, that significant
benefits can be won for labour in their bargains with the state [Crouch, 1977 and 1979].
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ii] When is corporatism, corporatism? The Key Features
"One of the main limitations of the corporatist debate has been a lack
of agreement, among those taking part in it, about what the term
means."
[Grant, 1989, p.32]
A major difficulty in identifying the key features of corporatism is in defining the precise relationships
between the state and organised interests at any given time between two potential extremes. That is
between the free market forces versus the state imposed solutions [Moore and Booth, 1989]; or as
described by Crouch [1985] between contestation and authoritarian corporatism. As discussed above,
Moore and Booth very clearly identify where they consider the boundary divisions between the three
concepts of pluralism, negotiated order and corporatism exist But the key features identified by them,
namely representation, responsibility and control would not be accepted, or may be labelled
differently, by other authors. As Grant and Sargent state there is little general agreement about what
the term corporatism actually means [Grant and Sargent, 1987, p. 17].
For example, there is considerable debate as to whether corporatism can be distinguished from
pluralism - "some writers see corporatism as a sub-type of pluralism" [Grant and Sargent, 1987,
p.17]; Schmitter [1979] argues that the two perspectives share a number of basic assumptions; and
Crouch [1985] argues that there can be boundary problems between the two concepts. One distinction
made between writers on pluralism and corporatism described by Jordan and Richardson [1987] rests on
their different treatment of the state.
"The pluralists appear to consider 'state' to be no more than a synonym
for government. Other writers present the state as a vital and distinct
concept."
[Jordan and Richardson, 1987, p.19]
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For Grant [1985] another distinction is that pluralism can refer to "an intensive consultative
relationship", whereas corporatism involves "designated organisations in the implementation of
policy." [p.3]8.
It is also argued that corporatism should be distinguished from tripartism, although some authors use
the terms interchangeably. Grant describes tripartism as "a weak form of liberal corporatism in which
the state, capital and labour engage in macro-level discussions on economic policy" [Grant, 1985,
p.9], on the basis that discussions which take place under a tripartite relationship result in general
guidelines for the conduct of policy with no firm commitment on those involved or mechanism for
implementing the decisions made. Further corporatist arrangements need not involve three actors in
the policy making process - they can be two-sided [bipartite] or involve more than three parties.
For Grant and Sargent [1987] the key features of corporatism are intervention, intermediation, and
incorporation. To explain the particular mode of intervention which could be described as corporatism,
they quote [Cawson, 1982, p.66]:
"The state is neither directive nor coupled to an autonomous private
sphere, but is intermeshed in a complex way which undermines the
traditional distinction between public and private."
[Grant and Sargent, 1987, p. 16]
Intermediation refers to:
"the particular kind of relationship that develops between the state and
organised interests operating corporatist arrangements. The organised
interests do not simply negotiate agreements with the state, they try to
ensure that their members comply with the terms of those agreements.
The state shares some of its authority with organised interests, but in
return the interest groups are expected to regulate as well as represent
their members."
[Grant and Sargent, 1987, p. 16]
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And related to the last point,
"incorporation refers to the fact that organised interests involved in
corporatist arrangements are necessarily drawn closer to the state; the
price of partnership is some loss of autonomy. This is particularly
true for the unions...."
[Grant and Sargent, 1987, p. 16]
In considering corporatism as a theory or theoretical framework for analysis, rather than constructing a
formal definition, Williamson [1989] summarises the key components as follows9:
1 restructuring of the relationship between producers, producers'
associations and the state in favour of the state;
2 establishment of basis upon which the state licenses the behaviour of
interest associations;
3 hierarchical distribution of power within interest organisations;
4 restriction of access for producers to effective associations to those
dependent on the state and hierarchically structured;
5 restriction of essential services to members of the association, in effect
compulsory membership;
6 role of interest associations in ensuring compliance with bargains
reached between them and the state;
7 role in the implementation of public policy, including representation
on public regulatory agencies, of regulating the non-members and
members alike;
8 in certain circumstances, attempts may be made to 'disorganize'
producers so they are less able to oppose regulatory powers delegated
to private associations;
9 existence of corporatism at macro, meso and micro levels of the
economy in addition to welfare services;
10 association with political dualism with privileged access being afforded
to certain interests on the basis of their relative power and at the
expense of electoral channels of representation.
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Clearly, however, even these attempts at clarification do not eliminate all the boundary problems
which can still exist. Another area of contention is the extent to which different forms of state
relation can co-exist within a single polity. The dual polity thesis has been developed by Cawson
[1982] in his analysis of meso-corporatism. Cawson argues that within capitalism there can be two
different forms of interest representation and intermediation depending on whether a firm is operating in
the competitive sector of the economy or the corporate sector dominated by large business corporations.
In the competitive sector policy making will largely be determined by pluralist relationships; and in
the corporate sector organized interest groups will enter into bargains with the state which can be
categorised as corporatist. Cawson has extended his analysis to the area of micro-corporatism to
describe certain relationships between the state and individual firms [Cawson, 1986] This and other
developments of corporatist theory have been attacked by some authors and it is to these critiques that
we now turn.
iii] Corporatism - pluralism by another name?
"The argument that corporatist theories are insufficiently distinguished
from pluralist theories gains some force from the fact that writers on
corporatism admit that the two bodies of theory share some common
assumptions."
[Grant, 1989, p.33]
The corporatist literature has been open to criticism from both its supporters and opponents. The
former group identify the following problems with the development of corporatist theory. First, the
over-emphasis on macro level analysis [Cawson, 1982]; second, the tendency to ascribe an artificial
coherence to state intervention [Schmitter 1985]; third, the poor or underdeveloped analysis of the
state [Cawson, 1985]; fourth, the mis-use or elastic use of the concept [Moore and Booth, 1989]; and
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fifth, the concentration on producer groups at the expense of consumer groups [Grant and Sargent,
1987],
As indicated above, the most heated attack has come from pluralist theorists. Grant [1985]
summarises the four main criticisms in the pluralist counter-attack as: first, that corporatist writers
have misrepresented the density and richness of pluralist writing; second, that despite placing
emphasis on the state, corporatists have little to say about it; third, that corporatism is nothing more
than a particular form of pluralism; and fourth, that there is an inherent uncertainly in corporatism
about the relationship between structure and function.
One example of the pluralist counter-attack can be found in the work of Jordan and Richardson [1987].
Their main objections are: first, that corporatism is not as novel as it claims and shares features of
and is very similar to pluralism; second, that it does not fit the empirical picture; and finally, that it
allows for less vigorous variants.
Another example is to be found in the essay by Andrew Cox [1988]. While accepting that the 'Old
Testament' of corporatism which refers to relationships within the corporate state does have some
merit, Cox attacks the 'New Testament' of neo-corporatism on the grounds that it has not led to
significant new insights into how policy is made or implemented; it is not unique; and it has added to
the confusion surrounding the topic. Specifically Cox questions the corporatist interpretation of
pluralism and argues that it is not necessary for open access, equal participation and a neutral state to
be present in each particular policy arena for pluralism to exist. He attacks the separation of societal
and state corporatism by Schmitter; attacks the notion of the dual state thesis on the grounds that
pluralism and corporatism cannot co-exist; scorns attempts to analyse corporatism at different levels of
policy making and especially the inclusion of bipartite arrangements; and accuses corporatists of trying
to construct one definition which will apply to all countries at all times and for failing to analyse the
gains and losers from so-called corporatist relationships.
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In reply to Cox, Cawson [1988] challenges Cox's interpretation of the work of Schmitter and his
discussions of pluralism, corporatism and dual state thesis. In contrast, Cawson argues that pluralism
and corporatism can co-exist and are always found in combination; and that, unlike some pluralists
who wish to deny the very existence of corporatism, corporatists do not want to deny that pluralist
relationships in society can be identified.
"A close inspection of Schmitter's 'Still the century of Corporatism?'
reveals a different purpose, however, which was to specify corporatism
as one of a number of possible ideal types of interest representation
systems among which were pluralism, monism and syndicalism."
[Cawson, 1988, p.309]
Therefore, corporatists have not tried to construct one theory which applies to all situations and
relationships and have developed their work on different forms of corporatism - state and societal;
bipartite and tripartite; and at the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. Cawson concedes that
"corporatist theory remains underdeveloped" but argues that:
"corporatist theory has succeeded in challenging the notion of a
monolithic state with some kind of essential unity and has shown that
modern capitalist states are complex structures which link with
economy and society in different ways. Neither pluralism nor
corporatism alone can capture this complexity, which would appear to
require a more sophisticated understanding than we have at present of
both corporatism and pluralism."
[Cawson, 1988, p.315]
iv] How relevant is the corporatist debate to an analysis of conditions in
post-war Britain?
As discussed Middlemas has analysed the tendency to 'corporate bias' in Britain, particularly in the post¬
war period:
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"I concluded [in 1979] that corporate bias was a characteristic of the
modern British political system and, indeed, in different forms, of other
Western industrial nations."
[Middlemas, 1986, p.7]
Middlemas acknowledges that while he developed the concept of 'governing institutions' to distinguish
the representative institutions who shared in the operations of the state from political lobby or pressure
groups, this did not imply formal incorporation of such institutions as they were, except in wartime,
"unable to deliver the general consent of their members on issues that
at various times were believed to be vital to government. ... Corporate
bias was therefore a tendency common to a particular stage of evolution
in industrial society."
[Middlemas, 1986, p.7]
Again, taking an historical perspective and adopting a very broad definition of macro corporatism,
McCrone et al [1989], start from the premise that corporatism did exist in Britain post 1920 without
entering the debates outlined above. They explore what they describe as 'the British road to
corporatism' before outlining the main critiques from the left and the right of the political spectrum.
The left were mainly sceptical and suspicious of corporatist relationships and feared the incorporation of
working class demands in favour of capitalism. However, according to McCrone et al the most
sustained and vigorous attack against corporatism was launched in the mid-1970s by a new and radical
New Right. Such an attack was fuelled by dissatisfaction with the increasing interventionist role of
governments in the post-war period and with fear of ungovernability and government overload. The
decision to withdraw from corporatist relationships by the new Thatcher administration is argued to be
in line with the government's monetarist policies and its sustained attack on the operation of trade
unions. The argument advanced by McCrone et al is vulnerable on the grounds that the authors accept
rather uncritically the existence of corporatism in Britain and use the term loosely to describe post-war
conditions.
In comparison, more in-depth or empirical studies have questioned the extent of successful corporatism
in Britain especially at the macro level. Even if the TUC and CBI had wanted to exert control over
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their members, it is argued that the very structure of organisations like the TUC and the voluntarist
nature of British industrial relations means that it is unable to guarantee the acceptance of its members
to decisions reached with government10. That is, neither organisation was necessarily able to deliver
the agreement reached with government. Although it may be possible to describe the relationship
between the government and the two sides of industry at the macro level as tripartist, Grant [1985]
argues that the relationship did not amount to an effective corporatist arrangement.
The closest Britain came to corporatism is argued to be in the period 1972-79 during the
administrations of the Conservative government led by Edward Heath and the Labour government led
by Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. Governments in this period experienced stagflation and
attempted to manage high levels of inflation and unemployment through incomes policy. The Social
Contract entered into by the Labour government with the unions prior to taking office in 1974,
whereby increased welfare and employment rights were afforded to trade unions in return for their
acquiescence on pay levels, is argued by some to be the peak of corporatist arrangements in Britain.
However, it is contended that the attempts at, what Crouch [1985] describes as, bargained corporatism
during this period could not be sustained and ultimately broke down during the so-called winter of
discontent followed by the election of the first Thatcher government in 1979. Thus although Britain
may have appeared to be a fruitful arena for corporatism at this time, Williamson [1989] argues that the
weakness of the key associations, that is the TUC and the CBI, combined with strong liberal
traditions in Britain worked against attempts to establish an enduring form of coporatism [Williamson,
1989, p.147]. At best Britain is described as having weak corporatism at the macro level11,
although other studies provide evidence of the existence of corporatism at the meso and micro level.
Indeed the collapse ofmacro corporatism may be associated with the fostering of new meso corporatist
arrangements [King, 1987] or what Grant describes as a move towards sectorally based privileged
forms of corporatism [Grant, 1986, p.38]. For example, Moore and Booth go so far as to argue that
the UK has very weak tripartite arrangements at the macro level and that those organisations such as
NEDO which have survived the Thatcher governments have become "largely symbolic forms of interest
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representation lacking any responsibility or control. However at other levels of the political economy
we can find interesting examples of corporatist arrangements." [Moore and Booth, 1989, p. 144].
As will be evident from the above discussion, conclusions about the existence of corporatism in
Britain will depend on the precise definition or criteria identified and which level of political economy
is under examination. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that there is no general agreement in the
literature either on an adequate definition of the term, or the existence of corporatism in Britain, it has
a strong common currency. First, it is used by commentators as a broad description of the pre-
Thatcher post-war eras as a way of distinguishing the period from the experience of the Thatcher
administrations which were to follow. In particular it is used by writers on industrial relations to
describe attempts by pre-Thatcher governments to work in partnership through a consultative
relationship with the trade union movement. In contrast the Thatcher governments were renowned for
their deliberate exclusion of trade union leaders from discussions on industrial relations or other
matters12. Second, it is used as a pejorative term by members and supporters of the Thatcher
administrations to discredit the management of the economy by past governments, especially their
attempts to reduce inflation through incorporation of the trade union movement13. Therefore,
although there are severe limitations in using corporatism as a theoretical concept in any analysis of
post-war conditions in Britain, it could be argued that any analysis which ignored the issue of
corporatism would also be inadequate.
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v] How relevant is the corporatism debate to an analysis of current
conditions in Britain?
Given that one of the key features of corporatism identified above was intervention, the application of
corporatist theory to conditions and relationships in the 1980s has been questioned. Significant
changes have taken place in the relationship between the state and organised interests since the election
of the Conservative government in 1979 and the past ten years have been marked by the government's
attempt to disengage itself from direct intervention. "Rolling back the frontiers of the state' was an oft
quoted intention of the Thatcher administrations [Gamble, 1988].
One attempt to analyse the new forms of state-organised interest relationships is the dualist tendency
identified by Goldthorpe [1984], Goldthorpe argues that a dualist tendency has re-emerged in recent
years as governments have attempted to offset the power of organized interests [particularly labour] in
the economy, by increasing areas of the economy within which market forces and associated relations
of authority and control can operate more freely. Thus the objective is to decrease the role of organized
labour, increase the power of unorganised groups, strengthen employers' interests and encourage the
free operation of market forces. A major source of dualism in the past was the use of migrant labour
to counteract the rigidities in the indigenous labour market. More recently Goldthorpe has identified
dualism in countries like Britain where employers have adopted new forms of production which weaken
labour and where there has been an increase in temporary, contract and part-time work. Corporatism
and dualism can co-exist, according to Goldthorpe, although there will be tensions between them, and
also the actors who play a crucial role will change. Under corporatism the trade unions had a dominant
role, but under dualism trade unions are excluded from government decision making and instead
employers and their managers are of crucial importance. The government can play a strategic role in
encouraging dualism and promoting employers' interests by passing legislation reducing the power of
trade unions and employment protection, changing social policy legislation and by retracting its own
areas of responsibility. The concept of dualism has been taken up by some writers and applied in
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particular to labour market policy [Brown and King, 1988; Hyman, 1989; and Longstreth, 1988],
although Longstreth contends that "dualist models of the labour market have remained largely at the
descriptive level, lacking analytical precision or even any clear definition." [Longstreth, 1988, p.428].
Therefore, as with corporatism, there are problems in the application of the term dualism.
The assumption inherent in some discussions and analysis of the 1980s is that neo-corporatism can
only apply to times of consensus politics and a broadly socialist approach to running an economy.
However, Bonnett and Jessop argue that:
"Once we break through the rhetoric of Keynesianism versus
monetarism, we find that both are effectively associated with forms of
meso and macro level intervention as a condition of their successful
implementation and that each has specific conditions of existence in the
social basis of state power and the management of resistances."
[Bonnet and Jessop, 1981]
Further Moore and Booth [1989] contend that corporatist arrangements can fit into one ideological
approach or another, that is into a broadly socialist or a market economy where a supposedly liberal
state may encourage certain relationships in order to rectify defects or dysfunctions of the market.
Therefore, a free market government may allow certain relationships to continue: [a] because a totally
free market would not be possible in practice and the alternative option of direct government control is
politically unacceptable; [b] because it can provide a managed market; and [c] because it can ensure
efficiency. Extending the discussions further McCrone et al argue that any government has to find
some means ofmanaging its relations with capital and labour, and speculate that:
"some form of corporatism will be back on the political agenda before
the end of the century .... It would be a considerable irony if Mrs
Thatcher had proved to be its midwife."
[McCrone et al, 1989]
These contributions provide some insights into the continuation of certain relationships which could
have been expected to cease after the election of a supposedly free market government in 1979. Such
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discussions of the significance of corporatist theory to the 1980s is of particular relevance to my
examination of the arbitration service of ACAS and will be explored in more detail below and in the
chapters which follow.
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THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION - THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION
"Arbitration is one of the methods of resolving industrial disputes.
Those who contemplate or advocate its use should be aware of its
strengths and limitations. It is not suitable for every occasion but in
some circumstances it can provide a way of reaching a settlement
acceptable both to employers and unions."
[Lockyer, 1979]
The above quote is taken from the Foreword to John Lockyer's Industrial Arbitration in Great Britain,
a book which Jim Mortimer argued "should become the authoritative published work on arbitration."
[Lockyer, 1979]. John Lockyer was the civil servant responsible for the ACAS arbitration service
from its inception in 1974 until his retirement in the early 1980s. In writing the book Lockyer was
responding to a plea for more information about arbitration. Although it was published in 1979, and
in spite of changes which have taken place since that date, this work is a useful source of information
for those who are unfamiliar with the processes of arbitration, as it outlines the nature of industrial
arbitration; the type of issues which lend themselves to and come to arbitration; the methods,
arrangements and process involved; the nature of the arbitration award; and finally the role of
arbitration in resolving industrial relations problems. Lockyer argues however that his book is not an
academic treatise on industrial relations, but rather is mainly intended for management and trade union
officials engaged in industrial relations activities.
In common with the literature on corporatist theory, there is a wide and varied range of literature on the
state's intervention in industrial relations and in relation to third party intervention and the role of
ACAS arbitration. This literature on third party intervention and arbitration has developed in different
disciplines including industrial relations [Bain, 1983; Clegg, 1979; Allen, 1964]; history
[Amulree, 1929; Davidson, 1985; Lowe, 1982; Sharp, 1950]; politics [Hyman, 1972, 1975,
1989; Crouch 1979]; economics [Hunter, 1977, 1983]; law [Rideout, 1986; Williams, 1983];
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sociology [Crouch, 1977]; and social psychology [Morley and Stephenson 1977; Webb, 1982,
1986].
Also the literature has developed in relation to specific debates surrounding the use and the process of
arbitration, such as compulsory arbitration [Fleischli, 1980; Institute of Directors, 1984; Minford
and Peel, 1983; Stevens, 1966]; no-strike deals [Burrows, 1986; McDowall, 1984]; straight
choice, flip flop or pendulum arbitration [Treble, 1984; Wood, 1985]; the use of arbitration in
unfair dismissal cases [Concannon, 1980; Rideout, 1986; Williams, 1983]; the process involved
[Lockyer, 1979; Sullivan, 1980]; pay disputes [Towers and Wright, 1983]; the prevention of
strikes [Kessler, 1980; Wootton, 1983]; and the potential scope and expansion of arbitration
[Johnston, 1975; Lowry, 1986; Mortimer, 1981], In addition, there is a broad range of
comparative analysis which compares the practices in Britain with those in other countries [Sawbridge,
1986; Mackie, 1986; Owen Smith, Frick and Griffiths, 1989]
Finally, there have been detailed examinations of other aspects of ACAS's work, namely the advisory
function, conciliation and mediation. As indicated in the opening quotation, arbitration is only one of
the methods of resolving industrial disputes in Britain. It is worth making the distinction between
conciliation, mediation and arbitration in order to understand what arbitration is and how it differs from
the other means of settling industrial disputes.
"Conciliation is a process where a neutral third party meets the
opposing sides and endeavours to help them reduce their differences and
so reach a setdement."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.6]
Most conciliation in Britain is carried out under the official auspices of ACAS and the third party
referred to is normally a civil servant employed by ACAS. ACAS is responsible for two forms of
conciliation, individual and collective14. A large degree of control still rests with the parties to this
process, and the role of the third party is mainly confined to bring the parties together in an attempt to
reach a mutual resolution of the problem.
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"ACAS has defined the process of mediation as 'a method of settling
disputes whereby an independent person makes recommendations as to a
possible solution leaving the parties to negotiate a settlement'. The
mediator goes further than the conciliator by putting forward his own
positive proposals aimed at settling the dispute."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.8]
The independent person in mediation cases is not an employee of ACAS but is appointed by ACAS
from a list of arbitrators and mediators. Under mediation, the parties still retain a degree of control as
they are under no obligation to accept the recommendations on the terms of a settlement proposed by
the mediator.
"Arbitration differs from conciliation and mediation in that the
arbitrator determines the outcome of the dispute by making a decision
or 'award' which the disputing parties at the outset, agree to accept."
[Lockyer, 1979, p. 10]
The arbitrator is appointed by ACAS from a list of arbitrators15 and like mediators, [s]he is not a civil
servant. It is in arbitration that the parties have least control over the outcome of the process in that
they give up the final decision to an outside independent person. Although the parties are morally
bound to accept the outcome of the arbitration, they are not legally bound to do so. In practice, failure
to implement arbitration awards is extremely rare16.
Before embarking on the detailed study of ACAS's arbitration service, a survey of investigations of
other aspects of ACAS's work was conducted. This was useful for at least two reasons. First,
because they provided models for the arbitration survey and points of reference for comparing the
different functions. And second, because in order to understand arbitration as the final stage, or as
some describe it the last resort, in third party intervention, it is necessary to have a clear
understanding of the demarcation lines between the different processes. Therefore, although arbitration
is offered as a separate service by ACAS, it normally occurs only after other avenues of dispute
resolution have been exhausted. The rationale behind this practice can be traced to the development of
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'voluntarism' in British industrial relations17. It is a rationale which I found to be reinforced by the
parties, civil servants and arbitrators involved.
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i] Advisory, Conciliation and Mediation Work:
[a] Advisory
A major study of the advisory role of ACAS was undertaken by Armstrong and Lucas [1984 and 1985].
Their research was conducted during the period 1982 and 1983 when more than half of the ACAS
advisory staff in ACAS regional offices were interviewed and evidence was gathered by questionnaire
survey from 548 ACAS clients [460 from companies and 88 local trade union representatives]. A
further 80 responses were received from a questionnaire issued to 'interested parties' - employers'
associations, trade unions, management consultants and professional/training institutions.
The advisory work is divided between advisory visits, either requested or non-requested, and in-depth
work. The distinction between the different types of service relates to the time spent on the issues on
which advice is sought. The questionnaire survey of clients was divided between 258 advisory visits
and 290 in-depth studies.
The responses from the survey demonstrated a high degree of satisfaction with the service offered.
Over 98 per cent of request and non-requested visit clients judged the style of advice presented to be
appropriate to the circumstances of the case, while 98% of requested visits [89.5% of non-requested
visits] thought the advice or information given was very good or good. Where advice was requested,
85.8% of clients had implemented the advice in full or to an appreciable extent. When asked whether
they would use the service again, 94% of all clients, both requested and non-requested visits, answered
in the affirmative. These results led Armstrong to conclude that there was a "significant measure of
general client satisfaction with the advisory visit" [Armstrong, 1985, p.144],
A similar level of satisfaction was expressed in relation to the in-depth work, although some differences
between the employers and trade union appraisals were noted. Ninety-seven per cent of employers
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considered the style of advice to be appropriate and 92% of unions; and 93% of employers and 90% of
unions said the advice received was very good or good. Eight-seven per cent of employers had
implemented the advice fully or to an appreciable extent, and 64.5% of unions. Finally 96% of
employers said they would use the service again and 95% of trade unions.
The impartiality and sound advice received from the service were noted as the factors of most
importance to the group of interested parties; with a combination of independence and impartiality the
most important factors for the client group. Ninety-four per cent of the client group considered that
the service should continue to be free [90% of interested parties] and that the impartiality and
independence of the service would be damaged by any payment system. Armstrong concluded that:
"Most respondents, clients and interested party alike, seemed strongly
in favour of maintaining the status quo position of ACAS independence
and free advisory service. Furthermore, the overall results of the survey
.... constitute a broad measure of client and interested third party
satisfaction with ACAS advisory performance."
[Armstrong, 1985, p. 146]
Armstrong and Lucas [1985] acknowledge that their findings are open to criticism on the grounds of
sample bias in favour of satisfied clients and low response rates. However, they support their
evidence on the basis of the quality of the 548 replies received.
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[b] Conciliation
A more restricted study of ACAS conciliation cases was conducted by Jean Hiltrop [1987]. Hiltrop
examined the records of a number of collective conciliation cases undertaken in Yorkshire and
Humberside Region, and talked to the conciliators who were responsible for the cases. Hiltrop was
interested in testing a number of hypotheses about the effect on the success rate of conciliation
measured in relation to the dispute ['situational factors'] and to the conciliator involved ['conciliator
characteristics' and 'conciliation techniques'].
The situational factors related to the nature of the principal issue in the dispute; the intensity of
conflict involved; the number of employees involved; the source of the request for conciliation; the
characteristics of the trade union involved; and federation of the employer. Hiltrop's results
demonstrated that the major factors that were particularly beneficial to the success of conciliation were
the pay-relatedness of the dispute; whether there had been a management only or joint requests for
conciliation; the union's prior success in settling disputes through conciliation; and the union having
relatively little experience with conciliation. In addition Hiltrop argued that conciliation is less
successful in the absence of actual or threatened industrial action.
Hiltrop also looked at the impact on success of the experience [number of previous cases] and skill
[defined as the conciliator's previous success rate] of the conciliator involved. He argued that previous
experience was critical and that both experience and skill affected the likely success rate of cases, with
the more experienced and skilled conciliator being responsible for higher success rates.
Finally Hiltrop examined the techniques employed by conciliators during a conciliation case. He
found that conciliators employed combinations of techniques in disputes; that no single technique
contributed greatly to success; that some techniques were used in all cases; and that they were highly
effective in some situations.
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From this study, Hiltrop claims that he can predict the success of conciliation with an 86% certainty.
This claim should be treated with some caution, however. First, as Hiltrop himself acknowledges, his
list of variables are by no means comprehensive; second, some of them can only be measured very
subjectively; third, no attempt was made to measure the skill with which particular techniques were
used; and fourth, it is questionable whether the whole complexity of the process can be measured in
the way Hiltrop proposes. In particular one has to be extremely careful about the concept of 'success'
applied. Success in these terms normally means that the case is settled to the extent that it is 'off the
conciliator's book' without reference to the future relationship between the parties. Therefore, such
success may be very short-lived.
A different survey of conciliation was conducted before the establishment of ACAS in 1974 as part of
the Department of Employment conciliation service. This survey of the attitudes of the parties in
conciliation was conducted by Goodman and Krislov [1974] through a questionnaire survey of all
parties involved for the first six months of 1972. Questionnaires were sent to 282 management
representatives, 249 trade union representatives and 49 conciliation officers with an overall response
rate of 44%. Contrary to the publicity given to the perceived lack of independence of the Department
of Employment, the parties indicated a high level of satisfaction with the neutrality shown by
conciliation officers; considered that the service performed a useful function; and three-quarters of them
said they would use the service again in similar circumstances.
Finally, a study of individual conciliation cases concerned with unfair dismissal was conducted by
Dickens et al (1983) as part of a larger project on third party intervention in industrial relations. This
research involved a postal survey of the parties to conciliation based on a ten per cent sample of all
conciliation cases in the period 1 February 1977 to 31 January 1978, excluding cases involving trade
union recognition. Although the researchers identified various problems with the industrial tribunal
system, and ACAS's role within it, their survey evidence suggested that both sides had a high regard
for the service which ACAS provides and would use it again if a similar issue arose. Dickens et al
(1985) followed up their interest in ACAS's involvement in unfair dismissal cases as part of a broader
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study of the industrial tribunal system. Because of problems identified with the industrial tribunal
system, the authors explore arbitration as an alternative form of dismissal dispute resolution.
[c] Mediation
An overview of mediation in industrial disputes was carried out by Ramsumair Singh. Singh
examined the British experience of this form of third party intervention since the establishment of
ACAS. He argued that where conciliation had failed and where arbitration was not acceptable to the
parties, then mediation offered a flexible, interactive alternative. Although more costly than
arbitration, Singh considered that the costs of a dispute could soon outweigh the costs of a mediation.
Citing examples of the miners' strike 1984-85 and the water industry dispute in 1983, he concluded that
there was scope for the development of mediation in dealing with particular types of industrial
disputes18.
ii] The literature on arbitration:
Before the present study, some work had already been conducted into ACAS arbitration in addition to
the work of John Lockyer referred to above. Three pieces of work have been written by arbitrators on
ACAS's current panel of arbitrators, that is by Harcourt Concannon, John Mulholland and Brian
Towers. Arbitration was the subject of Concannon's doctoral thesis [1986] and of Mulholland's MSc
dissertation [1974]; and of research conducted by Towers and Wright (1983 a and b).
Mulholland's work was completed before the establishment of ACAS and involved a comparative study
of arbitration in Britain and America together with a survey of the opinions of some of those involved
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in arbitration, that is of the Institute of Personnel Management [IPM] and trade union general
secretaries. The conclusions of this survey were that, although arbitration was not a substitute for
collective bargaining, both the IPM and trade unions representatives expressed the belief that arbitration
had a greater role to play in industrial disputes.
Towers and Wright, in their research, were concerned to provide some insight into the practice of
arbitration, with specific reference to the disclosure of informaion in general pay claims references.
The authors made use of two case studies and a mailed questionnaire survey of ACAS arbitration. In
part, because of the particular focus of their research, they did not obtain a high response and were
restricted to analysing twenty-nine responses to their survey - a response rate of 29.6%. From then-
research, Towers andWright concluded that industrial relations factors have more influence than ability-
to-pay in pay reference arbitration cases. Further they note that, although the arbitrator had a good deal
of freedom in the whole process, that this was constrained by customs, conventions and carefully
designed terms of reference.
The objectives of Concannon's thesis were to review the process of voluntary arbitration, examine the
policy debate concerning the distinction between arbitration and the work of industrial tribunals in
disciplinary disputes, and to compare the themes and styles adopted for collective and individualised
issues. The study examined the arbitration work of ACAS and concentrated on case study material for
single arbitrations, particularly in relation to disciplinary issues, for the period 1972 to 1981. The
study was also informed by the writer's own experience as an ACAS arbitrator since 1979.
Concannon's work provides a general overview of the different approaches to dispute settlement in
industrial relations and the methods of third party intervention available. He then outlines the different
types of arbitration and the historical framework in which voluntary arbitration developed before
explaining in some detail the whole process involved. The second volume of the thesis provides an
introduction to discussions surrounding arbitration awards. Finally, Concannon examines disciplinary
references to arbitration in depth, comparing the arbitration approach to unfair dismissal to that of
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industrial tribunals. Concannon's argument is that because of the criticisms of legalism often levelled
at the industrial tribunal process, there are advantages and much more scope for the use of voluntary
arbitration in dismissal and discipline cases than has been recognised previously.
In his thesis Concannon stresses that despite the long history of voluntary arbitration, the topic is
relatively unresearched. Instead much of the useful literature arises out of incidental discussion of the
topic is the course of work primarily concerned with broader questions of industrial relations and
collective bargaining. Therefore, one of his central objectives is to analyse the nature of the processes
involved in single arbitration and Concannon is successful in contributing to a better understanding of
this area of study. Concannon also notes the lack of published material on the work of single
arbitrators and he recommends a further exercise for future researchers based on interviews with
arbitrators. In addition he notes the paucity of knowledge regarding how the parties themselves value
the arbitration method and how arbitration awards work in practice.
The studies by Mulholland, Concannon and Towers and Wright contribute to knowledge of arbitration
as one form of third party intervention, and as with the work of Lockyer [1979], are written by
practitioners with an intimate knowledge of the whole process. However, in spite of brief references
to the recruitment of arbitrators and the types of awards which come to arbitration, very little detailed
information on these topics is available from these works. The survey of arbitrators conducted by
Towers andWright focussed on the disclosure of information in general pay claims cases. In addition,
although Mulholland did carry out a survey of interested parties in arbitration, this was limited in
scope and referred to a period before the existence of ACAS.
The result is that, as Concannon acknowledges, very little is known and has been written about the
arbitrators, arbitration awards and the perceptions of the parties directly involved in arbitration. Tom
Johnston has argued that arbitration in Britain has been ill-served by "the cloak of coyness and
anonymity that has surrounded it"19.
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To a large extent the lack of research into the above aspects of arbitration are due to the confidential
nature of the process and the fact that the awards are the property of the parties themselves and as such
are not published. Further ACAS, in collaborating with the research project to which this thesis
refers, have restricted access to the available data to the researcher involved. It should also be said that
while ACAS was extremely interested in a profile of its arbitrators and an historical survey of the
arbitration awards, there was some resistance to carrying out a follow-up study of the parties
themselves. Partly this was due to a certain caution and fear that approaching the parties after they had
learned to live with the results of the arbitration may rekindle elements of the dispute. However, after
the survey of the advisory service [Armstrong and Lucas, 1985]; the conciliation service [Hiltrop,
1987]; and the surveys of arbitrators and their awards [Brown, 1985 and 1986], ACAS were persuaded
that a survey of the parties to arbitration should also be conducted.
The surveys already conducted into the services offered by ACAS by the authors identified above are
located mainly within debates concerning third party intervention and collective bargaining. None
have attempted to locate their discussions within broader debates over the nature of the political process
and more specifically the relationship between the state and organised interests in industrial relations.
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THE OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THIS STUDY
"The process entails a continuing attempt to link empirical evidence
on organized interests to broader theoretical positions regarding the
state, power and democracy in contemporary liberal, capitalist
democracies in such a manner that these relationships can be
explained."
[Williamson, 1989, p.221]
Building on the work which has already been conducted into arbitration, the objectives of this study are
twofold. The first is to provide additional empirical evidence and case study material on the role of
arbitrators, the nature of awards, and the parties to arbitration. And the second is to link the findings
of these investigations to broader political discourses.
In meeting the first objective, a questionnaire survey of all arbitrators on ACAS's panel was conducted
in 198420; a survey of a one in ten sample of cases brought to arbitration for the period 1942 to 1985
was undertaken21; and a questionnaire survey of all the parties involved in references to ACAS single
and boards of arbitration in 1988 was carried out22. The information and data provided adds to the
body of knowledge on arbitration and should assist those researching into arbitration in the future.
The second object is to draw the literatures on corporatism and arbitration together. However, a major
difficulty with the diverse nature of the literature on corporatism discussed above is in applying it to
specific examples of relationships between the state, capital and labour. That is in identifying the key
characteristics of corporatism, which as indicated do vary between different authors.
Other authors have already undertaken the task of using current debates in state theory and applying
such discourses to a particular institution or interest group in society. For example Grant and
Sargent's analysis of Business Interests [1987]; and Moore and Booth's examination of decision and
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policy making in Scotland [1989]. These works have provided useful models for this project,
although their applicability to arbitration and industrial relations is limited.
The work of Colin Crouch [in Grant 1985], which specifically relates to industrial relations, provides a
useful starting point. Crouch classifies industrial relations systems in terms of corporatist theory and
develops an industrial relations bargaining model consisting of four elements - contestation, pluralist
bargaining, bargained corporatism and authoritarian corporatism. Under these elements the roles of
representatives can range from the purely representative to the purely disciplinary.
The basis of Crouch's argument is that as the relationship between capital and labour is fundamentally
unequal, the state adopts an active role in the management of the problems which can exist in that
relationship. His four categories describe different forms which that relationship can take:
1. Contestation:
Where the relationship between capital and labour is such that a change
to the benefit of one party can only occur at the same time as a
concomitant change to the disadvantage of the other - zero sum game.
Therefore, there is contestation as neither party can be expected to give
up their relative advantage voluntarily. Such a conflict relationship
can imply costs for the parties involved.
Under contestation Crouch contends there is little specialised role required for representatives of labour.
And because the expectations of the representatives and workers are broadly the same, then there is
little need for discipline.
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2. Pluralist Bargaining:
Where capital and labour decide that in the long run they would stand
to gain from decreasing conflict between them. To avoid mutually
damaging action, rules are established for deciding how issues should
be resolved and for recourse to conciliation and arbitration services.
This may represent a constraint on the actions of the parties, but
decreases the costs of conflict. The conflict then becomes
institutionalised.
Under pluralist bargaining Crouch argues that the actors in proceedings are representatives alone, and
procedures work only if the representatives are able to convince their members that the representatives'
experience of the service is a better guide to the balance of power than any attempt by the members to
play the matter out for themselves in 'real' conflict Both parties, capital and labour, accept the long-
term nature of the relationship between them, where neither side seeks to eliminate the other and where




Where capital and labour do not always follow the positive-sum
approach. Representatives ask members to accept a known sacrifice in
exchange for potential future gain. Under bargained corporatism the
object is to realise common interest and the parties are constrained to
restrict their pursuit of zero-sum game and expand their scope of
interaction. It should not be assumed that bargained corporatism
necessarily secures better gains for capital or labour than pluralism or
even contestation, as the result will depend on the balance of power
between the parties at particular times.
Crouch believes that a system of bargained corporatism is not assured of success but:
"It remains possible for the net gains expected from conflict by either
party to become greater than those from pursuit of the joint aims,
making it rational for them to break loose from the strain towards
conflict-avoidance that the above implies However, once such a
system becomes established, it contains certain self-reinforcing
elements. The dense nature of the web of exchanges eventually
enables commitments to be traded over time in a complex way."
[Crouch in Grant, 1985, p.75]
4. Authoritarian Corporatism:
As the next stage in what Crouch's describes as the "continuum of
industrial relations systems", authoritarian corporatism can only exist if
autonomous representative organisations are crushed.
In applying these models to Britain, Crouch argues that the British system experienced a brief
corporatist phase of the social contract from 1974-79, but that since the election of the new
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Conservative government in 1979, there has been a rejection of bargained corporatism and a move
towards a more classical pluralism with the role of labour being reduced. Further, in support of its
labour market policies, the government has been prepared to move towards contestation by pursuing
policies designed to weaken union leadership and through abolition of established procedures for dispute
resolution.
The evidence would tend to endorse Crouch's view that at the macro-economic level the government has
excluded labour from any neo-corporatist exercises since it took office in 1979, although one could
argue that it has been much more cautious in its approach at the meso and micro level of the economy.
The paradox is that withdrawal of state intervention at one level may necessitate stronger levels of co¬
operation from trade unions at other levels. The role given to trade unions as equal partners in the
tripartite Manpower Services Commission [now the Training Agency in England and Wales and part
of Scottish Enterprise in Scotland], is one example where the government required the support of trade
unions in the initial stages of its new training programmes for successful implementation of the
schemes. When the official levels of unemployment, specifically youth unemployment, began to
decline and the schemes were already well established, the government was more confident and felt able
to reduce the role and influence of trade unions and increase the influence of employers when it
restructured and finally abolished the MSC23.
For a supposedly non-interventionist government, the present administration has been remarkably
active in pursuing some of its objectives in the labour market [Brown and King, 1988]. Also
attempts at withdrawal in some areas have been limited. In the case of ACAS, it can be argued that
many of the elements of bargained corporatism described above still exist in the day-to-day functions of
the service. With reference to the Swedish system of corporatism, Crouch contends that:
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"It is not easy to build up a dense network of relationships essential to
the success of bargained corporatism, but once achieved, such a system
is not likely to be dispensed with lightly, given that the costs of co¬
operation are often exceeded by those of conflict."
[Crouch in Grant, 1985, p.88]
In relation to the arbitration service of ACAS, there has been little change in the process involved and
the use of the service by certain industries and trade unions. It must be conceded, however, that the
government has denied the right of access to arbitration to a large section of public sector employees.
My approach shall be, therefore, to examine the workings of the arbitration service of ACAS to
ascertain whether there is a major change or consistency in the state's intervention in this form or
dispute resolution, which at first sight appears to be a denial of the stated policy of market solutions;
and to consider why the particular tripartite form established in the setting up of ACAS in 1974 has
survived the Thatcher administrations. Second, to examine the extent to which the role given to
employers and trade unions in this structure can be described as one of intervention, intermediation and
incorporation as identified in the corporatist literature by Grant and Sargent [1987]; and whether the
process of arbitration can be incorporated within the models of state theory applied to industrial
relations by Crouch [1985]. Within this approach the role played by the civil servants who administer
the service; the significance of the move to increasing professionalism and efficiency of the service;
and the information flow between the parties, the civil servants and the state in the whole process shall
also be assessed.
I shall begin by examining the establishment of ACAS and the hopes and aspirations of those involved
in its formation; the development of the arbitration service especially the periods 1974-79 and post-
1979; and the context within which these developments have taken place [Chapter 2], Within this
framework I shall analyse the recruitment and appointment of arbitrators [Chapter 3]; the arbitration
process [Chapter 4]; arbitration awards from 1942 to 1985 [Chapter 5]; and the views of the parties
involved in arbitration. Finally, I shall locate the evidence from the case studies of arbitration within
the corporatist literature [Chapter 6] before reaching my final summary and conclusions.
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Sources:
The sources employed in this thesis include literature surveys; examination of archival material and
ACAS publications held at ACAS Head Office; interviews with ACAS staff and arbitrators;
questionnaire surveys; and involvement in the day-to-day workings of ACAS over a one year period.
ACAS participated in the research as part of a collaborative project arranged by Dr Roger Davidson,
Department of Economic and Social History, University of Edinburgh and John Lambert, their
Director of the Collective Conciliation and Arbitration Branch of ACAS. As part of the collaborative
relationship, ACAS granted me access to their files; conciliation24 and arbitration proceedings;
arbitrators' seminars; and council meetings. ACAS also supported the questionnaire surveys and
interviews as detailed.
Full details of the research sources are contained in the appropriate chapters, but can be summarised as
follows. First, a questionnaire survey of the 94 arbitrators on ACAS's panel of arbitrators in 1984
was undertaken to ascertain background information on the age, education and experience of those
people employed as arbitrators; specific information on their experience of arbitration cases; and their
views on arbitration in general. The response rate to this survey was 77%. Second, a questionnaire
survey of all the parties to arbitration in 1988 was conducted to ascertain their views of their most
recent experience of arbitration and their general views of this form of third party intervention. Of the
questionnaires issued, 203 were returned completed, a response rate of 91.0%. Third, a survey of
arbitration awards for the period 1942-85 was carried out using a one in ten random sample of cases
from single and boards of arbitration. This survey highlighted the types of issues coming to
arbitration over the period; the parties involved; the changes and continuity in the whole process; and
the results of the awards themselves.
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In addition I attended a number of events organised by ACAS. They included a one-week ACAS
induction course for advisors to work in the advisory service in 1983; a one-day ACAS induction
course for new arbitrators led by Professor George Bain in 1983; attendance, participation and
presentation of research papers at ACAS annual seminars for arbitrators in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988 and
1989 and two ACAS Council meetings; sitting in during two arbitration hearings; observation of the
negotiations in two conciliation cases; and attendance at a Railway Staff National Tribunal chaired by
Lord McCarthy. Finally, I conducted interviews with arbitrators, ACAS arbitration and conciliation
staff, and academics in the field. I also gained considerable knowledge and insight into the preocesses
involved by working in ACAS Head office over a one year period, during 1983/84, alongside civil
service staff in the arbitration section.
There are obvious limitations to the approach adopted in this study and had more time been available it
would have been instructive to have conducted more in-depth interviews with key politicians and civil
servants directly involved in policy making over the period. In contributing to this area of study, it is
to be hoped that other work will follow on these under-researched topics.
In particular the use of questionnaire surveys is limited, not least because the questions which were
acceptable and useful for ACAS's purposes are not necessary the ones which would be of most interest
to the social scientist. Also as Concannon notes [1986] there are technical problems in obtaining
reliable information form the postal questionnaire approach and it may be unsuitable in obtaining data
on arbitrators' attitudes2^. Nevertheless, they do provide valuable information on the profile of
arbitrators involved and insights into the views and perceptions of the parties to arbitration. Further,
the evidence has been supplemented by interviews; the experience of working alongside ACAS staff;
attending courses, seminars and meetings; and having access to ACAS papers and publications.
1 For discussion of the range and scope of legislation see, for example, H.A. Clegg [1979], The
Changing System of Industrial Relations in Britain, Chapter 10; John Mcllroy [1983], Trade Unions in
Britain Today, Chapter 3; John Maclnness (1987), Thatcherism at Work.
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2 There is much debate in the literature as to the extent of the post-war consensus, ie. at what level it
existed, over what range of policies, and in relation to different time periods. Indeed some authors, for
example, Pimlott [1988], question the very existence of the concept. For a discussion of this issue see.
Contemporary Record : "The Post-war Consensus', [Summer, 1988]; 'The Decline of the Post-war
Consensus', [Autumn, 1988]; 'Is the Post-war Consensus a Myth?', [Summer, 1989]; 'Adapting to the
Post-war Consensus, [November, 1989]; 'Post-war Consensus', [April, 1990].
2 For a description of the events leading up to and constituting the winter of discontent, see
Contemporary Record, 'Symposium: The Winter of Discontent', Autumn 1987, pp 34/43.
4 See, for example, statements made on behalf of the Institute of Directors.
2 Initially the government intended to reduce inflation through control of the money supply. The Medium
Term Financial Strategy [MTFS] established monetary growth targets. The MTFS was effectively abandoned
in the early 1980's. The government then shifted its attention to controlling inflation through management
of interest rates.
^ See Figure 5.2, p.102 and Figure 6.1, p.l 14 in Moore and Booth, [1989].
2 For a discussion of the role of the law of value and class struggle in Marxist state theory see Ben Fine and
Lawrence Harris, [1979], Re-reading Capital.
® A full discussion of the debate between corporatism and pluralism can be found in Williamson [1989],
Chapter 3.
9 Williamson [1989] outlines his general model of corporatism in Chapter 10. See in particular
pp.223/224.
I 0 See, for example, Grant [1985] Introduction and Grant and Sargent [1987].
II See, for example, Table 7.1 in Williamson [1989], p.150.
12 David Coates [1989] provides an example of such an approach. See especially Chapter 5, 'From
Corporatism to the Crisis of Labour'.
12 Remarks made on television interviews by the former Secretary of State for Health, Kenneth Clarke,
during the ambulance dispute in 1989/90 illustrate one example of this attitude. When asked why the
government was not prepared to intervene more directly in the dispute, Mr. Clarke replied that they had no
intentions of returning to the 'bad old days' of corporatism.
14 There is a distinction between collective and individual conciliation which can be summarised as
follows. Collective Conciliation: Section 2 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 empowers ACAS to
offer conciliation as a means of settling industrial disputes either at the request of one or more parties to the
dispute or at its own initiative. The use of collective conciliation is voluntary. Individual Conciliation:
there is a range of individual employment rights including equal pay, sex discrimination, the closed shop
and unfair dismissal where ACAS has a statutory role in conciliating between the parties in cases brought
under this legislation.
12 ACAS appoints arbitrators to serve either as a single arbitrator (single arbitration) or as a chairperson of
a group (board of arbitration). The appointments are made on an ad hoc basis in response to a reference to
arbitration. In addition the Service provides the secretariat and administrative support to arbitral bodies in
the public sector, including the Railway Staff National Tribunal, the Post Office Arbitration and Mediation
Tribunal and the Police Arbitration Tribunal. The Service may also suggest names of arbitrators to handle
private arbitrations which are not arranged under the auspices of ACAS. See Chapter 3 for a detailed
discussion of the selection and appointment of ACAS arbitrators.
1 ^ A discussion of arbitration awards and their implementation is to be found in Chapter 5.
1 ^ The concept of 'voluntarism' is discussed in Chapter 2.
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^ ® It is interesting to note that the studies of the advisory, conciliation and mediation services of ACAS
were all conducted by arbitrators on ACAS's panel of arbitration. Armstrong, Hiltrop and Singh were all
arbitrators at the time of their studies, while Dickens was appointed at a later date.
Quoted in Lockyer, [1979].
20 See Appendix I for results of questionnaire survey, 1985.
21 See Appendix II for results of survey of arbitration awards, 1986.
22 See Appendix III for results of survey of parties to arbitration, 1989.
23 For a detailed account of the rise of the MSC see Caroline Benn and John Fairley, [1986] and Alice
Brown and John Fairley, [1989].
2^ It was originally envisaged that the conciliation service of ACAS would also be examined. However,
objections from the civil service unions involved, especially to a survey of the civil servants who act as
conciliators, prevented this. After working in ACAS's Head Office in London, however, individual
conciliation officers did allow me to interview them and to observe negotiations in two cases.
23 Concannon [1986] notes an earlier attempt to conduct a questionnaire survey of arbitrators by the




THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION AND THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this chapter are to situate the use of arbitration and specifically developments post-
1979 within a broader historical framework. Although this section will not represent a comprehensive
survey of the period covered, some historical background is required in order to assess the extent to
which more recent events can be interpreted as a marked departure from the past or part of a continuing
process.
In undertaking such a historical survey of one particular aspect of the state's relations with organised
interests, it is also necessary to have an overview of the policy context in which developments
occurred. As will be observed the state has played an increasingly active role within British industrial
relations post-1945; and contrary to expectations, the Conservative government post-1979 has been
more active than previous governments in the area of labour market policy.
This chapter will, therefore, provide a brief historical overview of the history of arbitration and the
state's approach to industrial relations policy.
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SECTION I HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
"The concept of arbitration was introduced into British industrial
relations via the Cotton Arbitration Acts [1800, 1803, 1804 and 1813]
and the Combination Act 1800 and involved the use of an arbitrator in
place of the Justice of the Peace who could 'summon and examine on
oath the parties and their witnesses and forthwith determine the matters
in issue.'"
[Owen-Smith, Frick and Griffiths, 1989, p.6]
As the above quotation would indicate the use of arbitration in the British system of industrial relations
has a longer history than might be imagined. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a
comprehensive account of the development of arbitration. The history of this development is well
documented in other works [Amulree, 1929; Knoop, 1905; Rankin 1931; Sharp, 1950] and
excellent overviews are to be found in other sources [Concannon, 1986; Mulholland, 1974; Owen-
Smith, Frick and Griffiths, 1989]. What follows, therefore, is a brief account of the development
of arbitration and its establishment as a voluntary process within the British system of industrial
relations. Such a summary is necessary in order to place current developments and debates within their
historical context.
Owen-Smith et al [1989] periodise third party intervention in Britain into five phases, namely pre
1824; 1824-1896; 1896-1913; 1914-1945; and 1945 onwards. In contrast to this historical
approach, a thematic approach is taken by Mulholland [1974] who examines four main topics. The
first is the failure of the statutory schemes of enforceable arbitration which operated throughout the
nineteenth century; the second is the success of the voluntary measures in the joint boards for
conciliation and arbitration which existed at the end of the nineteenth century; the third is the
voluntary system of arbitration which originated in 1896 and which continued to exist in the twentieth
century; and fourth is the compulsory system of arbitration which operated during the first and second
world wars and the immediate post-1945 period.
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There are, however, overlaps in these apparently diverse methods and both the historical and thematic
approaches can be combined as follows.
i] Pre-1896 - attempts at statutory enforcement
As indicated above the concept of arbitration was introduced into British industrial relations via the
Cotton Arbitration Acts. In the nineteenth century, as industry was organised predominantly on a
domestic basis, disputes tended to be individual rather than collective; and local Justices of the Peace
acted as agents in fixing district rates of payment for work [Sharp, 1950]. As the structure of industry
changed and collective bargaining developed after the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824, so too
did the nature of third party intervention. An Arbitration Act was passed in 1824 which allowed for
most of the disputes that arose between masters and workmen engaged in cotton manufacture, and for
the settlement of a complaint by magistrates. Owen-Smith et al argue that this Act was not effective
for a number of reasons:
"firstly, the use of magistrates tended to suggest criminal proceedings;
secondly, disputes had to be referred without knowing exactly who
would arbitrate; thirdly, magistrates in manufacturing districts were
suspect as they were usually manufacturers themselves; and finally,
there was no protection from victimisation available to those who used
the legislation."
[Owen-Smith et al, 1989, p.7]
Therefore, suspicion over the level of legalism, lack of neutrality and alleged victimisation rendered
the Act unworkable.
However, in the period following 1824 there was a shift in opinion in support of conciliation and
arbitration, and voluntary arrangements began to develop. One example of such arrangements was the
joint board for the hosiery trade of Nottingham established by A.S.Mundella in 1860 [Owen-Smith et
al, 1989, p.8].
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As industrial unrest increased in the 1860s a Royal Commission was appointed, to examine the
problem and as a means of controlling the level of strikes, and introduced the Arbitration [Masters and
Workmen] Bill. The Act which was passed in 1872 allowed for the designation of a "board, council,
persons or person as arbitrators or arbitrator" in the event of disputes and provided that "a master and a
workman shall become mutually bound by an agreement under this Act1. Again this attempt at
compulsion was unsuccessful as only a few agreements were reached under the terms of the Act.
Further it can be argued that this measure represented the last attempt by the state in Britain at setding
industrial disputes by legal sanction. At the same time voluntary arrangements for conciliation and
arbitration developed in certain industries such as coal, steel, iron, textiles and footwear.
ii] 1896-1913 - development of voluntarist arrangements
The Conciliation Act of 1896 removed all provision for compulsory arbitration from the statute book
repealing the legislation of 1824, 1867 and 1872. The Act which was "to make better Provision for
the Prevention and Settlement of Trade Disputes"2 provided that the Board of Trade could exercise the
power to inquire into the causes and circumstances of a dispute; take steps to bring the parties together
with a view to amicable settlement of the difference; appoint a person or persons to act as conciliator
or as a board of conciliators; and on the application of both parties to the difference, appoint an
arbitrator [Owen-Smith et al, 1989, p. 10].
It is in this period that the foundations of the present system of third party intervention were laid, and
where the scope of the state's arbitration functions were established. As Owen-Smith et al [1989]
record:
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"This legislation included most of the functions which are now carried
out by ACAS - notably, arbitration, conciliation, inquiry and also the
brief of encouraging collective bargaining to take place in a context of
the existence of various types of voluntary industry-based joint
negotiating committees. It is therefore at this point that we can note
the birth of the present system of third party involvement in Britain in
a general form."
[Owen-Smith et al, 1989, p. 10]
Therefore, in recognition that compulsory third party intervention had been unworkable in practice, a
system of voluntary disputes machinery was established under the auspices of the state. State
involvement in disputes was restricted to the role of 'agents of last resort', when all other means of
dispute resolution had been exhausted. The 'last resort' principle has survived as an important factor in
present practice3.
iii] 1914-45 - war-time conditions and compulsory arbitration
The special conditions prevailing after the outbreak of the First World War led to the introduction and
acceptance of compulsory arbitration and the temporary suspension of voluntarism in the form of the
Munitions of War Act 1915. Initially the Act introduced a system of compulsory arbitration for
munitions work, but the powers of the Act also allowed for its extension to other industries involved
in the war effort. The Board of Trade [from 1916 the new Ministry of Labour] had powers to refer
disputes to arbitration; awards were binding; and strikes and lockouts were illegal. During its
enforcement [July 1915 to November 1918], 7,820 arbitration cases were dealt with, 3,746 of these
by the Committee on Production [Mulholland, 1974, p.57].
However, in spite of the special conditions of war-time, the legislation did not gain total support.
Strikes did continue to occur demonstrating the problem of enforcement of the statutory prohibition.
This experience was to influence attitudes to compulsory arbitration in the future.
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Adhering to the voluntary principle, one of the Whitley Committee's recommendations in 1916 was
that a permanent Court of Arbitration should be established. This recommendation was effected by the
Industrial Court Act 1919 which set up the Industrial Court [the forerunner of the Central Arbitration
Committee] and allowed for the appointment of ad hoc Courts of Inquiry.
During the inter-war period, therefore, there was a return to the system of voluntary pay determination
and, with the consent of both parties to a dispute, conciliation and arbitration were provided under the
Conciliation Act 1896 and the Industrial Court Act 1919.
The outbreak of the Second WorldWar again resulted in the introduction of compulsory arbitration to
minimise industrial disruption and maximise war production. The Conditions of Employment and
National Arbitration Orders [Order 1305] recommended compulsory arbitration; established the
National Arbitration Tribunal [NAT]4; prohibited strikes and lock-outs; and required employers to
observe recognized terms and conditions of employment. The Order which came into force in July
1940 applied to the whole of British industry and was "the furthest extent to which compulsory
arbitration [had] been imposed over industry in general in Great Britain" [Sharp, quoted in Mulholland,
1974, p.58].
Mulholland [1974] argues, however, that the provisions of the Order were not intended to replace the
normal processes of collective bargaining but to provide a final stage in them and that voluntarism was
still the basis of industrial relations. Also it should be noted that the imposition on workers to
observe the restriction on strikes and subject their pay claims and other disputes to compulsory
arbitration, was, to some extent, balanced by the prohibition on employers' ability to impose a lock¬
out and also the requirement to observe recognised conditions of employment in an industry. This
latter condition was to prove an area of dispute in future years.
56
iv] Post-1945 - the continuation of compulsion
Unlike the period immediately following the First World War, compulsory arbitration continued after
the war from 1945 to 1951 under Order 1305. Mulholland states that this was acceptable to both
employers and unions because the voluntary machinery continued to operate successfully; the ban
which the Order placed on all strikes and lockouts had no visible effect on the trends of unofficial
strikes; and in any event enforcement of the law against large number of workers became impossible
[1974, p.60]. In other words, Mulholland's contention is that the provisions of Order 1305 were
maintained because they had little influence in practice.
Alan Bullock's biography of Ernest Bevin provides a different interpretation of the support from some
union leaders for compulsory arbitration. Referring to the experience immediately after the 1914-18
war when unions had repudiated arbitration and had gone on strike for higher wages, Bevin argued that
the real danger period for inflation was not war-time itself but the period immediately after the war was
over. To avoid a repetition of this experience, Bevin argued for retaining and strengthening the
compulsory arbitration procedure he established in June 1940 as a check on unions' demands and
government policy. This he argued would be "the best guarantee against a runaway inflation when the
war was over." [Bullock, 1960, p.90].
It is interesting to note these different perspectives on the attitudes of trade union leaders. It is feasible
that both provide an accurate analysis, as there are many examples in industrial relations where trade
union leaders differ in their interpretation of the best interests of their members.
In the event, Order 1305 was replaced in 1951 by the Industrial Disputes Order [Order 1376] which
provided for reference to a new Industrial Disputes Tribunal [IDT] for arbitration at the request of one
party only - a system which was to become known as unilateral arbitration. Thus, Mulholland argues
that:
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"It was felt by the government, with the general support of both
employers and unions, that arbitration containing some measures of
legal enforceability still had a useful role to play in resolving industrial
conflict."
[Mulholland, 1974, p.61]
However, in recognition of the difficulty of banning strikes especially in the conditions of peacetime,
the Order ended the prohibition of strikes and lockouts.
Order 1376 was eventually repealed in 1959 and, in spite of opposition from the trade union
movement, the IDT was also abolished in 1958 after seven and a half years of operation in which it
issued 1,270 awards on both local and national issues, one quarter of these in the public sector
[Mullholland, 1974, pp.61/62]. The abolition of Order 1376 is attributed to the withdrawal of
support by employers and indeed direct opposition of employers to the operation of unilateral access to
arbitration.
"Gradually employers became disenchanted with a system which they
felt provided trade unions with the belt of industrial action and the
braces of unilateral reference to arbitration."
[Lowry, 1986, p.6]
The majority of references [approximately 95%] to the IDT were taken by the unions and the existence
of this option for unions was interpreted as 'one sided' by many employers; also there were accusations
that the Tribunal's awards were inflationary [Mulholland, 1974; Owen-Smith et al, 1989].
Mulholland quotes a spokesperson for the Conservative government commenting after the withdrawal
of Order 1376 "that a system in which 'one party or another had to be coerced by law was out of
keeping with the British system of industrial relations.'" [1974, p.63]
It is interesting to note this dissatisfaction with compulsion from employers at a time when there were
relatively full employment and labour was in short supply; and to contrast it with calls from some
employers and the Institute of Directors for compulsory arbitration in the 1980s when unemployment
was high and there was an over-supply of labour. It would appear, therefore, that market conditions
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and the balance of power in industrial relations at any particular time does influence employers'
attitudes to third party intervention and the form it should take.
v] 1959 and after - return to voluntarism
"State action as a third party in the post-war period in Britain derived its
authority from four legislative measures die Conciliation Act 1896;
Industrial Courts Act 1919; Wages Councils Act 1945 and Terms and
Conditions of Employment Act 1959."
[Owen-Smith et al, 1989, p.18]
Although the period post 1959 is generally accepted to represent a return to voluntarism, Lowry [1986]
argues that it was not the end of compulsory arbitration as Section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of
Employment Act of 1959 gave continued access to unilateral binding arbitration when an issue arose as
to whether an employer was observing established or recognised terms and conditions for the trade or
industry. However, during this period both the TUC and employers' organisations played an
increasing role in industrial relations; and unions and employers in the private sector developed their
own disputes procedures. Union membership increased and, after its formation in 1965, the
Confederation of British Industry [CBI] became the major representative of employers. By 1960
almost all major industries were covered by national agreements which often included grievance
procedures which provided for conciliation and arbitration. The private sector relied on the Department
of Employment conciliation services for resolution of disputes and when there was failure to agree
references were made to the Industrial Court or to a single or board of arbitrators on a voluntary basis.
The 1960s and early 1970s also witnessed an increased role for government in industrial relations. At
the same time confidence in the government's impartiality and the independence of the service provided
by the Department of Employment is considered to have declined. An example of this view is to be
found in a statement by the CBI:
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"In recent times the trade unions became unwilling to use the
conciliation and arbitration services made available by government
because of the belief that they were biased in favour of whatever
incomes policy the government of the day was seeking to impose.
This phase became evident when in 1968 the Ministry of Labour
became the Department of Employment and Productivity - the Ministry
traditionally concerned with industrial relations had by this change also
become involved in incomes policy."
[CBI, 1975]
In addition, White [1985] records two examples of what he describes as strained impartiality in Britain
in the 1970s. The first relates to the role of civil servants in the Department of Employment. As
illustrated by the quotation above, it was contended that civil servants acting as conciliators in
industrial disputes could not be impartial in their dealings with parties to a dispute when at the same
time the government, their employer, was attempting to implement incomes policies. This fear was
highlighted in 1972 when the Conservative government withheld conciliation facilities from disputes
arising out of wage claims which threatened to breach the pay policy norms. The experience of the
final years of the Commission on Industrial Relations [CIR] provides a second example of strained
impartiality. When it was set up by the Labour government in 1969, the CIR was to assist and
encourage the voluntary reform of industrial relations. After the change of government in 1970 and
the proposed extension of the CIR's powers under the unpopular Industrial Relations Act 1971, the
trade unions withdrew their support; and the CIR was wound up on Labour's return to office in 1974.
One result of the lack of confidence in the state's ability to intervene in third party disputes, was the
joint attempt by the CBI and TUC to set up their own voluntary conciliation and arbitration service in
1972. As recorded by the CBI:
"Believing that this attitude of non-cooperation could be overcome and
industrial relations improved if there were available a service
independent of government authority, the CBI and TUC signed an




It was anticipated that the service would operate from 1 September 1972 and that it would concentrate
initially on disputes of major importance in which a stoppage of work had occurred or was apprehended:
"Both parties agreed that collective bargaining is best brought to a
satisfactory conclusion by voluntary means and that the widespread
availability of independent conciliators and arbitrators can help
considerably to promote and maintain industrial peace."
[CBI, July 1972]5
The new service heard its first arbitration case in January 1973 before two arbitrators, Mr D Flunder
[Director, Dunlop Ltd] and Mr Will Paynter [former General Secretary of the National Union of
Mineworkers]. Writing for Personnel Management prior to the hearing of this case, Will Paynter
argued that the new Conciliation and Arbitration Service was set up because:
"the conflict between the government's role as manager of the economy
on the one hand, and as an agent for the promotion of industrial peace
on the other, has undoubtedly weakened the confidence of the unions in
the impartiality of government-provided conciliation and arbitration
particularly in pay disputes."
[Paynter, 1972, p.20]
He recognised, however, that particularly in times of high inflation and low economic growth, any
agency will have difficulties in maintaining the confidence of both sides of industry and that such lack
of confidence could also spill over to the concepts of conciliation and arbitration as a means of
reconciling industrial differences. His fears proved to be well founded as the service was "virtually put
into cold store by the arrival in November 1972 of a statutory pay policy" [CBI, 7 March 1975] and no
further cases were heard.
Arguing that previous attempts to reform industrial relations had not recognised the limits of legal
intervention, McCarthy and Ellis [1973] proposed a system whereby problems could be anticipated and
solved by joint agreement. They recommended the extension of third party intervention; and the
establishment of a range on independent agencies and a service free form government control but
financed through public funds. Their proposals undoubtedly influenced future developments.
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On its return to office in 1974. and after the issue of a Consultative Document, the Labour
government set up its own independent third party service the Conciliation and Arbitration Service in
1974, to be known as the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service [ACAS] from January 1975
and established by statute in January 1976 under the Employment Protection Act 1975. Parliament
gave ACAS three main tasks which are defined in Section 1 of the Employment Protection Act 1975:
to promote the improvement of industrial relations; to encourage collective bargaining; and to develop
and, where necessary, reform collective bargaining machinery [ACAS, February 1984; Mortimer,
1981 a]6. The terms of reference of the service were to provide conciliation and mediation; to make
facilities available for arbitration; to provide advisory services to industry on industrial relations; and
to undertake investigations as a means of promoting the improvement and extension of collective
bargaining. In his letter to the new Chairman of ACAS, Michael Foot, the Secretary of State for
Employment, stated that:
"It is of course essential to the concept that within these terms of
reference the service should be, and be seen to be, independent and so
attract and retain the co-operation and support of all sectors of
employment. So far as the government is concerned, it will not seek
to interfere in the activities of the Service."
[Foot, 1974]7
ACAS is separated from but administered by the Department of Employment, and was to derive its
independent status from a Council which was to be responsible for the general conduct of the service
and which was not to be subject to directions from any Minister of the Crown. The ten person
Council is made up of a full-time Chairman and nine part-time members appointed by the Secretary of
State for Employment. Three of the part-time members are nominated by the CBI, three by the TUC
and the other threq are independent members normally from the academic profession8. The staff of
ACAS are civil servants, who are accountable to the Council's Chairman and not to the Secretary of
State. In addition there exists a panel of independent persons who are called upon to arbitrate or
mediate on an ad hoc basis. The first chairman of ACAS was Jim Mortimer9, replaced in 1981 by
Sir Pat Lowry10 following the change in government, who was subsequently replaced in 1987 by the
current Chairman Douglas Smith11.
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Commentators warned again of the pitfalls which could face ACAS, particularly if the government was
concerned to check wage inflation. Interviewed by theDaily Telegraph in 1974, Mr Mortimer stated
that the service was primarily not an economic instrument, but one of public policy in industrial
relations, although he acknowledged that the two considerations overlapped somewhat. He was also
cautious about the position of the service if a government imposed wage restraint12.
White [1985] also draws attention to the limitations in the voluntarist and independent nature of
ACAS. Although separate from the Department of Employment, ACAS is still a creature of the
state:
"It receives its funds from the Exchequer; it embodies a particular view
of industrial relations; and it is infused with certain principles which
could be said to have their limitations."
[White, 1985, p.8]
He argues that examples of the particular view of industrial relations or the implicit principles
employed are to be found in ACAS's analysis of the success of its operations; the pro-employer bias
attributed to ACAS by some commentators; the experience of the orthodox approach to trade union
recognition cases between 1976 to 1980 and the limitations of ACAS's power in enforcing
recommendations; and the philosophy of encouragement of collective bargaining.
One of the examples cited by White has indeed received much attention and that is the provisions of
Section 11 of the 1975 Employment Protection Act. Under this section a trade union could unilaterally
refer a recognition case to ACAS, although as stated ACAS had no statutory power to enforce its
recommendations. This part of the legislation was opposed by employers and was subject to much
controversy and media attention. One highly publicised example of such opposition is to be found in
the Grunwick dispute1^. Even those, like Jim Mortimer, who argued for statutory provision for the
right to bargain collectively recognised that this objective was not satisfactorily achieved by the
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provisions of the Act [Mortimer, 1981 b] Sections 11-16 of the 1975 Act were, therefore, repealed
by the Conservative government in 1980.
During its early years of operation the use of arbitration under the auspices of ACAS did increase,
peaking in 1978. The references to arbitration declined in the period after the election of the
Conservative government in 1979 although the figures for 1989 show an increase over 1988.
Different reasons can be given for this. First there may have been reluctance by some trade unions to
use the service after the change of government; and second the rapid rise in unemployment
immediately post-1979 did appear to impact on the level of industrial disputes and hence the number of
references to arbitration. In more recent times the level of arbitration cases has again risen, although
not to the figures for the peak years14.
Summary
As has been outlined above the use of arbitration as one form of third party intervention has a long
history in British industrial relations. Early attempts at statutory enforcement of the process failed to
work in practice; and even during the special conditions of war-time, aspects of the compulsory
legislation did not enjoy total support The foundations for the present voluntary system of third party
intervention are to be found in the Conciliation Act 1896. As will be evident from analysis carried
out as part of this study, there is substantial support both for the use of arbitration itself and the
continuation of the voluntarist principle amongst arbitrators and parties to arbitration. Further, these
groups also consider the perceived independence and impartiality of the service to be an important
issue1^. This continuity of approach to arbitration will be discussed in the chapters which follow.
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SECTION II THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
"The historical development of arbitration in Britain is not a subject
which can meaningfully be considered in isolation; rather it should be
examined as Professor Turner noted: 'In the contexts of the evolution
of labour organisations and of state policy.'"
[Mulholland, 1974, p.29]
Any examination of arbitration cannot be conducted out of context of the political and economic
environment in which it is operating and more general attitudes towards industrial relations' policy.
For example as was discussed above, compulsory arbitration was only acceptable in Britain, and even
then not universally, under very specific, mainly war-time conditions. The establishment of ACAS,
its constitution and remit can best be understood, therefore, in the context of other conditions.
Further, in order to address the question of the survival of ACAS and its arbitration service in what
could be described as a hostile political climate, some understanding of the policies of the present
government and the impact of changing conditions and new legislation on labour organisations is
required. This can best be presented by looking at different periods post 1945.
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i] 1945-64 - post-war consensus and voluntarism
Before the end of the Second World War, a consensus was reached between all political parties in
Britain that the maintenance of a 'high and stable level of employment' should be a common objective
of post-war policy. That is, there was acceptance of responsibility in this area by future
governments. The White Paper on Employment Policy 1944 listed four main methods of achieving
this objective: [a] influencing the location of new enterprises in areas of high unemployment; [b]
encouraging mobility between areas and occupations; [c] retraining of labour; and most importantly,
[d] using government spending, taxation and monetary policy to keep aggregate demand or total
spending at high enough levels to maintain employment [HMSO, 1944],
The belief that governments were both capable of and responsible for achieving high employment
through greater intervention in the economy, marked a radical departure from orthodox economic
theory which dictated the adherence to market forces and balanced budgets, and opposed the proposition
that governments could affect the level of employment in an economy. However, the experience of
the two world wars and the depression of the inter-war period, created a popular demand for and belief
that government should and could take responsibility for the level of employment in an economy
[Addison, 1975; Marwick, 1968]; a demand which gained credence from the intellectual support of
the economist John Maynard Keynes and other economists, who attacked the weaknesses in orthodox
economic theory. In contrast it was contended that governments could influence the level of
employment by spending and stimulating demand if private investors were unwilling to do so.
Basically if there is insufficient demand in an economy to maintain full employment, Keynes argued
that governments could stimulate demand by increasing expenditure through deficit spending; and that
such spending would increase economic activity through the 'multiplier' effect. The initial budget
deficit used to stimulate the economy would then be offset by increased tax revenues16.
The theories of Keynes in particular were to have a significant impact on the policies of post-war
governments. Grahl [1983] discusses the 'revolutionary' nature of Keynes' analysis and the influence
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of his ideas were to have particularly on the leaders of the labour movement in the Labour Party and
TUC. Skidelsky [1979] argues that Keynes found an economic solution to a political and social
problem and provided a relevant philosophy for capitalist democracy against its critics. Or as
Kavanagh [1987] observes Keynes was a 'genius', because he showed politicians how to curb the risks
and uncertainties of the market.
In the immediate post-war period British governments, both Labour and Conservative accepted the new
economic orthodoxy of Keynesian demand management; intervened in the economy; and engaged in
what has been described as consensus politics17 [Kavanagh, 1987]. Any differences which did occur
between the parties were limited to the extent of government intervention in the economy. Kavanagh
outlines the main features of the consensus in terms of domestic policy as full employment budgets;
greater acceptance of trade unions; public ownership of the basic or monopoly services and industries;
state provision of social welfare, requiring high public expenditure and taxation; and an increased role
for the state in economic management and a decreased role for the market [Kavanagh, 1987; Kavanagh
and Morris, 1989].
In the 1950s and early 1960s, governments appeared to be very successful in maintaining a 'high and
stable level of employment' and the 'normal' unemployment rate was generally accepted to be of the
order of 2% [a figure somewhat less than the 6% which Keynes had anticipated]. It is less clear,
however, whether this success was due to government demand management policies per se, or the
favourable economic conditions of the post-war period [Tomlinson, 1985]. Inflation was also kept
low in this period and governments believed that they could trade-off the unemployment and inflation
rates, that is they believed they had a choice between unemployment or inflation [Grant and Nath,
1984; Trevithick, 1977]18. Dearlove and Saunders [1984] cite four factors which help to explain the
comparative economic success of this period, often described as the long boom. First, western
countries enjoyed a supply of cheap imports and cheap immigrant labour; second, a stable world
monetary system was established at Bretton Woods 1944 which enhanced world trade; third, new
investment opportunities presented themselves partially as a by-product of the new techniques
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developed during war-time; and fourth, the commitment by government to intervention along
Keynesian lines. Tomlinson [1985] argues that the apparent success of governments led to a
misunderstanding of the role which Keynesianism played in government economic policy, and an
exaggeration of the capabilities of governments to deliver their stated policy objectives.
During this period of high employment and low inflation, the main emphasis was on macroeconomic
policy management, and governments were less concerned with active labour market policy, although
they did intervene through regional policies mainly as a response to regional unemployment. There
also existed the 'voluntarist' tradition in British industrial relations, which holds that industrial
relations works best when government intervenes least; and which endorses the principle of free
collective bargaining, in which employers and employees are free to reach agreement on terms and
conditions of employment with the minimum of state interference. White defines 'voluntarism' as:
"a conscious decision on the part of the state not to interfere in
industrial relations, in response to a specific preference amongst
employers and the unions for autonomy in handling their affairs."
[White, 1985, p.l]
As a consequence, while the state has been involved in the past in passing laws recognising the status
of trade unions, establishing the rights of workers to strike and protecting unions from being sued, it
did not interfere directly in the bargains struck between employers and workers, bargains which were
deemed to be morally but not legally binding [Brown, 1988b]^. The other area where the law did
intervene and was permitted included the enforcement of certain safety and health standards for workers;
the protection of some groups of workers, including women and young people under the age of
eighteen, against long hours of work; and the provision of social security legislation covering
unemployment and health insurance and pensions [Clegg, 1979]. This prompted Otto Kahn-Freund
to comment in 1954 that there was perhaps no other major country in the world in which the law
played a less significant role in shaping industrial relations than in Britain20.
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In conjunction with the lack of legislation in industrial relations and in keeping with one of the
features of the post-war consensus, namely the acceptance of trade unions, Owen-Smith et al [1989]
outline the increased role given by the government to the TUC over the period. Further they note the
growth of trade union membership between 1948 and 1964 especially amongst white-collar workers,
but argue that because of structural changes in British industry this did not match the increase in the
size of the total employed population. However, by 1968 over 10 million workers, roughly 40 per
cent of the total employed population, were trade union members and 90 per cent of these belonged to
organisations affiliated to the TUC. An increased role was also given to the body representing a
confederation of employers, and in 1965 the British Employers Confederation merged with two
national trade associations to form the Confederation of British Industry [CBI], The new body claimed
to represent firms employing over 75 per cent of labour in private industry and transport21. As
representative of the two key organised interest groups, the TUC and the CBI were to play a greater
part in tripartite organisations and government macroeconomic policy discussions.
It is within this context that the pressure to abandon compulsory arbitration and unilateral access to
arbitration can be assessed. Therefore, the decision to repeal compulsory arbitration and unilateral
access to arbitration can be understood, not only because it was deemed to be inappropriate to
peacetime conditions; but second, because it was considered to be out of step with the voluntarist
tradition of British industrial relations, and the more consultative, co-operative relationship which was
being fostered with the two sides of industry.
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ii] 1964-74 - consensus and voluntarism under threat
During the late 1960s and early 1970s economic conditions deteriorated in Britain and governments
faced the problem of rapidly increasing inflation and unemployment and relatively slow economic
growth in compared to European competitors. At this time it can be argued that unemployment
declined in relative importance in terms of policy objectives and the focus of attention then became the
fight against inflation [Therborn, 1986]22. Adhering to a cost-push analysis of inflation,
governments in the period resorted to incomes policies in an attempt to manage the crisis, even when,
as was the case with the Heath administration, they had specifically rejected incomes policy as a policy
instrument [Grant and Nath, 1984; Glyn and Harrison, 1980].
Reasons, other than excessive wage demands, were given for the relative decline of the British
economy. For example some believed that the lack of national planning as practiced in France was the
cause of the economic decline23. Others blamed the 'British disease', that is the so-called strike
proneness, low productivity and high absenteeism of the British worker and prevalence of inter-union
disputes; and British workers were compared unfavourably with their German or Japanese
counterparts24. Another major theory was that 'excessive expectations' and growth of the welfare state
had put public expenditure under stress at a time when economic growth in the economy was
insufficient to meet the demands made on it causing a fiscal crisis of the state25. Indeed, some argued
that unless expectations [and in particular wage demands] were moderated, inflation would reach a level
which would pose a threat to liberal democracy26. As governments sought solutions to the problem,
they flirted unsuccessfully with economic planning; set up the Royal Commission on Trade Unions
and Employers' Organisations [Donovan Commission] in 1965 to investigate the British system of
industrial relations; introduced incomes policies; and attempted, without success, to curb public
expenditure27.
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Focussing specifically on industrial relations policy as the main interest of this study, the Donovan
Commission broadly supported the existing system of industrial relations in Britain, and Kavanagh
argues that:
"To the government's disappointment its report in 1968 was largely
non-interventionist in its recommendations."
[Kavanagh, 1987, p.49]
The Commission identified two systems in operation, the formal and informal. The formal related to
written, industry wide agreements and control over pay; whereas the informal was represented by tacit,
plant level bargaining, unofficial strikes and a powerful shop stewards' movement. Donovan's basic
recommendation was that the government should attempt to formalise the informal system of industrial
relations with the objective of controlling the level of wages and reducing the number of unofficial
strikes. Taylor [1987] contends that the findings of the Commission did not meet with the approval
of the Labour leadership who wanted to be able to legitimate more radical action to reform trade unions
and to deal with unofficial strikes.
Nonetheless, breaking with the voluntarist tradition, the Labour government proposed legislation to
reform industrial relations. In 1969, the White Paper, 'In Place of Strife' proposed legal sanctions
against unofficial strikes and recommended the setting up of a Commission on Industrial Relations;
conciliation pauses in unconstitutional strikes; and solutions for inter-union disputes. The Bill was
abandoned by the government after it met with strong resistance from the trade union movement and
the party in Parliament. This attempt at industrial relations reform is argued to have contributed to the
defeat of the Labour government in 1970.
The incoming Conservative government headed by Edward Heath produced its own proposals for reform
in the Industrial Relations Act 1971. The Act proposed a new framework of law to cover trade union
behaviour. The government incorporated many of Donovan's recommendations in the Act, although it
differed in its diagnosis of the causes and cures for unofficial strikes [Taylor, 1987]. It differed also in
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that it broke with the traditional, voluntarist approach to industrial relations which was inherent in the
Commission's Report:
"The British system of industrial relations is based on voluntarily
agreed rules which, as a matter of principle, are not enforced by
law."28
The Act established the National Industrial Relations Court and trade unions were given inducements to
register with the Register of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations; also a number of industrial
relations activities were classified as 'unfair industrial practices' with legal remedies for those deemed to
be unfairly treated. Taylor [1987] argues that the success of the Act depended on the willingness of
unions to register; the willingness of employers to institute proceedings against unions and strike
leaders; and the capacity of the new Court to enforce its decisions. After a campaign of opposition by
the unions and an unsuccessful testing of the legislation in the 1972 dock dispute, the Act became
inoperable when the TUC and individual trade unions refused to comply [Griffith, 1979].
These attempts at reform and intervention by both Labour and Conservative governments were
interpreted as anti-union by the labour movement and as Kavanagh states:
"The paradox was that the failure of the Wilson attempt to introduce
legislation and the ineffectiveness and political and industrial costs of
the Heath legislation only appeared to confirm the validity of the
voluntarist case."
[Kavanagh, 1987, p.53]
The Act proved to be so unpopular that the Labour Party promised to repeal it if they were re-elected at
the next election. The defeat of the Industrial Relations Act and Labour's previous attempts at reform
fuelled the belief that the law could not intervene in British industrial relations - a belief that was to be
challenged very directly after 19792^.
No alterations were made to the state's intervention in arbitration during this period as the function was
still carried out by the Department of Employment It is reasonable to speculate that had the Labour
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or Conservative governments been successful in their attempts to introduce the law into industrial
relations in the way proposed, then the system of voluntary arbitration would have come under stress.
As has been discussed above, however, the system did come under severe stress because of the conflict
of interest in managing an incomes policy and operating a supposedly 'neutral', conciliation and
arbitration service. As successful operation of such a service is dependent on the consent of the two
sides of industry, another solution to the problem had to be found.
iii] 1974-1979 - attempts at resolution: great expectations
The Labour Party was elected to office in 1974 after the defeat of Edward Heath's government in 1974.
As part of its 'Social Contract' with the TUC [an agreement drawn up by the Liaison Committee,
which comprised representatives of the unions, the NEC and PLP, embodied in the statement
'Economic Policy and the Cost of Living' in February 1973], the Labour leadership was, according to
Jordan [1982], forced to adopt a programme for a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of
power and wealth in favour of working people and their families. It proposed, and initially put into
practice, measures such as the abolition of the Pay Board and compulsory wage restraint; a freeze on
all rents; food subsidies; and increased pensions. In an attempt to improve its mandate, the Labour
government called a second election in October 1974 and outlined its proposals for legislation to
expand the comprehensive education system; phase out private practice from the National Health
Service; extend workers' participation in industry; implement a development land tax; and establish
Scottish and Welsh assemblies.
As part of the contract with the unions and in return for voluntary wage restraint, the Labour
government repealed the controversial Industrial Relations Act and replaced it with the Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act 1974; and put on the statute book a number of pieces of legislation which
improved the rights of working people, including the Employment Protection Act 1975, the Health
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and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976
[Clegg, 1979; Crouch, 1977]30.
Clegg [1979] notes that several new agencies were established to interpret and administer the new
employment rights, the most novel and important of them being ACAS. He argues that ACAS's
origins can be traced back to the incomes policy of the previous Conservative government and their
refusal to allow access to the conciliation service run by the Department of Employment in certain
cases where it was clear that the settlement would contravene pay policy. As discussed in Section I of
this chapter, this action led the TUC and CBI to attempt to establish their own independent machinery
for dispute resolution. The decision by the new government in 1974 to set up an independent service
to be run on a tripartite basis, and which combined all the different aspects of intervention [advisory,
conciliation, mediation and arbitration] into one single agency, gained general support from the
Congress and the Confederation. Other new agencies including the MSC and the Health and Safety
Commission took over areas of responsibility from the Department of Employment; and the Equal
Opportunities Commission and the Racial Equality Commission were established under the Sex
Discrimination and Race Relations Acts [Clegg, 1979].
The government set up the Bullock Committee to investigate how industrial democracy could be
extended by representatives of workers on boards of directors31. The committee was of a tripartite
nature and comprised representatives from employers and the trade union movement and an equal
number of academics. The proposal was dropped by Jim Callaghan, who succeeded Harold Wilson as
Prime Minister in 1976, after the Committee lodged a split report. The Majority report was signed
by the academics and trade union representatives; the Minority Report by the employers'
representatives. The former proposed that representatives on the Board should be elected by trade
unionists only; while the latter argued that the election of representatives should include all
employees. It should be said also that the proposal was unpopular with British managers at the time
and was perceived to be giving too much power and influence to trade unions32.
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The establishment of ACAS in conjunction with the increased rights given to workers marked a new
development in the relationship between the Labour government and the labour movement; and
Crouch argues that:
"the unions regarded their commitments under the social contract as
marking a significant new departure in their role in society."
[Crouch, 1977, p.250]
It is this period which Crouch describes as the height of bargained corporatism in Britain. It appeared
that having failed to reform industrial relations by legislation to curb trade union behaviour in the past,
the government attempted a corporatist approach based on their bargain and special relationship with
the trade unions.
But the Labour government continued to face problems of rising inflation and unemployment and low
economic growth. The other side of the contract, wage restraint, had not proved to be successful
from the government's point of view. As the pressure on inflation mounted, the TUC began to accept
that pay increases could be a factor in inflation [Crouch, 1977]. The government finally introduced a
policy of pay restraint in 1975 [described as a Social Contract and not an Incomes Policy] with the
threat of statutory control if the stated guidelines were ignored. Initially trade union leaders, and
especially Jack Jones, leader of the TGWU, gave their support to the government's policy. At this
time it is argued that the government withdrew from most of the radical policies contained in its
manifesto. As the economic crisis worsened, interest rates were raised; targets for control of the
money supply were introduced; and cuts in public expenditure were made through cash limits. This
action was severely criticised by those on the left as an abandonment of the post-war commitment to
full employment and an adoption of monetarist policies:




When the government tightened the terms of the Social Contract, unions resisted the attempt to
impose a 5% limit on wage increases in 1978, and industrial unrest increased, leading to the so-called
'winter of discontent'. While the number of conciliation arbitration cases coming to ACAS in this
period increased, the agency was unable to stem the increasing demands made on the government33.
In response to industrial pressure from unions in the private and public sectors, the government
modified its 5% policy and accepted the principle of pay comparability in January 1979. At the
beginning ofMarch, Professor Hugh Clegg was appointed to head a new standing commission on pay
comparability, but by the end of March the House of Commons passed a motion of No Confidence in
the Government, resulting in a general election in May of 1979.
At this time support grew for what Burkitt describes as the 'over mighty subject' thesis [Burkitt,
1981]. The basis of this thesis is that trade unions had abused the privileges they enjoyed under the
1906 and 1913 Acts, that their strength was used to the detriment of the economy and the national
interest, and that the balance of power in industrial society now favoured the trade unions. Burkitt
argues that proponents of the view that trade unions had become too powerful in British society failed
to address the crucial questions of power to do what and power in relation to whom? If these questions
are addressed then rather simplistic conclusions on the so-called power if trade unions can be avoided.
Nevertheless commentators such as Hayek argue that the trade unions had "become the biggest obstacle
to raising the living standards of the working class as a whole" [Hayek, 1978], The main criticisms
levied at trade unions were that they were too strong and militant; had too much influence on
government policy; were undemocratic; above the law; and indulged in unpopular secondary action
and picketing. It was contended by the opposition that the Labour government of 1974-1979 had
heaped privilege without responsibility on the trade unions.
Such criticisms were supported by public opinion polls and even by some trade union members. It
should be noted, however, that in spite of their general views on trade union activity, members
thought that their own union did a good job34. The opposition Conservative Party capitalised on the
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anti-trade union feeling during the election campaign and also highlighted public discontent with the
events of the previous winter.
Again the Labour Party's somewhat stormy relationship with the trade unions is argued to have been a
major contributory factor in the defeat of the party at the general election in 1979.
iv] 1979-1989 - smashing the consensus
The election of the first Thatcher government in 1979, in rhetoric at least, marked a radical departure
from the post-war consensus35. The government offered the British people a 'new beginning', and,
influenced by the philosophy of the 'New Right'36, attempted to distance themselves further from
responsibility for maintaining a 'high and stable level of employment' associated with the post-war
Keynesian consensus. In 1945 government intervention and demand management were deemed to have
saved the capitalist market system. But by 1979 such government activities were argued to be the
source of the economic crisis in the system. The priorities were now explicitly stated to be the defeat
of inflation by monetary policy; a withdrawal of government intervention and a return to market
forces; and strengthening of the supply side of the economy [HMSO, 1979].
The government's approach to supply side reform, is not clearly stated in the 1985 White Paper on
Employment where four main areas of labour market reform were identified, namely 'Quality' [which
includes education and training reforms; 'Costs and Incentives' [including downward pressure on wages
and decrease in taxation and benefits]; 'Flexibility' [which refers to trade union legislation and attempts
to change attitudes and working practices; and "Freedom' [which relates to deregulation, and the reform
of Wages Councils and health and safety and employment protection] [Brown, 1988a and b;
Department of Employment, 1985]. For a supposedly non-interventionist government, die Thatcher
administrations have proved to be extremely active in the labour market [Brown and King, 1988;
Robertson, 1986]. A major plank of this activity was the government's intention to reform industrial
77
relations and change the balance of power in favour of employers. Learning from the experience of
previous administrations and especially the experience of Heath's Industrial Relations Act, the new
government took a step-by-step or incremental approach to reform, and was cautious in timing the
implementation of its legislation.
The government's trade union reform can be divided into three stages. The first is outlined in the 1979
manifesto which proposed three changes regarding picketing, the closed shop and wider participation.
The main proposals for change were included in the 1980 Employment Act. This Act banned
secondary picketing; limited the scope of the closed shop and promoted the use of secret ballots. The
1982 Employment Act extended the legislation by making trade unions liable to be sued if they
organised unlawful industrial action; restricted the definition of a lawful trade dispute; extended
legislation on the closed shop; and outlawed requirements in commercial contracts concerning trade
union membership or recognition.
Stage two of the government's strategy was set out in the 1983 manifesto which proposed to "give
union members control over their own unions" by holding ballots for the election of governing bodies
of trade unions and deciding whether their unions should have party political funds. It proposed three
changes regarding the political levy, essential services and involving employees. The main proposals
were included in the 1984 Trade Union Act which introduced secret ballots for official strikes, the
election of union executives and the maintenance of political funds. No attempts was made, however,
at this stage to ban strikes in 'essential services', although civil servants were instructed to draft
potential legislation37.
Finally the 1987 manifesto proposed the next stage of legislation in relation to secret ballots for
strikes; disciplinary action against union members; election of trade union governing bodies; and
further legislation on the closed shop. Taylor [1987] argues that if all these reforms are passed the
unions will have the weakest legal protection since before the 1906 Trades Disputes Act. Nevertheless
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the government proceeded with its policy and the main proposals in the manifesto were included in the
Employment Acts 1988 and 198938.
As might be anticipated, the impact of the government's industrial relations and labour market
reforms, are subject to different interpretations39. A useful approach is provided by Longstreth
[1988] who categorises the literature into three main groups.
First, Longstreth states there are those who argue that there has been a 'roll back' of union power and
shopfloor strength as a central result of Conservative industrial relations and labour market policies;
and that employers are now on the offensive and adopting a more 'macho' style of management.
Evidence of this is to be found in the decrease in strikes and decline in trade union membership. In
turn, this has been met with division and disarray in the trade union movement and attempts to adapt
to changing conditions through a 'New Realism' approach.
The second approach identified by Longstreth is critical of the above analysis on the grounds that it is
premature, based on a misinterpretation of strike levels and union membership and relies too heavily
on newspaper headlines. Instead, it is argued that on the basis of empirical studies of workplace
surveys which have been conducted, there is a remarkable degree of resilience in union organisation,
collective bargaining is still a significant feature of industrial relations and the influence of shop
stewards has not been eroded. This group do not deny the impact of the recession on the trade unions,
but stress the continuity of bargaining relationships and the pragmatic adaptation of the union
movement to changed conditions. Some contend that the government's legislation has, in many
respects, worked to the advantage of the movement as a whole. For example, the number of strike
ballots which have gone in favour of holding a strike; the number of unions who have retained or even
introduced the political levy; and the involvement of other groups of workers, including the more
active participation of women, in trade union activities.
79
The third approach, which Longstreth himself supports, attempts to reconcile the evidence above with
wider social and economic trends, for example part-time and temporary work and increased pay
differentials. The argument here is that there has been an increased dualism or segmentation in the
labour market with an insulated core benefiting from the new conditions at the expense of an exposed
secondary or periphery sector of the economy. Although Longstreth is attracted to this line of
argument, he states that he finds the notion of dualism discussed by Goldthorpe [1984] difficult and
problematic and, as yet, not fully worked out as a theoretical model40.
What is evident from the above discussion is that attempts to analyse the impact of government's
policies on trade unions either in terms of 'the union have been defeated' or 'the unions have been
strengthened' theses are problematic. Also it is crucial to separate the government's own rhetoric in
relation to trade union reform from the reality of industrial relations practice41. As Robert Taylor has
argued;




The above section traces the broader economic and political context of state policy within which
arbitration has operated. The period of the Keynesian consensus in the post-war era has been outlined
and the apparent break with the consensus in the late 1970s. The unsuccessful attempts by the state to
reform industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s has also been discussed. Finally the impact of the
Thatcher governments' approach to industrial relations and labour market reform has been assessed.
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The significance of the debate for this thesis is the extent to which the government's approach impacts
on the role and work ACAS and in particular on its arbitration service. It also raises the question of
why the present government has decided, at least until now, to leave the work of ACAS largely
intact, while at the same time it has intervened so directly in other areas of the labour market and
industrial relations. The continuation of arbitration within the context of the changing relationship
between the state and organised labour will be discussed in the chapters which follow.
I Quote from the Arbitration Masters and Workmen Act 1872.
9L Quote from the Conciliation Act 1896.
^ As will be discussed below, evidence from the surveys carried out in this research indicates that, the
principle of the use of arbitration as the 'last resort' or final stage in dispute resolution still commands the
support of most civil servants, arbitrators and parties in industrial disputes.
^ It is estimated that 1,000 awards were issued by the National Arbitration Tribunal between August 1940
and October 1947, see Owen-Smith et al, 1989.
The full text of the CBI/TUC agreement on independent conciliation and arbitration is reproduced in the
CBI Industrial Relations Bulletin, 15 August, 1972, No.8; and a list of the jointly nominated members of
the panel of independent conciliators and arbitrators appears in the CBI Industrial Relations Bulletin, 29
September, 1972, No.9.
6 The Employment Protection Act 1975 repealed the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 and
replaced the provision in this act for access to unilateral binding arbitration by Schedule 11 which extended
the scope of this type of arbitration to include claims based on the general level of terms and conditions.
These cases were heard by the Central Arbitration Committee [CAC] which began to function in February
1976. The CAC is a standing body which replaced the Industrial Arbitration Boards [previously Industrial
Courts] dating from the 1919 Industrial Court Act.
7 A summary of the letter dated 8 August 1974 from Michael Foot, Secretary of State for Employment, to
Jim Mortimer, first Chairman of the newly established ACAS, can be found in the ACAS Annual Report
1975, Appendix B, pp.42/44.
® The first trade union nominees were Mr Richard Briginshaw, General Secretary of the National Society
of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media Personnel; Mr Jack Jones, General Secretary of the Transport
and General Workers Union; and Mr George Smith, General Secretary of the Construction Union. The CBI
nominated Mr Herbert Farrimond, Industrial Relations member of the British Railways Board; Mr George
Peers, Industrial Relations Director of the Engineering Employers Federation; and the CBI's own Deputy
Director General for Industrial Relations, Mr Thomas Swinden. The independent group included Professor
Hugh Clegg, Professor of Industrial Relations at Warwick University; Professor Laurence Hunter, Professor
of Applied Economics at Glasgow University; and Professor John Wood, Edward Bramley Professor of Law
at Sheffield University. The first Chairman was Mr James Mortimer, industrial relations member of the
London Transport Executive and former union official.
9 See ACAS Annual Report, 1975.
See ACAS Annual Report, 1982.
II See ACAS Annual Report, 1986.
12 Interview of Jim Mortimer, the first Chairman of ACAS, in the Daily Telegraph,




1 4 See TABLE 1.1 in Chapter 1 for number of arbitration cases conducted by ACAS.
See in particular attitudes of arbitrators [Appendix I] and attitudes of parties to arbitration [Appendix III].
1 6 For a discussion of the influence of Keynsian economic theory on post-war government policy see Grant
and Nath, [1984] and Brown, [1988b],
17 There is considerable debate about how real or imagined the consensus was in post-war Britain - see
discussion in Contemporary Record, referred to in footnote 2, Chapter 1, for a summary of the debate.
There is also debate amongst those who adhere to the consensus thesis, about the extent of the consensus.
For example, Kavanagh [1987] and Grahl [1983] argue that the consensus was of an elite nature and as such
did not necessarily reflect popular attitudes or enjoy public support.
1 ® See Trevithick, 1977 for a discussion of Phillips Curve analysis and the critique by Milton Friedman.
1' The main legislation referred are the Trade Union Acts of 1824, 1825 and 1871, the Trade Union
Amendment Act of 1876, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 and the Trade Union Act of 1911, which established
the rights of workers to combine and to strike in furtherance of their demands; provided that unions could not
be sued for an alleged wrongful act committed by the union or on its behalf; and which gave the trade unions
the right to include in their constitution, clauses which authorised the spending of money for purposes set
out in the constitution, for example political contributions.
20 Quoted in Clegg, 1979, p.290.
21 See Owen-Smith et al, 1989, pp.14/15.
22 Therborn dates the abandonment of full employment as the priority of objective of government policy
to a statement made by Harold Wilson in 1964. Other authors date the shift in policy to later in the period or
to James Callaghan's oft quoted statement to the 1976 Labour Party Conference when he argued that: "We
used to think you could spend your way out of recession, and increase employment by cutting taxes and
boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists, and that in so far
as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into
the economy followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step."
Kenneth Harris [1989] has argued that "It was Callaghan who in 1976 pronounced the death of the cosy
world of Keynes and ushered in the harsh winds of Thatcherism."
Other commentators consider the election of the first Thatcher government in 1979 as the key shift in
policy away from a commitment to 'full employment'.
25 See the discussion of the debate surrounding economic planning in Budd, 1978.
24 See Hyman, 1972 for an analysis of strikes and the industrial relations journals in the period for
discussion of the 'British disease' and comparisons with European workers.
25 See, for example, discussion in O'Conner, 1973.
26 One particular example of this argument can be found in the work of Samual Brittan, 1975.
27 There are many other competing theories for Britain's relative economic decline which are outside the
scope of this thesis. They include Britain's attempt to hold on to her role as a world power; the dominance
of financial capital; the lack of incentives for private industry; the banking system; poor management;
sociological and cultural factors; and Britain's two-party political system. Another approach is to examine
the period from the perspective of constraint theory - see Grant and Nath, 1984.
28 Section of Donovan Commission Report quoted in Kavanagh, 1987, p.53.
29 See quote from Conservative Manifesto 1979 in Chapter 1 where it is stated explicitly that the law would
be used in the future to reform industrial relations.
5 0 The legislation also addressed issues of equal pay, maternity rights and pensions.
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3 1 The lack of industrial democracy in Britain was often cited to be one reason for industrial unrest and
economic decline.
32 The government eventually published a White Paper in 1978 including items from both reports, but the
recommendations were not implemented in any significant manner.
33 See chronology of events from July 1975 to 3 May 1979 in Contemporary Record, Autumn 1987,
pp.38/39.
34 See, for example, discussion in Maclnnes, 1987, p.44.
33 As in the case of the post-war consensus, there is considerable debate as to the extent of policy changes
or continuity of policy post-1979. One approach is to interpret the industrial relations policies of the
Thatcher administration as a radical departure for the post-war consensus - for example, Mitchell [1987]
contends that Thatcherism has been successful in banishing the spectre of union might which haunted past
governments. In contrast, although McBride [1986] acknowledges the distinctive features in Thatcher's
approach, he argues that the roots of change go back to government policy in the 1960's. Therefore he
considers there is continuity of policy and not a radical departure from the recent past.
3 ^ por a discussion of the influence of the 'New Right' on government policy see Bosanquet, 1983 and
King, 1987.
32 To date this proposal has not been carried out by the government.
38 In December 1989, just before the publication of the Employment Bill, the Labour Party announced its
own intention to withdraw support for the closed shop, arguing that such an action is now conducive and in
line with the terms laid down in the European Social Charter.
3 9 This debate is linked with the debates surrounding the radicalism of the approach to industrial relations
post-1979 - see footnote 35 above.
40 See discussion of Goldthorpe's concept of dualism in Chapter 1 above.
41 Different interpretations are to be found in Mitchell, 1987; McBride, 1986; Maclnnes, 1987; Coates,






THE ARBITRATORS: THE UNKNOWN MEN AND WOMEN
INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this chapter are to provide some insight into the background and views of ACAS
arbitrators [arbiters in Scotland]; the social politics of their selection; and an assessment of the role
played by arbitrators as perceived by the parties to arbitration. The extent to which the selection and
role of arbitrators has changed over time will also be examined.
Arbitrators necessarily play a key role in the process of arbitration. Yet very little is known about the
arbitrators appointed by ACAS to conduct arbitration hearings, other than that they are not civil
servants or employees of ACAS. There is often a direct or at least an implied criticism, from those
who are not fully acquainted with the workings of voluntary arbitration in Britain, that the job is
mainly undertaken by academics or lawyers who are ill-suited to the task because they lack the
necessary industrial or commercial experience. Government Ministers are not exempt from
perpetuating this view. In response to the request for arbitration by the trade union side during the
1989/90 ambulance dispute, the then Secretary of State for Health, Kenneth Clarke, argued that such
a reference to arbitration through ACAS had no point since all it would mean was that some Professor
would arrive at a decision. The implied criticism from Mr Clarke is that a university Professor would
be out of touch with the realities of conditions in the labour market and with public expenditure
constraints; and that third party dispute resolution was of little value. As Rideout argues:
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"Thus he managed, in a single sentence, sneers at the academic world
and at industrial relations supportmachinery, neither of which are great
favourites of this government."
[Rideout, 1990, p. 10]
It is difficult for the researcher to evaluate direct or indirect criticisms of arbitrators as the identity and
background ofmost arbitrators is unknown. Even when industrial disputes which have been referred to
arbitration are reported in the media, it is unusual for the arbitrator in question to be named. There is
reluctance to include the arbitrator in the public discussion of the case and every effort it made to
protect his or her integrity and anonymity, although there are exceptions to this in major disputes.
One of the reasons for this is no doubt to protect the arbitrator and to avoid prejudicing his or her role
in future arbitration cases1. Having said this, the identity and experience of some arbitrators does
become known to the parties to arbitration; and some parties actually prefer to have the same arbitrator
should they require the services of ACAS in subsequent cases. Conversely, after an unfavourable
judgement, some or both parties may reject a particular arbitrator in any future reference.
In order to shed more light on the background of arbitrators, how they were selected and their views of
arbitration, ACAS agreed to a questionnaire survey of all the arbitrators on their panel of arbitrators as
at May 1984. Further information on the process of selection and the appointment of particular
arbitrators to disputes was obtained from interviews with ACAS staff. A questionnaire survey of
employers and trade unions who used the service in 1988 was also carried out, so that their perceptions
and views of arbitrators and the arbitration service could be ascertained. Given the lack of research and
available publised data on these issues2, these surveys provide the first opportunity for an in-depth
investigation of arbitration and original material on which future research can be based3. The findings
of these surveys are discussed in Section II of this chapter.
Of interest to this study is a comparison of current and past practice. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine briefly the historical evidence available on arbitrators and their appointment. It is clear from
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a study of the literature that the problem of selecting a person with what are accepted to be the
appropriate background, skills and qualifications for an arbitrator is one which has been the subject of
discussion throughout the history of arbitration. As will be evident in the analysis of the views of the
parties to arbitration in 1988, it is a question which has still not been resolved to the entire
satisfaction of all those involved.
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SECTION I ARBITRATORS AND THEIR APPOINTMENT:
THE HISTORY
i] Pre-1945
As was discussed above [Chapter 2] the use of Justices of the Peace in the first half of the nineteenth
century was deemed to introduce too much legalism into dispute resolution; and their knowledge of
industrial relations issues was questioned [Lockyer, 1979]. Amulree records the shift in practice,
following the introduction of the 1896 Conciliation Act, regarding the appointment of arbitrators:
"In the early years under the Conciliation Act 1896, the Government
and parties were fortunate in obtaining the services as Arbitrators of
men of sound sense and good judgement, and there was less disposition
to rely upon exalted rank and high sounding titles."
[Amulree, 1929, p.112]
Although Amulree notes the shift away from the appointment of people with rank and titles, he does
not identify the backgrounds of new arbitrators or methods of their selection. Also the whole concept
of what was deemed to be 'sound sense and good judgement' is not clarified.
There is another related issue to the appointment of arbitrators and that is the importance of the
relationship of arbitration selection to what the actual function of arbitration is itself perceived to be.
In other words, one's perception of the function of arbitration may impact on the criteria for selecting
an arbitrator. To illustrate the point, Davidson [1979], in recording the fact that the enforcement of
the Conciliation Act was entrusted to the Board of Trade rather than the Home Office, argues that;
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"The problem of industrial unrest was viewed by late Victorian
administrators as primarily one of economic dislocation rather than of
law and order. It was therefore more logical that the Board should
assume responsibility for dealing with it."
[Davidson, 1979, p. 176]
Davidson states that the Board of Trade was successful in resisting proposals for compulsory arbitration
and the consensus of expert opinion at the time favoured a voluntarist approach to dispute resolution.
As a result the 1896 Conciliation Act was extremely modest with no provision for a compulsory
cooling-off period. Instead the Act provided that state arbitration could only be initiated by the
voluntary submission of both parties to a dispute and that arbitration awards were not legally binding.
However, the trade union movement was suspicious of the Act and the Board's role in its
implementation, as they were disillusioned with the system of wage arbitrations operating in many
sectors of British industry and with the Board's handling of industrial disputes since 1893. As
Davidson points out their disillusion was based on the fact that:
"The majority of umpires were from the professional or upper classes.
They tended to adhere to the conventional view of political economy, to
make their awards in line with short-run changes in the level of
economic activity or with the selling price of the product involved, and
to pay little regard to the standard of living of the working classes. As
a result, during the depression in industrial prices between 1873 and
1896, the bulk of arbitration awards had given wage reductions."
[Davidson, 1979, p. 178]
In contrast some employers were concerned about the appointment of state arbitrators whom they feared
would be influenced more by socialistic idealism than by the dictates of the market [Davidson, 1979,
p.179]. In the event, employers need not have worried. Recognising that the support of
industrialists was essential if state arbitration was to succeed, Davidson argues that the Board carefully
selected umpires who were almost entirely from among the professional and upper classes and whose
economic orthodoxy could be relied upon [ibid, p. 185].
Given these circumstances, one may have expected the withdrawal of co-operation by the trade union
movement. But, as Davidson contends, this did not happen, because, in spite of socialist rhetoric,
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most labour negotiators were content to bargain in market terms of relativities and comparability.
Second, although social bias in the appointment of umpires existed, the Board laid greater emphasis
on the expertise of its umpires; it reduced the role of employers; and lastly confidence in the system
developed especially because of the success of George Askwith as an industrial negotiator.
Davidson details the occupational background of state arbitrators, comparing these with the use of
arbitrators in private, domestic dispute procedures [see Table 3.1].
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TABLE 3.1
Occupational Background of Arbitrators
Occupation % of arbitrators in private % of arbitrators in state
procedures M procedures &]
Lawyer 48 32
Civil servant [administrator] 5 14
Civil servant [specialist] - 20
National politician 10 5
Local politician 10 6
Architect/Surveyor - 8
Employer 19 6





Source: Davidson, 1979, p.186.
The above Table highlights the difference between the backgrounds of the private and state arbitrators
and the less significant role given to lawyers in the state machinery and the higher representation of
those from the industrial professions or with specialist scientific and industrial expertise in the civil
service. Davidson notes, however, that the degree of commercial expertise possessed by lawyers who
acted as state arbitrators is understated because lawyers were often selected by the Labour Department as
much for their specialised knowledge of particular trades as for their professional status [Davidson,
1979, p. 187],
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Apart from the social background and experience of the arbitrators, another major problem discussed in
the literature was the selection of a third party acceptable to both parties to a dispute to the extent that
he or she was perceived to be independent from government and impartial or unbiased in his or her
affiliations to either side. A related issue, which can conflict with the objective of impartiality, is
the view held by some that the third party should also have experience of industrial relations and in
some cases experience of a particular industry which is the subject of the dispute. Writing at the
beginning of the century, Knoop oudines the problem as follows:
"The first serious difficulty of arbitration is the choice of an arbitrator,
and it is a double one. Should he, or should he not, be connected
with the trade? and should he be a permanent officer, or be chosen to
decide a particular case? ... It is absolutely essential that both parties to
an arbitration should consider the umpire quite impartial and free from
bias. At the same time, it is very desirable, if the arbitrator is to
understand properly the case before him, without the arguments and
discussion being unduly extended, that he should have at least some
knowledge of industry in general, if not of the particular trade in which
the case has occurred."
[Knoop, 1905, p.29]
In noting the potential conflict between impartiality and experience, Knoop argues that this could be
overcome by appointing gentlemen from a particular class background:
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"The ideal arbitrator is an unbiased man connected with industry, but
unfortunately it is not always possible to find such a man, who is
acceptable to both parties, and then it becomes necessary to choose
some one unconnected with the trade, against whom no possible
imputation of bias can be made. As far as England is concerned,
members of this latter class have often been as successful arbitrators as
members of the former; the late Judge Kettle, Lord Brassey and Lord
James of Hereford, all gentlemen practically not connected with
mining or manufacturing, have been no less successful as arbitrators
than the late Rt. Hon. A.J. Mundella, the Rt. Hon. J. Chamberlain
and Sir David Dale, Bart., who are, or were, closely connected with
some industry. It will be noticed that all the gentlemen mentioned
above are members of the brain-working class. The same observation
might be made of almost all arbitrators. Mr and Mrs Webb have
investigated this question carefully and have come to the conclusion,
that this class alone is capable of bringing to the task the highest
qualities of training, impartiality and judgement. Out of the two
hundred and forty arbitrations ranging from 1803 to 1897, which they
investigated, only in one case, in an arbitration for a new agreement
between employers and employed, had a member of the wage-earning
class been chosen as umpire."
[Knoop, 1905, p.30]
These quotations from Knoop illustrate very well the potential difficulty in striking the right balance
between impartiality and experience. The impartiality/experience trade-off was an issue which was to
play a major part in future debates over the appointment of arbitrators.
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ii] Post-1945
Limited information is available in the literature on arbitrators in the post-war period. The Ministry
of Labour Industrial Relations Handbook [1961] provides little insight It refers to the three different
forms of arbitration operating at the time. The first was through the Industrial Court where members
of the Court were appointed by the Minister of Labour and "are independent persons, and persons
representing employers and workers; one or more women have to be appointed." [p. 137]. It is
interesting to note this apparent gesture towards increasing the representation of women. The reason
given for reserving places for women on the Industrial Court was the practical one that it was more
appropriate for a woman to deal with cases which referred mainly to female employment4. The second
form of arbitration was single arbitration and the third was a board of arbitration. In single and boards
of arbitration, one or more persons were nominated by the employers and trade unions respectively and
an independent chairman appointed by the Minister from a panel of what are described as suitable
individuals. There is no explanation in the Handbook as to which members of society were deemed to
be both 'independent' and 'suitable'5.
The debates concerning the background and experience of arbitrators are not confined to the early part of
the century and were the subject of examination by the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and
Employers' Associations [1966]. The context of this examination was, as discussed above in Chapter
2, an attempt to resolve perceived industrial relations problems, in particular unofficial strikes, and
their potential damage to economic performance. It should be stated, however, that in cross-
examination of witnesses, the Commission did not pursue in depth or give priority to questions
regarding the background and selection of arbitrators. Their concerns were more related to the process
of arbitration itself, the potential impact of awards on inflation and debates concerning the possible
extension of compulsory arbitration.
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In evidence to the Commission and in response to the question, 'What sort of people make the best
arbitrators - lawyers, economists, academics or others?', Sir Roy Wilson, QC [the last President of
the Industrial Court], stated that:
"the most important of all the qualities necessary for the good arbitrator
is the personal capacity to inspire in the parties who come before him
full confidence that he will hear and decide the reference with
understanding and care and complete impartiality."6
Sir Roy was not pressed on his interpretation of 'complete impartiality'. He did expand his statement
to contend that if one used his criteria, then anyone from the occupational categories cited could be an
appropriate person to act as an arbitrator. But, it was his contention that lawyers did enjoy certain
advantages, first in being accustomed to interpreting statutes and other documents, and second in
hearing evidence and submissions. Sir Roy conceded, however, that these skills would mainly apply
to participation in arbitration tribunals and boards of arbitration and were less important for cases
submitted to single arbitration.
Additional support for the appointment of persons with legal training was forthcoming from another
witness, Sir George Honeyman, CBE, QC. Although stating that it would be invidious of him to
express any marked preference with regard to the professional group likely to provide the best
arbitrators, Sir George argued that:
"The lawyer starts with an advantage in that by his training he is
accustomed to evaluating evidence. In separating the relevant from
irrelevant."
But he was also cautious on the limitations of a legalistic approach:
"He [the arbitrator] must, however, avoid being too legalistic both in
his approach to the evidence and to the interpretation of agreements
drafted by persons who tend to leave unexpressed matters which with
their industrial knowledge 'go without saying'."
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Sir George concluded by stating that experience of membership of aWages Council provided valuable
training and preparation for acting as an arbitrator7.
It is interesting to note the support from two men trained in the legal profession for the appointment of
arbitrators with skills which are often equated with those of a lawyer; and to speculate as to the extent
to which lawyers are responsible for perpetuating a view of the mystique of 'legal' skills inaccessible to
the layperson. Although this question was not explored by the Commission, further evidence in a
Research Paper entitled 'Who are the Arbitrators', was presented by Lord McCarthy8. This paper
examines the profile of a typical arbitrator operating in the USA and provides an interesting
comparison with practice in Britain. McCarthy refers to evidence obtained from a survey of the
membership of the National Academy of Arbitrators in 1962 which concluded that the typical
experienced arbitrator in the United States was fifty-three years old; was educated to at least
baccalaureate degree standard and probably had a law degree or Ph.D; had majored in one of the social
sciences, most likely economics; had worked with the Federal Government with the National War
Labour Board, the Wage Stabilisation Board during the Korean War or the National Labour Relations
Board; was a university professor or lawyer who spent only part of his time in labour arbitration; and
was someone who earned about one-third of his income from arbitration.
It is reasonable to conclude that considerations over the most suitable persons to act as arbitrators was
not a major priority for the Commission as it made no specific recommendations concerning the
recruitment and appointment of arbitrators. But, prior to the setting up of ACAS, a survey of
conciliation and arbitration carried out by the Incomes Data Study in 1972 noted that:
"In the UK Arbitrators are usually found from one of two sources,
academics or lawyers, who often operate with lay assessors.
Conciliation on the other hand has largely depended on the service
provided by the Department of Employment."9
The first Annual Report of ACAS in 1975 records that the list of arbitrators previously used by the
Department of Employment was made available to the new service and that "this panel consisted of 35
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independents with knowledge or experience in industrial relations, labour economics or law."10. It
notes the significant expansion of the panel to 120 members to cope with the increased case-load faced
by the new service in the early years of its operation. The new recruits included employers and trade
unionists nominated by the CBI and TUC respectively. Given previous concerns about impartiality,
the appointment of employers and trade union officials is somewhat surprising. However, referring to
the appointment of arbitrators on setting up the service, John Lockyer notes that the employer and
trade union representatives involved had retired from their full-time employment:
"ACAS appoints people from outside the Service to act as arbitrators
and has tackled the problem of finding suitable people by appointing
retired employer and trade union officials and by using independent
academics with a wide knowledge of industrial relations. Most of the
academics appointed by ACAS have also had practical experience in
industry earlier in their careers. Retired conciliators and labour lawyers
also make a valuable contribution."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.59]
In an interview with John Lockyer he indicated that approaches were made to the Department of
Employment and then the Wages Councils for prospective arbitrators, most of whom responded
positively. Initially, however, there was a problem in obtaining sufficient people with relevant
experience, and the only other people who did know about industrial relations were employers and
union officials. As Lockyer commented:
"We wanted people who knew about industrial relations. Ex-Members
of Parliament we did not want."
Asked to explain his remark, Lockyer stated that they did not want ex-M.P.s on the grounds that they
could be politically unacceptable to one or both parties. Instead they wanted people with a background
knowledge of collective bargaining and dispute procedures.
However, the appointment of employers and trade unions caused some difficulty especially from other
employers. Surprisingly perhaps it was not on the grounds of potential anti-employer bias from an
arbitrator with a trade union background. Rather employers objected to the appointment of another
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employer on the grounds that first "he may lean over to the trade union side" and second "he did not
want another employer looking at his business.". Another drawback in appointing retired employers
and trade union officials was their age and the time they had spent away from the business world, so
although they did have industrial or commercial experience, it could be argued that it was outdated. In
order to overcome the potential problems, Lockyer stated that the service appointed mainly academics
and lawyers with practical experience and knowledge of industrial relations - "We found they did the
best job."11.
In a subsequent interview with Les Parsisson, Principal Industrial Relations Officer [Arbitration] and
John Lockyer's successor, the question of the type of person most suitably qualified to be an arbitrator
was pursued. He stated the main qualities required of arbitrators were that they should be acceptable to
both parties, people of standing, independent, with analytical minds, trained to assimilate
information, and capable of producing a comprehensive report understandable to the parties and issue
an award which is without ambiguity. Academics and lawyers with industrial and commercial
experience were deemed most likely to fit the above criteria. It was considered that politicians and
others associated with specific political parties or those with radical political views of either right or
left wing persuasion would not make suitable arbitrators on the grounds that they may not be
acceptable to one side or the other. Therefore, the need for political disassociation especially from
government in office is seen as necessary to ensure the confidence of both employers and trade unions
officials coming to arbitration. This criterion relates very directly to the 'neutral', independent,
separate from government, image which ACAS strives to reinforce.
Although the needs of the parties and ACAS in the appointment and selection of arbitrators has been
discussed in conjunction, the main emphasis of this discussion has related to selecting arbitrators who
have the ability to command the respect and support of the parties to arbitration. However, another
more functional criterion of choice, from the standpoint of ACAS as an organisational structure, was
also identified. What was evident from the interviews I conducted with the civil servants responsible
for arbitration and from working on a day-to-day basis alongside ACAS staff members, was their
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attempts to run an efficient, professional service for those concerned with voluntary arbitration in the
public or private sectors - "All I aimed for was that we were professional."12. The code of practice
within which they operated could be described as a consensual approach to dispute resolution, where
what was considered to be the 'right' kind of person suitable for the role of arbitrator was evident to
those most direcdy involved in the process. That is, a person who accepted the dominant ethos of the
organisation and would be unlikely to upset any of the parties involved. One is reminded of the
observations ofHeclo and Wildavsky [1975] where they refer to the relationship between civil servants
and the unwritten codes:
"Kinship tells participants who is who; culture tells them how to act
toward each other."13
Over time the civil servants and arbitrators build up a relationship of trust and confidence, again
similar to that outlined by Heclo andWildsavsky:
"They all know or have heard about each other and enjoy rating one
another. ...Mutual trust is considered paramount by officials who know
they will have to continue doing business with each other year after
year on issue after issue; they believe, that, if professionalism means
anything, it means knowing how to treat members of one's own
group."14
In summarising the debate on the selection of arbitrators, Lockyer [1979] concludes that the most
important qualities required are those relating to character and personality - "To some extent these are
inbred and to some extent they are acquired through experience." [p.59]. The method by which
arbitrators gain their experience and build up the trust and confidence of civil servants and their peers,
and the manner in which ACAS staff sought to improve the professionalism of the service, will be
discussed below [see Section II of this chapter].
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Policy post-1979
Given the change of government post-1979 and the stated approach to industrial relations and labour
market reform, one may have anticipated some changes in policy especially within the context of the
shift to free market economics and civil service reform15. The consensual bias which was said to have
dominated post-war economic policy and civil service behaviour, were features which, at least at the
macroeconomic level, the new government was intent on changing.
From discussions with the civil servants involved, it would appear that, although they are sensitive to
the different political climate and circumstances in which they are operating, there is a remarkable
degree of continuity in [a] the practice of arbitration and [b] the appointment of arbitrators1". The
officials argued that there was no change in the policy towards the selection and appointment of
arbitrators following the election of the first Thatcher government. Especially where large national
pay disputes in the public sector are concerned, every effort is made [and has always been made] to
appoint an arbitrator or board of arbitration from the panel of arbitrators who have the necessary
experience and will carry the trust and confidence of all those involved.
One case which did cause some controversy, and which resulted in an approach from 10 Downing
Street, was recalled by an official. It involved a reference to arbitration from a company in the air
services sector. When the arbitration award went against the company, the manager involved, who
was a friend of Mrs Thatcher, wrote to her complaining that ACAS had appointed a left-winger from a
College who knew nothing about the industry to conduct the case. A letter was sent to ACAS
expressing Mrs Thatcher's concern. In the event, ACAS was able to reply to the effect that the
arbitrator appointed had been a wing commander in the airforce; left the airforce to work as a personnel
officer in industry and then at a later stage in his career became an academic. He, therefore, not only
had industrial and commercial experience but an intimate knowledge of the industry involved. The
matter ended there17.
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It would be naive, however, to suggest that no account is taken of the change of administration since
1979. For example, in the teachers' dispute in 1986, it was considered unlikely by a senior official
that Sir John Wood [also Chairman of the CAC] would be accepted as an arbitrator, because of his
alleged association with the newly founded SDP. It was also observed that another well known ACAS
arbitrator, and previously Chairman of the Railway Staff National Tribunal, Lord McCarthy, would
no longer be an acceptable arbitrator in a national dispute, because of his association with the trade
union movement and the fact that he was a Labour peer.
The extent to which the government can interfere directly in the appointment process is itself
constrained by the fact that the arbitrator must also be acceptable to the parties to arbitration. Parties
to a major dispute are unlikely to accept an arbitrator whom they consider might be prejudiced against
their case. Having said this, ACAS does attempt to retain as much control as possible over the
appointment of arbitrators to specific cases:
"Having got the parties agreement to go to arbitration we then like the
right to choose who the arbitrator or board will be. The risk is that if
the parties do not give us that right, we can end up in another dispute
over the arbitrator. We choose the person we consider is most
experienced for the case involved."18
As Les Parsisson commented:
"The major principle is to maintain the integrity of the arbitration
process. The appointment of an arbitrator against whom either party
has a prejudice, either genuine or illusory, would not serve the best
interests of arbitration."19
A distinction should be made between the different types of cases and experience of parties coming to
arbitration. If the parties are relatively inexperienced and the reference involves a comparatively minor
issue or small number of workers, then they are less likely to challenge ACAS's right to choose.
However, in major national disputes where the two sides are likely to be represented by industrial
relations personnel of some experience, then the parties will wish to be consulted in the appointment
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process. To this extent the appointment of the arbitrator becomes an extension of the bargaining
process. In this event it is usual for ACAS to suggest a few names to the parties and to ask them to
rank their preferences. This process of consultation then results in ACAS formally making the
appointment
However, when the government itself is one of the parties involved in public sector disputes, the
picture is more complicated. For example, in disputes over teachers' pay, it is normal for both the
Employers' and Teachers' Panel to be consulted on the name of the person to be appointed as arbitrator.
The Department of Education and Science, as a constituent of the Employers' Panel, will almost
certainly seek the approval of their Secretary of State, who in turn may seek further parliamentary
advice20. During the teachers' dispute in 1984, Sir Keith Joseph, the then Education Secretary, was
accused by Mr Doug McAvoy, the Deputy General Secretary of the National Union of Teachers, of
prejudicing the outcome of the arbitration by: "attempting to nobble the arbitrators before they have
even begun their work"21. The accusation followed a statement by Sir Keith in The House of
Commons to the effect that there was no more money to enable local authorities to meet any increase
in pay awarded by arbitration. Owen-Smith et al [1989] record that, in the teachers' dispute in 1986,
the parties were directly involved in negotiating a chairman of the board of arbitration from the names
put forward to them by ACAS. Both sides rejected the first three names put forward to them and made
their choice from the next five suggested. Therefore, in some cases, the appointment process can be
more politically sensitive.
In the economic and political climate of the 1980s, it was observed by one official that some criticism
had been made of older members of the panel of arbitrators on the grounds that they were out of touch
with the current industrial relations' scene and new economic conditions. There is evidence to suggest
that some account has been taken of this with the recruitment of younger members and the retirement
of older members of the panel of arbitrators [see Section II of this chapter].
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Because of the paucity of information on arbitrators, it was decided that a questionnaire survey should
be issued to all ninety-four arbitrators on ACAS's panel of arbitrators in 1984. Bearing in mind that
some arbitrators had been critical of a questionnaire issued by researchers at Warwick University in
1978, on the grounds of its length and complexity, it was decided to keep the questionnaire as clear and
concise as possible22. On interviewing one arbitrator with regard to the present survey, he remarked:
"I hope you are not a sociologist. I bet the Warwick questionnaire was
written by one. I was not happy with it and returned it to them."2^
The 1984 questionnaire, conducted as part of this thesis, was designed, discussed and agreed with
ACAS staff involved directly in the appointment process. The questionnaire was designed to obtain a
straightforward Yes/No response where this was appropriate; but also to obtain insight into the
background and experience of arbitrators; the method of selection; their experience as arbitrators; and
their attitudes and views relating to current practice and issues in arbitration. For this reason, many of
the questions were open-ended to allow a wide range of views and comments to be expressed. The
main findings of this survey were supported by interviews of selected arbitrators24.
At a later stage of the research it was also decided that it would be valuable to ascertain the perceptions
of the main participants in the arbitration process, that is the employers' representatives and trade
unions involved. A questionnaire survey of all cases which went to arbitration in 1988 was then
undertaken. Again the questionnaire was planned, discussed and agreed with ACAS officials in the
arbitration service, the main objectives of which were to ascertain the views of the parties on their
most recent experience of arbitration, their perceptions of the outcome and their attitudes to arbitration
and the role of the arbitrator.
The results of these surveys do provide valuable information on some of the questions highlighted
above, for example on the background, experience, and selection of arbitrators. In order to explore
the issues of selection and training, additional material obtained from interviews with ACAS staff; an
induction seminar for potential arbitrators; annual arbitrators' seminars; and bulletins issued to
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arbitrators by ACAS have also been analysed. Section II of this chapter explores these issues.
Subsequent chapters will look in more detail at the process and results of arbitration.
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PART II ARBITRATORS AND THEIR APPOINTMENT: THE EVIDENCE
i] Personal Background
The questionnaire was issued to the 94 arbitrators on ACAS's panel as at 1984 and 73 replies were
received - a response rate of 78%. One reply was in letter form only, explaining that as the arbitrator
had been on the list for some time but had not been instructed to arbitrate, he felt he could not usefully
complete the survey. The sample should, therefore, be reduced to 93 arbitrators and 72 replies - a
response rate of 77%. Questions were asked concerning the personal background of the arbitrators
including their sex, age, education and qualifications.
The vast majority of arbitrators are men with only 8, that is less than 10 per cent, women on the
panel, 7 of whom responded to the survey. The main reason given by officials for the low
representation of women was the difficulty in identifying enough women with the relevant industrial
and commercial experience. This is a fairly standard response not unfamiliar as an explanation for the
under-representation of women in other occupations or appointments. An additional factor advanced
was that, in some cases, the parties - the majority of whom are men in industrial relations - may not
find a woman arbitrator acceptable2^. It was considered that attitudes were changing, however, and
that ACAS now employed more female conciliation officers, a policy which will bring more women
into the industrial relations field26. Since completion of the survey there has been a modest
improvement in recruitment of women arbitrators with 4 women coming onto the panel compared with
11 men27.
The age profile of the arbitrators ranged from 35 to 71 years of age [see Figure 3.a and Appendix I,
p.2] with the majority of arbitrators, 49 [68%], aged between 46 and 65.
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FIGURE 3.a
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Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of Arbitrators - see Appendix I.
Again since completion of the survey a number of arbitrators have been retired by ACAS from the
panel. All of the new arbitrators recruited since 1984, fall within the 35 to 55 age group [at the time
of appointment]. The result of these changes is that the number of arbitrators currently on ACAS's
panel has been reduced to 7028. Apart from encouraging older members to retire the incentive to
reduce the size of panel is a response to the reduction in the number of cases coming to arbitration in
the 1980s.
The largest number of arbitrators 37 [51%] were educated at an English grammar school; 9 at a
Scottish or Welsh equivalent; 10 at non-grammar; and 3 at public school. Of the remaining 13
arbitrators, 9 were educated in the UK and 4 abroad, but they did not specify the type of school
attended. Ninety-four per cent of arbitrators [68] received post-school education at college or
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university, with eight-seven per cent [63] receiving a degree, ten of whom had degrees from more than
one university. Of the 50 arbitrators who specified which university they had attended, 13 were
graduates from Cambridge or Oxford [see Appendix I, pp.3/5]. It is interesting to note the educational
background of arbitrators, and specifically the relatively small number of public school pupils and
Oxbridge graduates in comparison with senior civil servants.
A broad range of subjects were studied by the arbitrators mainly in Social Sciences or Arts Faculties.
Twenty-one arbitrators had studied Economics and 12 had legal qualifications. In addition 32
arbitrators listed other professional qualifications such as Fellow or Member of the Institute of
Personnel Management and 23 listed other educational or industrial qualifications including
Certificates/Diplomas in Trade Union Studies, Personnel Management and Business Administration,
or postgraduate degrees [see Appendix I, pp.6/9].
ii] Experience
In order to test the criticism that arbitrators were amateurs with little industrial and commercial
experience, questions were asked concerning the past and current experience of those involved.
Fifty-four [75%] arbitrators said they had industrial or commercial experience. This figure was
somewhat surprising, as it is ACAS's policy only to appoint arbitrators who have some relevant
background experience. This practice can be compared to the situation discussed by Davidson [1979]
concerning lawyers who were appointed as Board of Trade arbitrators, and were employed as much for
their knowledge of particular trades as their expertise as lawyers. It is possible, therefore, that some
arbitrators under-stated or under-valued their previous experience. A broad range of experience was
quoted by the arbitrators including industry, banking, insurance, accountancy, engineering, civil
service, printing, journalism and the retail sector, with three arbitrators having worked as miners and
another as a docker [see Table 3.2], There was a bias towards experience of management with 49
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[68%] of arbitrators having had such experience in industry/commerce, the civil service or universities
[see Table 3.3]. Only 25 [34%] had experience as a trade union official, and just 4 had been full-time
officials [see Table 3.4], Sixteen [22%] arbitrators had legal experience at the Bar, as Lecturers in
Law, or through Industrial Tribunals and other organisations. Similarly sixteen [22%] arbitrators
were ex-civil servants having been employees of ACAS, the Department of Employment or the
Ministry of Labour. Since 1984 there have been no appointments made from the ranks of ex-civil
servants. A majority of arbitrators, 50 in total, had served in H.M. Forces. Finally, 58 arbitrators
said they had additional industrial experience including consultancy work [see Appendix I, pp.10/16].
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TABLE 3.2
Industrial/Commercial Experience of ACAS Arbitrators
Work Experience No. of Arbitrators
Company or Industry 01 11
Banking, Insurance and Accountancy 5
Engineering 01 2
Civil Service 01 4
Clerical 3
Personnel Management 8
Management - General 4
Management - Company Executive 1
Management - Directors 2
Journalist 1
Consultancy 01 1





Vocational Work 01 3
Unspecified 4
[1] Actual job unspecified
Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I.
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TABLE 3.3
Management Experience of ACAS Arbitrators






Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I.
TABLE 3.4
Trade Union Experience of ACAS Arbitrators







Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I.
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At the time of the survey 48 [66%] of arbitrators were in full-time employment, 45 of whom worked
in universities as professors, heads of department, senior lecturers, lecturers and tutors. At the time
of their appointment to the panel, 57 arbitrators were employed in universities, 1 was a barrister, one
a manager and 13 had retired [see Table 3.5], This breakdown of posts reflects a shift in the
recruitment of arbitrators since the days of the Board of Trade [see Davidson, 1979 and Table 3.1]
However, as is illustrated in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5, the figures under-state the previous labour
market experience of the arbitrators, as they refer only to the posts held by the arbitrators at the time
of their appointment. For example the figures do not reflect the broad range of experience gained from
manual and non-manual work, managerial posts, trade union activity, and employment in the civil
service or the legal profession. What can be observed from comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.5 is the
marked increase in the recruitment of academics, the decline in the appointment of civil servants and
the disappearance of politicians from the list of arbitrators.
TABLE 3.5
Occupation of ACAS Arbitrators at time of Recruitment







[1] Mainly Ex-Civil Servants
Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I.
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The profile of the 'typical' arbitrator in ACAS's panel in 1984 could be summarised as follows:
male
over 45 years of age
educated in an English grammar school, or a Scottish or Welsh
equivalent
educated to at least first degree level
employed in a university as a professor, head of department, lecturer
or tutor
previous industrial or commercial experience
management experience in industry, commerce, university or the civil
service
handled ten or more arbitration cases29
The views and perceptions of the users of the arbitration service were also sought through a
questionnaire survey30. Asked their views on the appropriate qualities in an arbitrator which were
essential or important for effective arbitration, 98% said impartiality; 90% said industrial/commercial
experience; 96% said knowledge of industrial relations and collective bargaining; 54% said knowledge
of particular industry involved; 98% said independence; 94% said authority; 88% said experience in
settling disputes by arbitration; and 98% said ability to understand complex problems quickly. Asked
to identify other qualities which the 'ideal' arbitrator should have, employers' representatives referred to
the ability to communicate and knowledge of the organisation; on the trade union side patience was the
most quoted quality. More than 84% of the parties considered the arbitrator's primary job should be
the setding of the dispute; 78% agreed that the arbitrator should not have any recent direct association
with management; and 75% said they should not have any recent direct association with a union. But
when asked to note any other comments they would like to express regarding their personal experience
of ACAS arbitration, some parties were critical of the appointment of academics and lawyers as
arbitrators.
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The above views highlight the problem of the experience/impartiality trade-off referred to in Section I
above, that is how an arbitrator can both have the necessary experience yet not be too directly
associated with and impartial between one side of industry or another. One method of overcoming this
problem is through the appointment of assessors with experience of a particular industry to assist the
arbitrator. It is practice for two assessors to be appointed, one representing each side of industry,
from a panel of potential assessors nominated by employers and trade union organisations.
There is a historical precedent for resolving the trade-off in this way. Lord Amulree [1929], who was
himself an arbitrator and President of the Industrial Court, records that in highly technical cases, the
single arbitrator may have the help of assessors. The role of the assessors was a consultative one, and
they did not share responsibility for the awards31. Forty-six of the arbitrators who completed the
questionnaire in 1984 had been assisted by assessors in cases they had dealt with. They cited the
advantages of their service as their first hand knowledge of the industry or technical knowledge and their
support and advice after the hearing. One example of the response to this question was:
"I began the hearing a little more informed as to the general system
between the parties by having a preliminary discussion with the
assessors. Similarly I was able to get from them after the hearing
minor points of information which had not come out during the hearing
but which subsequently appeared relevant. In two cases it was helpful
to find the extent to which the assessors had formed similar
judgements.
Twenty-seven of the arbitrators considered that the main disadvantage of having assessors was that they
sometimes exceeded their role and were often not always objective, acting as an advocate of the parties.
This was thought to be particularly so of the trade union representatives. Additionally it was thought
that they could lengthen or formalise proceedings. An example of the response to this question was:
"They are often strongly biased towards only one of the parties and
often tend to regard their role more as that of an advocate of the party
which they traditionally might be expected to support."32
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In spite of any disadvantages which may be experienced by the arbitrator, the use of assessors is one
method of satisfying the parties to arbitration that the relevant experience and knowledge will be
utilised at the hearing.
Boards of arbitration, made up of an arbitrator and two side members, is another method of broadening
the expertise available. Boards are normally reserved for major cases especially national pay disputes,
where it is deemed appropriate to have more than one person involved in the process. As with
assessors, side members are chosen from both sides of industry to assist the arbitrator. Fifty per cent
of the arbitrators surveyed had acted as Chairpersons on a board of arbitration. Again arbitrators found
both advantages and disadvantages in the services of side members. Arbitrators welcomed the specific
expertise and insights which side members could bring, for example one arbitrator commented that:
"It reduces the possibility of missing important clues in both written
and oral presentations. With their respective management and trade
union backgrounds, side members may provide insights into a problem
that might not occur to an independent. After the hearing a discussion
among three people may be better than the internal discussion of an
arbitrator."
Similar disadvantages in the services of side members to assessors were noted, for example:
"The main disadvantage occurs if the representative of the union or
employer simply acts as an advocate of the case of their respective side
and are not willing to act in any kind of conciliatory capacity; at worst
they transmit to the Board the same kind of deadlock as already exists;
they also prolong the proceedings sometimes leading to postponements
and adjournments."33
The distinction between assessors and side members is that the former are not responsible for the final
decision made by the arbitrator. Side members on the other hand participate in the decision-making
process and give their own opinion. In the event of a disagreement between members of the board,
however, the arbitrator's decision is final. It obviously adds more weight to the outcome if the
decision of the board is unanimous34.
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In summary, from the evidence cited, criticism of academics and lawyers on the grounds of
insufficient industrial and commercial experience and their detachment from the realities of the market
place would not appear to be justified. First, on the grounds that most arbitrators have varied work
backgrounds; and second, because arbitrators can call on the particular expertise of assessors and side
members should a specific case warrant specialist knowledge or assistance. Also, given the changes
which have occurred in the higher education sector in the last decade, including the introduction of
management accounting techniques, it could be argued that the view that academics are out of touch
with the realities of economic constraints and market pressures is an outdated one.
iii] Selection
The method by which arbitrators are invited to join ACAS's panel is somewhat of a mystery even to
the arbitrators themselves. Rather like candidates for leadership of the Conservative Party, names of
potential arbitrators 'emerge' from those connected with the service. The arbitrators were asked how
they were recruited to the service. The majority, 45 [62%], said they had been approached and
recruited by ACAS staff; 8 contacted ACAS themselves with a view to offering their services; 6 were
encouraged to approach ACAS by a third party [normally another arbitrator]; and 13 either followed on
from the Department of Employment or Ministry of Labour panel, or quoted a combination of the
above options. When interviewed, most arbitrators who had been approached by ACAS were unaware
why they had been selected.
This latter point was pursued with ACAS staff. The criteria for selection referred to by officials were
mainly those identified in the earlier discussion in Section I of this chapter on the qualities required for
an arbitrator [see in particular interview with Les Parsisson], That is they look for people with
knowledge of industrial relations and with an industrial or commercial background; someone they
consider is independent, fair minded, apolitical and capable of making sound judgements. Officials
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identify such people in the industrial relations field either at the regional or Head Office level. The
potential arbitrators may have been involved with ACAS in some form or another through the advisory
or conciliation service and their names put forward by a conciliation officer; known to ACAS staff
through conferences or seminars; or recommended to the service by another arbitrator.
Once a potential arbitrator has been identified, the normal process is that he or she is invited to attend
an induction seminar35 along with other potential recruits. This gives the recruit an opportunity to
meet ACAS staff and ask any questions about the role of an arbitrator and the arbitration service. It
also enables ACAS staff to assess whether or not the person is likely to have the necessary potential to
become an arbitrator and thus fit in and be accepted. An invitation to join the induction seminar does
not guarantee selection onto the panel, and recruits are not informed of the reasons should they fail to
be selected. A well known and experienced arbitrator who had proposed a colleague as someone whom
he considered had the necessary skills and qualifications, was somewhat surprised when the gentleman
was invited to and attended an induction seminar but was not appointed by the service. Both the
arbitrator and the unsuccessful candidate were unaware of the reasons for his failure36.
At the seminar which I attended, the Chief Conciliation Officer, the Director of Conciliation and
Arbitration and the Principal Industrial Relations Officer were in attendance as ACAS officers. In
addition participants had the opportunity to meet the ACAS chairman37 over lunch. The seminar was
under the chairmanship of an experienced and well known arbitrator. Of the people invited to attend
the seminar as potential arbitrators, two were Ex-Directors of ACAS, two were academics [one a
lecturer in economics, the other a senior lecturer in law], and the fifth person was an ex-national
officer for a major union and at the time was employed as an Industrial Relations Manager in the retail
sector38.
The seminar was conducted by an experienced arbitrator and ACAS's Chief Conciliation Officer, who
covered issues including conciliation and the pre-arbitration process; the arbitration process itself; and
practical questions including how to approach the writing of the arbitrator's report3^. Potential
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arbitrators were introduced to certain conventions and policy approaches. For example it is ACAS's
policy to preserve the separate integrity of the conciliation and arbitration process and to discourage any
interaction between the conciliation officer and the arbitrator. There are two reasons put forward for
this practice. The first relates to the belief that arbitration is very much 'the last resort'40 in a dispute
and that every effort should be made to encourage the parties to settle the dispute themselves or with
the assistance of a conciliation officer without resort to arbitration. It is assumed that arbitration
should be used only when other avenues of dispute resolution have been pursued and exhausted. The
importance of the move to the arbitration stage is that the third party [the arbitrator] and not the parties
is then responsible for making an award to settle the dispute. Second, there is the view that the
arbitrator should come to the issue fresh and with an open mind. Any communication between the
arbitrator and conciliation officer, therefore, could run the risk of prejudicing this objective. This
was an issue which was to be raised again at arbitrators' seminars and reinforced in the bulletins issued
to arbitrators [see discussion below under 'Training']. It was also stated that, while accepting the
principle of 'last resort', it was ACAS's policy to encourage the writing-in of arbitration clauses into
disputes procedures and the setting up of standing boards of arbitration as an alternative to proposals for
legally binding arbitration or no strike agreements.
An interesting discussion of the function of arbitration then took place - interesting because, as
discussed earlier [Section I of this chapter], how the state perceives the role can impact on the process
and the type of people chosen to fulfil the tasks of an arbitrator. The primary function of arbitration
was argued to be the resolution of disputes, although the experienced arbitrator present added that there
was an important function in encouraging the parties to take a more dispassionate approach to their
problem and to enable them to 'save face'. The question of whether the dispute should be resolved on
the basis of the justice of the case or on the grounds of what the arbitrator judged to be acceptable to
the parties was then explored. It was acknowledged that there may be differences of opinion or
approach on this question. At the end of the day, however, "The object is to get a settlement"
[experienced arbitrator]. The pressure to reach a settlement and resolve the dispute in a manner
acceptable to the parties is understandable. The service prides itself in its record in this regard.
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Although the awards issued by arbitrators are not legally but morally binding, there are extremely few
cases where the award has not been implemented. The people needed to carry out this function,
therefore, are not social reformers interested primarily in redistribution or social justice; neither are
they likely to be dogmatic and doctrinaire. As the experienced arbitrator present commented:
"You should not see yourself as a social worker in industry."
Instead there is a stress on a consensual approach to the resolution of the dispute. This is not to
contend that ultimately there will be no bias in favour of employers or unions or that the consensus
need be one which favours both parties necessarily41. It could be argued, however, that in general
terms a successful arbitrator will be one who can fit in with the dominant ethos of the organisation and
the economic and political orthodoxy under which is operates. More specifically, in relation to any
particular case, the skill of the successful arbitrator is to evaluate the balance of power between the
parties and issue an award which reflects this42. As the experienced arbitrator remarked so succinctly:
"The skill of the good arbitrator is to recognise the lion and award him
the lion's share."
Once accepted onto the panel, new arbitrators become part ofwhat Heclo and Wildavsky [1979] describe
as the 'nuclear family' where they learn the "norms of desirable behaviour" [p.40]. But, how do they
learn what they are supposed to do? Similar to Heclo and Wildavsky's reference to the learning of
Treasury norms, new arbitrators begin by sitting alongside experienced arbitrators before they take
their first case and make their first decision. Experience is then built up through conducting further
arbitrations and different types of cases.
"They learn what is expected of them; by taking decisions; and
discovering how others react to what they do."
[Heclo and Wildavsky, 1979, p.41]
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Discovering how others react to what they do mainly takes place at arbitrators' seminars to which all
arbitrators are invited each year. In this way arbitrators' learn from one another and are introduced to
the appropriate norms of behaviour.
iv] 'Training' the Arbitrators
Although a distinction has been drawn here between selection and 'training' of arbitrators, as will
become evident from the discussion below, there is a strong inter-relationship of continuity between
the two processes. That is, the selection process itself would appear to be a major part of the
'training' which is then reinforced through, at a later stage, seminars and bulletins.
The 'training' of arbitrators is a relatively recent phenomenon. As the experienced arbitrator in the
induction seminar stated:
"I have been arbitrating in the UK since 1970 and when I started I just
started. There were no briefings etc."
Policy changed in the early 1980s, however as the Chief Conciliation Officer outlined:
"Two years ago we set in motion a policy review of the arbitration
process. Not the kind the Department of Employment would conduct
for the Cabinet. We wanted to know in what ordinary ways we could
enhance the process of arbitration."43
The reasons for this review were a genuine interest on the part of the civil servants to provide, what
they described as, a more professional service to the parties. It is probable that other objectives were
to prevent criticisms being made of the service and to offset the possibility of a change in government
policy. Even if the new Conservative government did not intend to abolish ACAS itself, it was not
beyond the boundaries of possibility that they could have privatised certain functions of the service, by
119
no longer providing it as a public service and leaving the private sector to step in if industry required
The policy review resulted in the instigation of arbitrators' seminars and the issue of bulletins to
arbitrators.
The first bulletin issued to arbitrators in 1982 outlined the main results of the policy review and its
impact on future policy. The main items covered included terms of reference; the separation between
conciliation and arbitration; boards of arbitration and the role of side members; the role of the
arbitration secretariat; the giving of recommendations in the arbitrator's report; reasoned awards; the
encouragement of standing arbitration arrangements; and the selection, training and briefing of
arbitrators. The first bulletin outlines past and new policy for selection and training as follows:
"At some seminars the question of selection for the ACAS list of
arbitrators was raised. At present this was by informal
recommendation and talent spotting. This could continue and
arbitrators are asked to keep an eye out for potential candidates. Whilst
there was an acceptance of the traditional ACAS method of training
new arbitrators by the method of letting them sit in with one or two
experienced arbitrators, the seminars have shown that there were great
benefits to be achieved by organised communication and discussion
amongst arbitrators. Apart from rare occasions when an ACAS
secretary was provided, arbitrator worked in isolation with very little
feedback reaching them as to the quality of their performance; they had
no standards on which to judge themselves until occasions such as
these seminars arose when they were able only to compare practices and
attitudes with other arbitrators; these comparisons were partly
reassuring but for the most part they had caused each arbitrator to
question his own performance and possibly to see better ways of doing
his job, particularly with regard to the judgements he was asked to
make."4^
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Arbitrators were informed in the second Bulletin that in order to improve the method of selecting
arbitrators, arrangements would be made to introduce induction seminars:
"The idea will be to air a number of current industrial relations topics,
including arbitration itself and to establish the necessary working links
if they are to be widely deployed in an independent role by the Service.
The induction would be completed by 2 or 3 opportunities 'to sit with
Nellie'46 on specific cases."47
The induction seminars thus commenced in 1982.
Subsequent bulletins were used to inform arbitrators of general developments in the industrial relations
field, for example the experience of pendulum arbitration; any policy changes within ACAS
specifically relating to arbitration; proposals for seminar arrangements and topics; the appointment of
new arbitrators or council members and changes in ACAS staffing; and to reinforce ACAS policy and
practice in matters relating to arbitration. The latter can be viewed as a method of encouraging 'good
practice' and uniformity of practice amongst arbitrators. The first bulletin had noted that the first
seminars had:
"shown that practices, procedures and even attitudes varied considerably
between one arbitrator and another."48
This was also evident at the arbitration seminars which I attended during the years 1984 to 1989. In
the main, differences which did occur were between the relatively well known and more experienced
arbitrators who had built up a personal reputation over the years. Their differences of views and
approach were not only known but accepted by ACAS staff. However, is was extremely rare for new
arbitrators to deviate from the accepted norms of practice identified by ACAS staff, and on the few
occasions when they did - for example when one arbitrator admitted that he had contacted a conciliation
officer to ask for further details of the case with which he was dealing, this did not meet with
approval4^. On a number of key areas including sticking within terms of reference, not giving
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reasons but considerations in an award, and not giving recommendations the seminars were also used
to reinforce ACAS policy50.
The seminars instigated in 1981 were held on an annual basis51. The format varied from year to year
partially as a result of feedback obtained from arbitrators who attended seminars. It was usual for
ACAS staff to summarise developments in industrial relations and government policy, and outline the
changes and trends in the workload of the service, before giving arbitrators the opportunity to ask
specific questions. The programme normally included papers given by arbitrators on their research
relevant to arbitration; case studies of arbitration cases; and workshops to allow arbitrators to discuss
any specific problems or explore issues of interest to them52. The seminars were attended and chaired
by senior staff in ACAS including the chairman of the service. Conducting an arbitration is a rather
lonely task, the seminars thus provided a forum for arbitrators to meet each other and ACAS staff on a
relatively informal basis and exchange experiences and seek advice.
In the questionnaire survey of arbitrators the role of the bulletins, induction training and seminars, as
perceived by the arbitrators, was pursued. Arbitrators were asked 'Could ACAS do more than it
presently does in the form of bulletins, induction training and seminars to enhance industrial relations
arbitration?'53 Twenty-seven arbitrators answered yes to this question, recommending more regular
meetings, more publicity for the arbitration service and residential seminars; 32 answered no; 3 said
possibly; 6 said don't know; and 2 did not respond. The arbitrators answering yes to the question
were asked to suggest ways in which the training could be improved, for example whether they
favoured obtaining professional qualifications or becoming a member of an Institute. Varied
comments were made, but most arbitrators were against the two options mentioned, but recommended
that greater exchange of information about specific cases would be valuable. However, it was
considered that the process of training could be taken too far with possible implications for the
independence and acceptance of arbitration. The best qualifications and experience were still considered
by the arbitrators to be industrial relations experience.
122
Summary
At first sight there would appear to be some significant changes in the recruitment of arbitrators and the
role of the state in training suitably qualified persons to undertake the duties of an arbitrator. As has
been outlined above, if we compare the backgrounds of arbitrators; the training of arbitrators; the
perceived function of arbitration; and the economic and political climate and orthodoxy in which the
service operates, it can be contended that some shifts in practice have indeed occurred. However, if
we subject these indicators to more thorough analysis, the changes are not as significant as they first
appear.
For example, the shift in the social composition of arbitrators in 1990 is not surprising and is
consistent with social trends in other professions and public appointments. Occupational and class
mobility account for changing patterns of representation. Therefore, it would be unusual if the
composition of arbitrators had not changed over time. What is evident, however, is that arbitrators
are still part of the "brain working class' referred to by the Webbs, although they may not always have
been so as some arbitrators began working in manual trades; and they are people with experience of the
issues most likely to come to arbitration, similar to those appointed under the Board of Trade.
The evidence would suggest that the more formalised selection and training of arbitrators in the 1980s
through seminars and bulletins would appear to be a relatively new development not evident in past
practice. But arbitrators have always had direct communication with the key civil servants involved in
delivering the service. Further they have always been drawn from a relatively small network of people
who are likely to have contact with one another in other spheres of their working lives.
The function of arbitration remains the desire by the state to offset economic dislocation which
industrial disputes may cause. With some notable exceptions, especially in the public sector, where
the employer has been prepared to hold out against a strike54, the continuation of strikes is deemed to
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be costly both to employers in the form of lost profits and to workers in lost pay, but also in a wider
social, economic and political context. If industrial disputes and strikes are considered to have an
adverse effect on the economy, then speedy settlement of the dispute will be encouraged. Under
voluntary arrangements, it is argued by arbitrators and those closely connected with the service that the
parties would not come to arbitration unless they were willing to concede something in order to reach a
resolution. Where parties are not willing to make concessions, the case is unlikely to come to
arbitration in any event The 1989/90 ambulance dispute was one such case where the government
was unwilling to allow arbitration as an option on the grounds that there were insufficient public funds
to pay for any increase above the final offer made by management. Whether arrangements are
voluntary or compulsory, therefore, relates very directly to how the state perceives the costs of
industrial action and the practicality of workability of one system or another. This is an issue which
has changed little over time.
Finally in relation to the specific economic and political climate prevailing at any given time, again it
can be argued that arbitration practice is likely to reflect rather than set the dominant ethos and values.
If the post-war consensus thesis is accepted, the period immediately following the war can been seen as
a time of relative consensus concerning the state's approach to industrial relations, regardless of the
political party in power. In addition the period is marked by the growth of tripartite methods of
problem solving and policy making. ACAS and its arbitration service is a reflection of these
developments. It may have been anticipated that with the election of a government espousing the
benefits of non-consensus and a free market approach to running the economy, which effectively
excluded labour from decision-making arenas, that the arbitration service and hence the role of the
arbitrators may have undergone major changes. Apart from the moves to inject 'new blood' into the
panel of arbitrators and the obvious awareness of increasing financial constraints and developments
especially in the public sector, the dominant ethos in arbitration has changed little. Thus there would
appear to be a form of dualism [Goldthorpe 1984] in the state's treatment of industrial relations. On
the one hand the role of trade unions in macroeconomic policy making has diminished in the 1980s,
tripartism is discouraged and the law has been used on a number of occasions with a view to reforming
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industrial relations in Britain. Yet on the other, tripartism in ACAS is a necessary function for its
acceptance by the parties and its continuation and survival. These arguments will be developed below
in the chapter on the survival and future of ACAS.
1 If ACAS considered it was in the best interest of the parties, arbitrators and the arbitration service itself
that arbitrators should remain relatively anonymous, it is likely that their wishes would be respected by the
industrial press. One can only speculate as to the reasons why the press should collude with this practice. It
could be explained in terms of the relationship which has built up over the years between the press and ACAS
officials. It is likely that the press would respect ACAS's wishes on certain matters, so that they would
continue to benefit from access to information on industrial disputes which are of interest to them. Also,
within the present system of arbitration practice, there may be little to gain from publicising the identity of
arbitrators. This can be contrasted with the practice in the United States where the names and awards of the
arbitrators are known. This information is used by parties in their future choice of arbitrator.
2 See discussion in Concannon [1986] and his recommendations for future research.
2 See Appendices I and III for full results of questionnaire surveys of arbitrators and the parties to
arbitration in 1988.
4 The logic of including women to act as independent persons and arbitrators, even for the practical
reason stated, does not appear to have been applied in future practice. As the survey of arbitrators on the
ACAS panel of arbitrators in 1984 illustrated, only 8 out of a total of 94 arbitrators were women. This is a
very low percentage when one considers that women comprise almost fifty per cent of the labour force in
Britain.
The failure to appoint women in the industrial relations field led to a particular problem for ACAS when
designating a panel of Independent Experts under the terms of the Equal Value legislation. Independent
Experts assist Industrial Tribunals, when required, in deciding whether two jobs are of equal value by
carrying out a detailed job evaluation study of the two jobs in question and preparing a report. Given the
nature of the legislation, one could argue that it would have been preferable to have equal representation, at
least, of men and women on the panel, but ACAS ran into difficulty in identifying a sufficient number of
women with the necessary industrial relations experience. Out of fourteen experts designated by ACAS to the
panel, only three are women - see ACAS Annual Report, 1989.
2 Although the concepts of independence and suitability are not discussed explicitly, they can be linked
with and understood within the context of the dominant ethos which existed in relation to views of the state
and the civil service. That is with the liberal democratic view that the state is neutral and that, in theory at
least, civil servants are politically neutral.
^ Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Minutes of Evidence 45, 1966,
p.1931.
2 Ibid, Minutes of Evidence 60, 1966 p.2163.
8 See Research Paper No.8 to the Donovan Commission.
9 Quoted on page 15 of the Incomes Date Study No.35, Conciliation and Arbitration [1972].
ACAS Annual Report, 1975, p.14.
11 Evidence gathered from interview with John Lockyer in 1989.
12 Comment made by John Lockyer during my interview with him in 1989.
12 Quoted on p.14 of Heclo and Wildavsky [1975].
14 Quoted on p.15 of Heclo and Wildavsky [1975].
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1 2 A related issue of relevance to the discussion and analysis of the arbitration of ACAS is the question of
civil service reform post-1979. It has not been possible within the scope of this thesis to analyse the topic
in any depth. This is a subject on which future research could usefully be carried out.
1 6 The continuity in the practice of the whole process of arbitration will be developed in the chapters which
follow.
* 2 The particular case was recalled by John Lockyer during my interview with him in 1989.
1 ^ Quote from interview with senior ACAS official.
1 9 Quote from one of the many interviews with Les Parsisson. I worked directly with Mr Parsisson during
my time at ACAS Head Office.
20 Information from ACAS officials.
21 Quoted in a report in The Guardian, 20 June, 1984.
22 The Warwick survey involved issuing questionnaires to the arbitrators involved in arbitration cases on
the basis of a one in four sample. The focus was on the most recent disputes handled by the arbitrators,
details of the specific case, terms of reference, arrangements for the hearing, the arbitration hearing itself
and the outcome of the arbitration - information which can be obtained from ACAS's records. As far as the
writer can ascertain the results of the questionnaire have not been analysed or reported.
22 It is probably best that the identity of this arbitrator remains hidden for fear of retaliation by
sociologists!
24 Arbitrators were selected for interview mainly on the basis of 'availability', either when they were
attending Head Office to conduct an arbitration or at ACAS seminars. In addition I interviewed some of the
arbitrators who were located in Scotland.
9 S^ See discussion in footnote 4 above.
26 Information received from ACAS senior official.
22 in 1986 three new arbitrators were recruited, all of them men; in 1988 four new arbitrators were
recruited, three men and one women; in 1989 two new arbitrators were recruited, one man and one woman;
and in 1990 six new arbitrators were recruited, four men and two women.
28 In the Arbitrators' Bulletin No.10 [May 1989], it was noted that there were now 64 'active' arbitrators on
the ACAS panel. Since that time a further 6 arbitrators have been recruited - see Bulletin No.l 1 [May 1990].
29 The results of the survey were made available to Sir Pat Lowry and information on the profile of the
typical arbitrator included by him, with my permission, in his book on third party intervention - see Lowry
[1990a], It is interesting to compare the profile of British arbitrators with the profile of the typical
American arbitrator discussed in Section I of this chapter - see McCarthy's research paper to Donovan
Commission [although the figures for American arbitrators are now somewhat out-of-date]. There would
appear to be a greater tendency for American arbitrators to be legally qualified and to be paid more than their
British counterparts. British arbitrators receive a modest payment for their work. The daily fees payable to
arbitrators for arbitration and mediation hearings, as from 1 April 1990, is £137 and the hourly rate for
preparatory work and report writing is £9.79 per hour [see Arbitrators' Bulletin No.ll, May 1990],
2® A total of 223 questionnaires were issued, 161 in respect of single and boards of arbitration and 62 in
relation to cases brought by the Electricity Supply Industry. 203 questionnaires were returned completed, a
response rate of 91%. See Appendix III for full report of survey.
21 Lord Amulree was referring to practice in the early years of the Conciliation Act 1896. See Amulree
[1929, p.112] for discussion of this.
82 See pages 24/26 of Appendix I.
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3 3 see pages 27/29 of Appendix I. A further disadvantage of side members or assessors not noted by the
arbitrators but mentioned by Les Parsisson is that the parties could be discouraged from making a proper
presentation of their case in the expectation that this deficiency would be put right at a later stage by the side
member/assessor. This could result in the arbitrator making a decision on some important point or aspect of
the case on which one side did not have the opportunity to develop.
34 Another distinction between side members and assessors is that ACAS pays expenses of side members
and no payment is made to assessors.
33 The seminar I attended in November 1983 was described as a 'Seminar of Potential Arbitrators' and took
the form of a one day event. The latest seminar held in February 1990 was described as an 'Introductory
Seminar on Arbitration' and lasted for two days.
3 ^ Eight potential arbitrators were invited to the Introductory Seminar in Arbitration in February 1990 and
six were subsequently appointed.
37 The Chairman of ACAS at this time was Sir Pat Lowry.
3 & All were accepted onto the ACAS panel of arbitrators and participated in the questionnaire survey.
39 The programme for the Introductory Seminar on Arbitration for potential arbitrators which was held in
February 1990 was as follows. Day 1: Welcome and Introduction [Dennis Boyd, Chief Conciliation
Officer]; Arbitration - The Background [George Kahan, Director of Conciliation and Arbitration];
Conciliation and the Pre-Arbitration Process [Dennis Boyd]; The Arbitration and Mediation Process
[Experienced Arbitrator]. Day 2: Experience as a New Arbitrator [New Arbitrator]; Arbitration Case Studies
[Experienced Arbitrator]; Handling the Arbitrators Report and Aftermath [Alastair Campbell, Arbitration
Section - replaced Les Parsisson on his retirement]; and Open Forum and Review [Dennis Boyd and George
Kahan].
40 As discussed above in Chapter 2, there is an historic precedent for this principle - see Chapter 2, [ii] and
footnote 3 for discussion of arbitration as 'last resort'.
41 The outcome of awards themselves will be the subject of another chapter [see Chapter 5].
42 This was an issue debated by arbitrators at their seminars.
43 Quotes from seminar for potential arbitrators in November 1983.
44 This theme will be pursued in Chapter 6. The most likely area of cutback in ACAS was the advisory
service.
43 See ACAS, Arbitrators' Bulletin No.l, Review of Arbitration Services.
4^ 'to sit with Nellie' refers to the practice of sitting in with an experienced arbitrator before a new recruit
takes up his or her first case.
47 See ACAS, Arbitrators' Bulletin No.2.
48 See ACAS, Arbitrators'Bulletin No.l, Review of Arbitration Services.
49 At the seminar in which this occurred, it was made clear to the arbitrator concerned, by ACAS officials,
that this practice was not recommended and could prejudice the arbitration.
30 Issues relating to terms of reference, reasons and recommendations will be discussed in subsequent
chapters.
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No seminars were held in 1990, because of financial constraints. The ACAS budget is tightly
constrained and suffered additional pressure from the pay award achieved by civil servants. This was above
the level allowed for in public expenditure targets which were based on a lower inflation rate.
5 ^ The results of the surveys which are the subject of this thesis were also presented to arbitrators' seminars
by the author.
53 See Appendix I, pp.76/80 for full development of this topic.
54 por example the 1984 miners' strike where the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons that




THE PARTIES, THE ISSUES AND THE HEARING
INTRODUCTION
In chapter 3 the selection and 'training' of arbitrators was examined. But, of course, there would be
no arbitration and no third party intervention if there did not exist parties to a dispute. This chapter
provides information on the parties who have used the arbitration service and the issues which were the
subject of dispute between them. Through discussion of the terms of reference in arbitration, the
question of what the arbitrator is actually asked to do by the parties is explored. Finally ACAS's
involvement in preparing the parties for the hearing and the arrangements for the hearing itself will be
assessed.
The objectives of this chapter are to ascertain whether there have been major changes in the
participants, issues and terms of reference of arbitrations over the post-war period; and whether the
state's role in the proceedings has altered over time.
A major part of the research was the analysis of the arbitration records available at ACAS Head Office
dating from 1942. These took the form of written reports of the arbitrators including their awards.
As has been discussed these records do not constitute public documents and the report and awards are
deemed to be the property of the parties to arbitration. Although Concannon, [1986] and other
arbitrators have the benefit of their own reports and awards on which to base their research, the present
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study is the first systematic review and analysis of the records. Unfortunately it was not possible to
examine background papers to the arbitrations as these are destroyed after a two year period1.
A one in ten random sample of industrial relations arbitration cases was chosen from the reports of
single and boards of arbitration, excluding the awards of the Central Arbitration Committee [CAC],
The objectives of the survey were; first, to identify the main users of arbitration; second, to examine
the types of issues coming to arbitration and the extent to which these have altered over the period;
third, to assess the extent to which arbitrators have been constrained when making their awards [that
is, whether they have been asked to make a straight choice between the offer and the claim, or whether
they have been free to exercise their judgement]; fourth, to ascertain whether or not arbitrators have
given reason for their awards; fifth, to analyse the outcome of the awards themselves; and finally to
evaluate whether or not the criticisms sometimes made of the system, for example that arbitrators
always 'split the difference' or that arbitration is inflationary, are well founded. Objectives four, five
and six will be analysed separately in Chapter 5.
The survey of arbitration awards was of major interest to ACAS staff involved with the collaborative
project. It was of concern to ACAS officials that they should learn from past experience of arbitration
and if possible dispel some of the myths and criticisms that are sometimes levied at this form of third
party intervention2.
130
i] Who Uses the Service?
Given the influence of Jack Jones3 in the setting up of ACAS, his role as a member of the ACAS
Council and the size of the Transport and General Workers Union [TGWU], it is perhaps not
surprising to find that the TGWU is the major user of the service. However, it is clear from the cases
examined, that the TGWU had always been a significant user of the state's arbitration machinery long
before the existence of ACAS4.
Over the period examined from 1942-85, 27% of the cases involved the TGWU; 11% the
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [AUEW]; and 9% the General and Municipal Workers
Union [GMWU]; with the other major users including the Association of Scientific, Technical and
Managerial Staffs [ASTMS], the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer
Staff [APEX], the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union [EETPU], the
National Joint Industrial Council of the Electricity Supply Industry [NJIC/ESI], the Union of Shop,
Distributive and Allied Workers [USDAW], the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation [ISTC], the
National Union of Public Employees [NUPE], the National and Local Government Officers
Association [NALGO] and the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades [SOGAT] [see Figure 4.a]. Of
the remaining 31% of cases a large number of unions were involved, from relatively well known
unions such as the National Union of Seamen [NUS] and the Associated Society of Locomotive
Engineers and Firemen [ASLEF] to less well known unions no longer in existence including the
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The survey supports Concannon's findings [1978] that the largest single trade union user of arbitration
services was the TGWU. While conceding that there could be a number of reasons for the extent of
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Survey of Arbitration Awards, 1942-1985 - See Appendix II.
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"One is bound to come back to the clearly expressed TGWU policy of
using ACAS arbitration as the main explanation of its present position
as a 'user'."
[p. 18]
The evidence also supports Concannon's argument that the expansion in the number of cases from
1975 onwards can be accounted for by the increase in case input from the main trade union users, that
is the TGWU, AUEW and ASTMS; and by the fact that more unions came into the arbitration
system from 1974 onwards as the use of the service increased5. The figures show an increase in the
use of arbitration in the 1970s by ASTMS, APEX, EETPU and the NJIC/ESI, but in relation to
different issues. The ASTMS cases refer largely to grading issues in the universities; the APEX cases
to grading issues brought to arbitration by the firm Massey-Ferguson; and the EETPU and NJIC/ESI
cases to dismissal and discipline matters. The changes reflect the 'writing-in' of arbitration into
collective agreements and procedures6.
Therefore, one reason for the increase in ACAS's arbitration workload since 1975 can be traced to the
writing-in of arbitration into procedures, but of course the decision to take this particular step also
needs explanation. A number of inter-related factors could account for the increase including the
establishment of ACAS itself and the perceived independence from government [particularly in relation
to incomes policy]; the general economic and political climate in which trade unions had a greater role
in government policy making and had benefited from the extension of trade union and workers rights;
the encouragement of 'writing-in' as part of ACAS's policy7; the support for the service from
prominent arbitrators8; or because of past favourable experience of using the service. The decline in
the use of the service post-1979 could then also be explained by the suspicion that the service was no
longer as independent or impartial as it had been; the withdrawal by the government of the right to
proceed to arbitration from many groups in the public sector; the economic recession which led to
increased unemployment and a decrease in industrial disputes; and the changing political climate which
has been interpreted by some as anti-union.
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As unions have adapted to changing economic and political circumstances in the 1980s and when the
economy appeared to be recovering from recession, so 1989 was marked by an increase in the number
of working days lost because of stoppages, major disputes about pay in the public sector and an
increase in ACAS's arbitration workload9. As Table 1.1 illustrates the number of single and boards of
arbitration cases increased from 127 in 1988 to 150 in 1989. The reasons given for the increase are
reflected in a statement from the ACAS Annual Report 1989:
"The most notable features of our arbitration and mediation activities in
1989 were an increase, for the first time for some years, in the
number of requests received by the Service and the significant
contribution made by this type of third-party assistance to the
resolution of several complex and long-running disputes in the public
sector. In the early years of the decade recourse to arbitration had
declined, reflecting the changing climate of industrial relations and
changes in procedural agreements in the public sector. Many of these
had previously provided that either party had the right to refer
unresolved issues to arbitration, binding the other party to the process
and its outcome."10
Distinction should also be made in the analysis of users between employers in the private and public
sector. The survey of the users of arbitration, over the period 1942-85, reveals a division between
private and public sector industries with 18% of cases in the public sector and 82% in the private [see
Figure 4.b]. Some industries, for example steel, have moved in and out of the public sector over the
years, and this was taken into account. In the future the privatisation programme of the Thatcher
administrations is also likely to alter the balance of cases over time with a drop in public sector use as
more nationalised industries are privatised. For example, a substantial number of dismissal and
discipline cases are brought to ACAS arbitration by the electricity supply industry. At this stage it is




Use of Arbitration by Private and Public Sector Industries
in the period 1942-85




Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards, 1942-1985 - See Appendix II.
Attempts were also made to identify the categories of industries using arbitration, but this was not
always possible as the arbitration awards gave insufficient information as to the type of company
involved. Written reports for the earlier years in particular were very brief, in some cases as short as
half or a quarter of a page. From general observations it is clear, however, that the industries using
the service reflect the shift in employment patterns over the period, [for example from manufacturing
to service industries]; and also the level ofmilitancy of certain groups of workers at specific periods of
time [for example car workers in the 1960s], The earlier cases are dominated by references from the
textile, steel, engineering, transport, food and chemical industries, while more recent users include
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the education, banking, newspaper and television sectors. A major user of the service over the whole
period was the food and drink industry, the alcoholic drink industry in particular being a source of
many discipline cases.
The main users of arbitration then would appear to be those groups of workers with most developed
bargaining structures who also play a prominent role in the Trades Union Congress [TUC]. The
employers in the main are those who are party to national and local collective agreements, the
majority of whom are in the private sector. The analysis of users also reveals no significant changes
over the period except as a reflection of changing patterns of employment and economic conditions.
However, excluded from the figures are cases brought under the controversial Schedule II of the
Employment Protection Act 1975. Schedule II operated from January 1977 until it was abolished by
the Conservative government in 1980. Under this procedure trade unions could seek to improve the
terms and conditions of employment of their members on the grounds of comparability by invoking
certain standards set either at national or industry level or generally within an industry in a district.
The introduction of Schedule II was controversial because it was brought into effect during a period of
economic difficulties and pay restraint and was considered by some to be inflationary. The majority of
these cases were heard by the CAC and accounted for a significant proportion of its work. Analysing
the experience of the first two years of the CAC's involvement with Schedule II, Jones [1980] found
that the engineering industry dominated the awards with 45 per cent of cases although it had represented
only 17 per cent of employees. The other major user was the food, drink and tobacco industry with
10 per cent of awards. Although smaller groups of workers were the most prominent in the CAC
awards, accounting for 57 per cent of awards for groups of workers of 50 or less and 74 per cent of the
awards when the group size was 100 or less, they were in the main represented by the major trade
unions including the AUEW, TGWU, ASTMS, APEX and GMWU [Jones, 1980, p.36].
In addition Section II of the Employment Protection Act 1975 [not to be confused with Schedule II]
provided a procedure for dealing with trade union claims for recognition. ACAS was charged with the
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duty of encouraging the settlement of the issue by agreement with the help of conciliation. If, on
recommendation that a union be recognised, the employer refused to implement the recommendation, a
provision for further conciliation existed. If the issue was still not settled, then the union had the right
to make a unilateral claim to the CAC under Section 16 of the Act for the issue to be settled by
arbitration. This procedure was similar to that recommended by the Donovan Commission which
concluded that recognition questions should be handled by some new special tribunal which would not
act as an arbitrator, but would operate more like a permanent Court of Inquiry [Lockyer, 1979, p.25].
Lockyer [1979] records that during the three years 1976, 1977 and 1978 ACAS did not refer a single
recognition issue to arbitration under its voluntary arbitration arrangements, although it did settle a
large number of recognition disputes through conciliation [p.24].
As with Schedule II, recognition disputes under Section II were a controversial topic and during 1978
and 1979 ACAS was challenged in the courts by both employers and trade unions over the discharge of
its duties relating to trade union recognition11. The new Conservative administration of 1979 carried
out its proposals to abolish the statutory procedure for trade union recognition. For the purposes of
this survey, had the Schedule II and Section II cases been handled by the ACAS arbitration service,
the balance of users would have been altered.
ii] The Issues which come to Arbitration
The next topic to be explored is the issues which parties refer to arbitration and the extent to which
these have changed over time. The issues coming to arbitration are sometimes divided in the literature
between issues of right or issues of interest. Lockyer [1979] defines the distinction between the two
as follows:
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"An issue of Right involves the application of an agreement
[interpretation of the past]....An issue of Interest involves the
formulation of an agreement [decision for the future]."
Lockyer's definition is consistent with that adopted by Knoop at the beginning of the century as
follows:
"There are two distinct classes of labour dispute. The first class arises
out of the interpretation of existing contracts. These disputes are
generally individual, and are particularly suited for settlement by
arbitration, if no setdement can be effected by any other method. The
second class is caused by difficulties about the terms of future contracts,
and these disputes are usually characterised by their collective nature."
[Knoop, 1905, p.8]
The distinction between right and interest cases is, however, not as clearcut as the definitions infer.
What might appear on the surface to be a straightforward rights issue, could have implications for
interests in the future. Also it would be misleading to categorise particular types of issues, for
example grading, as always falling into the rights category. The majority do fall into this category,
where the arbitrator is asked to decide, by examining the current agreement, whether a job should be
classified grade A or B; but in other cases the arbitrator is asked to establish a new grading system,
thus falling into the interest category. Figures separating cases between rights and interest issues
should, therefore, be used with some caution. With these qualifications in mind, the distribution of
issues has been categorised from the data as 70% Rights; 29% Interest and 1% Mix. The category
'Mix' refers to cases which include both rights and interests where the arbitrator was asked first to
interpret the current agreement and then to settle a dispute over drafting of the new agreement.
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FIGURE 4.c
Distribution of Issues between Rights and Interests
Arbitration Awards 1942-85
[a one in ten sample]
From Figure 4.c it can be seen that the majority of cases do fall into the rights category. Issues of
right are often considered to be most appropriate for arbitration. For example, Lockyer states:
"In many cases disputes about the interpretation of agreements fall back
into the black and white category, where only one of two decisions is
possible, and compromise is ruled out. Such disputes make good
arbitrable issues and it is probable that, with the extension of the
practice of formulating agreements in writing at plant as well as at
national level, more disputes of this kind will be referred to arbitration.
In this field, arbitration often plays a useful remedial role in removing




This view is supported by the statement from ACAS's previous Chairman, Sir Pat Lowry:
"In my view the strongest case for a wider use of arbitration lies in the
application and interpretation of rights already established by collective
agreement Many of these agreements are notoriously badly drafted and
I question whether in the event of a difference of view it is always
necessary to determine a correct interpretation by the use of industrial
muscle."
[Lowry, 1986, p.20]
More controversy has surrounded the use of arbitration in interest cases. It is likely that, although
fewer in number, the interest issues will include the most complex cases involving national pay
disputes and/or a substantial number of workers; and it is in these cases where the control exercised by
the arbitrator is most subject to criticism. For example, arbitrators are often accused of 'splitting the
difference'12.
The distinction between rights and interest is a feature of the American model of arbitration and can be
understood within the context of industrial relations in the USA. It is not common for trade unions
and employers in Britain to distinguish between them12. In concluding his arguments for the use of
arbitration to aid industrial change, Johnston states:
"The terminology of 'rights' and 'interest' applied to disputes may be
unhelpful, in that it tends to polarise discussion of appropriate
industrial peace-keeping machinery. It may then be easier in Britain
than in countries which do draw such a distinction to move in the
direction of firmer institutional devises, such as arbitration, for
reaching accommodations between the parties to collective bargaining."
[Johnston, 1975, p.88]
Another way of categorising arbitration cases, other than on the basis of rights or interest, is in
respect of the types of issues which are the subject of arbitration. It is this method which is used by
ACAS in its Annual Reports.
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Over the period examined from 1942-85 very similar issues were the subject of arbitration cases,
although some were time specific, for example disputes over war bonuses in the 1940s or equal pay
for women in the 1980s. Pay and terms and conditions of employment accounted for 66% of the
cases; dismissal and discipline for 18%; and grading for 12%. Other cases included redundancy or
demarcation disputes and other trade union matters. Figure 4.d provides a break-down of the issues for
the whole period.
FIGURE 4.d
Issues which were the subject of Arbitration Awards
In the period 1942-85
[a one in ten sample]









Pay&T/C[l] Grading D». & Redundancy Demarcation Other TVDCS of Cases
Disc. [2]
[1] Pay and Terms and Conditions of Employment.
[2] Dismissal and Discipline cases.
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp.13/15.
A more detailed analysis of the figure [see Appendix II [b], pp.13/15] reveals that although issues
relating to pay and terms and conditions issues dominated the awards for the years 1942-69, from 1970
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there was a rise in the number of dismissal and discipline cases and also a significant increase in the
number of grading issues. Again this could be a reflection of the writing-in of disputes over these
issues into procedure agreements. In addition it is probable that the use of incomes policies in the
1970s could have resulted in an increase in requests for re-grading as a way of offsetting the effects of a
pay pause or percentage increase; similarly the extension of dismissal rights for workers in the 1970s
may have raised both awareness and confidence in taking cases to arbitration. With regard to dismissal
cases, the increase may also reflect a dissatisfaction with aspects of Industrial Tribunal hearings
[Williams, 1983 and Rideout, 1986]. Critics of the system drew attention to the level of legalism
and the low level of reinstatement for employees who were unfairly dismissed14. Indeed the topic was
debated within ACAS in the mid-1980s and the possibility of reforming the system and increasing the
use of arbitration as an alternative was explored. The then Chairman of ACAS, Sir Pat Lowry, stated
at a lecture on industrial relations:
"I know that many employers and trade unions are concerned with the
way in which the industrial tribunals have become submerged by what
is loosely described as legalism. Arbitration can never become a
substitute for the industrial tribunal procedure for the simple reason that
any employee is always entitled to exercise his rights under the law.
But there is nothing to prevent say a case of alleged unfair dismissal
being first referred to arbitration - as indeed they are in the electricity
supply industry. Once an arbitrator has pronounced in that industry,
it is unknown for the issue to be referred to a tribunal for final
determination. The arbitrator's award is accepted even if as it
sometimes does, it requires the employer to vary the disciplinary
penalty, eg, by suspension rather than by outright dismissal."
[Lowry, 1986, p.21]
The possibility of extending the use of arbitration in unfair dismissal cases was also the subject of a
paper and discussion at the ACAS Seminars in 198515. One arbitrator [Concannon, 1980] has
compared the differences between the two approaches, Industrial Tribunal and arbitration, to unfair
dismissal, while another, Professor Rideout [1986] is a prominent advocate for the case of extending
the use of arbitration in this area. In the event, the government did not fundamentally alter the
legislation with respect to unfair dismissal and instead reforms were made to the Industrial Tribunal
system.
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Nonetheless, dismissal and discipline issues do account for a significant proportion of cases which
come to arbitration especially in the post 1980 period16. If comparison is made between the figures
for the whole period covered by the survey of awards and the 1989 distribution of issues, it is evident
that pay issues have declined in percentage terms relative to dismissal and discipline and grading cases.
Table 4.1 details the changes as follows:
TABLE 4.1
Distribution of Issues referred to Arbitration and Mediation
Comparison between 1942-85 period and figures for 1989
[a one in ten sample]
1989 1942-85
No. % No. %
Annual Pay 27 16 309 66
Other Pay and Conditions of Employment 34 20 [1] [1]
Dismissal and Discipline 55 33 83 18
Grading 37 22 57 12
Others 4 9 18 4
Total 167 100 467 100
[1] Note that the figures for 'Other Pay and Conditions of Employment' are included in the figures for
'Annual Pay'.
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbtration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix n.a, b and c and ACAS Annual
Report 1989
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Notwithstanding the decline in pay issues referred to arbitration over the period, pay still accounts for
more than one-third of arbitration cases and these are the issues which receive most media attention
especially if they result in actual or threatened industrial action. It is necessary to distinguish between
annual pay claims and other pay and conditions of work. Many pay issues are not about annual pay
claims, but are concerned with matters such as bonus payments and allowances, payment during
strikes and holiday pay, and often involve small numbers of employees. However, what appears to
be a relatively trivial issue on the surface may have implications for the future, or may be a symptom
of other industrial relations problems at the place of work. These points were highlighted in the
discussions between arbitrators at the 1986 seminars when case studies of actual arbitrations were
examined. Nevertheless particular attention is given by the media to interest cases involving national
pay disputes and it is the outcome of arbitrations on this issue which attracts most attention from
critics and supporters of the service alike. The former on the grounds that arbitration results in
inflationary pay awards by an arbitrator who gives little attention to economic conditions or the
employers' ability to pay; and the latter in terms that arbitration is a preferable and more reasonable
way of settling a dispute reducing the real costs to all those involved especially if industrial action is
avoided. The results of the arbitration and the arbitrators' awards will be the subject of Chapter 5.
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iii] What is the Arbitrator Asked to Do?: The Terms of Reference
A major debate in the 1980s concerning arbitration has related to the terms of reference given to the
arbitrator at the outset of the case. The form which this debate has taken concerns promotion of what
is described in the literature as flip flop, pendulum, final offer or straight choice arbitration. Under
such arrangements the arbitrator is constrained in his or her remit to make an award either in favour of
the company's last offer or in favour of the union's last claim. This differs from terms of reference
which allow the arbitrator scope to make an award at some point between the claim and offer. Broad
terms of reference do not, however, prevent the arbitrator from awarding in favour of either the claim
or offer, or indeed from making an award below the company's offer17. An example of straight
choice terms of reference is:
"The arbitrator is asked to decide whether the 5.7% increase on basic
salaries already awarded and implemented by the society is to stand or
whether the claims by the Staff Association for an increase in basic
salaries of 6% is to be met, the arbitrator to decide for one party or the
other [ie 'pendulum arbitration']"18
In contrast an example of terms of reference which allow the arbitrator scope in determining his or her
award is:
"To determine the level of the 1985 pay award [as from 1 August 1985]
for Meat Porters/Cutters employed at Stanley Meat Market, Liverpool,
taking into account all relevant information submitted by Management
and Union."^
Interest in straight choice arbitration grew in the 1980s partially as a response to one of the criticisms
of arbitration mentioned above, that it was inflationary. Supporters of straight choice arbitration, in
the main advocates of free market economics, mobilised opinion regarding the advantages of this
procedure as an alternative to strike action by trade unions or a government imposed incomes policy20.
By adopting straight choice between the claim and offer, it was argued that this encouraged the parties,
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specifically the union, to be realistic in their claim. To make a claim which appeared to be excessive
would run the risk of losing the arbitration without improving on the offer made by the employer.
Lewis [1990] summarises the policy debate on the advantages and disadvantages of straight choice
arbitration as compared with 'conventional' arbitration as follows:
"On the positive side, it is said to provide an alternative to strikes
which overcomes the supposed defects of conventional arbitration,
limiting the arbitrator's discretion, offering a strong incentive for
settlement and encouraging closer and more reasonable positions if
arbitration proves necessary. On the negative side, it is said that
pendulum arbitration may founder on the difficulty of defining the
parties' final positions, that it is unsuitable for complex disputes
involving packages of proposals, and that it may be unfair and harmful
to industrial relations where the parties' final positions are
unsatisfactory and yet the arbitrator, deprived of flexibility, has to
give total victory to one side."
[Lewis, 1990, p.45]
Straight choice arbitration is often promoted in conjunction with other collective bargaining options
designed to improve industrial relations, including so-called no-strike agreements or single union deals
and in some cases compulsory arbitration is advocated as an alternative to industrial disputes [Burrows,
1986], These developments are referred to in the literature as illustrations of 'new unionism' or the
'Japanisation' of British industrial relations on the grounds that the practices have their origin in Japan
and have been imported into Britain through the collective agreements entered into by workers and
management in Japanese owned plants [Bassett, 1986].
In analysing the cases coming to arbitration in the period 1942-85, the terms of reference were divided
between four categories. 'Straight choice' - where the arbitrator was asked to decide between the last
offer of the employer and the last claim of the union; 'judgement' - where the arbitrator was allowed to
reach a decision between the offer and the claim if s/he wished or to award in favour of the union's
claim or the company's offer; 'revoked, confirmed or varied' - a category which applies to a specific
option in dismissal and discipline cases [mainly in the procedures of the electricity supply industry];
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and 'split' - where the arbitrator was faced with two sets of terms of reference, one from the employer
and the other from the union.
For all types of cases covered and over the whole period, the breakdown between the four categories was




Terms of Reference for Cases referred to Arbitration
In the period 1942-85








[1] Revoked, Confirmed or Varied - applies to dismissal and discipline cases only.
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp.7/9.
Although the debate over straight choice arbitration has re-emerged in the 1980s, it is evident from the
survey that straight choice [flip flop, pendulum or final offer] arbitration has been a feature of British
industrial relations at least post-1942 and is not necessarily a development of the so-called Japanisation
of industrial relations in 1980s. As Figure 4.e above illustrates, straight choice references account for
over 50% of the cases examined in the survey. It should be noted, however, that although the debate
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on straight choice surrounds pay issues, straight choice decisions have not been confined to pay, and
indeed it is often contended that they are more appropriate for issues of right including a dismissal or
grading issue, that is questions such as 'should an employee be dismissed or not'; or 'should the grade
for the job be A or B'.
In addition, although it is acknowledged in the literature that straight choice has operated in relation to
rights issues in the past, it is not normally acknowledged that it was practiced in relation to interest
cases concerning pay. For the period examined, in issues concerning pay and terms and conditions of
employment, 31% restricted the scope of the arbitrator to a straight choice decision, while 67%
allowed the arbitrator to use his or her discretion [see Figure 4.f], However, although arbitrators
could have made a compromise award in 67% of cases, they did so in only 55% of cases; and
arbitrators actually made a straight choice decision in 41% of the cases examined22.
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FIGURE 4.f
Terms of Reference for Cases relating to Pay
and Terms and Conditions of Employment referred to Arbitration
In the period 1942-85
[a one in ten sample]
0 Straight Choice
□ Judgement
■ Split and N/A [1]
[1] Applies to Split decisions and those cases which were non-applicable [N/A].
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp.22/24.
A more detailed analysis of the overall trend for the period illustrates that for all issues, straight choice
dominated the terms of reference at least until 1958 and for pay issues until 1950. However, because
of the small sample especially of pay related cases, care should be taken in drawing conclusions from
the figures. The figures show different trends at different periods of time and vary between all cases
and pay related cases23.
Another important factor to consider is that the cases up to the year 1958 operated under Order 1305
from 1940-51 and Order 1376 from 1951-1958. During these periods unilateral access to arbitration
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was in existence and most claims were initiated by the union. The choice faced by the arbitrator,
therefore, was to choose for or against pay claims made by the unions, as in most cases the employers
did not concede that an increase should be granted. An example of the terms of reference operating at
this time are:
"To consider and determine the Union's claim as follows:
[1] That the minimum rate be increased to 100/- per week with
proportionate increase for skippers and enginemen.
[2] That the present tonnage rate be increased by one penny per ton."
The arbitrator's decision in this case was:
"After full consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties I find
that the claim of the Union has not been established."24
However, the evidence from this present survey is not the earliest reference to the existence of straight
choice arbitration in the literature. In a paper written by Treble [1984] entitled 'How new is final offer
arbitration?', the author reveals that final offer arbitration operated in the British Coal Industry
Conciliation Boards at the turn of the century. The Boards' Constitution provided, that in the event of
no agreement being reached between the parties, an arbitrator should be brought in to give the casting
vote.
"There is one very important rule limiting the action of the independent
chairman or umpire in his decision in regard to an increase or decrease
of wages. It is that he has power only to decide for or against the
proposals previously made in writing by one side or the other side ...
Thus, if the workmen make an application for a 5 per cent increase of
wages, and the owners reply offering an increase of 11/4 per cent, the
chairman has no power to split the difference but must decide on one or
the other."
[Jevons [1915] quoted in Treble, 1984]
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Treble notes, however, that not all Boards interpreted their constitutions in this way. For example,
in Scotland arbiters exercised their judgement in reaching an award, while in the Federated Area, South
Wales, Durham and Northumberland the arbitrators interpreted their task as deciding between the final
offer or the final claim of the parties. With the exception of South Wales, the final offer
interpretation was changed - in Durham and Northumberland at the first opportunity and in the
Federated Area after a number of years. Changes to the constitution were largely as a result of pressure
from the arbitrators themselves. For example, one arbitrator expressed his dissatisfaction with the
constraint imposed on him:
"I suggested that I thought it would be advantageous in our proceedings
if you would allow some elasticity of decision in the Chairman beyond
saying 'Yes' or 'No' to a hard and fast proposition I would tell you at
once that it would be very much more acceptable to me if, instead of
moving to take off 10% in one motion, you would move to take if off
in two motions - that is, two separate motions - the 5% of January to
be taken off, and the 5% of October to be taken off, so that if it
should be thought that 5% ought to come off instead of 10% or even 7
or 8% instead of 10%, I should have more opportunity of arriving at
the exact state of wages I thought should exist."25
Treble makes reference to Jevons [1915] to identify the first claims of the so-called superiority of final
offer arbitration. The advantages cited are that the chairman has no power to compromise or 'split the
difference' between the claim and offer; it is more likely to result in reasonable pay demands from
unions; the offer and the claim are less likely to differ widely; much of the work is undertaken before
the parties come to the arbitrator; and one side is always satisfied [the converse, of course, is that one
side is always dissatisfied].
Treble states that the experience of the coal miners of Great Britain with final-offer arbitration was
mixed. In some areas they abandoned final-offer arbitration very quickly while in South Wales and the
Federated Area, the experiment continued for some time. He concludes that:
152
"It is a striking feature of the records that the parties to the negotiations
seem to have been uniformly indifferent as to the voting powers of the
arbitrator. It was always the arbitrator himself who raised objections
to it."
[Treble, 1984, p.25]
The debates over the advantages/disadvantages of final offer arbitration in the early 1900s are extremely
similar to those being expressed in current industrial relations debates. Some arbitrators consider that
in pay claims final offer arbitration is unsatisfactory. For example, Sir John Wood [1985] highlights
some of the disadvantages of last offer arbitration including the problem of determining the 'last offer'
and the 'last claim' and subjecting what are often complex and complicated cases involving a number of
issues to final offer decisions. Sid Kessler's paper to the 1985 arbitrators' seminars discussed the
difficulties involved from an arbitrator's point of view in taking such a case, particularly when [as was
his experience in a final offer case] the parties themselves hold different views over the interpretation of
the pendulum arbitration clause in their agreement and thus had different expectations of the outcome.
Roy Lewis [1990], also drawing on his experience as an arbitrator, argues that pendulum arbitration
"can be less conducive to the sensible resolution of disputes than more open forms of arbitration."
[p.50]. Although proposals for final offer arbitration especially for 'essential services' in the public
sector have been mooted along the lines of those operating in North America, Lewis contends:
"These proposals are open to challenge on grounds of policy,
practicality and economic cost, and pendulum arbitration is itself
problematical. A pragmatic reform of dispute resolution procedures in
essential services might include the option of pendulum arbitration in
appropriate cases, but only as part of a flexible and sensitive approach
to third-party intervention."
[Lewis, 1990, p.50]
Reservations about the operation of final offer arbitration from non-arbitrators are also to be found.
For example, using case study material, Webb [1990] examined the feasibility of final offer
arbitration as a method for the resolution of industrial disputes in the public sector. She argues that
although final offer arbitration may have a role in relatively simple cases, it is likely to be
unworkable, if not harmful to industrial relations, in complex disputes:
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"It is unrealistic to expect an external third party to produce a definitive
resolution of disputes which constitute a major conflict about the
appropriate frame of reference to be used in determining the value of
subsequent concessions. Consequently the use of final offer arbitration
in such cases is likely to go severely wrong unless there is a method
for distinguishing between disputes which are amenable to adjudication
and those requiring something more akin to mediation."
[Webb, 1990, p. 124]
Advocates of straight choice arbitration are to be found amongst arbitrators, economists and
proponents of free market economics such as the Institute of Directors [IOD], Supporters of straight
choice arbitration often argue that it should be instituted as a substitute for strike action [especially in
the public sector] and/or as a substitute for 'conventional' arbitration which they consider to be open to
criticism. Ramsumair Singh [1986], one of the arbitrators on ACAS's panel, examined the strengths
and weaknesses of final offer arbitration in relation to conventional arbitration. He concluded that final
offer arbitration had much to commend it, both in theory and practice, especially if mediation was
involved as an integral step, and that its use in the public sector should be explored further. Professor
James Meade's proposal for a 'not quite compulsory arbitration' policy and the setting up of an arbitral
body which would be restricted to final offer arbitration is analysed by Minford and Peel [1983].
Although criticising the proposal on the grounds that it stipulates that the primary determinant of pay
should be on the basis of promotion of employment, the authors argue the case for final offer
arbitration in restricted circumstances:
"notably to prevent strikes in sensitive areas of continuing public
sector monopoly and transitionally to enforce interim settlements in
labour markets where a Monopolies Commission has produced a
damaging report, to be carried out over a period."
[Minford and Peel, 1983, p.15]
It is interesting to note the current demand from some employers, such as those represented by the
IOD, for compulsory arbitration in the 1980s and support for final offer arbitration. One IOD
publication records:
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"Many employers are concerned that we are witnessing a resurgence of
the 'British disease'...."We wish to see, as part of the procedure in the
essential services, the including of compulsory and binding
arbitration...."We would welcome further discussion on the concept of
final offer arbitration with a view to considering how this idea could fit
into the pattern of British industrial relations."
[Institute of Directors, 1984, pp. 1/2]
In contrast, in the different economic climate of the 1950s, that is during the period of full
employment and when unilateral access to arbitration was available under Orders 1305 and 1376,
employers at the time considered this procedure to be inflationary and to give excessive power to trade
unions26. This change of attitude on behalf of some employers provides some insight into the
relationship between the balance of power between the parties at any given time and the economic
conditions under which they are operating. In the economic recession of the 1980s, some employers
at least considered they had something to gain by promoting unilateral access and straight choice
arbitration.
Given these different views on the use of final offer arbitration, it is useful to examine the impact of
the debate on the approach and policy of ACAS and its officials. In a speech delivered in 1986, Sir
Pat Lowry, the then Chairman, stated:
"ACAS has been accused of being opposed to final offer arbitration.
This is not the case. We are rightly questioning of any industrial
relations nostrum that is marketed as if it had all the qualities of Dr
Collis Browne's famous panacea. But we very much welcome
change and experimentation and, speaking personally, I would very
much like to see one or two of those public sector problems to which I
referred earlier being referred by joint agreement to final offer
arbitration."
[Lowry, 1986, p. 19]
The pros and cons of final offer arbitration have also been debated at ACAS seminars, and Bamber
[1987] states that at ACAS arbitration seminars, at least six possible disadvantages of pendulum
arbitration were identified27. However, in its Bulletins to arbitrators, ACAS has included references
to the use of pendulum arbitration, but has restricted its comments to factual reporting of the case and
the outcome of the arbitration28.
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The Annual Reports of ACAS and the CAC [1984] discussed the concept of straight choice arbitration
and imply that this form of arbitration is normally reserved for rights issues. Both reports, therefore,
under-estimated the use of straight choice arbitration in interest cases in the past. The 1989 ACAS
report outlines ACAS's current views on the issue as follows:
"In 1989 there was renewed awareness of the potential benefits of
arbitration and mediation, including a public debate about the value of
'straight choice' or 'Pendulum' arbitration. Here, in the event of a
final failure to agree, management and unions are committed to accept
the decision of a third party who resolves the difference by choosing
one or other of the two competing propositions advanced by them.
The general concept is, of course, far from new, and where non-pay
issues are concerned has been used over many years. In pay matters,
however, its advantages are less clear because of the possible effects it
can have in inhibiting negotiations, or establishing concepts of
winning and losing. We noted few new procedural agreements in 1989
which provided solely for pendulum arbitration."
[ACAS Annual Report, 1989, p.25]
When asked in the questionnaire if they considered there was wider scope for the use of straight choice,
flip flop or pendulum arbitration, a substantial number of arbitrators, 22, answered yes to this
question and a further 6 arbitrators said yes with certain conditions29. From Table 4.2 below, it is




Views of ACAS Arbitrators on
Wider Scope for Use of Straight Choice Arbitration
Response Number of Arbitrators
Yes 22
Yes, with certain conditions 6
No 15
Parties should decide 4
Depends on circumstances of the case 4
More research needed before deciding 2





Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I, p.46.
However, when asked if they preferred to make a straight choice in favour of one side or the other,
only 10 arbitrators answered yes to this question. Fourteen arbitrators were against such an option and
23 said they had no preference as it depended on the circumstances of the case [see Table 4.3].
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TABLE 4.3
Preference of ACAS Arbitrators for Straight Choice Terms of Reference
Response Number of Arbitrators
Yes 10
No 14
No preference - depends on the circumstances of the case 23
A matter for the parties, not the arbitrator to decide 2
Only when parties require it 6
Occasionally 4
Central question is to make an acceptable award and 5
resolve the dispute




Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbtrators - see Appendix I, p.45.
The views of the parties to arbitration on this issue were also sought. In the questionnaire issued to
employers and trade unions, they were asked, in the event of a dispute proceeding to arbitration,
whether their procedure agreements placed specific restrictions on the arbitrator's terms of reference.
Sixteen respondents answered yes to this question stating that the arbitrator can only decide either for
the employer's or for the union's final position [straight choice arbitration]. In a further 8 cases there
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were other restrictions on the scope of the arbitrator's decision. In the majority of cases, 91, the
arbitrator was free to award as s/he thought appropriate [see Table 4.4]30.
TABLE 4.4
Procedure Agreements of Parties to Arbitration 1988




Yes, the arbitrator can only decide either for the 16 11.1
employer's or for the union's final position
[straight choice arbitration]
Yes, there are other restrictions on the 8 5.6
arbitrator's decision
No, the arbitrator is free to award as he/she 91 63.2
thinks appropriate
No response 29 20.1
Source: Brown, Survey of Parties to ACAS Arbtration 1988, see Appendix III, Question 7[c].
When asked about the specific cases which had gone to arbitration in 1988 in which they were
involved, 39 respondents said that the arbitrator was restricted under the terms of reference to a straight
choice decision; 14 that the arbitrator was restricted in other ways; and 90 said the arbitrator was free
to award as s/he thought appropriate [see Table 4.5]. The perceptions of the parties to arbitration did
not always coincide. For example, 38 management representatives considered that the arbitrator was
free to award as s/he thought appropriate, compared to 52 trade union representatives31.
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TABLE 4.5




The terms of reference require the arbitrator to
choose the employer's or the union's final
position
39 27.1
The arbitrator was restricted in other ways 14 9.7
The arbitrator was free to award as he/she
thought appropriate
90 62.5
No response 1 0.7
Source: Brown, Survey of Parties to ACAS Arbtration 1988, see Appendix III, Question 12.
It is interesting to compare what the parties thought the arbitrator was asked to do with the actual
outcome of the arbitration. Although in over sixty per cent of cases they thought the arbitrator was
free to make a compromise award between the offer and the claim, when the parties were asked about
the outcome of the arbitration only 37 respondents [25.7%] perceived that the arbitrator had made a
compromise award32. Therefore, even when a compromise decision is available to the arbitrator and
pendulum arbitration is not imposed on him or her in the terms of reference, there is evidence to
suggest that arbitrators are not opposed to making straight choice decisions, as the evidence from the
survey of the arbitration awards also indicates33.
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One of the reasons for exploring the terms of reference of arbitration is that they set out the boundaries
of proceedings within which the arbitrator can operate; and especially if restrictions on the scope of the
arbitrator are included, can limit the power of the arbitrator. It is customary for the terms of reference
to be agreed between the parties before the case can proceed to a hearing. In exceptional cases where
the parties are unable to agree terms of reference, the arbitration may proceed with two separate terms
of reference, but this is unusual and not recommended by ACAS staff. Some procedure agreements,
like those for the electricity supply industry and some of the new so-called 'no strike' agreements,
specify the terms of reference in advance. Although in theory the parties should draft the terms of
reference, the conciliation service provides assistance with their preparation:
"the conciliation branch of ACAS is always prepared to assist with the
preparation of terms of reference and it is a good idea to make use of the
service offered by these experienced conciliators."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.56]
It is common, therefore, for a conciliation officer to be involved in drafting the terms of reference,
particularly if the dispute has been the subject of conciliation before proceeding to arbitration. It is
considered essential that the arbitrator's terms of reference are unambiguous and as far as possible
address the key issue of the dispute. If the terms of reference are unclear, or if the parties to the
dispute hold different interpretations of the terms of reference, this could result in difficulties during the
arbitration hearing and over the acceptability of the arbitrator's final report and award. Referring to
practice in the 1970s, Lockyer states:
"The arbitrator's terms of reference set out the question which he is
required to answer and is of fundamental importance - ask a silly
question and you are liable to get a silly answer. An ACAS survey
carried out in 1976 showed that in a large proportion of those few cases
where difficulties arose in the later stages of arbitration there was some
defect in the terms of reference. The importance of preparing proper
terms of reference cannot be emphasized too strongly."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.54]
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In order to reduce the problems associated with poorly drafted terms of reference, ACAS has developed
their staff training programme for conciliation officers to include instruction and advice from arbitration
staff on this and other subjects associated with arbitration34.
The more direct role played by conciliation officers in drafting terms of reference appears to contradict
evidence given by one of the Ministry of Labour's witnesses to the Donovan Commission. When
asked by George Woodcock: "What are the terms of reference you give in arbitration cases?", the
official replied: "The terms of reference are given by the parties to the arbitration.". When pressed
with the question: "Do you think the Ministry might in giving terms of reference to Arbitration
Tribunals look perhaps more closely than they have done in the past?", again the official replied: "At
present we are entirely in the hands of the parties because we cannot refer to arbitration except with the
agreement of the parties and in practice they determine their own terms of reference.". The response
from GeorgeWoodcock was "I cannot believe you are as neutral as all that."33.
It would appear that either ACAS policy is different from that operated by government officials in the
Ministry of Labour: and/or ACAS officials are now less coy about their role than their Ministry of
Labour counterparts. Les Parsisson's view is that ACAS policy on terms of reference does not
necessarily contradict what was said by the Ministry of Labour official in his evidence to the Donovan
Commission. After the establishment of ACAS a more 'positive' policy was adopted in conciliation
including drafting terms of reference, but ultimately the terms of reference are set by the parties to
arbitration36.
In their first Bulletin to arbitrators, ACAS records that there was general satisfaction expressed by
arbitrators with the quality of terms of reference presented to them:
"This reflected well on conciliators who played an important role in
ensuring that, as far as possible, the terms accurately defined the issue
and indicated, without ambiguity, precisely what was expected from
the arbitrator."37
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Arbitrators were informed that to minimise any future problems with terms of reference, two changes
in practice were to be adopted. First that conciliation assistance would be offered in advance of the
hearing "so that terms of reference and other arrangements for arbitration could be clarified and
mutually agreed"; and second that in cases going straight to arbitration without conciliation
"arbitrators should adopt, as a matter of routine, the practice of checking and clarifying the terms of
reference with the parties immediately before hearings start."38.
In the induction seminar for arbitrators held in 1983, the senior arbitrator present stated that the
preparation of the terms of reference was largely the conciliator's job and noted that "the degree of
professionalism in this area and others has increased very significantly in the last few years.". He
went on to argue that "you do not want to exceed your terms of reference" before offering practical
advice on clarifying the terms of reference with the parties before proceeding with the hearing39.
Oral evidence from the seminars held by ACAS for its arbitrators would indicate that every effort is
made to encourage arbitrators not to stray beyond the terms of reference actually set out for them by the
parties. To do so, it is argued, again runs the risk of prejudicing the proceedings at the hearing and
acceptability of the award. ACAS officials were pressed in discussion by arbitrators about exceeding
the terms of reference when, during the hearing, it becomes evident that there is an underlying issue
which needs to be addressed but does not form part of the formal reference. Their response was that,
although this was not recommended, there may be few occasions when it was possible as long as the
parties were both agreeable. In reply, one arbitrator commented that in such an event:
"I stifle my temptation to play God - my loyalty to you above my
sense of justice."40
The final acceptability of the award, which is morally and not legally binding, and the avoidance of
another dispute, therefore, play a crucial part in the attitude of officials to the terms of reference and
constraint on the arbitrators.
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Although, as indicated, the conciliation officer may have a key role in assisting the drafting of the
terms of reference, the role of the parties themselves should not be underestimated. Depending on the
complexity of the case and the relative experience of the parties to arbitration, drawing up the terms of
reference can also be the subject of some negotiation between the parties. In this sense, this stage can
be viewed as a continuation of the bargaining process. The process is then extended to the preparation
for and proceedings at the hearing.
iv] Preparation for the Hearing
It is usual for written statements of the case prepared by the parties to be exchanged and then submitted
to ACAS for transmission to the arbitrator before the hearing:
"This [the written statement] should be as clear and complete as the
parties can make it with the resources available to them since good
written evidence helps the arbitrators] to form a clear picture of the
situation and the problem in advance of the actual hearing. This may
also help the parties to make their oral statements at the hearing itself."
[Lockyer, 1979, p. 133]
To assist the parties in the preparation of their written statements, ACAS issues a leaflet entitled
'Notes for guidance on the preparation of written statements of case for arbitration'. The leaflet sets
out the benefits of preparing a statement and reassures the parties that, where they have already been
involved in conciliation, the arbitration will not be influenced by previous events:
"Conciliators do not reveal what is said to them during the conciliation
process because these discussions are regarded as confidential. Where
arbitration follows conciliation the conciliator will have full knowledge
of the issues and of the general circumstances of the dispute, but the
arbitrator will not. Arbitrators come to each case with a completely
fresh mind."
[Lockyer, 1979, p. 134]
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Given this statement made by Lockyer in 1979, the stress made on the preservation of the separate
integrity of the conciliation and arbitration stage by ACAS officials at the induction and other
arbitrators' seminars can be understood.
Advice is given by ACAS officials on the content, layout, timing and exchange of papers. The
parties are encouraged to keep their statements as brief as possible but to include information on the
history and background of the dispute; background information about the company including its
products and union representation; the arguments supporting or opposing the claim; and a brief
summary of the case highlighting the key point which the arbitrator is being asked to consider
[Lockyer, 1979].
In the questionnaire survey of the arbitrators they were asked if they found the written statements of the
parties to be satisfactory. They responded as follows:
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TABLE 4.6
ACAS Arbitrators' Satisfaction with
Written Statements of Parties to Arbitration






Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of ACAS Arbitrators - see Appendix I, Question 13 [b], p.37.
There was some indication that arbitrators found the trade union statements less satisfactory than those
of employers. For example, of the arbitrators responding 'Yes' to the above question, 8 stated that
the trade union statements tended to be less satisfactory. Of those answering 'Generally', 5 were less
satisfied with the trade union statements and one arbitrator who answered 'No' to the question
specifically mentioned that the trade union statements were unsatisfactory41.
In discussions with arbitrators at seminars, there was some sympathy expressed for trade union
officials in preparing written statements, as it was considered that employers were more likely to have
the skills and ready access to the resources necessary to produce satisfactory written statements. It was
argued by the arbitrators that in most cases the oral submissions of the trade union representatives
compensated for any defects in their written statements. Experienced arbitrators commented that they
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learned not to pre-judge a case from the written statements as often their initial response to these papers
was overturned by the events and evidence from the hearing.
The assistance given by ACAS officials to parties in preparation for the arbitration hearing can be
viewed as an additional method of improving what they describe as the professionalism and efficiency
of the service. Such procedure also reduces the time of the hearing in dealing with background
information and, it can be argued, increases the possibility of smooth running of the hearing. It can
also enhance the confidence of the parties if they are made aware that the arbitrator has acquainted
herself or himself with the facts of the case42. This in turn is likely to have a positive effect on the
acceptability of the final award. Thus the officials do exercise a degree of control over the process
through procedural conventions built up over time. As Webb [1982] observes this has implications
beyond improving professionalism and efficiency:
"The formality of proceedings independently of who has control over
the decision, can be used to ensure a narrow definition of the issue and
function to exclude personal hostilities; both may be necessary to
achieve at least temporary resolution of the dispute."
[Webb, 1982, p.75]
v] The Arbitration Hearing
Procedure conventions also surround the arbitration hearing itself. As in most dispute situations time
is an important factor, every effort is made to arrange a hearing as soon as is practicably possible.
ACAS officials endeavour to set up a hearing within three weeks of instruction. Delays may, of
course, occur because of diary commitments of the parties and potential arbitrators. Delay in the
process was one criticism mentioned by a small number of parties in the questionnaire survey:
"My major criticism is that from the appearance of the problem to the
final award can be a very long time."43
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While acknowledging that the parties should not experience any unnecessary delays, the response of
arbitrators and ACAS staff to this criticism was that resolution of the dispute through arbitration is
likely to be considerably quicker than letting the problem continue unresolved. Also the time
involved has to be seen in relative terms to the time already expended by the parties in the dispute
before the reference to arbitration was made44.
The venue for the hearing can either be the employer's offices or workplace or the hearing can take
place on neutral ground, most commonly at ACAS premises in the regions or Head Office. ACAS
arbitration staff are then available to assist the parties and aid the smooth running of the hearing. For
example, there is an increasing trend for secretaries [ACAS officials] to assist an arbitrator by taking
notes of proceedings, summarising submissions and preparing the first draft of the report, especially
in complex cases.
The parties are normally represented by those people involved at the earlier stage of negotiations. The
employer's side will almost certainly include members of line management and those responsible for
industrial relations and the trade union side will be represented by full-time officials and shop stewards.
It is unusual for the parties to have legal representation and this is discouraged. Lockyer [1979] refers
to a statement made by Sir Roy Wilson QC in his evidence to the Donovan Commission that he had:
"never seen any indication that the other side, whether it be the workers' side or the employers' side,
had felt that they were being put to an unfair disadvantage" when the other side had legal representation.
Perhaps this is the perception of someone fully acquainted and familiar with legal proceedings, because
Wilson's view conflicts with the oral evidence obtained from arbitrators' seminars and from an actual
arbitration case, where the 'other side' did feel very much at a disadvantage when the employer brought
along a legal representative. Also the involvement of a lawyer representing either of the parties was
not welcomed by the arbitrators themselves4^.
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In keeping with the historical tradition of British industrial relations, stress on the non-legality of the
process is reinforced in the arrangements and procedure of the hearing where efforts are made to keep
proceedings as informal as possible. Commenting on practice in the 1970s, Lockyer states:
"The arbitration hearing is also always informal It is not a judicial
occasion, statements are not taken on oath and the parties invariably
sit when making them. Arbitrators do their best to put everyone at
their ease and to conduct the hearing in as relaxed an atmosphere as
possible."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.67]
Oral evidence obtained as part of this research project confirms that this policy continues to be carried
out in practice.
At the outset of the hearing, it is the arbitrator's job, in addition to clarifying the terms of reference,
to clarify the procedure s/he proposes to adopt. The normal procedure is for the arbitrator to allow the
parties to present their case before questioning them on any points:
"the arbitration procedure makes use of various methods of obtaining
information. It uses the 'adversary principle' in as much as the
arbitrator obtains information by listening to the arguments of the
contending parties and it also uses the 'inquisitorial principle' or 'truth
theory' to the extent that the arbitrator closely questions the parties to
obtain information."
[Lockyer, 1979, p.69]
Ninety-five per cent of the parties to arbitration surveyed in 1988 agreed that the arbitrator had allowed
them sufficient time to state their case and ninety-four per cent considered that they had sufficient
opportunity to question the other party46.
Finally the parties are allowed the opportunity to sum up their respective cases before the end of the
hearing. Some arbitrators also take the opportunity to summarise the issues and arguments as s/he
understands them at this stage.
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No decision is made on the day of the hearing - at least none is transmitted to the parties. Instead on
completion of the hearing the arbitrator informs the parties that they will receive her/his decision in
writing within two to three weeks. One arbitrator describes his feelings at this stage of the process as
follows:
"Arbitrators delude themselves if they imagine that disputes are passed
to them because parties lack skill to resolve their problems on then-
own. The arbitrator is not infrequently a whipping boy, and at the end
of many an arbitration hearing it is the arbitrator who retires with the
weight of the glum world on his shoulders and with a decision to be
made, while the parties, having passed the buck, may depart together
With peace and consolation ...And calm of mind, all passion spent!"
[Johnston, quoted in Lockyer, 1979, p.76]
Summary
As has been discussed above, there is a remarkable degree of continuity over a number of key issues in
arbitration. First, the users of the service have not altered fundamentally over the period examined.
Second, the issues coming to arbitration have also remained similar although the relative distribution
of the issues coming to dispute have changed over time. As indicated this can be accounted for by the
writing-in of arbitration into procedure agreements in some industries. As a significant element of the
dismissal and discipline cases are referred by the electricity supply industry under their current
agreement, it remains to be seen to what extent these procedures will be affected by the privatisation of
the electricity industry. In the absence of increased use of the service from other sources or for
different reasons, discontinuation of these cases will significantly reduce the arbitration caseload.
Third, it has been illustrated that straight choice arbitration is not a new phenomenon in British
industrial relations and that the degree of control exercised by the arbitrator over the arbitration can and
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has been restricted by the terms of reference. ACAS and its officials do appear to play a more direct
role, however, in establishing the conventions surrounding the drawing up of terms of reference.
Finally, the role of establishing procedural conventions has also been extended in relation to the
preparation for the hearing and the hearing itself. These conventions are reinforced through the
information issued to the parties and the bulletins and seminars for arbitrators.
The outcome of the process will be explored in Chapter 5.
I There are two types of files held by ACAS, policy files which are registered by registry and section files
which include those used for arbitration applications. After two years the arbitrators' reports and awards are
bound into volumes and the background papers are destroyed. Neither the Department of Employment nor
ACAS Registries have any interest in these non-policy files. Similarly they are not kept by the Public
Records Office. This information was obtained from a senior civil servant involved with arbitration who
stated that the lack of space necessitated this practice.
^ The results of this survey are summarised and contained in the attached three schedules of awards for the
years 1942-1985 for single and boards of arbitration and also the separate schedules for the dismissal and
discipline cases for the period 1974-85 for single and boards of arbitration - see Appendix II a, b and c. A
summary of the results was presented to the 1986 arbitrators' seminars together with summaries of the
schedules referred to. A similar paper was prepared for the ACAS Council meeting in January 1987.
3 Jack Jones was General Secretary of the TGWU and was instrumental in the setting up of ACAS. Because
of his role in industrial relations and the Social Contract with the Labour Government in 1974-79, it was
often contended that Jack Jones was one of the most, if not the most, powerful men in the country. Such
an interpretation of events often coincides with the thesis that trade unions in the period had excessive
power. For reference to this view of Jack Jones, see, for example, Coates, 1989, p.85 and Machines,
1987, p.45.
4 See pages 4/6 of Appendix II [b].
^ Ibid.
^ Reason given by ACAS officials for the increased use of arbitration by the unions quoted.
^ See Chapter 3 in relation to selection and 'training' of arbitrators when ACAS's policy in this matter was
discussed by an ACAS official.
^ For example, arguments advanced by Professor Tom Johnston [1975] for the increased use of arbitration
in British industrial relations.
9 Lowry, 1990 [b]; and speech by the new Chairman of ACAS, Douglas Smith, to the Arbitrators'
seminar in November 1989.
ACAS Annual Report, 1989, p.25.
II The most publicised case related to a dispute at Grunwick where the House of Lords decided that an
employer was under no legal obligation to cooperate with ACAS even though this might make it impossible
for the Service to carry out its statutory functions in some cases - see discussion in Lockyer, 1979.
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13 Evidence from the analysis of arbitration awards [see Appendices I, II and HI and discussion in Chapter
5] would indicate that the criticism that arbitrators always 'split the difference' is unjustified. This is one area
where ACAS was interested in the survey of arbitration awards.
See discussion in Webb [1982] and distinction between statute law and common law models of
bargaining.
See discussion in Dickens et al [1985] regarding satisfaction with the industrial tribunal system and
Concannon [1980] for comparison between industrial tribunal and voluntary arbitration approaches to unfair
dismissal.
13 A paper entitled 'What Went Wrong with Unfair Dismissal' was presented by one arbitrator, Professor
Rideout, to the Arbitrators' seminars in 1985. The paper was then the subject of discussion at the
workshops.
1 ® From the survey of arbitration awards it was evident that a large proportion of dismissal and discipline
cases were arranged for the NJIC/ESI. Since 1980 these cases have accounted for an increasing percentage of
the total dismissal and discipline cases from 30% in 1980 to 67% in 1985.
1 3 For further discussion of arbitration awards see Chapter 5.
18 Arbitration Award No 2C/224/1985 from ACAS Arbitration Awards, 1985.
19 Arbitration Award No. 2C/263/1985 from ACAS Arbitration Awards, 1985.
31 One example of this view is to be found in Minford and Peel [1983].
31 For a more detailed analysis of practice over time, see Appendix II [b], pp.7/9.
33 The implications of the outcome of arbitrations will be discussed in Chapter 5. For a breakdown of the
terms of reference for cases relating to pay and terms and conditions of employment see Appendix II [b],
pp.22/24.
33 See Appendix II [b], pp.7/9 and 22/24.
34 From records of Arbitration Awards for the year 1948 - ref. S.A. etc. No. 21/1948, I.R. 905/1948.
33 Comment made by Lord James of Hereford [1828-1911] and quoted in Treble, 1986, p.17.
36 por discussion of this issue see Chapter 2, Section I, [iv] above.
33 See Bamber, 1987, p.16.
38 ACAS, Arbitrators'Bulletins, Nos. 2 and 9.
39 See Appendix I, p.46.
31 Because of the specific nature of the terms of reference written into the procedure agreements for the
electricity supply industry, these cases were omitted from this question, reducing the sample to 142 - see
Appendix IB, Question 7[c].
31 See Appendix HI, Question 12, for a breakdown of responses between management and trade union
representatives.
33 Further discussion of the arbitration awards follows in Chapter 5 below. For figures quoted, see
Appendix III, Question 20 [single and boards of arbitration cases].
33 Evidence from survey of Arbitration Awards, 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp.19/20.
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34 Les Parsisson stated during one of my interviews with him that when he was responsible for the
arbitration service in the 1980s, the few complaints he received from parties about awards in the early days
of his appointment, turned out to be as a result of asking the 'wrong' question of the arbitrator in the terms of
reference. The arbitrator had answered the question set, but it was not the answer the parties wanted. He
initiated the inclusion of sessions on drafting terms of reference in the training programme for conciliation
officers. He considered that training the conciliation officers in this way made them more aware of the
problem and helped eliminate this type of complaint.
33 Minutes of Evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Book 1,
p.75.
3 ^ Interview with Les Parsisson.
37 ACAS Arbitrators'Bulletin, No.l, p.l.
3 ^ Ibid, p.53. Some procedure agreements do not include a conciliation stage. In some cases parties
decide that they do not wish to take advantage of the conciliation service and instead move straight to
arbitration. Even where the conciliation process has not been pursued, oral evidence would indicate that a
conciliation officer may offer advice in drafting the terms of reference.
39 Comments made by Professor George Bain, Seminar for Potential Arbitrators, November 1983.
4® Comment made by Professor Carbery, at Arbitrators' Seminar held in Edinburgh 1986.
41 See Question 13[b], p.37 of Appendix I.
42 Some criticism was made of arbitrators who did not convince the parties that s/he had aquainted
themselves with the background papers - see comments made in Appendix III.
43 Comment made by one trade union respondent - see comments made in Appendix III.
44 This oral evidence was obtained from ACAS officials and arbitrators at the Arbitrators' Seminars in 1989
when a paper on the outcome of the Survey of Parties to Arbitration was presented by the author.
43 Oal evidence from Arbitrators' Seminars and sitting in on a board of arbitration case.





THE OUTCOME OF THE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3 and 4 above, the recruitment and appointment of arbitrators, the parties and issues which
come to arbitration and the whole process surrounding this form of third party intervention, have been
discussed. What is also of major interest to those involved either directly or indirectly in arbitration is
the actual outcome of the procedure. Further it is against the results of arbitration, especially in pay
disputes, that criticisms of arbitrators and arbitration itself are most often made. For example,
arbitrators are accused of 'splitting the difference' between the claim and offer, or of paying little regard
to the employer's ability to pay, or the economic climate in which pay settlements are made in
reaching their award; and the system of arbitration is said to be inflationary [Brown, 1990; Lowry,
1986].
The objectives of this chapter are, therefore, to examine the factors which arbitrators take into account
in reaching their decisions and the extent to which these have changed over time; the ongoing debate in
the literature surrounding the giving of Reasons to the parties when making an award; and whether or
not it is appropriate for arbitrators to offer Recommendations in their report to the parties for
improving future industrial relations in their organisation. As will be apparent from the evidence
discussed below, questions of the criteria which arbitrators should employ or whether they should give
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Reasons for their decision or make further Recommendations to the parties, are topics which have been
rehearsed at different times in the history of arbitration.
A further objective is to ascertain whether the criticisms sometimes made of arbitrators and arbitration,
in relation to the results of this form of third party intervention are justified. To meet this objective,
the outcome of arbitration hearings, that is the arbitration awards themselves, and the views and
perceptions of those most directly involved in the process, will also be analysed by drawing on
evidence from the survey of arbitration awards 1942-85 and questionnaires issued to the arbitrators and
the parties to arbitration..
A major problem for researchers in investigating the results of arbitration, is that arbitration awards are
deemed to be the property of the parties and as such are confidential and unpublished. Analysis of
arbitration awards is, however, undertaken by the civil servants responsible for the arbitration service.
Each case is recorded with respect to the type of arbitration; whether conciliation preceded the
arbitration; who initiated the arbitration; the terms of reference; the subject of dispute; the result of
the award; reasoning of the award; whether supplemented by recommendations; in the case of a board,
the unanimity of the award; and whether after the issue of the award there were requests for
clarification, complaints or any other difficulties. But the only statistics published in ACAS's Annual
Report relate to the number of cases, the type of arbitration and the subject of dispute1.
Exploring the reasons for the confidentiality of awards with the officials concerned, it was considered
that parties are more inclined to use arbitration as a form of third party dispute resolution if they have
control over the publicity associated with the result. For example, where an employer has provided
detailed information on the company's financial affairs, the confidentiality of this information has to
be protected. It is considered that most employers would not wish this type of information to be
readily available to potential competitors2, to employees or the general public. Also it was argued
that it would be considered inappropriate for the British system to move towards the practice in the
United States where awards are published and the name of the arbitrator revealed. It was the opinion of
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officials that the American system encouraged a form of league table to be drawn up where arbitrators
could be viewed as either pro-employer or pro-union in their decisions, and where the parties chose an
arbitrator on the basis of their past, published record. The complexity of particular cases or the facts
of the case itself would then be in danger of being lost; that is, while on the surface a particular
arbitrator might appear pro-employer because his or her last awards had gone in the employers' favour,
it might in fact be that the employers in these cases had the more convincing arguments.
Until the current study, apart from the access any individual arbitrator may have to his or her own
records, there has been no opportunity to examine recent arbitration awards. In his discussion of
pendulum arbitration, Lewis notes that:
"There are no publicly available statistics to facilitate comparison with
awards under conventional arbitration, and even if there were,
meaningful comparison would be difficult."
[Lewis, 1990, p.44]
Lewis's statement highlights another problem, that is of quantifying the actual awards whether it be
for comparison with pendulum arbitration or other purposes. For example, in arbitrations relating to
pay and conditions, the arbitrator may be asked to examine not only the level of annual pay, but a
whole range of working conditions including payments for overtime, holidays and sickness or shift
work and bonuses. The award then is a package which can be difficult to quantify with any accuracy.
Therefore, even although additional evidence is available from this study, problems of analysis still
remain. Nevertheless, some general trends in both principles and practices adopted over time can be
identified.
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i] Reaching the Decision
The factors which an arbitrator should or does take into account in reaching a decision have never been
entirely clear, and the main focus of attention has been in respect of pay issues. One of the problems
which the previous Warwick questionnaire survey of arbitrators encountered was in trying to identify
such factors. Arbitrators were asked, in pay and conditions issues, to rank the extent to which a
range of variables influenced their decisions. These included the merits of the case; subsequent
industrial relations between the parties; the relative bargaining strength of the parties; settlements
made elsewhere; the general level in the industry; the company's or industry's ability to pay; current
pay guidelines; the likely effect of the award elsewhere in the company or industry; and the possible
effect on the arbitrator's own reputation with the parties. They were asked to rank their response on a
four point scale of Very Influential; Fairly Influential; Of Little Influence; and Of No Influence At
All. Arbitrators were very reluctant or unable to quantify their actions in such a precise manner3.
The clearest statement of ACAS's position on the factors which an arbitrator should take into account
in reaching his or her award is contained in a letter from ACAS written in reply to a request for further
information from one researcher in 1985:
177
"An arbitrator has to take into account many factors, and these include:
[i] the parties have to work together after an arbitrator's award, the purpose
of which is to bring a dispute to a conclusion. There would be no
point in an arbitrator making an award which perpetuated an industrial
relations problem;
[ii] the effect of an award on other groups of workers;
[iii] the employer's ability to pay;
[iv] the consequences of the award, which an arbitrator has to bear as would
any responsible individual.
In many cases the parties enter voluntarily into arbitration so that they
can 'save face', compromise being the only solution. The arbitrator's
task is to find a realistic, workable solution to their problem which
takes account of the factors mentioned above and it does not necessarily
follow that this will be a 'shabby' compromise."4
Thus the main criteria to be used by arbitrators in current practice were identified, but problems still
remain over how they should be interpreted. The factors quoted are by no means clear-cut and
unambiguous, especially the fourth factor cited. In addition how can an arbitrator assess with any
accuracy the effect of an award on other workers; or the employer's ability to pay?
The information which an arbitrator may have at his or her disposal in order to evaluate the employer's
ability to pay was a question explored by Towers and Wright [1983 a and b]. In examining general
pay claim references to arbitration, Towers and Wright assessed the weight given to the disclosure of
financial information by the company. Using evidence from two case studies, they argue:
"The case studies clearly demonstrated that the disclosure of financial
information by employers at arbitration is something which needs
careful consideration if it is not to damage, rather than assist, the
employer's case. It was also demonstrated from the case studies that
trade unions may be reluctant to rest their cases solely on ability-to-pay
grounds and that arbitrators may consider industrial relations factors
[bargaining strength, justice etc] to be more important than the
financial ability of the employer to meet the union's claim."
[Towers andWright, 1983[b], pp.83/84]
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Following up the case studies with a survey of arbitrators to ascertain their experience of the disclosure
of information in pay reference arbitrations, Towers andWright conclude:
"The practice of arbitration, in the case of general pay references,
emerges from this research as a process in which awards arise from a
complex consideration of a number of interlocking criteria in which
that of ability-to-pay, while important, tends to be given less weight
than those influencing industrial relations. In short it is more of an
exercise in the intangible considerations of acceptability, peace and
compromise rather than one of straightforward economics - which, in
any case, is never straightforward in practice."
[Towers andWright, 1983[b], p.91]
Professor Rideout, one experienced arbitrator on ACAS's panel, notes that a number of factors will
normally be considered by the wage arbitrator, namely:
"increase in productivity, or the lack of it; increase in the cost of
living; comparison with other rates and the extent of recent change in
those rates; the effect on differentials, the need to avoid damaging
existing pay structures and other 'knock-on' effects; the ability of the
employer to pay; the ability of the employer to compete at the new
rate; and the ability of the employer to recruit labour."
[Rideout, 1990, p. 17]
But that, depending on the circumstances of the case, differing weight may be given to the criteria and
distinction made between cases in the private and public sectors. However, in drawing the distinction
between the difference of purpose between the arbitrator and the judge, he stresses the primacy given to
settling the dispute in arbitration:
"The judge is trying to decide what the rights and duties of the two
opposing parties are by applying a more or less complex set of rules to
the facts presented to him [whether those facts are presented
inquisitorially or by two straight-forward stories]. An arbitrator's
purpose should be to resolve the dispute in a practicably workable
fashion."
[Rideout, 1990, p.13]
The views of the parties obtained in the questionnaire survey would support the suggestion that the
arbitrator should see his/her primary job as settling the dispute, with 167 [84%] of respondents
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agreeing with this statement and only 18 [9%] disagreeing. In disputes over pay, 103 [72%] of
respondents agreed that the arbitrator should take into account the employer's ability to pay; 116 [81%]
agreed that comparability should be a factor; 91 [63%] that inflation should be a consideration; but 63
[44%] disagreed with the suggestion that the general/public interest should be a criterion, with only 52
[36%] supporting this proposal [see Table 5.1]5.
TABLE 5.1
Views of Parties to ACAS Arbitration 1988
Factors which Arbitrator should consider in Disputes over Pay
[Excluding ESI cases]
Factor Number [%] of Responses
Agree Disagree Don't No
Know Respor
103 24 9 8
Ability to pay [71.5] [16.7] [6.3] [5.6]
116 14 6 8
Comparability [80.6] [9.7] [4.2] [5.6]
91 32 8 13
The Rate of Inflation [63.2] [22.2] [5.6] [9.0]
52 63 15 14
General Public Interest [36.1] [43.8] [10.4] [9.7]
Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of Parties to Arbitration 1988 - see Appendix HI
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There were some interesting differences between the responses of the two sides to the dispute on three
of the four criteria to be adopted by an arbitrator on disputes over pay. These are illustrated in Figure
5.a below.
FIGURE 5.a
Views of Parties to ACAS Arbitration 1988















Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of Parties to Arbitration 1988 - see Appendix EI
One of the criteria mentioned above in the 1988 survey of users of arbitration was that of the interest of
consumers and the general public, and the parties were divided in their views on this issue6. This
question of the public or national interest was also a topic of debate in the Donovan Commission in
the 1960s. The Commission questioned a number of witnesses on the arrangements which could or
should be made to ensure that the national interest and the interests of consumers were taken into
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account by arbitrators. In giving evidence, Sir Roy Wilson QC, argued that arbitrators do consider
the national interest and interest of consumers, but in conjunction with the facts of a particular case:
"It would be unrealistic to imagine that arbitrators decide each case in a
watertight compartment, looking only to what they are told in that
particular case. They are expected - and for the most part expected by
the parties themselves - to be conversant with a wide range of economic
and social considerations arbitrators do in fact take the national
interest into consideration, and indeed are bound to do so inasmuch as
the interests of particular workers or groups of workers are in the long
run bound up with the national interest."7
Sir Roy's evidence was supported by other witnesses. But there was opposition from witnesses to any
proposal to 'ensure' that the national interest or interest of consumers should be taken into account,
that is there was resistance to compulsion or statutory obligation in this area. What was deemed to be
in the 'national interest' tended to be assumed by participants in the proceedings rather than clearly
defined, although Sir Roy was concerned that this should not be equated with the government's policy
on incomes8.
Yet the topic was of interest to the Donovan Commission largely because of its concern with the level
of incomes. One of the lines of the Commission's enquiry was whether arbitrators should be
compelled to take incomes policy into account in making their decision; and whether an arbitrator's
decision could be referred to the National Board for Prices and Incomes if the incomes policy guidelines
were breached. Sir Roy and others resisted the proposal to make such a requirement on arbitrators:
"The main objection to any such arrangement is that 'to ensure that
arbitrators should take account of the national interest' would be widely
and perhaps even universally understood as meaning 'to ensure that
arbitrators should apply Government incomes policy'. It is in my
opinion wrong to treat the national interest and Government incomes
policy as interchangeable expressions."^
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Sir Roy argued that to take such a move would prejudice the independence of arbitrators from
government and could have a 'fatal effect' on the voluntary system of arbitration. In spite of these
views, the Commission decided that;
"The application of incomes policy will be frustrated if arbitrators
make, and may even feel themselves compelled by their terms of
reference to make, awards which do not conform with the incomes
policy It is desirable therefore that effect should be given to
incomes policy in the making of the arbitration awards. To this end
we recommend legislation placing on all arbitrators an obligation to
take incomes policy into account when making their awards."10
This recommendation of Donovan's was not implemented, and indeed, one of the main reasons for
setting up ACAS was to convince the parties to third party intervention that arbitrators and civil
servants involved were removed and independent from government policy. The acceptability and
workability of the system was dependent on this fact as was the maintenance of the confidence of the
parties. Therefore, during the period when the Social Contract was in operation [1974-79],
arbitrators included a caveat in their awards as follows:
"The parties should note that I am not empowered to give any
authorative ruling as to whether my award conforms with existing pay
policy. Any doubts on this aspect by the parties should be clarified by
seeking advice from the appropriate authorities."
But, of course, a real conflict of interest still remains between meeting competing objectives. Writing
in 1983, Hunter outlines the problems posed by arbitration during periods of incomes policy. The
arbitrator runs the risk either of disregarding the policy and possibly contributing to inflationary
pressures; or in complying with the policy and deterring parties from referring cases to arbitration.
He cites evidence to support the discouragement effect during the operation of incomes policy between
the early 1960's and 1970's when the case load of the Industrial Arbitration Board fell by around 60-70
per cent, and argues:
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"There is a then a clear conflict of interest, defined in terms of the
public good. For while incomes policy pursues the public interest by
discouraging inflationary settlements, arbitration equally seeks to serve
the public interest by reducing the costs of industrial conflict"
[Hunter, 1983, p.63]
However, as Hunter and witnesses to the Donovan Commission state, without being compelled to do
so, arbitrators do in practice take account of current government policy, economic conditions prevailing
at any given time and the employer's ability to pay. Whether, of course, these factors constitute the
'national interest' is still a matter for debate. It could be argued that it would be surprising if the
arbitrators did not take these criteria into consideration. As was noted in the selection of arbitrators
[Chapter 3], they are chosen to some extent on the basis of their conformity and adherence to the
accepted principles and economic orthodoxy operating within the state's arbitration machinery.
In many respects the analysis and debate, at the time of Donovan and more recently, echo that of other
commentators on the operation of arbitration in the past. For example, writing in 1905 and referring
to practice at the turn of the century, Knoop states:
"Practically the arbitrator is obliged to take a great many things into
consideration: the movements in demand and supply of labour and
product; the keenness of competition; the alterations in the price of
the product; the living wage required by the workman; and the length
of training the skilled mechanic has undergone."
[Knoop, 1905, p.32]
A more critical analysis is to be found in Davidson's study of the Board of Trade and Industrial
Relations in the period 1896-1914. Davidson argues that although the Board of Trade never imposed a
formal wages policy upon its umpires:
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"the type of arbitrator selected inevitably conditioned the criteria adopted
in the determination of wage awards.... Generally, they adhered to the
traditional criteria of the state of trade, the competitive needs of a
district, or changes in the selling price of the product involved. The
under-lying assumption of all wage awards was that wage-rates should
fluctuate with the market. Umpires refused to countenance the
growing demand from labour negotiators for a 'socialistic minimum' or
'living wage'. They argued that it constituted a violation of the laws
of political economy that would undermine the cost competitiveness of
British industry."
[Davidson, 1978, p.586/7]
Thus, as in current practice, it was and is unnecessary to introduce compulsory adherence to a formal or
informal wage policy, as careful selection procedures of arbitrators can ensure that awards will be
within 'acceptable' limits. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, the arbitrator is already constrained by the
terms of reference agreed before the arbitration hearing. In addition, it could be argued, that to go
along the path of compulsion could threaten the use of arbitration and the raison detre behind the
provision of such a service by the state, that is to avoid or reduce the incidence of costly industrial
disputes.
To conclude, it would appear that the principles behind and the practice adopted in reaching an
arbitration awards remains somewhat ambiguous and perhaps deliberately so. This does, of course,
have implications for understanding the politics of selecting arbitrators and also for the next topic of
discussion, namely the giving of Reasons for awards.
ii] Reasons for the Award
Directly linked to the debate on the criteria used by arbitrators in reaching their decisions, is the
controversy surrounding the giving of Reasons as part of an arbitrator's award. The dominant view in
ACAS is that formal Reasons should not be given by an arbitrator.
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Clearly, as we have identified, there are also practical problems involved in giving Reasons, namely
that arbitrators themselves would often find it extremely difficult to state, with any precision, the exact
grounds on which they arrived at their decision and the weight to be attached to the different criteria
involved. The experienced arbitrator at the induction seminar for potential arbitrators confessed that:
"Even if you do have Reasons you would not give the real one, ie you
rationalise it. You have got a conclusion and you work backwards in a
sense."11
The policy on this issue in ACAS is that arbitrators should not give detailed Reasons for the award.
Rather, if they wish to include the reasoning behind their decision, they should note the
'Considerations' which were borne in mind in arriving at the award. To the outsider the distinction
between Reasons and Considerations may seem rather spurious. However, in the arbitrators' seminars
and bulletins, ACAS policy is reinforced and the distinction between the two approaches drawn. For
example, commenting on discussions at arbitrators' seminars, the first Bulletin for arbitrators records
the following statement:
"Reasoned Awards
In the light of the perennial debate as to whether or not arbitration
awards should be reasoned, arbitrators were largely able to agree that,
rather than link reasons directly to awards with the consequent risk that
the reasons themselves then became open to challenge, the matter was
best dealt with by the introduction of a section on 'Considerations' in
their reports. Many arbitrators already adopted this practice which had
the advantage that 'Considerations' summarised in a neutral way the
range ofmatters to which they had given particular attention during the
arbitration, and enabled them to separate these from the terms of the
award itself. It was also flexible in the sense that 'Considerations'
were clearly not necessarily comprehensive reasoning. Reasons were
given in practice in some form in about four out of ten awards in the
past two years. In future we would prefer the 'Considerations' style to
be used wherever possible."
[ACAS, Arbitrators' Bulletin, Nol]
ACAS's policy was underlined in a paper presented to ACAS Council by Richard Harrison [former
Director of Conciliation and Arbitration], The paper summarised the results of the questionnaire
survey of arbitrators conducted by this researcher and set out some questions which he considered "raise
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policy questions and therefore require comment". Paragraph 16 of the paper referred to Reasons for
Awards:
"This has been a subject discussed at some length at arbitrators'
seminars. Our policy is to encourage arbitrators to set out the
'considerations taken into account in coming to the award'. This
enables the parties to see what influenced the arbitrator and provides
some logical justification for the award without risking the sharp
reactions from one or other party that can arise if 'reasons for awards'
are, rather more starkly, given."12
ACAS's policy on the issue was then endorsed by the Council.
But why is the giving of Reasons considered with such seriousness at ACAS? It is argued by some,
that one explanation, is that to give Reasons runs the risk of setting precedents or case law on
arbitration which would be counter to the traditional, voluntarist, non-legalistic approach of arbitration
in Britain. The main explanation given by ACAS officials is that to give detailed Reasons also carries
the danger of complaints being raised by the parties that their particular arguments had not been given
sufficient weight by the arbitrator. Any such complaints could prejudice the acceptability of the
arbitrator's award and could also result in another dispute over the arbitrator's Reasons. Referring to
the particular problems associated with a board of arbitration, one arbitrator argued the case for not
giving Reasons as follows:
"Particularly with boards, people can often arrive at the same
conclusions for different reasons - this is one of the best reasons for not
giving Reasons."1-^
The arguments in support of giving Reasons are that the arbitrator is not 'God' and it helps to
legitimate the award and clarifies, for the benefit of the parties, the grounds on which s/he has arrived
at the final decision. Also it can aid the arbitrator in thinking through the process of decision making.
To counter the argument that Reasons can be of benefit to the parties in understanding the arbitrator's
line of thinking, ACAS recommends that, if the parties would like some explanation, then arbitrators
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should give Considerations. This was explored in the Induction Seminar where potential arbitrators
were advised how to phrase their Considerations. Without being too specific, the arbitrator could
adopt the phrase "I find particularly relevant the union's argument that..." or "I believe the case centres
on the following issue ..."
In the questionnaire survey of arbitrators [see Appendix I] conducted for this research project, the
arbitrators were asked their views on the question of giving Reasons. Questioned on what they
considered to be the advantages of giving Reasons for their awards, the arbitrators felt that it
legitimised the award and could be of assistance to the parties in understanding how the award had been
arrived at and could have an educational function in future relations between the parties. Thirteen
arbitrators considered there were no clear advantages or none at all14. The main response to what they
considered to be the disadvantages of giving Reasons for their awards was that it could lead to new
disputes about the Reasons themselves. Arbitrators also thought that the parties could disagree with
the Reasons given; and that there was a danger in setting precedents for the future which had 'legal' or
judicial implications Only four arbitrators considered there were no disadvantages of giving
Reasons15.
The majority of arbitrators [40] preferred the system recommended by ACAS of recording their
Considerations and only 6 did not prefer this system. The main reason given by the arbitrators for
their support of Considerations was that they fell short of Reasons but allowed some explanation to the
parties of what had influenced the arbitrator in reaching his or her decision [see Figure 5.b].
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FIGURE 5.b
Survey of ACAS Arbitrators
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Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of Arbitrators - see Appendix I
Given the principles outlined by ACAS and the views of the arbitrators, the extent to which practice
reflected policy was explored in the questionnaire survey of the parties to arbitration. It would appear
that most arbitrators are adopting ACAS's policy, as 158 [80%] respondents said that the arbitrator had
given some indication of how s/he had arrived at her/his award and only 28 [14%] answered no to this
question.
A comparison of current practice with that of the past can be obtained from the survey of arbitration
awards for the period 1942-85, which highlights some changes in practice over the period16. There
were only two cases identified over the whole period, one in 1976 the other in 1981, where an arbitrator
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gave Reasons under a heading with this title. However, in fifty per cent of cases, the arbitrators gave
some form of reasoning - twenty per cent in the general discussion in the report or with the award
itself, with no specific heading, and the other thirty per cent under such headings as General
Considerations, Comments, Conclusions or Findings. In forty per cent of cases, over the whole
period, no Reasons or reasoning were given. Breaking the evidence down into different time periods, it
was very uncommon to include reasoning under another specific heading prior to 1974, although some
reasoning was included in the report It was more common in the early years for arbitrators not to give
any reasoning at all. As the data illustrate the adoption of the procedure of including reasoning under a
heading has increased since the arbitrators' seminars were established in the 1980s and it is now less
likely that an arbitrator will make no comments at all.
What is also evident from reading the arbitrators' reports examined over the period is the greater degree
of standarisation of report writing in the 1980s, particularly for boards of arbitration where ACAS
Secretaries are involved in drafting the reports for the board or in single arbitrations where a Secretary
assists an arbitrator in a complex case. It would appear, therefore, that there has been a growing
tendency to standardize practice and that the policy recommended by ACAS is being adopted by
arbitrators. The contrast with current practice, (where the average length of reports is five or six pages
and which include summaries of the written and oral evidence before the arbitrator reaches his or her
Considerations and award) can be drawn from one example of a case heard by an arbitrator in 1953 under
the Industrial Courts Act in 1919. The total report consisted of the following:
"On 21st February I was appointed by the Minister to determine the
dispute between the X Company Ltd and the National Union of General
and Municipal Workers. The dispute concerned the Union's claim for
'a substantial increase in wages for all grades of workers'.
The hearing took place in the offices of the Ministry of Labour
Industrial Relations Department in Glasgow on 4th March.
My decision is that an increase in wages of one penny per hour should
be granted to all grades of workers, the award to take effect as from the
first pay-day following 1st March, 1953.
13 March, 1953 [Sgd] D. S. Anderson"17
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However, as discussed above, although the dominant view in ACAS is that Reasons should not be
given, there have long been two differing views about the desirability of giving Reasons in arbitration
cases - a difference of opinion which has not been resolved. Writing in 1929, a former President of the
Industrial Court, Lord Amulree argued that a study of the decisions given by the Court revealed a
departure from the practice adopted by industrial arbitrators. While, with certain exceptions, it had
been usual for an industrial arbitrator to give his decision without any statement of the facts or
arguments, Amulree notes that:
"The decisions given by the Industrial Court are more expansive. ...
More noteworthy, however, is the endeavour of the Court to indicate
the grounds of their decision. In the past it had been the rarest event
for an industrial arbitrator to give any indication of the reasons which
led him to decide as he had done. Reticence on this point had, indeed,
been counted almost a virtue. The Court thought otherwise. They
took the view that the silence maintained by arbitrators regarding the
direction in which their thoughts had moved had the effect of making
recourse to industrial arbitration unnecessarily hazardous."
[Amulree, 1929, pp.183/4]
Therefore, the Court held the contrary view to ACAS's current practice.
Amulree was in support of the Court's approach of giving Reasons and considered that it would be
advisable for the Court to build up a body of cases which would provide arbitrators in future references
with certain principles on which to proceed [Lockyer, 1979; Amulree, 1929]. In discussing
Amulree's recommendations, Lockyer [1979] notes that a body of case law did not materialize and that
the majority of arbitration cases were carried out on an ad hoc basis without the assistance of
previously published awards.
The whole issue was explored in depth by the Donovan Commission in the written and oral evidence.
In his written submission and in cross-examination a different point of view from that expressed by
Lord Amulree was advanced by Sir Roy Wilson QC, the last President of the Industrial Court. From
his own experience and after discussing the issue with representatives from both sides of industry and
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others with experience of industrial arbitration, Sir Roy was convinced that, in general, it was
preferable that arbitration decisions should be given without Reasons. He advanced four reasons to
support his conclusion, arguments which are familiar to current discussions:
"(a] An arbitration award is intended to be in itself the termination of
the dispute. To give reasons for the award would in general result in
prolonging and possibly exacerbating the differences between the
parties, or in transferring the area of controversy from one topic or
topics to another;
[b] It is possible that the giving of reasons would to some extent
result in the building up of a body of case law. I feel that under the
consensual arbitration system operative in this country case law would
result in excessive rigidity of treatment;
[c] It not infrequently happens that in tribunals consisting of an
independent member and of what may be called 'side' members
representing employers and workmen respectively all three members,
while reaching the same decision, do so for different reasons; and
[d] I feel sure that in general the side members of an arbitration
tribunal themselves prefer not to give reasons for an award. To some
extent this may be because they are frequently persons who are actively
engaged in industrial relations matters and negotiations in their own
industries and because it would not make their tasks in that field any
easier if reasons given for their awards could constantly be quoted
against them."1**
Sir Roy added that he considered that the popularity of arbitration would decrease greatly as would the
confidence which parties have in arbitration if Reasons had to be given for awards
The debate has continued, however, as the following statement from one leading arbitrator, Sir John
Wood, who is also Chairman of the CAC [the standing body which succeeded the Industrial Court],
illustrates:
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"Of recent years, the predominant view appears to have been that the
giving of reasons is inadvisable. ...Against this view there are several
strong arguments. Modern practice is tending to look at all decision
makers to give reasons. Only if reasons are given can a consistent
pattern be seen to emerge from the various decisions in the same or
related areas. Reasons enable other disputes to be voluntarily setded or
parties to disputes which are submitted to prepare their cases
effectively."
[quoted in Lockyer, 1979, p.84]
Therefore, there is no unanimity amongst practitioners on the costs or benefits of giving Reasons.
However, as has been discussed above, ACAS policy is clear on the issue and most arbitrators on the
current panel adopt the recommended practice. To reject explicitly the recommendations of ACAS and
give Reasons could run the risk of not being appointed to another arbitration case, especially if,
because of the Reasons quoted in a report, the award was not accepted by the parties.
iii] Making Recommendations
Another area of policy closely linked to giving Reasons, is the making of Recommendations to the
parties in the arbitrator's written report. The survey of arbitration awards over the period 1942-85,
reveals that up to 1957 there were only two cases where arbitrators gave Recommendations. By 1973,
the number had increased to eleven, and by the end of the period examined, that is 1985, there were
fifty-four instances where Recommendations were given [see Appendix II [b]].
ACAS policy is very much against the giving of Recommendations, again on the grounds that they
run the risk of prejudicing the acceptance of the award and of continuing the dispute between the parties
on old or new grounds. At the Induction Seminar for arbitrators, John Lambert [former Director of
Conciliation and Arbitration] referred to a remark made by Lord Askwith at the beginning of the
century to the effect that:
'Arbitrators should not prophesy or state pious opinions.'20
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The experienced arbitrator at the seminar argued that giving Recommendations could lead to future
problems, and that they should not be given unless the parties requested it. He stated:
"Do the job you are asked to do. I do not think you should volunteer
recommendations - you have no idea what the ramifications will
be."21
Similar to the discussion on Reasons above, this policy was supported by Richard Harrison in his
report to ACAS Council as follows:
"Recommendations
This has also been the subject of discussion at the arbitrators' seminars.
Our policy is that arbitrators should stick to the terms of reference
given to them by the parties, and should only give recommendations
when requested to do so by both parties to the dispute. Awards are
checked by Head Office staff before they are sent to the parties to see
that gratuitous advice has not crept in."22
Again this approach was endorsed by the Council and no comment was made about the direct
intervention of officials in checking awards.
Somewhat surprisingly, in spite of ACAS policy on this issue, when asked if they considered it was
part of the arbitrator's duties to make Recommendations, 29 arbitrators in the questionnaire survey,
over forty per cent, answered 'Yes' to this question and only 22 said 'No' [see Figure 5.c]. Arbitrators
then elaborated on the advantages and disadvantages of giving Recommendations [see Appendix I, pp
55/7]. It would appear that there is a temptation for the arbitrator to exceed his or her remit especially
if s/he considers that giving Recommendations will help the parties in their future relations.
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FIGURE 5.c
Survey of ACAS Arbitrators
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Source: Brown, Questionnaire Survey of Arbitrators - see Appendix I, p.53
Don't Kno
Although the survey indicates that arbitrators are tempted to go beyond the terms of reference and give
Recommendations, when the parties to arbitration were asked if the arbitrator did so, an overwhelming
majority [184 or 94%] stated that the arbitrator had stayed within the terms of reference laid down and
only five respondents answered 'No' to this question. Also as the survey of awards highlights,
arbitrators gave Recommendations in only ten per cent of cases [see Appendix II (b), pp 16/18] over the
whole period. It is reasonable to assume that, at least in some of the cases, they did so with the
consent of the parties. In the main, therefore, practice would seem to match the policy set out for
arbitrators in this respect, in spite of the comments made by arbitrators.
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iv] The Outcome of Arbitration: the Arbitrator's Decision
The outcome of the arbitration hearing is a matter of key interest to the parties involved and, as has
been stated, parties are informed of the arbitrator's decision, in writing, around two or three weeks
following the hearing. It is likely that regular users of arbitration keep their own records of arbitrators'
decisions, but they are unlikely to have details of the outcome of other arbitration cases.
The results of arbitration, and hence arbitration itself, are also of more general interest and have been
subjected to criticism on a number of grounds. The 1984 ACAS Annual Report included a statement
to the effect that the Service "continues to be concerned at the misunderstanding and misrepresentation
that sometimes arises over arbitration." When asked to clarify the meaning of the statement by one
researcher, ACAS responded as follows:
"The comments on arbitration to which you refer relate to the ill-
informed criticisms one hears, the most common of which are:
(i) arbitrators always split the difference;
(ii) arbitration is expedient, unaccountable, lacking in authority, and
produces each time a shabby compromise;
(iii) arbitrators award money without any responsibility for funding
the award;
(iv) arbitrators do not have to live with their awards;
(iv) neither the national interest nor the needs of groups other than
the parties concerned is taken into account.
Arbitration in industrial relations disputes is a far more sophisticated
process than it is given credit for and the Service would reject any of
the criticisms outlined above."23
As has been stated above, there are problems in assessing the accuracy of these criticisms as there are
no published statistics on the outcome of awards, although ACAS itself dooes keep records. One
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argument against the publications of such figures is that it could encourage the concept of 'winners' and
'losers' which may prejudice the use of arbitration in the future. This is also a reason advanced by
those who are against the extended use of pendulum arbitration. Also, there may be a major difficulty
in quantifying some awards, especially those involving pay and different terms and conditions of
employment
Some of the criticisms cited by ACAS have already been discussed in section (i) above, "Reaching the
Decision', including the question of the 'national interest'. It is not possible to test such criticisms
from the data available, but one specific debate and criticism that arbitrators always 'split the difference'
between the claim and offer and reach a shabby compromise was pursued. As will be discussed below,
what is meant by 'splitting the difference' is by no means clear.
The analysis of the awards for the period 1942-85 was one method of examining the evidence on the
outcome of arbitrations and the issue of 'splitting the difference'. However, because of the lack of
background papers and the brevity of the earlier reports, it was not possible to conduct a sophisticated
analysis of all cases. This was a particular obstacle for complex pay and terms and conditions of
employment cases which could involve a whole package of issues. For example, the assessment of
the outcome of arbitration had to be based on the last stated position of both parties. Because of the
strategies used in bargaining, it was not possible to assess what the real position of both parties might
have been. In addition, it was not possible to quantify, with any accuracy, the potential impact of
changes in some terms and conditions of employment; or the short and long term effects of awards.
The outcome of awards were divided into four different categories - "For the Employer'; 'For the Union';
'Compromise'; 'Varied'. 'Compromise' relates to cases where something was given to both sides -
where the arbitrator 'split the difference' - although not necessarily an exact split between the claim and
offer; and 'Varied' applies to disciplinary cases where the penalty was varied. Because insufficient data
was available in some cases, the category Unquantifiable' was added; and as some cases were withdrawn
during the hearing, another category "Non-applicable' was also included.
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Bearing these points in mind, for the awards studied over the period 1942-85, the outcome for all cases
over the whole period can be summarised as follows. Thirty per cent of decisions went for the union
and 39 per cent for the employer, that is the arbitrator made a straight choice between the offer and the
claim in 69 per cent of cases. Twenty-six per cent were compromise awards between the offer and the
claim. Table 5.2 details the outcomes.
TABLE 5.2
Survey of Arbitration Awards 1942-85
Outcome of Arbitrators' Awards
[All cases - a one in ten sample]
Outcome Number of cases % of cases
For Employer 183 39.2





Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp. 19/21
If these figures are compared with what the arbitrators were actually asked to do under the terms of
reference [see Chapter 4], the following results emerge. Although in 53 per cent of cases the terms of
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reference were of the straight choice type, arbitrators actually made a straight choice in 69 per cent of
cases. Forty-one per cent of the terms of reference allowed the arbitrator to use his/her judgement and
award between the claim and offer, although this was only exercised in 26 per cent of cases. That is a
compromise decision was possible in 41 per cent of cases, but arbitrators compromised in 26 per cent
of cases only. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, arbitrators do not always 'split the difference'. It
must be remembered, however, that the above figures include issues concerning grading and dismissal
matters which do not often lend themselves to split decisions.
Because of the expansion of the Dismissal and Discipline cases handled by ACAS in the 1970s and
1980s, and because of the particular interest in these cases brought about by the proposed changes to
the Industrial Tribunal system [see discussion in Chapter 4], a separate survey of the outcome of these
issues was undertaken. The figures show that for Dismissal and Discipline cases over the period 1974
to 1985, 221 cases [41.5%] went in favour of the union and 249 [46.8%] in favour of the employer
[see Table 5.3]. These results illustrate the point that in such cases the decision is most likely to
favour one party or the other. Any compromise which does occur in disciplinary issues usually
involves a reduction in the penalty inposed. 24
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TABLE 5.3
Survey of Arbitration Awards 1974-85
Outcome of Arbitrators' Awards
[Dismissal and Discipline Cases only]
Outcome Number of cases % of cases










[1] Where a reduced penalty was imposed by the arbitrator.
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [c], p.2
As Lowry indicated, the main source of the criticism that arbitrators 'split the difference' refers to
Interest cases concerned with pay and terms and conditions of employment:
"As regards disputes of interest there is no doubt that undeserved though
it is, arbitrators have a reputation, regardless of the facts of the case, of
always 'splitting the difference'. To take refuge in a canard of this kind
is a convenient way of avoiding a more principled argument but until
ACAS and the CAC can effectively nail the lie any extension of the




One reason why arbitrators have gained this reputation could be that some arbitrators in the past have
seen 'splitting the difference' as part of the arbitrator's role. For example, Mary Rankin in discussing
the Scottish cases referred to the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, in the 1950's, argued that:
"The Tribunal's assessment will not greatly differ from that of the
parties and cannot do otherwise than split the difference between them,
leaning, it is true, a little to one side or the other in the special
circumstances of the case."
[Rankin, 1955, p.222]
Also there is another point made by arbitrators which is that in some circumstances it may be entirely
appropriate to 'split the difference'. As Johnston [1978] stated: "'Splitting the difference' may often be
perfectly sensible and rational." [p.89] This view is supported by another arbitrator, Sullivan:
"There are conditions where it is appropriate to split the difference if at
all possible. First, if both bargaining ratios are less than one and the
costs of continuing the negotiations are very high, then a result that
splits the difference may be quite acceptable. We have already
suggested that this situation may well have caused the early trade
unions and employers in coal and steel to adopt arbitrations and/or
sliding scale wage agreements. Secondly, where the dispute is a
genuine case of misunderstanding, or where the wording of an
agreement may mean different thing to the two parties, this approach
may be adopted."
[Sullivan, 1980, p.197]
It could be argued, that if the parties to arbitration did not wish an arbitrator to 'split the difference',
they could specifically ask her/him to find in favour of the claim or the offer in the terms of reference.
As was stated in Chapter 4 in the discussion of the terms of reference, the parties can have a degree of
control over the arbitrator's influence by placing some restrictions on the basis on which the arbitration
is to be conducted. Also there is an assumption that if parties voluntarily come to arbitration then,
unless otherwise stated, both are willing to concede something in the claim or the offer. As Lowry
states:
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"I have never acted as an arbitrator myself but I suggest that the
arbitrator acts on two assumptions. First, that the union would not be
coming to arbitration unless it felt that it could secure more [than was
being offered by the employer] for its members; and second that in
agreeing to arbitration, the employer was anxious to avoid the
alternative of industrial action and all its attendant costs. He would
therefore be willing to pay a little more if such action could be
avoided."
[Lowry, 1986, p.16]
There is, of course, a degree of ambiguity about what the term 'split the difference' actually means. In
the questionnaire survey, arbitrators were asked their interpretation of this phrase. Less than half [33]
of the arbitrators understood the phrase to mean the exact half-way or middle position between the
claim and offer. Twenty-three arbitrators interpreted it to mean a compromise decision somewhere
between the offer and the claim [see Appendix I].
Analysing the awards for the period 1942-85 with respect to Interest cases, involving pay and terms and
conditions of employment, reveals that in 17% of cases the award went in favour of the union; 24%
in favour of the employer; and 55% were compromise awards [see Table 5.4], In these cases the terms
of reference allowed the arbitrators to compromise in 67% of cases, but as the awards indicate they did
so in 55% of cases. Thus arbitrators made straight choices in 41% of cases although were directly
asked to do so in only 31% of cases. Again the evidence would suggest that arbitrators do not always
'split the difference' although they do compromise when asked to do so by the parties. Of the
compromise decisions, there were very few examples of the 50/50 split type, that is where the award




Survey of Arbitration Awards 1942-85
Outcome of Arbitrators' Awards
[Pay and Terms and Conditions of Employment Cases Only - a one in ten sample]
Outcome Number of cases % of cases
For Employer 32 23.9
For Union 23 17.2
Compromise 74 55.2
Unquantifiable 5 3.7
Source: Brown, Summary of Arbitration Awards 1942-85 - see Appendix II [b], pp.22/4
The evidence would suggest that employers did better out of arbitration and that arbitrators were not
inclined to make awards which exceeded the employers' last offer by any great extent. This would
support a statement made by Lowry in discussing public sector awards that:
"The small amounts by which arbitrators have improved upon the final
offer of the employer have in my view to be judged not just against the
extra cost which the awards imposed upon the Exchequer but against
the enormity of the potential cost if there had been a strike as a
consequence of a refusal to go to arbitration at all."
[Lowry, 1986, p. 15]
Lowry's statement can also be interpreted as an example of the justification for having state arbitration
machinery, and a counter to those who see the market place as the best ajudicator of industrial disputes.
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Given that the survey of the outcome of awards showed a bias in favour of employers, one of the
questions asked of the parties to arbitration in the questionnaire survey concerned the arbitrators'
decisions. The perception of the parties to arbitration in 1988 was that in respect of all cases, 80
[40%] of decisions went in favour of the employer's position; 60 [30%] found for the union's position;
and 54 [27%] involved a compromise award. Surprisingly, these perceptions are remarkably close to
the actual figures analysed for the period 1942-85 and confirm that, the parties to arbitration themselves
recognise that employers fared somewhat better than the unions 25. In spite of this, the service
received a overwhelming degree of support from both parties to arbitration. Seventy per cent [139] of
the parties considered that the award was fair and only eighteen per cent [36] were of the view that it
was unfair. Excluding the cases brought to arbitration under the electricity supply industry agreement,
when asked if they would use ACAS arbitration again if a similar dispute arose in the future, eighty-six
per cent [124] of the parties answered 'Yes' to this question and only 12 respondents said 'No' [see
Appendix III],
It is ACAS's practice not to inform the arbitrator formally of how his or her award is received by the
parties. When asked in the questionnaire survey if they would like to be informed as to how their
award was received by the parties, a majority [41] of arbitrators said 'Yes' and 25 answered 'No'.
ACAS has always been reluctant to follow up the response of the parties, unless informally through
future liaison with a Conciliation Officer. The reason for this has been a fear that to approach the
parties after the case again ran the danger of raising grievances and prejudicing the acceptability of the
award. Also there is the practical problem of when to approach the parties. What may in the short
term appear to be a decision favouring one party, could because of changing or unforeseen
circumstances turn out to be to their disadvantage in the longer term. In spite of their reluctance,
ACAS agreed to the questionnaire survey of the parties and one of the questions asked related to the
contribution of the award to the settlement of the issues in dispute. Excluding the electricity supply
industry cases, over ninety per cent of respondents considered that in the time since the award was
issued it had made an excellent, very good, good or moderate contribution to the settlement of the
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dispute. Asked the same question in relation to the longer term, the percentage was reduced, but still
exceeded eighty per cent [see Appendix III].
Finally, as an additional way of gauging the level of satisfaction of the parties, respondents were
invited to make additional comments regarding their personal experience of ACAS arbitration. Of
those respondents making additional comments, a significant number noted the efficient and
professional service offered by ACAS and the impartiality shown by arbitrators. One employer stated
that he was "Very impressed with the slick ACAS organisation" and one trade unionist concluded:
"In my experience ACAS have provided an essential service to
industrial relations practitioners who find themselves unable to resolve
difficulties via the normal procedure. Whilst I agree that
arbitration/conciliation should only be necessary in exceptional
circumstances, the mere fact that the safety valve exists is helpful.
The standard of service provided by ACAS and its arbitrators is high
and perfectly satisfactory. In general I am more than satisfied with the
impartiality shown."26
It would appear from the above evidence that first, criticisms that arbitrators always 'split the difference'
and make shabby compromises are unfounded; and second, that despite criticisms made of arbitration,
the service does enjoy strong support from the parties involved.
Summary
It is evident from the above discussions that many of the current debates surrounding the criteria used
by arbitrators in reaching their decisions; the giving of reasons and recommendations; and the
criticisms sometimes made of arbitration, echo previous discussion and analysis of the process of
arbitration and its results.
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Although these issues have been debated over the last century, the principles on which arbitrators reach
their decisions remain largely unspecified, although they are 'learned' by the arbitrator through
experience and contact with ACAS officials and other arbitrators. Differences of opinion still exist
regarding the practice of giving reasons or recommendations, but in the main, the policy recommended
by ACAS officials and endorsed by ACAS Council is adopted by arbitrators.
It has also been illustrated that many of the criticisms made of arbitration are largely unfounded and that
the evidence would suggest that arbitrators do not simply 'split the difference'; and in making their
awards they do give consideration to a wide range of factors including the general economic climate and
the employer's ability to pay. It can be argued that the dominant doctrine of political economy at any
given time and the terms of reference put to arbitrators have constrained the outcome of arbitration
awards. Although arbitrators in the post-war period did not follow the practice of their predecessors at
the end of the last century of awarding wage reductions [Davidson, 1978] - there was only one case in
the survey where an arbitrator issued an award below the level of the employer's final offer -
nonetheless they have operated within a market framework. Because of the limited data available and
problems of conducting such analysis, it was not possible to test the criticism that arbitration awards
were inflationary. However, although as illustrated, arbitrators wrote in a caveat in their awards to the
effect that they were not constrained by incomes policies in operation, it was and is unusual for
arbitrators to award a pay claim which is markedly out of line with the going rate of inflation or the
rate for the job in a particular industry.
In spite of the fact that parties often 'lose' as well as 'win' arbitration cases, there is a remarkable degree
of support for the service. To ACAS's knowledge there are no occasions on which an award has not
been implemented by the parties since 1974. Again similar evidence can be obtained from the history
of arbitration. For example, Knoop [1905, p.20] and Amulree [1929, p.l 12] remark on the fact that,
in the main, arbitration awards were accepted and implemented by the parties to arbitration at the
beginning of the century. The fact that parties abide by the moral obligation on them to accept the
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award is the strongest argument ACAS and other supporters of the voluntaristic system of arbitration
have in resisting any moves to make arbitration compulsory or awards legally binding.
Finally, the alternative to arbitration may be a costly dispute which neither side may relish. Quoting
the words of a well-known arbitrator at the beginning of the century, Knoop states:
"Unorganised labour, the new union, the employer, who though old in
years, first meets a labour trouble and who has not learnt that 'war is
hell' - such do not need arbitration. They believe they can win out and
are quite sure to have nothing to arbitrate. In proportion as the
contestants learn to respect the ability of the opponent to inflict injury
and appreciate that victories are expensive, they will be willing to
arbitrate, provided, of course, they have confidence in the tribunal
proposed."
[Knoop, 1905, p. 17]
Although political and economic pressures in the 1980s were in favour of less consensus and a move to
free market solutions to industrial relations problems, it is clear from the surveys of arbitrators and the
parties to arbitration that there is still a considerable degree of support from those who choose this
method of dispute resolution27.
1 As has been indicated in Chapter 4, the background papers relating to arbitration cases are destroyed
after a two year period. The report and award are kept in bound volumes in ACAS Head Office.
2 As evidence from the past would indicate, employers were reluctant to appoint an arbitrator, who was
also a local employer, because they did not want him or her to have access to detailed financial information.
2 Oral evidence from interviews with arbitrators confirmed this view. Arbitrators often found it very
difficult to articulate exactly which factors influenced them most.
4 Extract from letter from Les Parsisson, ACAS to P.J. White, Business Studies Department, University
of Edinburgh, dated 6 June 1985.
^ For more detailed figures see Appendix HI, Question 25.
6 Ibid.
7 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Minutes of Evidence, 1966, pp.
1936/7.
® It is interesting to note Sir Roy's concerns in this regard, especially as Prime Ministers [for example
Harold Wilson] often appealed to the 'national interest' as a reason why the government's incomes policy
should be accepted and implemented.
9 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Minutes of Evidence, 1966,
p.1936.
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10 Paragraph 285 of Donovan Report, quoted in Incomes Data Study of Conciliation and Arbitration,
August 1972.
11 Comment made by Professor George Bain at Seminar for Potential Arbitrators, November 1983.
*7 Discussed at Council meeting attended by this author in 1985. Harrison's policy paper was based on the
results of the questionnaire survey conducted by this researcher.
1 Comment made by Professor George Bain at Seminar for Potential Arbitrators, November 1983.
*4 For a full breakdown of the responses from arbitrators, see Appendix I, Question 16 [a], p.47. Note,
the arbitrators were free to suggest any advantages which occured to them. Closed response options were not
given.
1^ For a full breakdown of the responses from arbitrators, see Appendix I, Question 16 [b], p.48. Note,
the arbitrators were free to suggest any disadvantages which occured to them. Closed response options were
not given.
1 ^ See breakdown of details in Appendix II [b], pp.27/29.
See Arbitration Awards 1953. The above example also provides an illustration of the kind of vague
terms of reference which ACAS tries to avoid - see discussion of terms of reference in Chapter 4.
1® Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Minutes of Evidence, 1966, pp.
1935/6.
I9 Ibid, p.1957.
7® John Lambert made this remark when he attended the Seminar for Potential Arbitrators in November
1983.
71 Comment made by Professor George Bain at Seminar for Potential Arbitrators, November 1983.
72 This author attended the Council meeting at which this was discussed in 1985. Harrison's policy paper
was based on the results of the questionnaire survey conducted by this researcher.
73 See footnote no.4 above.
74 In dismissal cases, if the employee was not dismissed this was quantified in terms of 'for Union'.
However, some employees received some form of penalty, for example loss of wages or downgrading.
75 See Appendix HI, question 20. If the cases are divided between single and boards of arbitration and the
ESI cases, significant differences in perceptions of the outcome are revealed. In ESI cases in particular, it
would appear that there is a strong bias in favour of the employers' side. However, the compromise decision
noted here refers to cases where the employee was not dismissed but was subject to another form of discipline.
This was treated in the analysis of arbitration awards for the period 1942-85 as 'for Union'. Therefore, if it is
analysed as such in this survey, then the disparity between the outcome for employers and trade unions is
reduced. It can be argued that this is how such a case would be interpreted by the trade unions involved, ie the
object for them is to ensure that the employee is not dismissed and they may even concede and that another
penalty should be imposed.
76 See full details of comments made in Appendix III.
77 As Lowry (1990) argues, however, this method of third party dispute resolution has always had limited
use in the British system of industrial relations. The explanations advanced by him are [i] trade union
preference for strike action; [ii] employers' reluctance to hand over responsibility to a third party; [iii]
disenchantment with war-time experience of compulsory arbitration; and [iv] employers' suspicion that








Using data and material gathered from questionnaire surveys, studies of arbitration awards and oral
evidence from interviews and seminars, chapters 3 and 4 provide information on the principles and
practices involved in selecting arbitrators and the arbitration process itself; and chapter 5 provides data
on the outcome of arbitration hearings.
The objective of this chapter is to bring together the evidence available on the practice of arbitration
under ACAS with the more theoretical discussions and debates outlined in chapters 1 and 2.
This chapter is, therefore, addressed to two questions. The first asks how can we assess ACAS
arbitration in the light of the corporatist debate. The second considers whether the so-called rejection of
corporatism and attack on trade union power by the Thatcher governments have had any significant
effect on the work of the ACAS arbitration service.
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i] ACAS Arbitration: Corporatism in a Cold Climate?
"Although pluralism, corporatism, centralisation, partnership and other
concepts provided lenses through which to view reality, the authors
found that these lenses were difficult to focus, their angle of vision was
unknown, and it was not clear what filters to use."
[Raab, 1990, p. 19]
As the quotation from Raab illustrates there are difficulties associated with using any particular concept
as a description or view of 'reality'. As such there are numerous problems in applying discussions on
corporatism to ACAS arbitration. Crouch's [1985] model of Contestation, Pluralist Bargaining,
Bargained Corporatism and Authoritarian Corporatism is useful, but it was developed to explain
relationships at a macro level of analysis. In addition most of the debates on corporatism at different
levels of analysis are concerned mainly with policy making. In the strict sense of the term, ACAS
does not make policy in relation to the labour market and certainly not in relation to macroeconomic
management, although senior ACAS officials do have an opportunity to comment at least informally
on aspects of labour market reform, especially industrial relations reform1; and ACAS as an
organisation, through ACAS Council, can participate in government consultative exercises, for
example the proposed reform of Wages Councils2. In view of the anti-union rhetoric of the
government, ACAS, as a tripartite organisation dependent on the support of both sides of industry, has
attempted to distance itself from some of the more controversial aspects of the government's industrial
relations reform.
ACAS is active, however, in making and reinforcing policy in relation to the conduct of arbitration and
in a more general sense in relation to dispute resolution. In these respects, as was illustrated in
chapters 3-5, it has remained essentially conservative in its approach with emphasis on maintaining the
status quo. In contrast, at the macro level the government has attempted to break with the post-war
consensus and compromise approach to dispute resolution and to establish a more adversarial and
contestation strategy. Crouch summarises developments as follows:
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"In some respects it is possible to describe the changes since 1979 as a
determined return from an unsuccessful bargained corporatism to a
classical pluralism, with organised labour being pressed back into its
'proper' limited confines. However, there are some indications that the
government, and a few sections of capital, want to go even further.
Pluralism implies strengthening [a] the middle levels of the labour
movement against the shop-floor, and [b] the elaboration of procedures
for dispute settlement. But it is present policy to weaken union
leaderships and to break up many established procedures of dispute
settlement.... this is a shift to contestation."
[Crouch, 1985, pp.84-5]
Such a shift to contestation has not occurred in ACAS in general and its arbitration in particular, where
the whole ethos continues to be one of consensus and co-operation. If such a shift was to filter down
to all levels of industrial relations then, it could be argued that, the raison detre of ACAS and the
organisation itself would cease to exist. It would appear that, even if Crouch is correct in stating that
the government and a few sections of capital wish to return to contestation, a substantial number of
employers do not welcome such a move3.
If we apply Crouch's framework to ACAS as an example of a meso level organisation we can reach the
following conclusions. As has been suggested the model of contestation where the relationship
between the parties represents a zero-sum game, that is where a change to the benefit of one party can
be achieved only through a concomitant change to the disadvantage of the other and where neither party
can be expected voluntarily to concede gains to the others, cannot be used as a description for the
relationship between the parties to arbitration. As we have discussed parties come to arbitration
voluntarily, most references are made jointly by both parties, the parties can limit the cost of the
outcome of arbitration through the terms of reference, and both parties agree to be morally bound by
the arbitrator's decision. The whole point of them coming to arbitration is that they are no longer
willing to bear the costs of contestation. Also, the practitioners most directly involved with
arbitration argue that, in general, parties would not go to arbitration voluntarily unless they were
prepared to concede something to the other side.
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We can also reject the model of authoritarian corporatism as a description of the arbitration process.
Given that this form of corporatism can only exist in Crouch's analysis when the state has crushed
autonomous representative organisations, then clearly such circumstances do not apply.
The model of pluralist bargaining where both parties decide that they would stand to gain from a
reduction in the costs of conflict, a positive-sum game, would appear to be more appropriate to the
arbitration relationship4. Under this model parties develop rules and procedures for resolving matters
of dispute including the use of conciliation and arbitration. To adopt this line of action does impose
restraints on the parties' freedom of action, but it is assumed that such restraint will be tolerated in
order to reduce the potential costs of conflict. Under such arrangements the role of representatives is to
convince their respective constituencies that there is more to be gained by adopting dispute procedures
to resolve a disagreement between the parties than to pursue strike action. Also current negotiations
are influenced by the assumption that the relationship between the parties will be long-term and the
likelihood that there will be future bargaining rounds between them. From the survey of the parties to
arbitration it was evident that the parties considered there was more to be gained from coming to
arbitration than continuing with their dispute; the majority of respondents stated that they would use
arbitration again in similar circumstances; and there was evidence to suggest that the parties considered
the likelihood of future bargaining rounds5.
The criteria for bargained corporatism identified by Crouch [1986] would also appear to be present in
the arbitration process. That is the assumption that there will be pursuit of joint interests by the
parties; and in order to realise common interests the parties will be constrained to reduce potential
conflict and to exclude a zero-sum game. However, parties will not always follow a positive-sum
approach as they may have to sacrifice one particular round of negotiations for the sake of potential
future gains. In this way the outcomes of bargains will be traded over time and the participants will
build up credits, although whether the eventual outcome will favour either capital or labour is not pre¬
determined. Finally, the practitioners will also become experts and derive status from their role in the
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process. Clearly there are elements of the arbitration process which fit this description. Most
references to arbitration are made jointly and joint references are encouraged by ACAS6; parties who
use the service over the long-term do build up credits and are prepared to accept losing a specific case on
the grounds that future references will go in their favour7; and participants in the system do derive an
expertise and status from their involvement8.
Therefore, there would appear to be elements of pluralist bargaining and bargained corporatism - a
pluralist corporatism - in the operation of ACAS arbitration which has not altered since the election of
the Conservative government. This could provide evidence of the co-existence of pluralism and
corporatism identified by Cawson [1988]. Further, contrary to changes in the policy approach at the
macroeconomic level and in the industrial relations climate, support for arbitration has been
maintained^ and ACAS still maintains control over the organisation of the arbitration service.
ACAS's practice of appointing arbitrators has not altered significantly; it continues to set the agenda
for policy discussions on arbitration; and apart from the move to improve professionalism and
efficiency the operation of the arbitration system has remained unchanged. It would appear from the
evidence in this thesis that the 'rules of the game' are accepted and supported by a whole network of
relationships which have been built up between the representatives of trade unions and employers and
the civil servants involved in ACAS on the one hand, and the civil servants and the arbitrators on the
other. Such developments could also provide an illustration of the dualism referred to by Goldthorpe
[1984], where the government has played a strategic role in attempting to break corporatist
arrangements and encouraging dualism at the macroeconomic level, but where corporatist relationships
are maintained at other levels of analysis.
Taking a different approach and adopting Grant and Sargent's [1987] key features of corporatism,
namely intervention, intermediation and incorporation, one can reach the following conclusions. At
the level of dispute resolution the state does intervene, albeit through a quasi-departmental organisation,
in a complex way and on the voluntarist principles established in British industrial relations. The
pressure to write-in some form of third party [and state] intervention in procedure agreements to apply
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to certain stages of a dispute has built up over the last thirty years. Even where ACAS arbitration has
not been written into an agreement, should a dispute reach the stage of actual or threatened industrial
action, it is ACAS policy to 'run alongside the dispute' offering assistance to the parties. Every
attempt is made to resolve the dispute, preferably without resort to arbitration itself, which is
considered to be the final stage in the process10.
There is also evidence of intermediary relationships between ACAS and the representatives of organised
interests. ACAS endeavours to encourage 'good practice' in industrial relations by issuing
publications and carrying out advisory visits to workplaces. If parties proceed to conciliation, a whole
network of relationships is built up between ACAS conciliators and representatives of employers and
trade unions. Once parties have agreed to refer a case to arbitration they are morally bound to
participate in proceedings as established by ACAS and to accept the outcome of the arbitrator's
decision. Through the whole process both sides are represented and to some extent regulated by
interest group leaders. It is usual for the procedures and the outcome of an arbitration, no matter how
unwelcome by either party, to be honoured by both sides11. Therefore, in arbitration cases,
representatives of trade unions and employers have been successful in delivering the acceptance of their
respective constituencies and the implementations of the decisions reached.
Lastly the element of incorporation referred to is also present in the arbitration process.
Representatives of employers and unions are naturally drawn closer to state dispute resolution
machinery when they agree to come to ACAS to resolve a dispute. Especially in relation to
arbitration they sacrifice autonomy of action by giving up the final decision to a third party. As
illustrated by the relatively small number of cases which proceed to arbitration, this is a price which
some employers and trade unions are not prepared to pay.
A third approach would be to use Moore and Booth's [1989] analysis. ACAS arbitration would appear
to fit neatly into their description of 'negotiated order' where a state institution has been established; in
which the state's interests are articulated by a representative or a surrogate who acts as an agent of the
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state and where organized groups are also represented; and where the parties involved in such
arrangements are responsible and accountable for the attainment of agreed objectives. However, the
operation of ACAS arbitration also contains the criteria which Moore and Booth identified as being
necessary to represent corporatist arrangements, that is representation, responsibility and control.
These latter criteria are close to the key factors identified by Grant and Sargent [1987].
Therefore, the answer to the question as to whether corporatism is an accurate description or view of
reality for the arbitration service is both yes and no, because it all hinges on the actual definition of
corporatism employed. Application of the different models above do reveal some support for
corporatist relationships within ACAS and its arbitration service. But it must be stressed that
arbitration is a very limited activity in British industrial relations. Therefore, while corporatist
arrangements may be evident in the process, one must question the level of significance of these
arrangements for industrial relations in general. Nevertheless, given the anti-corporatist statement and
the rhetoric and policies of the Conservative governments post-1979 on industrial relations, some
impact on ACAS's arbitration service could have been anticipated. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine the effects, if any, on the operation of ACAS and the practice of arbitration.
ii] The New Regime: Rejection of Corporatism and Trade Union Power
"With the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration
and its continued dominance throughout the 1980s, the era of
corporatism might be considered to have been quietly laid to rest. This
view of policy-making in Thatcherite Britain is one which we
challenge."
[Moore and Booth, 1989, p.3]
As discussed in Chapter 2 above the Conservative administration which took office in 1979 rejected
both the post-war consensus and the corporatist arrangements which the consensus was said to have
fostered. Instead they offered the electorate an alternative to the policies pursued by previous post-war
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governments - a new beginning [Conservative Party, 1979], This 'new' approach to economic
management and the adoption of monetarist rhetoric was associated with the influence of 'New Right'
philosophy within the Conservative Party [Bosanquet, 1983; King, 1987]. As the trade union
movement was identified as one group in society which was deemed to have become too powerful under
corporatist arrangements, the government proposed to exclude trade union representatives from policy
discussions and to introduce legislation designed to shift the balance of power in industrial relations
back towards employers [Conservative Party, 1979],
The impact of the government's approach to industrial relations on the British trade union movement
has been widely debated12. It is not possible in this thesis to explore this debate and the other factors
which have contributed to any changes which have occurred since 1979 in any detail. Rather this
section examines whether the government's stated policy on trade union reform has impacted to any
significant extent on the arbitration service of ACAS.
It is generally accepted that after the Labour government's attempt to include representatives of the trade
union movement in negotiations regarding wage and benefit levels and to regulate wage increases under
the Social Contract [1975-79], the Conservative administrations post-1979 have indeed excluded trade
unions from such a role [Grant, 1989; Maclnnes, 1987; Mcllroy, 1988 ]. One reason for this
exclusion was that formal incomes policy of the type pursued in the 1960s and 1970s was abandoned as
a policy instrument. The Conservative government explicitly rejected incomes policy as a means of
controlling inflation, arguing first that inflation could only be reduced by control of the money supply
and second that wage levels should be determined by negotiation between employers and unions which
in turn would be affected by market conditions in any particular industry. The new government did,
however, recommend limits for pay settlements in the public sector in line with its objective to reduce
public spending and used 'cash limits' as one method of imposing a constraint on public sector pay
levels. Also Brown and Sisson [1983] have identified three additional forms of incomes policy being
pursued in the public sector in the early 1980s, namely indexation of pay for the armed forces, police
and fire services to national average earnings; Pay Review Bodies for groups including doctors,
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dentists, judges and politicians; and cutbacks in funding to those industries in the private sector
dependent on subsidies from the Exchequer.
In excluding the trade unions from government level discussions, Grant argues that the Conservative
government broke away from the tripartite style of policy-making which was adopted not only by the
last Labour administration but in the last two years of the Heath government from 1972-74.
Although Grant describes the 1970s as a period of tripartite policy making process, he contends that:
"tripartite arrangements fell far short of the corporatist ideal in so far as
the CBI and the TUC often had great difficulty in implementing
agreements."
[Grant, 1989, p.34]
The reason cited by Grant was that, because of inherent weaknesses in the CBI and TUC, neither
organisation could ensure acceptance and implementation by their members of any agreements reached
with government. In addition he cites Joel Barnett's, Chief Secretary to the Treasury in the 1974-79
Labour Cabinet, statement that Labour paid a high price to obtain the co-operation of the trade unions,
as temporary agreements on incomes policy were obtained at the expense of commitment by the
government to legislative concessions to the movement. Grant argues that the legislative changes,
which were deemed to be pro-union, outlived the gains to the government from the labour movement's
short-term acceptance of the restraint on wages under the Social Contract. While accepting that neither
the CBI or the TUC are organisations which can guarantee their members' compliance with any
agreements reached, I would take issue with Grant on the second point relating to the cost imposed on
the Labour government. By their very nature attempts at corporatist arrangements are not costless and
will inevitably entail some form of bargain or concessions from government in return for wage
restraint. However, if governments are prepared to pursue such a bargain, it is assumed that they are
doing so because they judge the costs of not entering into such a relationship will outweigh the
concession costs. Whether or not they calculate the relative costs accurately if, of course, another
matter. Arguably, what happened in the case of the Labour administration was that it was unable to
deliver its side of the bargain when world economic conditions worsened. Finally, as we have
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witnessed in the 1980s, any advances gained by the trade union movement in legislative terms during
the 1980s have been eroded by the industrial relations and other labour market reforms of the current
administration. The other element of the implicit contract between Labour and the unions in the
1970s, namely improved social benefits for working people, have also been reversed in the 1980s.
One reason for the rejection of tripartite policy-making by the new government discussed by Grant
[1989] is that they identified corporatism in Britain in the post-war period as one of the causes of
Britain's poor economic record in the past He quotes a 1988 White Paper which claimed:
"The ability of the economy to change and adapt was hampered by the
combination of corporatism and powerful unions. Corporatism limited
competition and the birth of new firms whilst, at the same time,
encouraging protectionism and restrictions designed to help existing
firms."
[Cm. 278, p.l quoted in Grant, 1989, p.35]
The government's analysis sits at odds with the orthodox, but not universal, view of corporatist
theorists that corporatism has never existed or has failed to be established in Britain. Grant explains
the apparent disparity between the different analysis in terms of the loose application of the term
corporatism and its confusion in the literature with tripartism and the failure to define the concept more
precisely. But, it can be argued that, even if the term was used loosely, and in an academic or
theoretical sense corporatism did not exist, nevertheless it did have a powerful political currency.
What the Conservative administration would appear to be referring to is a particular style of
government and policy-making which they argued had developed in the post-war period of so-called
consensus politics. It was associated with, or indeed can be seen as a consequence of, adherence to the
economic orthodoxy of Keynesian demand management and the primacy given to the objective of full
employment. Whether in a technical sense previous post-war government's were Keynesian, as
Tomlinson [1985] argues, the fact that they worked on certain principles which assumed that they were,
influenced the behaviour of key economic actors.
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To some extent Tomlinson's argument can be advanced with respect to the popular use of the term
corporatism to describe the late 1960s and especially the 1970s. It reflected a growing perception that,
as governments responded to the combined problems of rising inflation and unemployment and as
traditional Keynesian demand management techniques did not appear to provide the 'answer', they
resorted to formal incomes policies, mainly as a crisis measure, in an attempt resolve their dilemma.
The use of incomes policy necessitated the bringing in of both employers and unions into a more direct
relationship with the state, a move which was interpreted by writers from both a left and right wing
perspective as anti-democratic. Rightly or wrongly this trend was labelled corporatist as it represented
a move beyond tripartite arrangements whereby representatives of employers and unions sat on
government bodies. Instead a more direct role was accorded to employers and unions, first, in agreeing
national wage levels and in the case of the social contract, benefit and legislative concessions; second,
in 'selling' such agreements to their respective memberships; and last, in effect in implementing
policy. In the event, the inability of the CBI and TUC to ensure the compliance of their members
over a sustained period meant that corporatism as a method of dispute and crisis resolution was short¬
lived. As has been indicated, it was also an expensive option for the state in terms of other benefits or
legislative concessions. Nevertheless this did not prevent leading trade unionists like Jack Jones being
considered as, if not more, powerful than the Prime Minister of the time [Maclnnes, 1987, p.45;
Coates and Topham, 1986, p.56] and increased public concern about the role which union and
employers' representatives were perceived to be playing in the policy making process. These
perceptions, together with growing unrest about public sector pay disputes, contributed to public
opinion and the view that unions and some trade union leaders were becoming too powerful in British
society.
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 1 and highlighted in the quote from the government's White Paper
above, not only corporatist arrangements, but the trade unions were identified by the new Conservative
government under Mrs Thatcher as a cause of Britain's economic decline. As a result the new
administration was determined to change the balance of power in industrial relations in favour of
employers. One of the methods of achieving this objective was stated in the Conservative Party's
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1979 Manifesto to be trade union reform. Attempts at trade union reform were, of course, not new in
British industrial relations and had been pursued unsuccessfully in 1969 and 1971 by previous Labour
and Conservative administrations. However, by the time the new administration took office in 1979,
economic conditions in Britain and the world had changed considerably from those existing in the
1960s and 1970s. Expensive concessions to the trade union movement in return for wage restraint
was one option which the new government was no longer prepared to entertain.
Instead the Conservative government excluded the trade unions from discussions at governmental level;
with some notable exceptions, reduced the power of tripartite bodies such as the NEDC; moved to
privatise large sections of the public sector thus reducing the problem of public sector pay; deregulated
the labour market by reducing the power of Wages Councils and employment and other rights; and
embarked on an ambitious programme of trade union legislation. For a government which was on
record as supporting a free market philosophy, they were surprisingly active in the labour market. But
it was activity or intervention designed to remove perceived obstacles to the free functioning of the
labour market [Brown, 1988a and b; Brown and King 1988].
Some authors have argued that the Thatcher government's approach to trade union reform can be
interpreted as an extension of policies adopted by previous Labour and Conservative administrations,
and as such are not significantly different or radical in relation to post-war trends. While recognising
that the impact of government policy should not be over-estimated, it is argued here that if one
considers the context within which these reforms took place, that is under the new economic
orthodoxy of monetarism; that the reforms were implemented without consultation and above the
heads of trade union leaders; and the fact that they were combined with a whole package of labour
market reforms discussed above, then such an approach marks a significant departure from post-war
policy in this area.
Locating events in Britain within a context of the response of capitalist democracies to labour market
problems in the post-war period, Robertson [1986] argues that in the 1970s capitalist democracies
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normally used three main methods of resolution. The first he describes as a passive, social democratic
or guardian strategy as operated in Britain; the second as an active, social democratic or egalitarian
strategy such as that adopted in Sweden; and the third as a passive, neo-liberal or business-centered
strategy as pursued in the United States. He contends that the Thatcher administrations resurrected a
fourth strategy which he describes as market-centered which combines neo-liberalism with an active
state. Thus although the government may have shifted from an active to passive demand management
strategy at the macroeconomic level, this has involved a shift from passive to active labour market
management. Robertson cites the strategic role given to the tripartite body the MSC, downward
pressure on wage levels, changes to the benefit system, increased incentives to work; and employment
and training programmes as evidence of the government's activitism. Robertson's list is by no means
exhaustive and other policies pursued by the government can be included to support his argument
[Brown, 1988a and b; Brown and King, 1988].
In spite of the anti-tripartite, anti-corporatist and anti-quango rhetoric of the government, it is perhaps
surprising that a tripartite quango such as the MSC should be given such an major role in labour
market strategy. The expansion of the MSC is cited by some authors as evidence that corporatism
was still alive and well in Britain in the early 1980's and has been practised by the government in
specific circumstances. However, the rise of the MSC was associated directly with the rise in
unemployment, especially youth unemployment, in the early 1980s [Benn and Fairley, 1986; Brown
and Fairley, 1989]. At this stage the government needed the co-operation of the TUC and trade union
representatives on the MSC to secure trade union acceptance and implementation of training policy.
With demographic changes and an upturn in economic activity in the late 1980s, unemployment ceased
to pose such a political problem for the government. Moves were then made to reform the functions
and balance of representation within the MSC. Increasingly trade unions were not consulted before
major training programmes were adopted and implemented. In the latter years of its existence the
representation and power of trade unions and local authorities on MSC committees declined
significantly. The government changed the functions and name of the quango to Training
Commission then Training Agency before abolishing it as a separate organisation and returning many
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of its responsibilities back to the Department of Employment [Brown and Fairley, 1989]. Therefore,
if the MSC was an example of corporatism under Thatcherism it was a very short-lived one. The
experience also provides a good illustration of how an administration can use a particular form of
government, in this case a non-departmental body, with a particular objective in mind and then dispense
with it when the policy which it was designed to address is no longer considered a problem for
government. This is best illustrated with a quote from Hood and Wright:
"The non-departmental body thus appears to be a remarkably tenacious
form of government, even in ostensibly 'hard times' ... It offers at
least four potential political uses that are not likely to disappear.
First, governments will probably always have need of
'unacknowledgeable means' or at least of bodies from which central
government can distance itself in some sensitive areas, such as arms
sales and cloak-and-dagger activities at home as well as abroad. Second,
given that modern governments need to have a permanent
administrative apparatus of some sort, there will presumably always be
a value in having contemporary, expendable organisations outside the
permanent government service that can be discarded when circumstances
permit. Third, the use of such bodies as an administrative means of by¬
passing other public organisations that for one reason or another
politicians distrust goes back at least as far as the seventeenth century.
Fourth, the advisory committee is frequently too convenient a device
for political 'window dressing' to become extinct as a form of non-
departmental body."
[Hood andWright, 1981]
The experience of ACAS is somewhat different. It was not identified as an institution to implement a
major change in government policy and as such has neither experienced the spectacular rise or the fall
of the MSC post-1979. Like other non-departmental bodies ACAS has suffered reductions in the real
value of its Budget; pressures to reduce its activity in some areas of its work such as the advisory
service or 'fire-prevention' work; and there has been some speculation about the organisation charging
for some of the services it provides1-5. In most respects, however, ACAS has survived the change of
government largely intact, and its main functions of advisory, conciliation, mediation and arbitration
work have continued.
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Specifically in relation to arbitration, Lowry [1990a] notes that as part of the deregulation policies of
the Conservative government, Schedule II was repealed by the Employment Act 1980; the Fair Wages
Resolution was rescinded with effect from September 1983; and statutory trade union recognition was
repealed in Section 19 of the Employment Act 1980. Thus three grounds for unilateral access to
arbitration disappeared from the statute book. However, the decision by the government to legislate in
these areas came as no surprise. As has been discussed above, these issues, especially the provision
for trade union recognition, had been contentious matters in the past.
Lowry refers to an argument advanced by Bassett that the Cabinet's secret economic committee
reviewed arbitration and, according to a Cabinet paper, concluded:
"The only sure way for employers to avoid the risk of awards which
they cannot afford is to refuse to go to arbitration. It follows that
arbitration should not take place without their consent, but only on
mutual agreement"
[quoted in Lowry, 1990a, p.59]
Therefore, Lowry concludes that the Thatcher government was not totally opposed to the principle of
arbitration. Rather, they were against unilateral access to, or compulsory arbitration. Their support for
the proposition that arbitration should only take place on a jointly agreed basis, is according to Lowry,
reflected in more recent agreements signed with the Civil Service unions. That is, where the
government had withdrawn access to arbitration for some workers in the public sector, it has been
prepared to re-negotiate agreements which allow for arbitration on a mutually agreed basis.
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iii] How can the continuation of corporatist relationships within ACAS be
explained?
On the surface there would appear to be a contradiction between the government's macroeconomic
stance and stated approach to corporatism and the operation of ACAS arbitration. How can this
apparent contradiction be explained?
First, it should not be assumed that corporatist strategies are impossible under a neo-liberal or free
market approach to running the economy. As we have illustrated with the example of the MSC,
corporatist strategies may indeed be necessary, at least in the short term, as one method of meeting a
policy objective even within a free market culture. Also as others writers have discussed, corporatism
can co-exist with other strategies, for example pluralism [Cawson, 1988] and dualism [Goldthorpe
1984],
Second, linked to the first factor, it can be useful for a government, and especially a government
espousing the benefits of the free market, to distance itself directly from an industrial dispute, but to
have another institution which is able to take a more conciliatory line should it become necessary. In
other words, the government has to have some means at its disposal to rescue an industrial conflict,
especially in the public sector, when it considers it cannot 'win'. That is, it is not just employers and
trade unions in private sector disputes who may seek a means of 'not losing face' - the government may
have need of such an arrangement. We could speculate that the more non-interventionist the
government, then the increased likelihood of bitter industrial conflict and thus the greater need for an
'independent' organisation like ACAS to act as a form of damage limitation.
Third, while aspects of the government's labour market reform have impacted on the general climate of
industrial relations, as workplace studies have highlighted, they have not necessarily altered the day-to¬
day relationships within some organisations. That is, the impact of the government's legislation has
not been universal. For example, evidence would suggest that companies which did recognise trade
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unions in the past continue to do so, and which did have procedures for dispute resolution have
maintained them [Kelly, 1989; Metcalf, 1990], Therefore, the practice of industrial relations within
many companies has remained largely unaltered by the change in government and their approach to
trade union reform.
Fourth, the continuation of corporatist relationships in arbitration may represent an example of the
dualism described by Goldthorpe [1984], At the macroeconomic level the government is excluding
trade unions from decision-making processes and enacting legislation to free the labour market, but at
the meso or micro level relationships between employers and unions in many organisations has not
undergone a dramatic change. Both parties continue to recognise the mutual advantages in pursuing a
policy of co-operation and consensus and in bringing differences to arbitration. This is not to assume
that there will not be tensions between the two strategies from time to time.
Fifth, there may, of course, be no other option for parties to continue this form of relationship,
because, as we have discussed above, there has been a growing tendency to write-in arbitration as a final
stage in dispute resolution. Such a practice in industrial relations is likely to ensure a certain
continuity of practice regardless of the industrial relations policies of any particular administration in
power. It is possible then that nay changes which may occur in such practice will only occur in the
longer term.
Finally, as Crouch [1985] recognises once certain relationships have built up over a period of time
they are not easily changed. In the case of arbitration we have traced the development of relationships
over time and the role of the state in providing arrangements for dispute resolution. Therefore, in spite
of the government's rhetoric it is difficult to foresee that they could dispense with a system for
resolving disputes which has existed in some form for over one hundred years, although whether the
government will continue to provide such a service under the auspices of ACAS is a matter for
speculation.
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This leads on to the question of why ACAS itself has survived the election of the Conservative
government, which is one of the topics for the next and final chapter.
Summary
It has been argued in this chapter that corporatism is a useful but limited concept for understanding the
practice of ACAS arbitration. By employing definitions of corporatism advanced by different
theorists, we have identified elements of both corporatism and pluralism in the arbitral relationships
between the civil servants, arbitrators and the parties to disputes. The precise label we attach to this
relationship will depend to a large extent on the particular definition applied.
In spite of the Conservative government's approach to macroeconomic management and industrial
relations reform, we have observed little impact of the changes since 1979 on the operation and
outcome of ACAS arbitration. Therefore, contrary to developments at the macroeconomic level,
elements of corporatist relationships which were identified continue to exist.
Finally, we have advanced some explanations for the apparent continuity of practice in ACAS
arbitration since 1979.
1 During interviews with ACAS officials, they stated that they had discussion with civil servants in the
Department of Employment responsible for drafting industrial relations legislation. They mentioned, in
particular, the difficulties encountered by D/E officials when they attempted to draft legislation banning
strikes in 'essential services'. In the event, no such legislation has yet been presented to the House of
Commons.
2 ACAS was one of the organisations which responded to the government's Consultative Paper on Wages
Councils issued in March 1985. For discussion of the reform of Wages Councils, see Brown, 1988a.
^ Evidence from work-place studies in the 1980's would appear to support the view that not all employers
have adopted a more confrontational approach to industrial relations. For example, Coates, 1989 refers to
the study conducted by Brown et al [1981] which was replicated and extended in the mid-1980's. From this
study Coates argues that: ". . . it emerged that little had changed during the early Thatcher years. Union
recognition remained extensive, collective bargaining for pay was stable everywhere except in
manufacturing . . . and the system of shop stewards remained firmly intact [p.141].
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4 See discussion of pluralism by Hyman, 1989, chapter 3.
5 See details of responses to questions and comments in Appendix in and discussion in Chapter 5 above.
^ In order to maintain the 'voluntarist' principle and to secure the acceptability of the arbitration award, it
is ACAS policy to encourage joint references, so that neither party perceives that they were 'forced' into this
form of third party dispute resolution.
^ The evidence gained from the survey of parties would indicate that even when one party 'lost' the
arbitration reference they were prepared to use the service in a similar dispute in the future; in addition
comments to this effect were made by respondents - see Appendix HI.
® Trade union officials and employers' representatives who are regular users of the service do build up
knowledge, experience and recognition from their involvement in arbitration. In addition, the arbitrators
themselves derive expertise and a degree of status from the role which they play. Because of the rather closed
nature of the whole arbitration process and the practice of non-publicity surrounding the arbitrators
themselves, the status which participants gain is normally confined to within the small group of people who
are most directly involved. There are, of course, a small number of key figures who enjoy broader recognition
in the media.
^ See Table 1.1 for breakdown of number of cases coming to arbitration. Also see Appendix III for support
for arbitration from users of the service.
I ® Information gained from discussion with ACAS officials and work experience in ACAS itself.
II See discussion in Chapter 5 above.
12 See, for example, Bassett [1986], Maclnness [1987], Coates [1989] and summary of debate in
Longstreth [1988].
1 ^ Evidence from discussion with ACAS staff. These issues were sometimes raised at Arbitrators' Seminars.






Expanding the themes outlined in Chapter 6 to explain why corporatist relationships within ACAS
have survived the election of three consecutive Conservative administrations, this chapter will explore
the reasons which can be offered to explain the continued existence of the organisation.
A second objective is to consider the future prospects for ACAS and the different services which it
provides. To some extent future developments will be dependent on the result of the next general
election, the outcome of which is the subject of another debate outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, conclusions derived from the context, evidence and implications of this study of ACAS
arbitration will be advanced. It will be argued that, in spite of the changed climate in which ACAS
has operated and the drive by ACAS officials to standardise conventions and practice and to increase the
efficiency and professionalism of the service, there is a substantial degree of continuity in the operation
of arbitration. This continuity can be explained in the context of the long history of arbitration in
British industrial relations.
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i] The survival of ACAS
"Those who thought that the arrival of a Conservative government
would mean curtains for ACAS have been confounded."
[Lowry, 1990b, p.6]
When it came to power in 1979, the first Thatcher government made no secret of its dislike for
quangos. As Pliatzky [1989] discusses, in its backlash against quangos, the government set up a
review of these bodies in 1979. Pliatzky argues that the government's attitude to these non¬
governmental bodies can be explained by three factors. First, hostility towards quangos came from a
section of the government's own supporters who viewed quangos as a growing extension of
government. Such developments were said to result in an expanding, but unseen, number of civil
servants, a tendency which was counter to the government's stated policy to limit the size of
government bureaucracy. Second, it was contended that quangos were an undesirable form of
patronage; and third, that government ministries should be more accountable to parliament for all their
interventions in the market-place. Pliatzky notes a contradiction in government policy, however, for
while the government reduced the role of or abolished some bodies, it also established other such
organisations.
Given that ACAS is funded by government and, with very few exceptions, is staffed by civil servants,
some commentators speculated on the continued existence of the organisation or how long it could
survive without privatisation of its functions under the new administration [Torode 1984], Others
noted with some surprise that ACAS had survived the change of government relatively intact:
230
"Given that environment of uncertainty and rapid change the first
accolade I would award ACAS on its tenth anniversary is for still being
there; more than that, fulfilling the role prescribed for it at the outset
with a marked degree of consistency."
[Clavert, 1984, p.5]
Although Pliatzky [1989] and other authors refer to the survival of ACAS post-1979, they do not
explore the reasons for the government's decision not to abolish this particular quango. This issue
was touched on briefly by Pat Lowry [1990a], former Chairman of ACAS, in his recent book on
employment disputes and the involvement of a third party. Lowry surveyed the different forms of third
party intervention in British industrial relations and in recording the sustained number of advisory,
conciliation and arbitration cases dealt with by ACAS during its years of operation, notes that:
"From such figures as these it might be assumed that the future of
ACAS as an effective peace-maker was never in doubt"
[Lowry, 1990a, p. 192]
However, Lowry states that ACAS's future was in doubt with the election of Mrs Thatcher and the
adoption of policies to de-regulate the labour market. Although Lowry asks why it was that ACAS
did survive, he does not fully develop his analysis. His main argument is that politicians of all parties
are now aware that as much criticism as kudos can be gained from personal involvement in major
disputes, and that, therefore, it is better for government to distance itself as far as possible from the
conflict. The government can then criticise or make comments, just like anyone else, from the
sidelines of the dispute.
The question of the survival of ACAS was one question which was explored during this research
project in interviews with ACAS officials and arbitrators. It is unlikely that there is one single factor
which can provide a satisfactory explanation for the durability of ACAS. Rather a number or all of
the undernoted reasons could have contributed to the survival of the organisation. These can be
categorised under five main headings, namely the strategic use of a quango; the role played by the
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leadership of ACAS; the support which ACAS enjoys from the users of the Service; ACAS's ability
to respond to changing conditions; and the low cost of maintaining the Service.
[a] Strategic use of a quango
First, in support of Lowry's argument that governments may wish to distance themselves from
industrial disputes, it is reasonable to suppose that the government would not wish to return the
contentious issue of dispute resolution to within the control and responsibility of the Department of
Employment. Senior officials in ACAS recalled a vist from Norman Tebbit when he first became
Employment Minister. Apparently he came to see for himself the type of work which was carried out
by ACAS and is said to have remarked - 'If ACAS did not exist we would have to invent it.'*
Whether or not Mr Tebbit was sincere in his statement, it is clear that most governments and
particularly a government which prides itself in non-intervention in industrial disputes, would wish to
be seen to be distancing themselves from major disputes. As the quotation from Hood and Wright
[1981]2 illustrates, a non-departmental body can fulfil a strategic role for the government. In this case
ACAS provides a welcome buffer for governments at certain stages of disputes. A supposedly free
market government can assert that it is up to the parties to resolve the differences between them and if
they fail to do so there is an 'independent' organisation which can come to their assistance. There is
evidence that the government has used such public relations tactics either in rejecting the use of
arbitration in some disputes or in asserting that there is no need for strike action in other disputes
because ACAS is available to resolve differences between the parties^ .
The government can thus distance itself from the consequences of conflict situations if they wish to do
so. One could argue that it is even more important for a neo-liberal government pursuing free market
solutions to have such an organisation at its disposal. The more the government moves towards the
contestation model identified by Crouch or conflict strategy, ironically the more the government is in
need of a non-departmental institution as a damage limitation device. The alternative for the
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government would be to resort to the use of the law as a means of resolving disputes. For example,
the government could pursue legislation to make arbitration compulsory as an alternative to strike
action, but there are often disputes where the government is prepared to allow a strike to run its course
and would not wish to invoke arbitration procedures. Therefore, given the historical experience of
compulsory arbitration and given the danger that in a different economic climate, unions could gain
from compulsion, it is unlikely that the government would wish to adopt such an option. However,
this was an option recommended to the government by the Institute of Directors, who called for the
introduction of compulsory and binding arbitration in essential services in the public sector:
"An alternative to cooling off periods, and one which the Institute finds
more attractive, is binding arbitration. This would be built into
procedure agreements in essential services as a last stage to be reached
only when all other provisions have been tried and had failed The
special circumstances under which essential services operate, however,
make it necessary to compel arbitration if that is the only way of
preventing disruption."
[Institute of Directors, 1984, p.6].
Linked to the last point, another explanation could be that ACAS is being tolerated as an institution
which is largely cosmetic and has little impact on British industrial relations. Because it is a
relatively weak organisation, it cannot act as a constraint on government policy. Therefore, there
would be little rationale for abolishing it Alternatively, as more of industry is being returned to the
private sector it could be argued that any power which ACAS had has been diminished significantly
since 1979. Under this scenario the market would be the final determinant of industrial conflict
between employers and workers. Thus the government would not need to intervene directly in
ACAS's destruction, but could allow structural and political changes to weaken the institution over
time.
Further the rejection of a formal incomes policy and the abolition of Section 11 and Schedule 11 of the
Employment Act, 1975, meant that ACAS was removed from the more contentious areas of its
activity, that is potential deviation from pay guidelines, trade union recognition issues and claims for
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the observation of relevant terms and conditions of employment for workers in a specific industry.
With their removal, ACAS returned to work which was mainly a continuation of the work carried out
by the state during the whole history of conciliation and arbitration, and which did not threaten the
government's labour market policies. Therefore, the institution could be retained to fulfil a strategic
role when required, but was not powerful enough to threaten or constrain the implementation of
government policy.
[b] The role of the leadership of ACAS
Some have attributed the continuation of the service to the skills of the chairmanship of Jim Mortimer,
Sir Pat Lowry and latterly Douglas Smith and also to the expertise of senior officials such as Dennis
Boyd^. Through their leadership it is argued that ACAS has been able to walk the tight line between
meeting the needs of the parties who come to them as an 'independent' body for assistance; and
sensitivity to the views of government towards industrial relations.
It would appear from the continued use of the Service since 1979 that there is still a substantial degree
of confidence in the organisation from both sides of industry. Further from the survey of parties to
arbitration conducted as part of this research, it was clear that, although a small minority of trade union
representatives were of the view that ACAS was more pro-employer since the election of the first
Thatcher government, this did not prejudice their use of the Service. It is considered that the leadership
of ACAS have been instrumental in maintaining support from users of the Service, because of the
direct role they play in major industrial disputes, but also because of the relationship they have built up
with the trade union movement and representatives of industry.
The leadership also maintain communication links with government Ministers responsible for
employment and industrial relations affairs. The bringing in, for example, of new Employment
Ministers to see what actually happens in ACAS would be one example of this. Further, as part of
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the Whitehall community, it is reasonable to assume that senior ACAS officials also maintain some
form of contact with their counterparts in the Department of Employment. This is especially so in
the case of the present Chairman, Douglas Smith, who, unlike Jim Mortimer and Pat Lowry ,5 was a
senior civil servant himself in the Department of Employment before being appointed to ACAS in
1987. According to Lowry [1990a], because of this departure from past practice, it was argued by
some that in the future ACAS would "dance more readily to the government tune.". Lowry argues
that they were mistaken, because:
"Happily for ACAS, these critics would not have been aware of the
experience, skill and, above all, integrity of the individual concerned."
[Lowry, 1990a, p.l93][].
Chairmen of ACAS and the Chief Conciliation Officer also have a strategic role in leading the ACAS
Council. They have had to head this tripartite body through sometimes difficult periods in the last
eleven years. Two incidents, the withdrawal of trade union recognition and membership rights at the
Government Communication Headquarters [GCHQ] at Cheltenham [ACAS, Annual Report, 1984], and
the issue of letters to workers who had been dismissed for taking strike action in the News International
[or Wapping] dispute [ACAS, Annual Report, 1986], both strained relations on the Council and in
particular between the TUC and ACAS.
The first incident resulted in the threatened withdrawal of support for ACAS, and other tripartite bodies,
by the TUC, when a senior ACAS official, John Lambert^, was recalled by the Department of
Employment and sent to Cheltenham to advise management on the establishment of a staff association
to replace the trades union at GCHQ. It was felt by some that ACAS management should have stood
firm against the request from the Department of Employment and refused to allow John Lambert to
take on this unenviable task. The secondment of an ACAS official in this way exacerbated trade union
anger at the government's decision to abolish unions at GCHQ and also resulted in a protest and
questions in the House of Commons
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ACAS Council responded by issuing a press statement on the following lines:
"The Council attach great importance to the Service's deserved
reputation for integrity and even-handedness in disputes and to the
impartiality of ACAS staff. They will be requesting a meeting with
the Secretary of State for Employment to make clear their view that the
Service has been placed in an invidious position by this incident and
that senior members of ACAS staff should not be withdrawn by the
Department of Employment in this way."
[ACAS, 15 March 1984]
In the event John Lambert did go to GCHQ, and after discussions with the TUC, it was agreed that
Lambert should not return to ACAS after he had fulfilled his duties. In return the TUC agreed to
continue its representation on ACAS Council.
The second incident which called for leadership skills involved events surrounding the News
International Dispute. The company rejected attempts by ACAS at collective conciliation and
dismissed employees who had taken strike action. A majority of the ex-workers, 4,700 out of a total
of 5,300, then made complaints of unfair dismissal to an Industrial Tribunal, which resulted in ACAS's
individual conciliation branch becoming involved. In the meantime, although the company's proposed
offer of a settlement was rejected twice following ballots of the dismissed employees, the company
wrote directly to individual ex-employees offering them a settlement based on its final offer. This was
accepted by 1,700 workers. In addition the company requested ACAS's assistance in concluding
settlements. ACAS was then involved in issuing a statement to all dismissed employees explaining
the ACAS role and the implications of accepting the employer's offer [ACAS, Annual Report, 1986].
This matter was raised, by a representative from the TUC, and discussed at an ACAS Council meeting
attended by this researcher. The representative from the TUC, John Monks, expressed the movement's
concern about this development, arguing that it was a very serious issue which could further damage
relationships between the TUC and ACAS. The TUC's view was that ACAS's involvement could be
interpreted as undermining the strike and encouraging other employers to take similar action against
their employees. In response the chairman and other senior ACAS officials explained the
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circumstances of ACAS's involvement and their view that they had a statutory obligation to provide
individual conciliation assistance. The matter was deferred on the understanding that discussions would
subsequently take place between ACAS officials and the representatives of the trade unions involved in
the dispute and the TUC. In the days that followed, meetings did occur and again the threatened
withdrawal of the TUC was prevented.
Because these two incidents were considered to be against the general interests of the union movement,
it is not surprising that the TUC expressed its disapproval. There is less evidence, however, of similar
rifts with the CBI, and ACAS Annual Reports post-1979 make reference to the different reactions of
the trade unions and CBI to the government's contentious industrial relations reforms. That is, there is
recognition in the Reports that the trade union reforms were less likely to gain support from the TUC,
and that there had been a shift in the balance of power in industrial relations in favour of employers.
However, one minor difference which did occur between the CBI representatives and ACAS officials on
the Council related to the drafting of the Annual Report for 1985 ^. In the original draft the
document referred to the new 'macho' style of management which was being employed in some sectors
of the labour market as a response to the economic recession and rising unemployment in the 1980s.
The CBI representatives objected to the reference to macho management on the grounds that the
behaviour of a few should not be interpreted as a general trend. The issue was debated with the
chairman expressing the view that it was necessary to refer to the fact that some managers were taking
a harder industrial relations line and in some cases had not been respecting procedure agreements. The
result was that the Annual Report was amended and instead referred to the "mixed evidence" relating to
management styles and responses in the 1980s [ACAS, Annual Report, 1985],
Clearly the management of these sensitive issues required considerable skill on the part of the senior
officials involved. However, their expertise is also exercised very directly in the resolution of major
industrial disputes. Dennis Boyd in particular has gained the respect and confidence of parties, both
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employers and trade unions, who have had direct dealings with him. This is evidenced in the regard
with which he is held by the staff of ACAS and arbitrators who have had contact with him^ .
Both the chairman and senior officials play an important public relations role in speaking at industrial
relations events, to political parties and other organisations; in attending party conferences; and
liaising with the media. They are also called on from time to time to meet representatives from other
countries or to visit other countries to outline the role and function of ACAS^ .
[c] Support for ACAS
In spite of difficulties which ACAS may have encountered in the past eleven years, and the incidents
which strained relationships discussed in the context of the skill of the leadership above, ACAS has
maintained the general support of the TUC and the CBI. Also in spite of the more confrontational
climate in which it has operated in the 1980s, ACAS's Annual Reports, which are endorsed by all
members of the Council, refer to ACAS's policy of reducing conflict in industrial relations and
wherever possible settling disputes by voluntary means without the intervention of the law .
As is also evident from this and other studies, the users of the advisory, conciliation and arbitration
functions of ACAS have expressed considerable support for the organisation and its work. As
discussed in the summaries of the previous research into the different services offered by ACAS in
Chapter 1 above, a common feature of these studies was the high level of regard for the service
displayed by the users and their preparedness to come to ACAS again in the event of a similar issue
arising in the future. For example, the evidence from the survey of the advisory service conducted by
Armstrong and Lucas [1985] demonstrated over ninety per cent rates of satisfaction and willingness to
the use the service again. The work carried out by Dickens et al [1983] into individual conciliation
also uncovered a high regard for the service from both sides involved.
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Similarly, as outlined in previous chapters, the study of arbitration carried out as part of this project,
has revealed that a large majority of both management and trade union representatives considered that
the outcome of the arbitration was fair, were satisfied with their experience of the use of arbitration and
would use the service if a similar dispute arose again^® .
However, as other organisations have witnessed in the 1980s, support for an institution alone - even
consumer support - is not a sufficient condition to guarantee its continued existence.
[d] Responsiveness to change
Although as discussed above, many aspects of ACAS's work and the ongoing debates within the
service have not altered significantly over time, ACAS has been sensitive and responsive to the
changing political climate. The 1979 Annual Report noted the potential effect of the change of
government with a different approach to economic and political matters, their new programme of
industrial relations reform and the abandonment of a formal incomes policy:
"These developments, though not changing the functions undertaken by
ACAS, did influence substantially the general atmosphere in which the
Service operated."
[ACAS, Annual Report, 1979, p.7]
ACAS Council was also sensitive in its response to the changed conditions of the 1980s. For
example, given the controversial nature of some aspects of the government's trade union legislation,
ACAS Council distanced itself from commenting, at the consultative stage, on the more contentious
elements of the government's industrial relations reform:
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"The Council offered no comments during the consultation on the
provisions of the Act [1980 Employment Act] and of the codes of
practice, mainly on the grounds that to do so could prejudice the
acceptability of the Service to both sides of industry on issues where
views were so widely divergent."
[ACAS, Annual Report, 1980, p.9]
ACAS's ability to respond to the changing climate of a new 'radical' administration and in securing the
acceptability of the two sides of industry, was commented on by Wootton:
"The appointment by the Labour government in 1975 of the
independent advisory council familiarly known as ACAS was a
landmark. The subsequent indefatigable activity of ACAS itself under
succeeding governments, regardless of their political complexion, has
been astounding."
[Wootton, 1983]
In addition, ACAS has been concerned to increase the professionalism and efficiency of the service
which it offers. One illustration of this was identified in the changes which it has implemented in the
delivery of the arbitration service and the emphasis given to the selection and training of arbitrators and
ACAS personnel^ * . The attention given to improving the professionalism and efficiency of the
service can be interpreted within the context of civil service reviews implemented by the government in
the 1980s and the hiving-off of some civil service functions to the private sector. In other words, it
can be seen as a defensive strategy.
Similarly, the opening up of some of ACAS's files to academic research and the support for the
surveys carried out into the different functions, can be interpreted as one method of improving the
service's accountability and making it less vulnerable to attack from hostile sources. As noted, in the
past there was strong resistance from ACAS officials to allowing researchers to approach the parties to
arbitration, because of the concern that any such approach could re-kindle the conflict. Policy on this
issue altered with the approval given to conduct the survey of parties to arbitration in 1988.
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[e] Cost to the Exchequer
Lastly, it must be remembered that the cost of running the service with a Budget of around 16 million
pounds currently, is so low in public expenditure terms that the government could not make a major
financial saving by abolishing ACAS. In value for money terms the argument for retaining ACAS is
very strong indeed. Commenting in 1984, when the ACAS Budget was of the order of 12 million
pounds, Calvert argued that given ACAS's significant role in collective conciliation and its success in
'professionalising' its work:
"A stronger ACAS with more precise terms of reference for conciliating
and advising will continue to make a major contribution and at £12
million a year is cheap at the price."
[Calvert, 1984, p.5]
It is impossible to calculate with any accuracy the cost to the Exchequer of not having an institution
like ACAS or some machinery for third party dispute resolution. However, in most industrial
disputes which could potentially result in strike action, even conservative estimates of the cost of non¬
intervention are likely to exceed ACAS's current Budget.
While the factors cited above may have contributed to the explanation for the survival of ACAS, it
should be re-emphasised that the state has a long history of third party intervention in industrial dispute
resolution in Britain and it is highly unlikely that any government would or could abandon this role
entirely. Nevertheless it is not necessary for this intervention to take the form of a tripartite body




"Looking ahead, all the major parties are supportive and interested in
extending the work of conciliation, arbitration and ACAS."
The above statement was made by Richard Harrison, former Director of Collective Conciliation and
Arbitration, in his speech to the arbitrators' seminar in Edinburgh in 1986. The grounds for
Harrison's optimism were that, first a joint document prepared by the Labour Party and TUC - 'People
at Work' - expressed a commitment to strengthen ACAS and the role of conciliation and arbitration
machinery in a future Labour government. Second, that the SDP had prepared a consultative paper for
their party conference which envisaged an expansion in the role of arbitration and contained a proposal
for non-binding arbitration. Dennis Boyd had also been invited to speak to a fringe meeting of the
party at their conference. Finally Harrison argued that the Conservative government had become
increasingly supportive of ACAS's work and cited the teachers' dispute and the fact that arbitration was
being considered as an alternative to Industrial Tribunals in dismissal cases, as evidence to substantiate
his remarks.
Given developments since 1986, including the demise of the SDP, Harrison's comments demonstrate
the pitfalls in looking too far into the future. Also I doubt wheher the confidence expressed by
Harrison in the support from the Conservative Party for arbitration in 1986 would be as strong today.
Since 1986, the government has been openly hostile to arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in,
for example, the ambulance dispute. Therefore, the government has a tendency to blow hot and cold
on the arbitration issue depending on the dispute in question.
I shall not enter into predicting the future but rather shall make some tentative observations about
possible future trends.
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As has been discussed the need for some form of dispute resolution machinery is likely to continue.
For example in relation to arbitration, Wootton argues that arbitration is preferable to industrial strikes:
"Inevitably, therefore, we are led to the conclusion that as long as
conditions of employment are generally determined by collective
bargaining, there ought to be some last resort system of arbitration in
cases where the parties, having failed to come to terms, are falling back
on force."
[Wootton, 1983]
The issue for this thesis is whether it should take the form of a tripartite, independent body such as
ACAS. As outlined earlier there is a strong level of support for the service from its users;
commentators have argued for the expansion and extended use of arbitration [Johnston, 1975; Meade,
1982; Wootton, 1983; Rideout, 1989; Lowry, 1990a]; and there is likely to be reluctance on the
part of any government to return the functions of ACAS back to the Department of Employment. Yet
much will depend on trends and developments in the economy, not all of which will be within the
control of the present or future governments. To some extent future prospects may also be determined
by the outcome of the next general election and developments in Europe, such as the introduction of
the Social Charter^.
Should the Conservative Party win the next election, the abolition of ACAS could not be ruled out.
However, it is more probable that the government will leave the service largely untouched but will
continue to put restraints on its Budget. One possibility, although there will be strong resistance to
such a move, would be for the government to introduce charges for some aspects of ACAS's work,
especially the advisory function.
The government may continue its practice of tackling the perceived problem of public sector pay
through more indirect methods such as restricting public expenditure, fragmenting national pay
bargaining and further privatisations. The electricity industry is in the process of privatisation and it
is possible that the coal and railway industries will follow should the Conservatives win the next
general election. In these circumstances there will be less political pressure on the government to set
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up additional Pay Review Bodies or Arbitration Boards to settle major disputes. Some commentators
have suggested that the government has used this indirect approach to imposing pay restraint rather
than pursue its proposed legislation to ban strikes over pay in essential services . At present there
would appear to be no incentive for the government to change its policy in this respect
Noting his concern at the Conservative government's withdrawal of the rights of some public sector
workers to settle disputes by arbitration, Lowry comments:
"There is surely a case for actively encouraging the wider use of
arbitration in disputes affecting one large and important group of
workers, namely those covered in the non-trading part of the public
sector."
[Lowry, 1990a, p.85]
The public sector workers to which Lowry was referring include civil servants, school teachers and
National Health Service employees.
Commenting further on the role of ACAS under a Conservative administration, Lowry notes that there
are developments which could "give rise for concern for the future of ACAS." (Lowry, 1990a, p.193].
Lowry argues that, although the relevant statute makes clear that ACAS should be separate from and
not subject to directions of any kind from any Minister of the Crown in relation to the way it operates,
there is nothing to prevent central government from duplicating functions of ACAS or taking upon
itself responsibilities which ACAS currently has. He cites the change which has occurred over the
issue of Codes of Practice, where, in spite of the fact that ACAS's powers to issue these Codes have
not altered in theory, the government has adopted the practice of issuing its own Codes. Further, he
records that ACAS's power with regard to Wages Councils has been diminished, as the service is no
longer required to conduct an enquiry before a Wages Council can be established, reformed or abolished.
Therefore, while Lowry does not anticipate the demise of ACAS, he is nervous about its potential
future role under a Conservative administration.
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Should Labour win the next general election, the role and functions of ACAS could be expanded to
assist the implementation of the party's proposed industrial relations policy, for example the
enhancement of rights at work for part-time workers. Also depending on Labour's approach to the
European Social Contract, ACAS may be given a role in encouraging implementation of the
conditions and recommendations laid down in the Charter. Any such expansion would not necessarily
imply an increased role for arbitration, unless the party decides to reform the Industrial Tribunal system
and use arbitration in dismissal disputes. Ironically, should Labour move along the road of
improving workers' rights, they may encounter opposition and resistance from employers which could
threaten the support which ACAS has from both sides of industry. Clearly employers would have to
be persuaded that it was in their interests also to pursue such policies especially in the new economic
environment which will follow the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992.
Debates at the 1990 TUC and Labour Party conferences would indicate that support for entering into a
co-operative and consensual relationship with employers is strong within the labour movement. For
example a discussion document published jointly by the GMB and the UCW [1990] and presented by
their General Secretaries, John Edmonds and Alan Tuffin respectively, advocates a joint trade union and
employer approach to the problems of the 1990's. Referring to the system of wage bargaining in
Britain, the authors argue for an annual pay round affecting all workers where:
"a consensus view is reached about the overall scope for pay rises
which conditions negotiations and influences settlements, notably by
affecting the going rate set in each pay round."
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Linking the question of pay with the control of inflation, Edmonds and Tuffin state:
"Our fight against inflation could be strengthened if more of our major
negotiations on pay and conditions of employment were concentrated in
the first three months of the year following a public discussion between
the Government, CBI and TUC of Britain's economic prospects. This
discussion could be launched by the publication of the Government's
annual autumn statement on the economy. Pay settlements would be
more likely to fall within a range which the social partners [my
emphasis] accept as consistent with national needs [my emphasis]."
[GMB and UCW, 1990, p.9]
Such rhetoric sounds very much like the 1970s and the social contract revisited. It could be argued
that it reflects the ethos of partnership with industry and responsiveness to economic change which is
prevalent in the Labour Party's Policy Review and evident in proposals for a National Economic
Assessment1 ^ .
In summary, whatever the outcome of the next general election it is difficult to envisage that ACAS
will be abolished, but stranger things have happened. What is clear is that whichever party is elected
they will still have a problem which has taxed governments over more than one hundred years and that
is how to resolve the conflict between capital and labour. Like the state itself, this is an issue which
is not likely to fade away.
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[iii] Conclusions
The aims of this thesis were to conduct a detailed survey of ACAS arbitration, to build on the research
which had already been carried out in this area and to add to the general body of knowledge in this
relatively under-researched field of study. More specifically, the objectives of this study were to
analyse the operations of ACAS arbitration within the context of the ongoing corporatist debate, the
history of the state's involvement in third party intervention, and the changed political, economic and
social conditions which followed the election of the first Thatcher government in 1979. The reasons
for the survival of ACAS in an apparently hostile climate were also explored. A major theme of this
research was to examine the extent to which the practice of ACAS arbitration and the role of the main
actors involved, represented a significant departure from or continuity with past practice.
Our conclusions were that, although there had been changes in some of these aspects, in the main the
practice of ACAS arbitration has displayed a remarkable degree of continuity with the history of the
state's involvement in arbitration. What we discovered was that the system is supported by a whole
network of relationships between representatives of employers, trade unions and the state; and between
the representatives of the state and arbitrators. Together they pursue a common objective of reducing
the perceived costs of conflict by adopting a co-operative and consensual approach to dispute resolution.
Although it has been possible to gather a substantial body of evidence from the two questionnaire
surveys of arbitrators and parties to arbitration; the summary of arbitration awards over the period
1942-85; interviews with civil servants and arbitrators; and the experience of working within ACAS,
attending hearings, seminars and Council meetings, there are limitations to the approach adopted. For
example, it was not possible to compile an in-depth analysis of the outcome of arbitration hearings,
partially because of the lack of available background papers. The choice of a one in ten sample across
the whole range of issues which come to arbitration, meant that the sample size was small in the
earlier years examined. In addition, as the questionnaire surveys and summary of awards were not
conducted in exactly the same period, the evidence obtained from these studies could not be matched
247
directly. Further, because of the breadth of the topic covered and the numerous and complex debates
which underly the main theme of this study, there are issues which could not be explored and developed
in this thesis. Rather this work is more concerned with identifying broad patterns and general
tendencies and trends over time, which leaves room for more detailed case study approaches.
In Part I [chapters 1 and 2] the context for the current study and examination of arbitration was
established. In chapter 1 the literature on corporatism, third party intervention and the role of
arbitration was reviewed. It was argued, first that there were problems in applying the theoretical
discussions on corporatism to arbitration, and second that there were major gaps in the available
evidence and knowledge of arbitration.
There are difficulties in analysing the role of any institution or set of relationships in isolation.
Chapter 2, therefore, sets current debates within the historical development of arbitration in British
industrial relations and the wider political and economic conditions in which arbitration operated. It
was established that the use of arbitration as one form of third party intervention can be traced as far
back as the year 1800, and that current arbitration practice has its foundations in the 1896 Conciliation
Act. Attempts in the past to introduce and enforce compulsory arbitration were unsuccessful. Instead
support for voluntary arbitration and the 'voluntarist' principle are to be found among practitioners and
users of the service. The changing political and economic climate in which arbitration operated in the
post-war period was also reviewed. The implications of the stated rejection of the post-war Keynesian
consensus in favour of economic management based on monetarist principles were discussed and the
potential impact of the present government's approach to industrial relations and labour market policy
assessed.
The evidence gathered from the two questionnaire surveys and the review of arbitration awards are
discussed in Part II [chapters 3,4 and 5]. In these chapters we shed some light on the background and
attitudes of the men and women who are appointed as ACAS arbitrators and the way in which they are
recruited, selected and trained to carry out their tasks. It was suggested that, although at first sight
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there appeared to be a shift in practice in the recruitment and training of arbitrators, on further
investigation it was argued that any such changes reflected general trends relating to the representation
of different social classes in positions of authority; and that arbitrators were selected for their previous
experience and acceptance of the prevailing economic orthodoxy, broadly defined.
In chapter 4 we were concerned to examine the whole process of arbitration including a review of the
parties who come to arbitration; the issues which are the subject of arbitration references; the
constraints imposed on the arbitrators via the terms of reference; and the conduct of arbitration
hearings. We identified a number of similarities between current and past trends in relation to the
users of arbitration and the issues involved. We observed, however, a more interventionist role for the
civil servants in establishing and maintaining a set of conventions surrounding the drawing up of terms
of reference and procedural conventions relating to the preparation for the hearing and the conduct of the
hearing itself.
Using evidence from the survey of arbitration awards and the questionnaire surveys, the outcome of the
whole process, the arbitrators' awards, was evaluated in chapter 5. It was contended that many of the
discussions and debates surrounding the making of decisions, the conventions about giving reasons and
recommendations, and the criticisms sometimes levied at arbitration are not new. It was noted that the
criteria adopted by arbitrators in reaching their awards remain difficult to identify; but it was argued,
from the available evidence, that many of the criticisms made of arbitration are not readily supportable.
It was also observed that the alternative to arbitration may be a costly dispute which both parties and/or
the state may wish to avoid.
Finally, in Part III [chapters 6 and 7] we examined ACAS arbitration in the context of the corporatist
debate and asked whether the Thatcher governments' stated rejection of corporatism and attack on trade
union power had impacted on the work of this service. The reasons which could explain the survival
of ACAS, in what may be described as a hostile climate, were also explored. Elements of both
corporatist and pluralist relationships were identified in ACAS arbitration and it was suggested that
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these have altered little since the change of government in 1979. A number of reasons were advanced
to provide some explanation for the apparent contradiction between the government's declared
macroeconomic policy stance and the continuation of corporatist relationships within ACAS. We
ended by examining the factors which could account for the survival of a tripartite body like ACAS,
and speculated about its future prospects.
While this research is based on the three surveys referred to, there is scope for further detailed study of
the arbitration awards, especially with relation to the increasing focus and interest in pendulum or
straight choice arbitration^. Second, one aspect of the study which emerged during the research was
the crucial importance of the key civil servants in the whole process. A research project based on
detailed interviews with civil servants involved in ACAS, both past and present would provide more
insight into the role which they perform. Lastly, more evidence of party political views and the
attitudes of key politicians towards ACAS would add to knowledge and understanding of this field of
study.
On the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis,we can advance the following observations and
tentative conclusions.
The practice of present day arbitration displays a remarkable degree of continuity and consistency with
past policy. First, the view that arbitration should only be used as a last resort or final stage in
negotiations has been sustained over the period. It is based on the principles of free collective
bargaining and a voluntarist approach to dispute resolution where it is considered that, if possible,
parties should be responsible for reaching their own decisions.
Second, moves towards unilateral or compulsory arbitration have been rejected, unless under the
unusual circumstances of war. The issue of compulsion has re-emerged at different times in history
especially in response to economic recession and rising wage pressure. There is no absolute consensus
on this issue between arbitrators and others who have an interest in this question. It is ACAS's policy
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to discourage such moves towards compulsory arbitration on the grounds that they could exacerbate
industrial relations problems. As has been discussed, current government policy is also against the
use of compulsion in this area, but for different reasons.
Third, issues such as giving reasons for decisions or making recommendations to the parties have been
debated over time. Again there are differences of opinion on these matters, but the present balance of
opinion supports traditional arbitration practice which holds that the giving of reasons or
recommendations should not be encouraged, again because they could prolong a dispute or endanger its
acceptability to the parties.
Fourth, debates over the criteria for the appointment of arbitrators, the way they should conduct an
arbitration, and the factors which they should bear in mind when reaching their decisions have
continued over the period examined. One crucial area, the role of the common good or public interest
in the outcome of arbitrations, is an issue which has remained unresolved. What was evident from the
surveys was that arbitrators are appointed on the basis of their perceived independence and dis-
association from either side to a dispute. Examination of awards revealed that arbitrators were not and
are not social reformers intent on reversing perceived disadvantages of labour in the economy. Instead
their awards are made within the constraint of the parties' terms of reference and within a particular view
of political economy.
Fifth, the successful operation of arbitration is based on a whole network of relationships of trust and
confidence between employers and trade unions who use the service and the civil servants who run
ACAS. In addition both parties to a dispute normally represent different constituencies; act as
intermediaries between the state and their members; and play a key role in ensuring the acceptance and
implementation of arbitral decisions. Such relationships have been sustained over the whole history
of arbitration.
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In spite of the change in government in 1979 and its more radical and ideological stance on running the
economy and labour market policy, we can observe that the operation of arbitration over the period
examined has not been dominated by ideological differences between parties and this is reflected in the
continuity of policy. As Lowry has argued:
"For more than a century the independent third party had made an
enormous contribution to the working of the British industrial relations
system. There is no reason to suppose that this contribution will not
be continued in the future."
[Lowry, 1990a, p. 198]
The general picture then is one of continuity and change. The evidence from this thesis would
therefore support the old adage:
plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose
I Information from interview with Dennis Boyd, Chief Conciliation Officer, ACAS.
^ See discussion in Chapter 6 above.
3 For example, in the Miners' dispute in 1984, it was contended by the Prime Minister that there was an
adequate machinery available which the trade unions could use instead of maintaining their strike action.
^ This particular reason was quoted by some of the arbitrators I interviewed as a factor in the survival of
ACAS.
Jim Mortimer was appointed the first Chairman of ACAS, in part because of his links with the labour
movement. After the change of government in 1979, he was replaced by Pat Lowry who came to the Service
with previous experience in industry. Neither Jim Mortimer or Pat Lowry were civil servants. The
appointment of a civil servant, Douglas Smith, after the retiral of Pat Lowry in 1987 was, therefore, a
departure from previous practice.
6 John Lambert was former Director of Conciliation and Arbitration. He was a supervisor of this doctoral
thesis until his departure from ACAS. This researcher was working in ACAS during this rather tense period.
^ This researcher was present at the ACAS Council meeting at which this topic was raised and discussed.
® A significant number of staff and arbitrators interviewed referred to the particular style, expertise and
approach of Dennis Boyd and his role in maintaining the respect and confidence of parties who come to
ACAS. Dennis Boyd also played a key role in staff training and the induction of arbitrators.
"
Dennis Boyd in his opening address at Arbitrators' Seminars often referred to this role, arguing that
ACAS was viewed as a model of 'good practice' by representatives from other countries.
* 0 See detailed responses to questions in Appendix m.
II See discussions in chapter 3 above.
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In an article for Personnel Management, March 1990, Mark Hall highlights the key areas where
European Community legislation is likely to impinge on British industrial relations practice.
13 See for example Labour Party documents including Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, Meet the
Challenge, Make the Change, Looking to the Future.
14 Lowry [1990a] states that new style agreements with built in provision for pendulum arbitration are so
few that their impact is relatively negligible. It is understood by the present researcher that David Metcalf
from the London School of Economics has been awarded a research grant from the Department of Employment
to conduct a study into final offer arbitration.
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SURVEY OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS:
Introduction
A Questionnaire was issued to the 94 Arbitrators on ACAS's current list and
73 replies were received - a response rate of 78%. One reply was in letter
form only, explaining that as the Arbitrator had been on the list for some
time but had not been instructed to arbitrate, he felt he could not
usefully complete the survey. The sample should, therefore, be reduced to
93 Arbitrators and 72 replies - a response rate of 77%. Two of the 72
Arbitrators who completed the Questionnaire are new to ACAS, and thus felt
unable to complete the Questionnaire in full, answering Questions 1-7
(inclusive). Thus Questions 1-7 will relate to 72 responses; and Questions
8-28 will relate to 70 responses.
The Questionnaire was designed to obtain a straightforward Yes/No reply
where this was appropriate; but also to obtain the attitudes and views of
the Arbitrators. For this reason, many of the questions were open-ended
and deliberately did not lead the Arbitrators, so that a wide range of
views and comments could be expressed. Where possible, these views and
comments were grouped together and specimen answers quoted. Full answers
were given to some questions which related to the role of ACAS, where it



















(a) Where did you receive your secondary education?
No of Arbitrators
Grammar School (England) 37
Grammar School (Scottish or Welsh equivalent) 9
Non Grammar School 10
Public School 3
UK - type of school unspecified 9

















(b) At what age did you leave full-time education?
Age No of Arbitrators
14 5
15 2 + 2' R'
16 5
17 10
18 3 + 1'R'
19 3
20
21 11 + l'H"
22 8
23 7









= Returned at later date to full-time education)
Education:








Breakdown of 'Yes' response:





























Did not state which University
Totals 60 because 10 Arbitrators had 2 Degrees from different
Universities
3. Qualifications:



















































1 Economics and History
1 Economics and Geography





1 Economics and Modern History
1 History
1 PPE and History
3 Economics
1 Economics and Geography
1 English
6 Economics
2 Economics and 1 Management Science
NB Although 68 Arbitrators had University/College education - see
Question 2(c), only 63 obtained degrees
Qualifications:
(b) Do you have legal qualifications?
YES
NO
























Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Type of Qualifications
FIPM/MIPM






Associate of Inst of Bankers
Diploma in Management
IMS










































Fellow or Member of the Institute of Personnel
Management
Royal Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
Fellow or Member of the British Institute of Management
Industrial Management Society, or Institute of
Management Science
Fellow or Member of the Institute of Mechanical
Engineers
Associate Fellow of the Industrial Marketing
Association or International Management Association
Associate Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society
Fellow of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects
Fellow of the Institute of Plant Engineers
Fellow of the Institute of Industrial Management
Fellow of the Institute of Production Engineers
Qualifications:





Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Type of Qualifications
Certificates/Diplomas (eg in TU Studies,















Totals 27 as 4 Arbitrators quoted more than 1 qualification
4 o Experience:





Breakdown of 'Yes' responses:
Work Experience No of Arbitrators
Company or Industry - actual job unspecified 11
Banking, Insurance, CAs 5(1 as Partner:
1 as Economist
1 X 1 yr:
1 X lYz yrs:
1 X 5 yrs)
Engineering - actual job unspecified 2(1 X 4 yrs:
1 X 5 yrs)
Civil Service - actual job unspecified 4(1 X 17 yrs:
1 X 46 yrs)
Clerical 3(2 X 2 yrs:
1 X 4 yrs)
Personnel Management 8(1 X 10 yrs)
Management - general 4(1 X 2 yrs:
1 X 6 yrs)
Management - co Executive 1




Chairman of IR Court 1
Miner 3(1 X 3 yrs)
1 X 11 yrs)






* Totals 57 as 3 Arbitrators quoted more than 1 job
(-) No of years worked where quoted
Note:
1. As it is ACAS's policy only to appoint Arbitrators who have some
industrial/commercial experience, it is assumed that some Arbitrators
under-stated their experience.
. Experience:
(b) Do you have management experience?
YES
NO

























Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses
TU Experience



















(d) Do you have any legal experience?
YES
NO






















(e) Have you ever been employed by ACAS or the Department of





Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
No of Arbitrators
Min of Labour, Dept of Emplt or ACAS 13
HMI 1
Economic Adviser (1 year) 1
Unspecified 1
16
Breakdown of M/L, D/E, ACAS Responses:
No of Arbitrators
M/L, D/E and ACAS 6
M/L only 3





(f) Have you been in HM Forces?
YES
NO









Specific Position and/or years
Unspecified











18(1 X 7 yrs:
1 X 6 yrs:
4 X 5 yrs:
1 X 4 yrs)
12(2 X 3 yrs:











Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
No of Arbitrators


















Totals 74 as 1 Arbitrator had experience in 4 areas; 1 Arbitrator in 3
areas and 11 Arbitrators in 2 areas
5. Occupation:






(b) If you are in employment, please give a brief description of the
post held:
Post No of Arbitrators
Professor 12






* Totals 51 as 3 Arbitrators are Professors and Heads of Department
Notes:
1. 4 Industrial Relations







2. 1 Legal Dept
1 Industrial Relations
1 IR and Management Science
1 Management Science
1 School of Man Sc





1 IR and Labour Economics
3 Economics
4 Law






1 Economics and IR
1 Economics







1 Fellow in Industrial Relations
1 Academic - unspecified
Occupation:


























(d) Please list previous posts held:
Previous posts were grouped under the following headings:
Manual; White/collar; Managerial; Academic; Civil Service; Legal;
and Trade Union.
No of Arbitrators




Academic and Legal 6
White-Collar and Academic 5
White-Collar, Managerial and Academic 4
Academic and Trade Union 3
Manual and Academic 3
Manual, Managerial and Academic 3
Manual, Academic and Trade Union 2
Managerial and Trade Union 2
Legal 2
White-Collar, Academic and Civil Service 1
White-Collar and Civil Service 1
White-Collar, Academic and Trade Union 1
Academic and Civil Service 1
Manual, White-Collar and Academic 1
Total:
The posts can also be broken down as follows:
Manual W/Collar Managerial Academic C S







How were you recruited as an Arbitrator for ACAS?
a) Did ACAS approach you?
b) Did you contact ACAS with a view to offering your services?
c) Were you encouraged to approach ACAS by a third party?




























1. "Informally" - 1
"On recommendation from 2 persons" - 1
"Following D/E and Wages Council work" - 2
"From Ministry of Labour" - 2
"From Department of Employment" - 2
"Knew 3 other Arbitrators who may have indicated my interest" - 1
No additional comments
3. "ACAS official" - 1
"TU Gen Sec and D/E official" - 1
"My Professor" - 1
4. "Combination of A and B during an informal meeting" - 1
"Ministry of Labour" - 1
"Follow on Ministry of Labour and Department of Employment" - 1
"My Head of Department contacted ACAS" - 1
"At IR Seminar, ACAS official invited applications" - 1
5. "Informal discussion with ACAS officials" - 1
6. "Colleague on Arbitration list"
7. "Because close liaison with ACAS" - 1
8. "Other Arbitrator" - 1
"Other Mediator" - 1
"CIR Official" - 1
ARBITRATION
How long have you acted as an Arbitrator for ACAS?




























As ACAS has only been in existence for 10 years, those quoting more than
10 years must have worked for the D/E and/or the Min of Labour.
NOTE: SAMPLE NOW REDUCED TO 70
8. In addition to working for ACAS, have you acted as an Arbitrator for
any of the following:
a) CAC?
b) Institute of Arbitrators?
c) Privately?




A and C 13





(a) Approximately how many ACAS voluntary Arbitration cases have you
dealt with as a Single Arbitrator?





























(c) What did you find to be the advantages of their service?
Comments No of Arbitrators
None 1
Their first hand knowledge of the industry.
Technical knowledge, eg on Work Study,
Industrial Relations procedure in a particular
industry and relevant precedents. 30
More general comments on their experience,
information they provided and support, eg at
the hearing - may ask questions which ensure
both sides' case is clarified and put
effectively; may reassure parties and thus make
the Award more acceptable. After the hearing -
act as a sounding board for Arbitrator's ideas;
may report on attitudes of sides which did not
come out at the Hearing; general consultation
and their opinions after the Hearing. 15
* Total 46 - see (b) above
Note:
1. A typical answer to this question was:
"Their first hand knowledge in the industry, eg one of the options for
the Arbitrator is to award re-employment but in some different area of
work. Before using this option the Arbitrator needs first hand
knowledge that there exists suitable alternative jobs.
2. A comprehensive answer to this question was:
" i) I began the hearing a little more informed as to the general
system between the parties by having a preliminary discussion
with the Assessors;
ii) Similarly I was able to get from them after the hearing minor
points of information which had not come out during the hearing
but which subsequently appeared relevant;
iii) In 2 cases it was helpful to find the extent to which the
Assessors had formed similar judgements."
Total: 46 »
9. Single Arbitration
(d) What did you find to be the Disadvantages of their service?
Comments No of Arbitrators
None 16
None if their function is properly defined
and understood 3
The main disadvantage cited was that Assessors
exceeded their role and often were not always
objective, acting as an advocate of the
parties. This was thought to be particularly
so of the TU representatives. 1 12
Other general comments were as follows: At the
hearing - they can make proceedings more
formal; take longer; or influence statements at
the hearing by the parties because of their
status within the organisation. In the
discussion with the Arbitrator after the
hearing there was a tendency to repeat the
arguments of the hearing or to disagree with
each other. 3
Increase the time taken in the whole process 3
They were superfluous 2
Quality sometimes low 1
Total: 46 *
* Total 46 - see (b) above
Notes:
1. Examples of the answer to this question are:
"They are often strongly biased towards only one of the parties and
often tend to regard their role more as that of an advocate of the
party which they traditionally might be expected to support."
"Trade Union Assessors do have difficulty in making objective
assessment. Employer Assessors are rather more able to be objective."
_ op, _
Board of Arbitration:
(a) Approximately how many ACAS voluntary Arbitration cases have you
dealt with as Chairman of a Board of Arbitration?










10. Board of Arbitration:
(b) What did you find to be the advantages of having side members on
the Board?
Comments No of Arbitrators
Their specific expertise and insights into
problems 14
The opportunity to exchange views with others -
3 minds better than one 10
Similar to advantages of Assessors - Technical
and background knowledge 6
The responsibility is shared 3
Fuller appraisal of merits of the case 3
Help the decision-making process 3
The Parties more likely to accept the Award if
there is consensus 3
Can ask more penetrating questions than is
expected of the Arbitrator 2
Make process more acceptable to the
Parties 1
Depends on the Side Members and how free they
feel not to sympathise or identify strongly
with either side 1
Only moral support 1
Very few or no real advantages 3
Total: 51 *
* Totals 51 as some Arbitrators quoted more than one advantage - The
number of Arbitrators was 35 see (a) above.
A comprehensive answer to the Question was:
"Reduces the possibility of missing important clues in both written and
oral presentations. With their respective management and TU backgrounds,
side members may provide insights into a problem that might not occur to an
independent. After the hearing a discussion among three people may be
better than the internal discussion of an Arbitrator."
10. Board of Arbitration:
(c) What did you find to be the disadvantages of having side members
on the Board?
Comments No of Arbitrators
May prolong proceedings 8
Partisanship 7
Problem of reaching full agreement 7
Quality sometimes low 2
One may be more cooperative than the other 2
Increase formality of the process 1
Having to reach an agreement on the same day 1
Bias towards splitting down the middle 1
On one occasion, one was abrasive which made it
difficult to present a united approach to the
Parties 1
None or no significant disadvantage 7
No response 2
Total: 39
♦ Totals 39 as some Arbitrators quoted more than one advantage - The
number of Arbitrators was 35 - see (a) above.
A comprehensive answer to the Question was:
"The main disadvantage occurs if the representative of union or employer
simply acts as advocates of the cause of their respective side and are not
willing to act in any kind of conciliatory capacity; at worst they transmit
to the Board the same kind of deadlock as already exists; they also prolong
the proceedings sometimes leading to postponements, adjournments etc."
11. Single or Board of Arbitration:
(a) Have you observed any distinction between the type of cases going






Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Comment No of Arbitrators
More important national disputes (often over
pay) and affecting public sector go to a Board 5
Large, politically sensitive issues go to a
Board 3
Depends on the wishes of the parties 3
Single Arbitration is limited to individual
cases or small groups of workers 3
More complex issues to a Board 2
Issues concerning a large number of people go
to a Board 2
Custom and practice in the industry or
procedure agreement determines choice 2
ACAS influences choice 1
Large organisations go to a Board 1
Single Arbitration unless there are special
features, eg complexity or importance 1
Boards for collective issues, frequently pay;
Single for individual cases 1
Issues with wider scope and repercussions to
Board 1
Board for NJIC agreements 1
Boards where several unions are involved 1
Total: 27 *
* Totals 27 as some Arbitrators mentioned more than one distinction.
6 of the Arbitrators answering 'No' to this question also commented as
follows:
"Depends on scale, 'importance' of the case."
"Where parties insisted on a Board."
"More than one issue likely to go to the Board."
"Tendency for agreements to refer to a Board."
"Dependent upon the Parties attitude and 'trust'."
"Number of cases where Board seemed expensive way of dealing with the
dispute - tendency to use it if it is there."
Single or Board of Arbitration:









Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Comments No of Arbitrators
More complex, perhaps politically
sensitive, collective issues to Board 7
The wishes of the parties 5
Board for cases requiring specialised or expert
knowledge 4
More straightforward cases to Single 3
Cases of wider scope and possible repercussions
to Board 3
Boards too expensive for trivial cases 1
Board when one side or other is likely to
dispute the outcome 1
Single for cases where parties are deadlocked 1
Board where large sums of money are involved
(more than £10,000) 1
Experience of the Arbitrator available 1
Where parties require the objectivity which the
broad representation of interested bodies on
the Board provides 1
Where more 'authority' is required, a Board
should be used 1
Contd.
Board for cases infringing government
regulations, eg incomes policy
Boards almost always more perferable





* Totals 32 as some Arbitrators mentioned more than one point.
Breakdown of 'No' Responses;
Comments
The Parties should have the choice
ACAS should decide
Not possible to devise criteria




1. A typical answer to this Question was:
"Should be left to the parties who have to live with the outcome to
















(b) If yes, did you encounter any particular problems in






* Totals 55 as some Arbitrators mentioned more than one problem.
Breakdown of 'Yes' responses:
Comments No of Arbitrators
Agreements often vague and contradictory 9
Loose drafting which is fairly common 6
Over the intentions of the parties at the time
of writing the agreement 6
Over custom and practice 3
Trying to define ambiguous terms, such as
'productivity', 'average bonus', 'relativities',
'equitable' and 'efficiency' 3
Stretching the agreement to fit new, changing
circumstances 3
Whether to apply legal concepts to agreements
which are not legally binding 1
Between national and local agreements 1
Total: 32
O A
Notes: Examples of the above answers are:
1. "Of course, agreements are multi-dimensional, frequently obscure and
even contradictory"
2. "Have taken the line that only the parties who drew up the agreement
in the first place can give an authoritative interpretation"
y
12. Agreements:








Most deliberately vague, therefore, not
out of date 1
Need qualification rather than revision 1
No response 1
Total: 50 *
* Total 50 - those that answered 'Yes' to (a) above
Breakdown of 'Yes' responses:
Most Arbitrators did not elaborate on their answer. Of the 8 who did
the main points made were that some agreements needed revision in the
light of changing circumstances, ie they should be brought up-to-date
and should be clearer and 'simpler1.
13. Written Statements of the Parties:






Yes, except on one occasion only received
one statement 1
Total: 70



















Of the Arbitrators who answered 'Yes' to this question, 3 were
satisfied in 'most cases' and 8 stated that the TU statements tended
to be less satisfactory.
Of the Arbitrators who answered 'No' to this question, 1 specifically
mentioned that the TU statements were unsatisfactory.
Of the Arbitrators who answered 'Generally' to this question, 5 were
less satisfied with the TU statements.
13. Written Statements of the Parties:





To some extent 3
No response 34 *
Total: 70
* Large number did not respond to this question as they had answered 'Yes'
to (b) above.
Notes:
1. Of the Arbitrators who answered 'No' to this question, 9 mentioned
that it just made the process take longer; and 2 emphasised that the
hearing itself is crucial and where deficiencies in the statements can
be overcome.
Example answers were:
"No, except it took longer. It took me some time questioning in some
depth to ascertain what the issues were."
"No, since the oral hearing is crucial."
14„ Terms of Reference:







75% of the time 1
No response 1
Total: 70
(b) To what extent have you felt restricted by the terms of reference?
No of Arbitrators
Always 3
Intended/preferable to be restricted 12
At times 19
Almost never 12





Not restricted but sometimes difficult to
identify issue
This is a matter for the parties
N/A
No response
Notes: Example answers are:
1. "Always - but that is a good thing. With wider terms of reference one
would go roaming into all sorts of dangerous issues many of which




- but surely that is the intention, and quite
3. "At times I have felt I was dealing with a limited visible problem
when the real cause was not mentioned."
4. "I have only rarely felt restricted."
5. "Not to any extent."
- 40 -
14. Terms of Reference:
(c) If you have felt restricted, how, if at all, did you overcome
this?
Comments
Always kept within terms of reference -
should be restricted
Clarified them with the parties
Making comments distinct from the Award
Only one occasion, when I stopped the
Arbitration and with the consent of both
parties, proceeded to Mediate
Transmitted intentions privately via ACAS
and/or through Assessors
By expressing views and not awarding













Notes: Example answers are:
1. "I don't. I have always regarded the terms of reference as strictly
binding."
"Why do you need to overcome an intended restriction?"
2. "Usually at the beginning of any Arbitration I take the terms of
reference for granted or only formally check them with the parties.
If, however, they appear in some ways to be incorrect or odd I try to
clarify this from the beginning. If during the course of the
Arbitration it appears that they do not express what the case is
really about I decide whether it is profitable to ask them whether
they should be changed or not."
3. "Sometimes through general comments. Kept entirely distinct from the
Award."
15. Award:
There is an implied criticism that Arbitrators always seek to 'split
the difference':
(a) What is your understanding of the term 'split the difference'?
No of Arbitrators




Something to each side 12
Somewhere between one party's offer and





Notes: Typical answers are:
1. "Some people mean half-way between last claim and last offer."
"The mid-point between offer and claim."
(6 Arbitrators specifically mentioned half way or mid point between
the parties' final/last offers or claims)
2. "Finding a 50/50 position between the parties."
"50/50 split".
3. "To find a compromise position between last positions of the parties".
"Compromising in rather 'wet' fashion 'in the middle'."
(2 Arbitrators specifically mentioned the middle or half way
compromise, the others were less specific)
4. "An award which gives something to each side, but which does not
necessarily divide the difference equally."
"To seek to make an award that gives some measure of success to each
side."
5. "There are 2 different types of case which lends itself to the black
or white and it is not possible to 'split the difference'. In other
cases the parties are looking for a way around their difficulty, and
finding a balance, not necessarily "in the middle' which will satisfy
the parties, is in my view a prime aim of the Arbitrator."
"The term implies the possibility of a range of choice being available
which therefore requires very careful qualitative assessment. The
judgement of Solomon usually satisfies neither party."
"This really has no meaning for me - I am looking for a workable and
acceptable solution to a problem."
"To apportion costs/benefits equally."
"The usual one."
6. "I refuse to recognise this."
3 Arbitrators mentioned the cases to which it would apply but gave no
definition - eg pay issues.
3 Arbitrators attacked the question and notion of 'implied criticism'.
15. Award:
(b) How often have you felt under pressure to 'split the difference'












1. 3 Arbitrators mentioned compromise only.
2. 1 Arbitrator said compromise frequently, split the difference never.
3. 3 Arbitrators cited the wishes of the parties, eg
"This depends on what the parties appear to want - most terms of
reference do not, in my experience, provide an opportunity for
splitting the difference except in the sense of saying kind words to
the party that has come out on the wrong side. The terms of reference
are the fundamental guide."
3 Arbitrators made general comments, eg
"Some issues lend themselves more easily to maximising satisfactions
than others."
1 Arbitrator had only dealt with cases where this could not arise.
15. Award:
(c) Do you prefer to make a straight choice in your judgement in




No preference - depends on the
circumstances of the case 23
A matter for the parties, not the
Arbitrator to decide 2
Only when parties require it 6
Occasionally 4
Central question is to make an acceptable
award and resolve the dispute 5
Cannot give a simple answer - dangers in
making a straight choice 4
No response 2.
Total: 70
Notes: Typical answers are:
1. "It all depends. You have to read the situation. One doesn't often
split the difference. Usually you can't - most Arbitrations are not
of that nature - eg discipline, job grading and agreement
interpretations."
"Depends on facts, circumstances - not preference."
Award:
(d) Do you consider that there is wider scope for the use of straight
choice, flip flop, pendulum Arbitration? If so, can you suggest






Parties should be left to decide 4
Depends on particular circumstances of
the case 4
More research needed in this area before
a view can be formed 2













Where parties understand the process 2
Local Plant Procedures 1
Sex Discrimination 1
Equal Pay 1
Where parties go to Arb too frequently 1
Where parties want it 1
Where there is compulsory arbitration 1
Where employers reluctant to go to arb 1
Where there is a tendency to split the
difference 1
Where industries costs are high 1
Where the parties have narrowed their
difference to a minimum 1
Total: 37 *
Totals 37 as 15 Arbitrators gave two or more examples
Reasons
(a) What do you consider to be the advantages of giving Reasons for
your Award?
No of Arbitrators
Legitimises the Award, and makes it more
acceptable to the parties
May help those affected to understand how
the decision was arrived at
May point the parties towards a more
constructive path in the future -
educational function
More credibility to the Award
Parties know Arbitrator has thought about
the issues involved
Forces you to think logically - problem
solving approach
Better than being mysterious
Opportunity to show one's reasoning
Justice to the parties' efforts
Parties may think there are advantages
Enables Awards to be used as 'Case law' in
the future
For one's own satisfaction
Depends on the circumstances of the case
No clear advantage
None


















Totals 75 as 5 Arbitrators gave more than one advantage.
Reasons:
(b) What do you consider to be the disadvantages of giving Reasons
for your Award?
No of Arbitrators
Can lead to new disputes about Reasons 23
Parties may disagree with them and the
Award, especially the losing party 14
'Legal' implications, ie set precedents
for the future; appeals 8
May 'offend' the losing party - loss of
face 5
Exposure of ignorance or understanding of
detail on the part of the Arbitrator 4
May prompt criticism from the parties and
thus discredit the process of Arbitration
itself 5
Cannot cover all the points or be set out
in rational way 2
May be misunderstood 2
May not improve Industrial Relations 2
Often reasons are judgemental 1
Against the public interest 1
Weakens the Arbitration process 1
If Arbitrator is unsure of his grounds 1
Reasons open to contention 1
Accusations that all factors have not been
considered 1
Undermines acceptance of the Award 1
Sidetracks reason for Arbitration and may
prolong Hearing and terms of reference etc 1




Totals 80 as 7 Arbitrators gave more than one Disadvantage
Reasons:
(c) Do you prefer the system of recording your 'Considerations'





Depends on the circumstances of the case 4
Don't know 1
Prefer to give both 2
I do not sharply distinguish between the
two procedures 6
Use Considerations, but do not necessarily
prefer it - Reasons carry more weight 2
Even better to express as 'Findings' 1
Prefer Reasons or Recommendations 1
Do not understand the Question 1
No Response 6
Total: 70
Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Falls short of Reasons, but allows some
explanation of what influenced the Arbitrator 12
Reasons implied but not explicit 3
Parties see that their arguments have been
taken into account 3
Some indication of the Arbitrator's thinking 2
Prevents arguments and involving other issues 2
'Safer' than Reasons 2
Gives some background to the Award without
having to justify it 2
Indication without detailed reasoning 2
Contd.
Summary of the submissions
Likely to cause less damage
Useful to widen the area of interest to cover
the state of Industrial Relations within the
concern
Can help acceptance of the Award, but never
give Reasons
Need careful drafting but can have persuasive
function
Clarifies scope and nature of the Award
Weighing up evidence and submitting it clearly?
Avoids argument while showing that the
Arbitrator has not forgotten or ignored
important evidence
Allows aspects to be written in logical way
One can choose what one says - improving
Industrial Relations is the objective
Can indicate that one has thought through the
issue; direct attention to issue requiring
attention; help Managers and Shop Stewards get
acceptance of the Award
Reasons:










Breakdown of 'No' Responses:
14 Arbitrators added comments as follows:
Parties should be satisfied that Arbitrator has
paid some attention to the arguments 5
Leaves the impression that Arbitrator does not
have a clue 1
It is important to demonstrate through the
Report that the Arbitrator has understood all
the arguments 1
Too brusque, arbitrary 1
Parties prefer some explanation 1
Parties entitled to get some reaction to at
least their main arguments 1
Allows Arbitrator to play God, which is a bad
thing 1
Comments provide continuity with terms of
reference and submissions 1
Rarely justified - implies arrogance or fear
that his views might be faulty 1
But there is merit in the legal dictum that you
should always give your verdict but never your
Reasons 1
Total: 14
Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
6 Arbitrators added comments as follows:
This is most practical method 1
In cases where feelings run deep, and one
party has to accept an Award they do not like 1
Settles dispute without further conflict of
views 1
Prevents arguments 1
Sometimes there is nothing to add 1
If this is what the parties want 1
Total: 6.
1. A comprehensive response to this question was:
"Depends on the case. Parties do not want to read the lot, but do
want to feel that they have had value for money. Quite often in
Arbitrations it is self-evident that the parties just want the
question decided. One has to assess when it is helpful to give
reasoning and when it may be counter-productive."
17c Recommendations:
(a) Do you consider it is part of the Arbitrator's duties to make
Recommendations?
No of Arbitrators
YES (with comments) 21
YES (no comments) 8
NO (with comments) 10
NO (no comments) 12




If Parties wish it 2
Not a question of duty 2
Yes and No - I think it is a good idea
but it is discouraged by ACAS 1
You cannot give an absolute answer to this 1
Don11 know 1
Total: 70
1. Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Occasionally 8
In appropriate circumstances/cases 5
Only if both parties want it 4
But with considerable care 1
If Arbitrator identifies a basic weakness in
the Industrial Relations practice or procedure
which contributed to the dispute 1
Only where helpful to the parties, and does
not bring Award into question 1
Where relevant and provided Arbitrator knows
what he is doing 1
Total: 21
- 53 -
Breakdown of 'No' Responses:
Not unless asked by the parties
Should not, save exceptionally
Not usually
Arbitrator's duty is to settle the difference
according to the terms of reference
Arbitrator's job is to decide; a Mediator
recommends
Recommendations:
(b) What do you consider
Recommendations?
to be the advantages of giving
No of Arbitrators
Helps parties - Assistance in future
Industrial Relations
When one finds problems, eg with out of
date procedures
If parties wish it, there must be
advantages
In some cases gives a losing side
something from the Arbitration
To cover points which might arise at the
Hearing outside the terms of reference
Can prevent recurring problem
Deeper dispute can be diagnosed
Allows relevant comment which is not part
of the terms of reference or Award
Educational function
Can show that Arbitrator understands the
difficulties encountered by the parties
It saves face - the Arbitrator can be
blamed
Ameliorate unwelcome aspects of the Award
Avoid a repeat of the dispute
Outsider may see points which the parties
should attend to
Can be constructive, but ...




















(c) What do you consider to be the disadvantages of giving
Recommendations?
No of Arbitrators
Insufficient knowledge to give advice -
could be contentious 8
Parties resent it - may have
repercussions for future IR 8
Necessary to stick to the terms of
reference - parties could object if you do
not 6
Could invite hostility to the Award 4
Not part Of the Arbitration procedure 4
Inadequate knowledge - hostility of
parties 3
Could leave greater problem than existed
before Arbitration - parties have to live
with the Award 3
Recommendations are for Mediation -
Arbitration is to determine a problem 3
Danger of opening up the issue again 3
Parties may disagree about their status 3
Particularly resented by losing side 3
May be counter productive 2
May appear naive and ill-informed 2
Not likely to be accepted - interference 1
Might increase the giving of gratuitous
advice 1
Not necessary and parties do not usually
want them 1
Recommendations are best left to proper
diagnostic service and in-depth
investigations 1
Appear too intrusive and offensive to
losing party 1
Interfering in 'domestic' situation 1
Contd.
They can seem to carry more weight than
they should
Unacceptable to one party
Where parties are over sensitive about
their IR practice
Depends on the Recommendations
None
No response
73 as 3 Arbitrators gave more than one answer
18. Outcome:
Would you like to be informed as to how your Award was received
by the parties?
No of Arbitrators
YES (no comments) 29
YES (with comments) 12
NO (no comments) 13




Breakdown of 'Yes' Responses:
Out of curiosity/personal interest
Would help in future cases
Some time later when dust has settled
In some cases
With reservations - may not be practicable or
may endanger relationship with the parties
Would like to know if parties were satisfied
with handling of the case







Breakdown of 'No' Responses:
Likely to hear anyway if there have been
problems
May well raise grievance of a party or cause
future problems
May influence subsequent decisions
Would put additional strain on the parties if




Unless it was received badly




(b) Have you any ideas on how this could best be done to ensure
reliable feedback?
Comments - with ideas




Through ACAS staff/officials (no further
comment on how this should be done) *
Through ACAS **
Form/Questionnaire issued with Award
Ask ACAS personnel how this should be done
Informal way (not specific)














5 Arbitrators mentioned the Conciliation Officer who dealt with
the case.
3 Arbitrators said any comments/reactions given to ACAS should be
passed on to the Arbitrator; 2 Arbitrators said through gentle,
informal enquiry of the parties; and one felt it would be useful
for ACAS to monitor trends and disclose these to the Arbitrators.
Through Questionnaire, Pro-forma or just asking the parties to
give their reaction/comments. Two Arbitrators felt that this
should be done almost straight after the Award is issued, and
again in six months time.
_ cn
2. Breakdown of Comments Against Feedback
Present system is adequate 1
agree with ACAS's existing practice, but there
is a need for some overall evaluation of the
process which could perhaps be done in
discussions between ACAS/CBI/TUC 1
Costly and perhaps not worth setting up the
necessary machinery 2
Encourages prolongation of the argument 1
Would give rise to future difficulties 2 '
Every case is different, therefore do not know
what could be learned from this 1
Not necessary as regular meetings of
Arbitrators already provides useful feedback 1
If parties knew they could convey their
feelings to the Arbitrator this may affect the
independence of the Arbitrators 1
Feedback does not matter - if good, only





(a) Have you dealt with cases where the parties' voluntary agreement













Varies from case to case 1
Some need updating 1
Often the dispute arose because it was not 1
Don't understand the question 5
No response 8
Total: 70
* Of the 44 Arbitrators that answered 'Yes', 7 made further comments:
3 said yes with reservations.
1 said in most cases.
1 felt that at times the agreements were rather cumbersome
1 said yes, even if the parties themselves took a different view, and
1 said he would like to see more use made of the USA distinction of
'rights' and 'interests'.
19o Procedure Agreements:
(c) What do you consider to be the advantages of writing-in
Arbitration and/or the use of ACAS itself into Procedure
Agreements?
No of Arbitrators
Avoids necessity to take industrial
action 15
Further stage in the procedure which may
avoid dispute 12
Useful safety valve and 'let out' for the
parties or officials 8
More certainty in situation 7
Provides for settlement of difference by
peaceful means 3
Provides an independent and impartial view 4
Avoids further dispute about whether or
not to seek ACAS help, or who Arbitrator
should be 2
May encourage parties to make greater
effort to solve problems jointly without
the help of a third party 1
Encourage parties to use Arbitration (ie
opposite view to the above) 2
Focuses attention on the possibility of
using ACAS 1
Ready made machinery in the event of a
dispute 1
Other comments * 8




* Further comments were made by 8 Arbitrators, ie did not give
1 advantages'
2 said that this was a question for the parties themselves
2 felt that Conciliation should be written in, but not Arbitration
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1 argued that reference to Arbitration should be mandatory, but specific
reference to ACAS should be voluntary in order to preserve faith in its
impartiality
1 said it would depend on whether it was an option or mandatory
1 said it was more appropriate in the post 1974 period when ACAS was
building up its reputation and case load
1 did not think it mattered
Notes: Typical answers were as follows:
1. "It should avoid the necessity to take industrial action."
"Clearly an alternative to industrial action."
2. "Obvious further stage."
"It provides another stage for the possible peaceful resolution of the
dispute."
3. "Providing ACAS can remain independent it is a useful safety valve -
particularly for an individual."
"It provides an escape route, whereas when the 'heat' is on, one party
or the other is pressurised into refusing independent Arbitration."
4. "Both sides can be clear where the case ends up - promotes order and
ensures the parties tread carefully on the way."
"This introduces more certainty/clarity into the situation."
Procedure Agreements:
(d) What do you consider to be the Disadvantages of writing-in
Arbitration and/or the use of ACAS itself into Procedure
Agreements?
No of Arbitrators
May encourage parties not to settle in
negotiations or maintain unreasonable
attitudes/position 16
Easy way out - decreases the urgency and
resolution of own disputes/problems 8
Abdication of responsibility 5
Parties may not want, or require it 3
May cause more problems than it solves 3
May be occasions when parties do not want
to be restricted by standing commitment to
Arbitration 1
Sometimes parties would have settled
earlier, but feel they should go through
the whole procedure arrangements 3
Narcotic effect - too automatic 3
No disadvantage in ACAS, but compulsory
Arbitration may shorten negotiations
Rejection of the Award if it is automatic,
and one party is opposed








Notes: Typical answers were:
1. "'Chilling effect' on negotiations."
"In several cases I have noticed that negotiations at the earlier
stages were perfunctory, so that Arbitration was becoming a substitute
for negotiation."
(While 4 of the Arbitrators cited this as a disadvantage they added
that this had not been their experience.)
2. "I have taken cases where I felt that the parties should certainly
have been able to sort out the problem without resort to Arbitration.
In other words, Arbitration can be an easy way out."
"Can lead management and unions to shy away from taking uncomfortable
decisions."
3. "Can lead to the parties abdicating their responsibilities in reaching
their own solutions."
* Of those Arbitrators who answered 'None', 6 made further comments:
1 said there may be theoretical disadvantages, but he had not found any
5 had reservations -
unless automatic which harms collective bargaining
if it is the last resort
except that the matter may have been examined many times before it
reaches ACAS
provided that it is recognised that Arbitration is in reality only
penultimate stage
provided Conciliation is written in before Arbitration.
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19. Procedure Agreements:
(e) Do you have views about the use of Arbitration in the public
sector, and in particular 'essential services'? (For example,
the use of standing bodies of Arbitration.)
No of Arbitrators
Comments in favour 34
Comments against 6
General comments 12
No - no comments 9
No strong views 2




1. In general the Arbitrators felt that there had to be some way of
resolving or preventing lengthy and costly disputes in the public
sector and protecting the taxpayer and consumer. The Arbitrators did
note that there were difficulties over the interpretation of
'essential services' and the possible 'interference' by Government, eg
where pursuing a particular economic policy or formal/informal incomes
policy.
Examples of the comments made are:
"Yes - I do believe that Arbitration must have a greater role in the
public sector with the increasing militancy of public sector unions.
But it is not 'magic'. In particular I have doubts about the use of
Arbitration to settle pay questions in view of possible conflict with
a Government's economic policy. If the Arbitrator ignores government
policy he is 'independent* but 'irresponsible'. If he gives effect to
that policy he is seen as a government 'poodle'."
"Yes - the public sector is in a different position to private sector
because the only source of finance is the taxpayer, ie HM Government.
Standing bodies can keep a check on industrial relations issues which
need not always be financial ones."
"Yes - but it needs to be mutually accepted by the parties, as a
principle, and not seen as an expedient. Also standing bodies of
Arbitration would need to be seen as not subject to over-riding
Government intervention which undermines their independence."
2. The main comments against the use of standing bodies were that they
may lose freshness of approach to problems; they may overstay their
welcome; and could cause erosion of negotiation. Two Arbitrators were
particularly against the use of compulsory standing bodies.
3. General comments were made over the difficulty of defining what is an
'essential service1; the possible cost of the use of standing bodies,
especially if unions accept 'no strike' clauses; and the desirability
of leaving parties to solve their own problems wherever possible on a
voluntary basis.
20. Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(a) What are the advantages of voluntary Arbitration?
No of Arbitrators
Acceptance of the outcome 30
In keeping with British system of
Industrial Relations 4
Mutual consent of parties 4
Additional stage in bargaining process 3
Peaceful way of resolving dispute 2
Speedy way of resolving dispute 2
No enforcement problems 2
Increases understanding between parties 2
Others * 9
Cannot answer briefly 4
No response 8
Total: 70
* Other general comments were made, eg:
"It can get parties off the hook."
"I think there are well rehearsed arguments about this matter."
"This question raises major issues of political values, eg the role of
unions and collective bargaining in society, etc."
"It depends what you mean by 'compulsory Arbitration'."
_ CO
20. Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(b) What are the disadvantages of voluntary Arbitration?
No of Arbitrators
None 16
Few, but can lead to manipulation 4
Delay 3
Impasse if one party refuses to go 5
One party may be unwilling 4
Might not be accepted by one party 4
Overuse 3
Not used enough 2
May prevent use of Arbitration 2
Others * 16
Cannot answer this briefly 4
No response 7
Total: 70
* Other general comments were made eg:
"Parties resent 'extreme' decisions."
"Third Party interests cannot be represented."
"Usefulness recognised by those least in need."
"Very few as long as parties don't get addicted to it."
"Can lead to unresolved issues."
"Demands on the Arbitrator."
"Puts issue into the hands of someone who does not have to live with the
Award."
"It does little or nothing to redress any fundamental inequality of
bargaining power."
"May discourage parties from negotiating."
"There are well rehearsed arguments on this."
"Depends on definition of terms."
"It is always a second-best solution - an imposed solution is always likely
to be inferior to one jointly arrived at."
"Obvious!"
Total: 73 *
20. Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(c) What are the advantages of compulsory Arbitration?
No of Arbitrators
None 5
Comments that there are few or no
advantages 11
Comments stating advantages 31
Depends on the circumstances 3
Need fuller definition of 'compulsory
arbitration' before answering 5




* Totals 73 as 3 Arbitrators gave more than one advantage
Notes:
1. Examples of comments were:
"Few - short-term cure only."
"Could not be used for long."
"Not acceptable to both parties in the UK industrial relations
system."
"Unworkable."
2. Breakdown of Advantages:
Possible avoidance of industrial action 12
Certainty and getting an answer 4
Speed 3
More extensive use of Arbitration 2
Orderly system 1
Gives issue an airing 1
Neat and authoritative 1
Contd.
Both sides can be heard
Concentrates the mind
Parties may settle without going to Arbitration
Last resort
Norms of behaviour of advantage to both sides
Makes parties narrow the gap
Useful in essential services, disputes cases,
interpretation
Other comments were:
"Well rehearsed answers here."
"Almost a contradiction in terms."
Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(d) What are the disadvantages of compulsory Arbitration?
No of Arbitrators
Resentment and unacceptable to parties
Impairs negotiations and removes
responsibility from parties
Cannot be made compulsory or imposed
Can become discredited and thus the whole
system of Arbitration
Makes Arbitration more coercive and short¬
lived




Symptoms would be treated, but not
necessary real problem
Liable to be political misuse
May harm future industrial relations
Too much power in hands of a third party
Forcing someone too quickly
Depends on the circumstances
Don't know











20. Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(e) What do you consider to be the relative merits of joint and
unilateral access to Arbitration?
No of Arbitrators
Comments on joint access 31
Comments on unilateral access 28
Cannot answer this question without
definitions 5
Both should be allowed 2





* Totals 79 as, after 9 Arbitrators commented on both joint and unilateral
access
Notes:
1. Breakdown of joint access responses:
Joint is preferable 11
Arbitration needs agreement of both parties 5
Better chance of getting Award that sticks 3
Fewer problems provided you agree terms of
reference 1
In favour of joint for reasons implicit in
above replies to Voluntary and Compulsory
Arbitration 6
Acceptance of the Award 2
Flexibility 1
Joint responsibility 1
Less reluctance to go to Arbitration 1
Total: 31
Breakdown of unilateral access responses:
Against for reasons implicit in above replies




Undue pressure put on either party
Award may be rejected
One party may be reluctant and resent it
May enourage frivolous applications
Inflationary
Less satisfactory than joint
May frustrate negotiations
Less likely to produce lasting settlement
Weaker party has opportunity to force stronger
one to Arbitration
May force a decision
For recognised terms and conditions
Only for interpretation issues
- 75 -
21. ACAS:
(a) Could ACAS do more than it presently does in the form of










1. 13 of the 'Yes' Arbitrators commented as follows:
"Very limited indeed."
"Regular meetings with a sound working Agenda."
"I think so but it costs money and requires resources."
"But with care."
"One can always do more in this imperfect world. But it does depend
on funds and staffing. At present I am sure ACAS does what it can."
"But it is doubtful whether it would be of great value."
"More publicity should be given to Arbitration - many industrialists
do not realise the advantages of proceeding through ACAS."
"There should be residential seminars for Arbitrators (like for JPs)."
"Through the publication of selective studies conducted by individuals
on Arbitration, more frequent seminars, and the encouragement of a
resource network amongst Arbitrators."
"More training at start." *
"Short induction sessions with list of recommended reading and
possible role playing."
"But ACAS needs first to sort out its own attitude to the value of
Arbitration."
"Certainly on the Bulletins and Seminars. There are problems about
in-house training."
* This comment was made by one of ACAS's 'old' Arbitrators, who is perhaps
unaware of ACAS's current practice.
10 of the 'No* Arbitrators commented as follows:
"Not sure if anything."
"I am satisfied with the contacts made and seminars to keep us in
touch."
"Improvement in recent years."
"Probably about right for the present, though more development might
be appropriate in future."
"What it does is just about right."
"The introduction of bulletins and conferences has made welcome
provision, previously lacking."
"The present arrangements are adequate. If it did it could be
counter-productive - compromise the independence of Arbitrators. They
don't want to be known as 'Men from the Ministry'."
"I'm pleased with what ACAS does."
"I doubt it very much. I have little faith in exhortations - think
change will come about only through the actual experience of the
parties."
2 of the Arbitrators who answered 'Possibly' commented as follows:
"Depends on extent to which ACAS uses Arbitrators' existing expertise.
If likely to be called upon to go beyond this, further instruction
might be helpful."
"ACAS essentially controlled by its own 'terms of reference'. I find
its service to Arbitrators good - possibly the parties could be helped
by further local contacts but this involves staff time and present
cuts 'limit any possible extension'."
21. ACAS
(b) If yes, can you suggest ways? (For example, would you favour










1. Varied comments as follows:
"Professional qualifications do not by themselves indicate an
individual is analytical or capable of an honest and fair judgement.
They imply he has reached a level of knowledge of a subject. More
seminars devoted to case studies could be extremely useful -
confidentiality would be a problem."
"I would strongly oppose Arbitration becoming a 'professional' matter
as it is, for example, in the United States."
"To deal with the examples: I feel that ACAS (As the parties
themselves in the case of private arbitration) should have the
greatest possible freedom of choice over Arbitrators, and wouldn't
want them to be restricted to members of a certain institute or people
with certain qualifications. The present arrangements - where ACAS
recruits people for its panel and proposes Arbitrators to disputants
seems to me to work well enough. Only if the reputation of ACAS were
to fall might an institute be worth considering; at present, it might
be an unnecessary competitor for ACAS and a harmful distraction for
parties in dispute."
"I would not favour obtaining professional qualifications or becoming
a member of an institute (it is desirable of course that the person
appointed is already in possession of a professional qualification) -
perhaps an induction course of about 1 week would be desirable (given
by an experienced competent Arbitrator)."
"No advantage in professional qualifications, but more seminars would
be very welcome, including analysis of particular cases after the
event."
"The Chartered Institute of Arbitration MIGHT help but commercial
Arbitration is an entirely different matter from industrial
relations."
"As in the USA?"
"Yes - if confined to employment arbitration."
You are really on your own and should remain that way."
"I do not favour attaching professional labels or institution
membership which tend to feed the ambitious. Totally confidential
discussion groups, as already held are helpful. The problem is how to
get experienced Arbitrators into a position of revealing how they have
handled recent cases and the problems that arose. This helps newly
appointed Arbitrators. There is also a case for those who have
handled highly pressurised national cases to be willing to talk fully
to other Seminar Arbitrators about the case, its development, conduct,
award and outcome."
"NB I think ACAS could do more, but I don't think it should. I think
what it does is helpful."
"More frequent and more intensive discussions among Arbitrators (and
ACAS). Not favour professional qualifications or Institute."
"Yes - I think Arbitrators should present a professional image to
industry. From my experience too little is known about Arbitration."
"Yes - through the publication of selective studies conducted by
individuals on Arbitration, more fequent seminars, and the
encouragement of a resource network amongst Arbitrators."
"I am not sure about professional qualifications. I may be prejudiced
because of my own background, but I do not think there is any
substitute for all-round industrial relations experience. It would
not be practicable for ACAS to circulate every report and award to
every Arbitrator, but perhaps selected awards might be circulated
because of their special interest or even as 'models'. What about
Regional Seminars on Arbitration for TU officials?"
"Greater use of Boards or Assessors. Publicity in press/paid weekends
for Arbitrators and industrial colleagues to meet and share
experiences. Institute membership."
"Period of 'apprenticeship' - 3 cases at least."
"Most Arbitrators are already exceptionally well qualified in a
variety of specialist fields respectively. In the majority of cases
they will also be skilled in the principles and practice of
negotiations and human relations; have a sound knowledge of
legislation and of systems of reward and recompense for work done."
"How do you assess experience/maturity/understanding etc and other
qualities which make for good Arbitration? I doubt whether holding a
'Certificate' would make me a better Arbitrator."
"It seems impossible to provide examinations for Arbitrators but there
is value in better public relations. Possibly an Institute would
assist this process. Whether such a step is taken or not it is
essential that the experience of the best industrial relations
Arbitrators should be conveyed to beginners. Although much of the
secret of success is a knack there are good and bad attitudes which
can be the subject of instruction. There are also pitfalls to be
avoided and signs to look for. The main trouble is that the best
Arbitrators appear to work by instinct and have not thought deeply
about what it is they are doing. Perhaps a start could be made by
use of the device common in Industrial Tribunals and the CAC of a
series of introductory sittings with experienced Arbitrators."
"ACAS do well and would give help if asked."
"Possibly more interchange between Arbitrators through
seminars/meetings, and interchange with ACAS officials. It might be
useful to have an Institute of Arbitrators, where Arbitrators
themselves could operate professionally and be less 'anonymous' and
their professional standing made clear (that they are not unaware of
the 'facts of life')."
"Would favour some form of body - not an institute - but more on lines
of National Academy of Arbitrators - US style."
"I suppose training is always a good thing but nous and experience
seem to be prime requisites."
"Induction training."
"Yes, but needs a lot of thought."
"Slightly more formalisation of induction training."
"Arbitrators are essentially slightly loner minds - if too much
training, individuality may be quashed. Make clients more
suspicious."
"Yes." (no further comment)
"Certainly not either of these examples. The more ad hoc, ephemeral,
and unorganised the Arbitrators are, the better for voluntary IR."
2. 5 Arbitrators said 'No' and made no further comments. The other 6
commented as follows:
"No - commercial Arbitration is very different from IR Arbitration."
"No - more small regional and inter-regional meetings of Arbitrators
for Arbitrators not for benefit of HO. Preferably chaired by Regional
Directors."
"No - can arrange 'case conferences' where Arbitrators could discuss
different approaches."
"No - professionalism would or might lead to quasi-legal approach."
"No, No. The last thing you want is a professionalisation of the
service. The great merit is that it draws from a pool of very diverse
characters, with differing experiences. The Arbitrator is an
individual."
"No. But more exchange of information about cases could be very
instructive."
Full details of the answers have been quoted for ACAS's purposes.
21. ACAS


















1. The following comments were made:
"That danger exists."
"Imagine so."
"Which process? Arbitration? Yes - some cases involve trivial
amounts. Promoting Industrial Arbitration? Yes - if it were pushed
to the point where ACAS made a nuisance of themselves."
"Yes. The strength of ACAS Arbitrator is that he is not a
professional and has no powers."
"Yes it can. ACAS do at present run an annual seminar, that is good,
and with the addition of an induction course that is all that should
be necessary. The important consideration is that the Arbitrator has
a proven track record in IR. An academic discipline is desirable to
provide a logical problem solving approach and to help in presenting a
clear reasoned report."
"I suppose so."
"We are certainly not at risk yet in that respect. Note also the
possiblity of short reports by Arbitrators to ACAS, to improve the
annual statistics."
"Yes. The best qualification is IR experience."
"Yes indeed. Success (if that is the right word) depends largely on
common sense and sympathetic objectivity."
"Far too far."
What process? That of 'enhancing' Arbitration? Yes, I think so. If
the Arbitrators are well-chosen and not kept on for ever that would be
better than constant buffing-up."
"Yes - particularly if it is publicised or becomes a bandwagon for the
inexperienced."
"Yes - I'd be against over-formalisation and form of credentialism as
a condition of Arbitrators being appointed."
"Yes - in the sense that the greater effort/expense is likely to be
disproportionate to the benefit."
"Evidence for current methods is the success over many years.
Confidence of the parties in the Arbitrator and the system is
essential. Perhaps some parties, especially some unions would not
welcome an Arbitrator of a 'specialised' kind."
"Only if it is badly run. ACAS would have to ensure that the process
weeded out the prejudiced and inadequate Arbitrators."
"Yes, if development becomes too institutionalised at the expense of
self development."
"I think it can. I think ACAS must continue to rely on people who are
'ready made' to act as Arbitrators, and give them the kind of support
and training as at present provided."
"Not if it reflects views of trade unions/management on its
professionalism."
"Generally a letter briefly from ACAS seems to be a good idea. If the
parties, however, came to believe that ACAS is too far involved they
are likely to lose confidence in the Arbitrator as having been
instructed from above."
"Yes, but ACAS present performance is very good on the whole."
"Yes. Arbitrators are usually men and women to whom time is a very
valuable commodity. Any extended training could prove repetitious
especially to experts, well practised, in the art of digesting reports
and case histories. The sheer breadth of human activity involved
could make the preparation of curriculum a daunting task and the mere
completion of a specified course of study may still not produce the
ideal Arbitrator for every case."
"Yes, in theory. I should not wish to see IR Arbitration become a
profession - though, that said, more needs to be made known and
understood about the Arbitration process (contrast the situation in
the USA)."
"Yes, an Arbitrator does operate by instict guided by experience.
Constant reference to taught principles could be damaging."
"Not sure what this question means. Obviously a sense of perspective
must prevail. But to date, I think the image of ACAS Arbitrators
could do with enhancement to indicate that they are persons of high
professional standing, etc."
O r\
"Yes - ACAS is, and should be, judged by its works."
"Yes - should not imply formal and rigid rules, or set case law."
"Yes - a long lasting solution is for the parties."
"Yes: I am against the further professionalisation of the subject."
"Limit to training - experience real training."
"Very easily."
"Yes, there is a limit to the number of issues that Arbitration raises
and can be discussed, eg in seminars. In training there is a point at
which the novice must go it alone."
"Difficulty of finding a balance - give new Arbitrators some sort of
idea how to do the job, but in such a way that they are still
independent."-
"Yes - implication for independence and acceptance of the
Arbitration."
details of the answers have been quoted for ACAS's purposes.
22. Conciliation:
Are you satisfied with the current arrangements for preserving the
integrity of Arbitration and the separate integrity of Conciliation?









1. 9 Arbitrators did not explain their answer. The remaining 48
Arbitrators made comments, examples of which are as follows:
"At the moment there is no connection at all between Conciliation and
Arbitration. I think this is the way it should be."
"Broadly correct. Arbitrators are expendable. Conciliation must
continue to be seen as independent."
"It does seem to me to be important that the parties are satisfied
that they will get an impartial (as well as independent) hearing (and
consideration generally) of their difference; and this means excluding
the possibility of the Arbitrator becoming prejudiced through previous
discussion with a Conciliation Officer."
"In my experience, Conciliators have been scrupulous in not allowing
influence on Arbitrators."
"I do prefer to be able to say to the parties that I am entirely
dependent on them for my knowledge of the case."
"ACAS Conciliation Officers have a reputation for impartiality. That
should be preserved. Keeping the Conciliation process and Arbitration
separate assists in this respect. If, in the present system, an
Arbitrator is controversial then blame can be attached to the
Arbitrator, or the particular context. Confidence in the system can
be maintained by keeping the two processes separate."
"I believe it is essential for the Arbitrator to enter the field
'cold', ie without prior knowledge of the comings and goings which
took place during the Conciliation process."
"Conciliation will never work if it is known that things said, or
possibilities hinted at, will subsequently come to the knowledge of a
final Arbitrator."
7 of the Arbitrators who made comments also stated that in exceptional
cases or special circumstances, some contact between the Conciliator
and Arbitrator can be helpful.
2. Comments were made by 5 Arbitrators as follows:
"I have not encountered any indicators that it is unsatisfactory though
this is not to say that there are no unsatisfactory manifestations."
"I am unaware of any such arrangements. But remarkably few people seem
to be aware of the true difference between Conciliation and Arbitration
and ACAS has not shaken off the image it acquired in its early days,
under the Chairmanship of Jim Mortimer, now General Secretary of the
Labour Party."
"I think that the Arbitrator should have powers (with agreement of the
parties) occasionally to convert Arbitration into Mediation or
Concilition."
"The CAC does not preserve separate integrity. It constantly has in
mind the possibility of agreed settlement. On the CAC, I have
sometimes suggested to the parties a solution. This is, indeed, common
on information issues where the preliminary hearing is partly for this
purpose. Disciplinary Arbitrations probably could not incorporate this
possibility but I think it would be possible for the parties to
indicate whether they were prepared to accept Conciliation."
"Would prefer more contact with Conciliators on particular cases."
3. 3 Arbitrators did not directly answer Yes or No, but made the
following comments:
"I am not convinced of the wisdom of keeping them separate. At times
an experienced Arbitrator might be an effective Conciliator."
"I have deliberately fudged it on occasions - you can't be too rigid.
(They will probably fire me for this confession!)"
"They are not separate."
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23. General:
Please make any other general comments that you would wish to make on
the present and/or future role of Arbitration and the Arbitrator.











1. 35 of the Arbitrators who made comments were against legally binding
arrangements. Some examples of their comments are as follows:
"Don't believe that legally binding awards, any more than legally
binding agreements, can solve industrial relations problems. The
constructive improvement of industrial relations can only be achieved
by voluntarily building procedures which acquire credibility and
acceptance."
"If the law is to be amended to allow legally binding arrangements,
will this not also lead to an appeals procedure against the legal
enforcement? If parties go to Arbitration, they are committed to
acceptance of the decision. If they do not want or fear the result of
Arbitration, they just do not go unless it is built into their
procedure. In this last case the parties are morally bound to accept
the decision."
"Attacks on Arbitration in recent years have been unfortunate. The
role of Arbitration should be extended in the interests of 'good'
industrial relations and in avoiding costly disputes for the parties
and indeed the general public. The attacks have been made on a flimsy
basis and opportunities should be taken to refute them. Given the
record of observance of awards, I see no advantage in having legally
binding awards."
"I hope I have said enough in my previous answers to convey my belief
in the essentially voluntary nature of the Arbitration process. The
only obligation on the parties to accept awards is a moral one, but it
is a fact that over the many years that voluntary Arbitration has been
available very few awards have been rejected. In my view that is the
strength and the ultimate test of the system."
"Unless there is an outstanding case for increased legislation why add
more? The more legislation the less freedom and the greater will be
the expertise required to interpret it. Heaven forbid that we become
a nation of lawyers or that the legal profession should grow to become
the greatest service industry."
"If industrial relations are good, law is unnecessary. If they are
bad, laws make them worse."
"Legally binding agreements through Arbitration or otherwise are no
more than a joke in industrial relations. Persuasion is essential.
Compulsion will not work. It never has. Examples of the failure of
the law abound."
"The quicker way to make our Arbitration system useless and unwanted
and unused, would be to give it greater formality and (heaven forbid)
make the awards legally binding."
"On the whole, I think ACAS has got it right and has had it right from
the start. ACAS is an independent service which offers to help
parties in difficulties in a variety of ways. Arbitration is just one
of those services, available if the parties want it. Such things as
legally binding agreements are not for ACAS or the Arbitrator to
impose. If the parties want it to be legally binding it can be made
so, but not otherwise."
The remaining 11 Arbitrators made general comments or made reference
to articles they had written on the subject. Examples of their
comments are as follows:
"A great deal more needs to be understood about Arbitration. When
more work has been done it may be possible to ensure a better general
quality of Arbitrator. The introduction of tripartite Arbitration
would, I believe, greatly advance the reliability of Arbitration. But
only then is it feasible to think of legally binding Arbitration."
"I do not share the fashionable view that legally binding agreements
are wholly undesirable. On the other hand I do not advocate total
legalism. I suspect this and future governments will experiment much
more with legalism; they may have a role in connection with certain
public sector bargaining units in return for no strikes or even
(following GCHQ) no unions."
"Arbitration could have a more important role if its advantages become
better known to industry. I think that the existing ACAS panel should
merge with the CAC and that there should be no division between the
function of the CAC and the Arbitrator or Mediator."
"I think that Arbitrators could be usefully used more in local
disputes (as was envisaged when the CAC was first set up)."
"I think ACAS handles its Arbitration responsibilities very well. It
may be embarrassed by having too many Arbitrators for the work arising
at present, but I do not think it would be advantageous to industry or
the unions to move away from present concepts of roles and
responsibilities.
"I do not think one should get too excited about prospects for change
in the nature of Arbitration or the extent of its use. The experience
of the parties and the facts of economic life matter much more than
external advice from any source."
(D) MEDIATION





Those Arbitrators who answered 'Yes' were asked to complete questions
25-28. However, 5 of the other Arbitrators made comments or answered
questions 26-28.
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26. Mediation: Which particular issues, if any, do you consider are
better dealt with by Mediation rather than by Arbitration?
No of Mediators
Issues 18
Not issue but circumstances 8
Where parties want recommendation not
award 5
Where parties unwilling to commit





* Totals 37 as this includes 5 replies from those Arbitrators who have not
acted as Mediators.
1. Of the 18 Mediators who cited issues, the most quoted was complex
cases where a compromise decision rather than a one side or the other
is appropriate. Other issues mentioned were:
Those of a more political nature.
Those which require problem solving approach.
Highly charged and antagonistic issues.
Interest cases.
Where Mediation is written into procedure agreements.
Conditions at the workplace.
Basic principles such as TU recognition, inter-union issues.
Where there is rationalisation and reorganisation and an independent
examination is required.
Where some research work is required.
Notes:
Where decisions may have signification commercial impact for a
company.
2. 8 Mediators specifically emphasised that it was not necessarily a
question of issues but more the attitude of the parties involved or
deadlock situation which they may have reached. Examples of such
replies are:
"I think it is the attitudes of the parties which are important rather
than the issues. Some parties (particularly TUs) might be willing to
accept Mediation but not Arbitration."
"Situations rather than issues perhaps, eg with the wish of the
parties to remove a deadlock in negotiations."
3. Related to (2) above, 5 Mediators emphasised the situation where
parties want Recommendations but want to reserve the right to make
their own decision, ie where, when Conciliation has failed, they will-
accept Mediation as a useful option if they are unprepared to accept
Arbitration. Examples of such replies are:
"Where Conciliation has failed and Arbitration is unacceptable."
"It is only if Arbitration is rejected or is inappropriate for some
reasons, that the Conciliator will turn to Mediation in the hope that
a formal recommendation might gain enough acceptance."
"Mediation is a useful option ACAS can put to parties who are
reluctant to commit themselves to the decision of an Arbitration."
4. A further 3 Mediators, believed Mediation was appropriate where the
parties may be unwilling to commit themselves to fixed terms of
reference, eg
"Where the parties find difficulty in agreeing terms of reference to
resolve their problem. There is an urgent need to resolve the
problem."
27. Mediation: Are you satisfied with the distinctions between Mediation






* Totals 37 as this includes 5 replies from those Arbitrators who have not
acted as Mediators
1. 30 Mediators answered Yes to this question, 25 did not elaborate but 5
added the following comments:
"Most seem to understand it, or can appreciate an explanation."
"Both have distinct roles to play. Mediation is not as widely known
as its usefulness would justify. Mediation was little used prior to
ACAS."
"Reasonably."
"Although I find that any Industrial Relations and Personnel Officers
are not sufficiently well informed. Companies are not always ready to
recognise the need for outside help, especially when budgetary
constraints are looming large in their thinking."
"But I am by no means sure they are widely understood. Terminology in
industrial relations is not as widely understood as it ought to be."
2. Other comments were made as follows:
"The Arbitrator acts as judge and jury in matters put before him. The
Mediator merely recommends. The Conciliator does neither, his is the
role of Chairman without even a casting vote."
"Again the distinction is sometimes too rigidly applied."
"I don't think they are well understood in industry at large."
"It seems to work quite well, With the consent of the parties it
would sometimes be nice if Arbitration could continue from Mediation
at the same hearing. In practice this does sometimes happen. Though
very rarely."
"No. Some procedure agreements use the word Arbitration when
Mediation is meant. ACAS could do more to publicise the difference."
Notes:
"It would be wrong to pretend that they must be distinct."
28. Mediation: Are there any special methods you introduce to Mediation
which you do not use for Arbitration?
No of Mediators
Yes - parties can be seen separately more
like Conciliation 20




* Totals 37 as this includes 5 replies from those Arbitrators who have not
acted as Mediators.
1. 20 of the Mediators noted that Mediation allowed them to see the
parties separately with one hearing room and two side rooms; it
allowed greater opportunity for informal discussion; also to offer
ideas and suggestions for a solution, ie more like Conciliation
process. Examples of such answers are:
"In Mediation I may have separate discussions with each party as a
Conciliator would do, where I can probe narrow differences and test
ideas. I have found, in Mediation cases, that parties are more ready
to change views and attitudes than in Arbitration. Probably because
they are not bound by the recommendations even though they normally
accept them. I am also conscious that even although they may not
accept the recommendations they may use them for further useful
negotiations."
"As in Conciliation one might at times talk to the parties
separately."
"See parties separately and jointly, explore range of possible
solutions, fuller reports."
"Separating the parties and talking as a supportive friend to each
group which opens them up and indicates area of compromise which they
would otherwise decline to indicate."
2. While not mentioning Conciliation or separate meetings specifically,
the other 7 Mediators comments as follows:
"Generally much more informal, with parties constituted as a committee
with independent Chairman. Goodwill tends to be high at first but
falls away after about 3 months, so if much work is needed, it tends
to be very intensive."
"A later start in order that there will be an adjournment for lunch.
And attempt to formulate a proposal to put to the parties at the
hearing in order to focus their ideas."
Notes
"The problem first required an overview before the investigative
procedure is introduced. The procedure to be adopted needs to be
fully understood and agreed with the parties concerned. Without this,
there is unlikely to be any acceptance of the ultimate recommendation.
In an Arbitration local issues are paramount. Mediation often needs
to take account of broader issues which may be of a regional or
national character."
"Not specifically but it would depend upon the individual case."
"Yes. One is more persuasive in advancing a possible resolution."
"They are quite different - Mediation is much more open-ended and time
consuming."
"Of course dishonesty is the obvious one."
The above results have been prepared for the benefit of ACAS. This is not
a published document and should not be reproduced or quoted without prior
consultation with Alice Brown, Department of Economic History, University
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SUMMARY OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 1942-1985
As part of the Survey of Arbitration and Mediation Procedures in Britain, a
survey of Arbitration Awards for the period 1942-85 was undertaken. A one
in ten random sample of ad hoc arbitration cases was chosen (Single and
Boards of Arbitration) excluding the awards of the standing bodies of
arbitration such as the Industrial Court and the CAC. As the awards studied
are the property of the parties, the identity of the parties has not been
disclosed.
A full report of the survey has been prepared for the use of ACAS. This
summary of the results was prepared for the 1986 Arbitration Seminars
together with summaries of the schedule of awards.
The objectives of the survey were:
To identify the main users of arbitration;
To assess the extent to which Arbitrators have been constrained when
making their awards, ie whether in the terms of reference they have
been asked to make a straight choice between the offer and the claim,
or whether they have been free to exercise their judgement;
To determine whether or not Arbitrators have stayed within their terms
of reference;
To examine the types of issues caning to arbitration and the extent to
*
which these have altered over the period;
1
To ascertain whether or not Arbitrators have given Reasons for their
awards;
To analyse the outcome of the awards themselves; and
To evaluate the criticisms sometimes made of arbitration, that
Arbitrators always split the difference or produce a shabby compromise,
and make their awards without regard to the employer's ability to pay
or current economic conditions.
Because of the particular interest in 'General Pay Issues' a separate
schedule was compiled to deal with these cases. Further, as the operation
of the Industrial Tribunal system is currently under examination, a separate
breakdown of Dismissal and Discipline cases for the period 1974-1935 (under
the auspices of ACAS) was also compiled.
The survey examined the Industries using aroitration; the Trade Union users;
the Terms of Reference; the Issues coming to arbitration; Arbitrators'
Remarks; and the Results of the Awards themselves.
1 Industry
The survey of the users of arbitration showed a split between the private
and public sectors of industry as 82% in the private sector and 18% in the
public sector, with an increasing use of aroitration by the public sector in
the 1980s. Some sectors have moved in and out of the public sector over
the years, and this has been taken into account.
In the full survey report prepared for ACAS attempts were also made to
2
identify the categories of industries using arbitration, although this was
not always possible as the arbitration awards gave the name of the company
but no information as to the type of operation. What is clear from the
schedules, however, is that the industries using the arbitration service
reflect the shift in employment patterns over the period (for example from
manufacturing to service industries); and also the increasing militancy of
certain groups (for example the car industry in the 1960s). The earlier
cases are dominated by references from the textile, steel, engineering,
transport, food and chemical industries, while more recent users included
the education, banking, newspaper and television sectors. A major user of
the service over the whole period was the food and drink industry - the
alcoholic drink industry in particular .being a source of many discipline
cases.
2 Trade Union
Given the influence of Jack Jones in the setting up of ACAS and the size of
the Transport and General workers Union, it is perhaps not surprising to
find that the TGWU is the major user of the service. However, it is clear
from the cases examined, that the TGWU has always been a significant user
of the state's arbitration machinery even before the existence of ACAS.
Over the period examined, 27% of cases involved the Transport and General
Workers' Union (TGWU); 11% tne Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
(AUEW); 9% the General and Municipal Workers' Union (GMWU); 5% the
Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff (ASTMS) and
the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff
(APEX); 4% the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union
(EETPU); 3% the National Joint Industrial Council of the Electricity Supply
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Industry (NJIC/ESI); 2% the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied workers
(USDAW) and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC); and the National
Union of Public Employees (NUPE), the National and Local Government Officers
Association (NALGO) and the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT)
each accounted for less than 1%. Of the remaining 31% of cases, a large
number of unions were involved - from relatively well known unions such as
the National Union of Seamen (NUS) to less well known such as the Scottish
Horse and Motormen's Association (SHMA).
3 Terms of Reference
The Terms of Reference for the arbitrations were divided into four
categories: - (i) Straight Choice (where the Arbitrator was asked to decide
between the offer and the claim); (ii) Judgement (where the Arbitrator was
allowed to reach a decision between the offer and the claim if s/he wished);
(iii) Revoked, Confirmed or Varied (this applied to the NJIC/ESI Dismissal
and Discipline cases only); and (iv) Split (where the Arbitrator was faced
with two sets of terms of reference one from the employer and tne other from
the union).
For all types of cases covered and over the whole period the results were as
follows:
Arbitration Terms of Reference
53% Straight Choice
41% Judgement
3% Revoked, Confirmed or Varied
2% Split
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For ths earlier years, the category Straight Choice has been used when the
Terms of Reference were of the nature - "To decide whether the following
claim of the union should be conceded" or "To decide whether the claim of
the union for Is per week increase in wages is justified." in this sense,
Straight Choice (final offer, pendulum or flip-flop) arbitration has always
existed in British industrial relations. In addition, particular types of
cases lend themselves to Straight Choice decisions eg Dismissal cases -
"should an employee be dismissed or not" or Grading issues "should the grade
for the job be A or B".
It should be noted that the earlier cases operated under Order 1305 from
1940 - 1951 and Order 1376 from 1951 until 1958. During this period there
was unilateral access to arbitration, and most claims were initiated by the
union. The choice faced by the Arbitrator, therefore, was to chose for or
against the claim - as in most cases the employers did not concede that an
increase should be granted.
However, this is not the earliest reference to Straight Choice arbitration I
have discovered. In a paper written by Dr Treble of Hull University
entitled 'How New Is Final Offer Arbitration', Dr Treble stated that final
offer arbitration operated in the British Coal Industry Conciliation Boards
at the turn of the century.
The Boards' Constitution provided, that in the event of no agreement being
reached between the parties, an Arbitrator should be brought in to give the
casting vote. This clause was, however, interpreted differently in
different areas - for example, in Scotland Arbitrators exercised their
judgement in reaching an award, while in the Federated Areas of South Wales,
Durham and Northumoerland the ArDitrators interpreted their task as deciding
between the final offer or the final claim of the parties. With the
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exception of South Wales, the final offer interpretation was changed after a
number of years largely as a result of pressure from the Arbitrators
themselves.
Treole quoted from a book by Stanley Jevons (1915) to identify the first
claims of the so-called superiority of final offer arbitration - that is, it
is more likely to result in reasonable demands; the offer and the claim are
less likely to differ widely; much of the work is undertaken before the
parties come to the Arbitrator; and one side is always satisfied. The
debates over the advantages/disadvantages of final offer arbitration in the
early 1900s are very similar to those oeing expressed in current literature.
For example, many Arbitrators considered final offer arbitration to be
inferior and that the important factor to be considered was the future
harmony between the parties.
The findings of Treble are similar to my findings particularly with regard
to the 1940s cases, where the Terms of Reference, although on a strict
reading appeared to be Straight Choice, were interpreted differently by
different Arbitrators. However, in some cases where although the Terms of
Reference were of a Straight Choice nature and the outcome has been
classified as 'Compromise', this was often because a number of issues were
put to the Arbitrator simultaneously, and the Arbitrator found for or
against the claims separately. The figures quoted for the outcome of the




(a) Rights or Interest
Of the issues caning to Arbitration, an attempt was made to divide them
between the categories 'Rights' and 'Interest'. The definition outlined in
John Lockyer's book on Arbitration has been adopted, ie an issue of Right
involves the application of an agreement (interpretation of the past); and
an issue of Interest involves the formulation of an agreement (decision for
the future). However, the figures quoted should be used with some caution
as some cases have elements of both Rights and Interest, and what might
appear to be a straightforward Rights issue on the surface, could have
implications for Interests in the future. Also it would be misleading to
categorise particular types of issues, eg Grading, as always falling into
the Rights category. The majority do fall into the Rights category, where
the Arbitrator is asked to decide, by examining the current agreement,
whether a job should be classified grade A or B; out in other cases the
Arbitrator is asked to establish a new grading system, thus falling into the
Interest category.
With the qualifications expressed above, the figures are:
70% Rights
29% Interest
1% Mix (ooth Rights and Interest where the Arbitrator was asked
first to interpret the current agreement, and secondly to
settle a dispute over the drafting of a new agreement)
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(d) Types
Over the period examined very similar issues were the subject of arbitration
cases, although some were tine specific, for example war bonuses in the
1940s and equal pay in the 1930s.
Pay and terms and conditions of employment accounted for 66% of the cases;
Dismissal and Discipline for 18%; Grading for 12%. Other cases included
Redundancy and Demarcation disputes, and other Trade Union matters.
Pay issues are the cases which receive most media attention. However, it
would oe misleading to conclude that the 66% pay and terms of conditions
cases quoted above were all major pay issues. Many pay issues are not about
annual pay claims, but are concerned with bonus payments and allowances,
payment during strikes, holiday pay etc. However, what appears to be a
relatively trivial issue on the surface may have implications for the
future, or may be a symptom of other industrial relations problems at the
place of work. It should also be noted that the arbitration awards can
cover from one worker to thousands of workers.
5 Arbitrators' Remarks
Whether or not Arbitrators should give Reasons for their awards has been the
subject of much debate in the past. From the awards examined, very few
Arbitrators have actually given Reasons under such a heading - in only 0.4%
of the cases. However, in 50% of cases the Arbitrators gave sane form of
reasoning - 20% in the report or with the award itself and the other 30%
under such headings as General Considerations; Coirments; or Conclusions.
The adoption of the procedure of including reasoning under these headings
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has increased since Arbitrators' Seminars were set up. In 40% of cases
Aroitrators gave no reasoning for their awards, and especially in the
earlier years where the reports themselves were often only a half or a
quarter of a page in length. Again, in recent years the writing of reports
has become more comprehensive and standardised.
Another area of debate in arbitration is whether or not Arbitrators should
give Recommendations when making their awards. Recommendations were made in
10% of the cases. In the earlier cases Arbitrators were less inclined to
make Recommendations, although the practice increased in the 1970s. In more
recent years the tendency has been for Arbitrators not to give
Recommendations unless required to do so by the parties.
6 Outcome of Arbitration
(a) All Cases








If these figures are compared to what the Arbitrators were actually asked to
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do under the Terms of Reference (see section 3 above) the following results
emerge. Fifty-three I of cases were of the Straight Choice type, out
Arbitrators actually made a Straight Choice in 69% of cases. Forty-one % of
cases al loved the Arbitrator to use his/her judgement and award between tne
claim and offer, although this was only exercised in 26% of cases, ie a
compromise decision was possible in 41% of cases, but Arbitrators'
compromised in 26% of cases only. Therefore, contrary to popular belief,
Arbitrators do not always 'split the difference', although they do
compromise when asked to do so by the parties involved. Further cases such
as Grading and Dismissal issues do not often lend themselves to split
decisions.
(o) Interest Cases (Pay and terms and conditions of employment)
It is in respect of annual pay claim cases where Arbitrators are most often
criticised for 'splitting the difference'. In these cases, 31% were of a
Straight Choice type and 67% allowed the Arbitrator to make a judgement.






Therefore, in 41% of cases, the Arbitrators made a Straight Choice although
were directly asked to do so in only 31% of cases. Thus, although
Arbitrators could have compromised in 67% of the cases, they did so in only
55% of cases. Again, the evidence would suggest that Arbitrators do not
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always 'split the difference' although they do compromise when asked to do
so by the parties. Of the compromise decisions, there were very few examples
the 50/50 split type, ie where the award was exactly half-way between the
claim and offer, and the majority of awards lay closer to the Employer's
offer. Further, compromise decisions often related to very complicated and
complex cases where pay and conditions had to be considered. These cases
are less likely to fit into the Straight Choice category as the Arbitrator
has to consider a number of issues within the overall package.
(c) Dismissal and Discipline
A separate schedule was prepared for Dismissal and Discipline cases
conducted under the auspices of ACAS frcm 1974-1985 for Single and Boards of
Arbitration and Mediation.
Sixty-seven % of cases were Dismissals and 33% ware Discipline. Of these





1% Cases withdrawn or unquantifiable





1% Cases withdrawn or unquantifiable
*In 51% of the cases found in favour of the Union, a reduced penalty was
imposed, ie the employee was not dismissed out was disciplined. In the
remainder of cases the employee was also judged to have been unfairly
dismissed, but did not receive an alternative penalty. Whether or not the
Arbitrator recommended reinstatement or re-employment depended on the terms
of reference.
Dismissal and Discipline cases have formed an increasing proportion of tU.
Arbitration cases particularly from 1980. However, a large proportion of
these cases are arranged for the NJIC/ESI. Since 1980 these cases have
b>~ 5-c ;y









* Percentage of total number of Dismissal and Die.upline cases.
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Therefore, the proportion of Dismissal and Discipline cases would not have
altered significantly over the period if these cases were excluded.
7 Conclusions
From the awards surveyed, it is possible to reach the following
conclusions:
i) The main users of arbitration are in the private sector and reflect the
shift in employment patterns over the period. The TGWU is the major
trade union user.
ii) Straight Choice arbitration is not new in British industrial relations.
iii) Arbitrators do not always 'split the difference', especially if the
split is considered to be a 50/50 position between the claim and offer.
Arbitrators do, however, compromise when asked to do so by the parties
and where a Straight Choice decision is not appropriate.
iv) Arbitrators do mainly stay within their Terms of Reference, although
the interpretation of Terms of Reference will vary between Arbitrators,
and this has always been the case.
v) Of the issues coming to arbitration, approximately two-thirds can be
categorised as Rights and one-third as Interest cases. The issues most
frequently referred were Pay and Conditions of Employment, Dismissal
and Discipline, and Grading.
vi) Arbitrators seldom give Reasons for their awards, although there is an
13
increasing trend to include their reasoning under 'General
Considerations' or other headings.
vii) The outcome of the awards varied depending on the type of issue and the
terms of reference. With the exception of Dismissal and Discipline
cases, a larger proportion of the awards were found in favour of the
employer.
viii)Arhitrators are often criticised for making their decisions without
regard to economic conditions and 'ability to pay'. In the awards, it
was usual for Arbitrators to refer to such factors in pay issues when
reaching their decision, although these were not the only
considerations involved. Other factors were considered, such as the
maintenance of good industrial relations in the future. This conclusion
supports the results of the research by Towers and Wright, and also
their general conclusion that British Abitrators respond to the
particular needs of the parties concerned, and like the tailor the
Arbitrator makes 'suits which are recognisaoly similar although
skilfully tailored to meet the special requirements of each customer.'
14
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(53.5%) (41.1%) (2.8%) (1.7%) (0.9%)
ACAS
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Arbitration Awards 1942-1985 (incl)
(\Sample of @ 1 in 10)
4. Issue (b)
Year t Total No. Pay and Grading Dismissal Redundancy Demarcation Other
of Cases t/c and Disc.
1942 7 7--









1952 4 2 -1
1953 4 3 -1
1954 .2 2



















Total No. Pay and Grading Dismissal Redundancy Demarcation
of Cases t/c and Disc.




3 3 - -
4 3 - -
3 1-1
4 3 - -




3 3 - -
6 4-1
5 5 - -
6 3-3
126 105 3 11
- 15 -
Kear Total No. Pay and Grading Dismissal Redundancy Demarcation Other
of Cases t/c and Disc.
1971 6 4 - 2 - - -
1972 7 5 1 1 - - -
1973 6 5 - - - 1
1974 14 8 2 4 - -
1975 30 18 4 7 - - 1
1976 31 16 8 7 - -
1977 31 14 4 9 2 2
1978 43 28 5 9 - 1 -
1979 38 23 10 5 - -
1980 29 16 6 6 - 1 -
1981 25 16 5 4 -
1982 24 12 4 7 1 - -
1983 21 12 3 5 1 - -
1984 19 14 2 3 - - -
1985 17 13 - 3 - 1
467 309 57 83 5 76




Arbitration Awards 1942-1985 (incl)
Arbitrators' Remarks:-
Year Total No. Reasons Reasoning Recommendations Other None
of Cases
1942 7 - 3 - 4
1943 10 - 2 1 2 5
1944 7-3 - 4
1945 5 - 3 - - 2
1946 4 - 2 - - 2
1947 3 - 1 - 1 1
1948 4 - 1 - - 3
1949 6 - 3 - - 3
1950 3 - 2 - - 1
1951 5-2 - - 3
1952 4 - 2 - - 2
1953 4 - 1 1 - 3*
1954 2 - - - - 2






































































































































































* Some cases involved more than one heading.
Notes:






















Arbitration Awards 1942-1985 (incl)
For For Compromise Varied U/Q n/a
Union Employer
14 2 -
4 2 4 -
3 2 1 1 -




2 3 1 -
2 1 - -
2 1 1 1
2 1 - - 1
12 1 -
1 1 -






























































































































































467 138 183 120 18
(29.6%) (39.2%) (25.7%) (0.4%) (3.9%) (1.3%)
ACAS
Summary Arbitration Awards 1942-1985 (incl).

































































31 29 21 17
- 23 -
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108 26 90 41 2 1 23 32 74 5
(80.6%) (19.4%); (67.2%) (30.6%) (1.5%) (0.7S)(17.2%) (23.9%) (55.2%) (3.
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ACAS - 1 -
Summary
Dismissal and Discipline Cases 1974-1985 (incl)
(Arbitration and Mediation)
Year Total No. Dismissal Discipline Annual Report (% of
of Cases Cases Only Cases Only Figures all Cases)
1974 22 18 4 141
1975 39 29 10 46 15.0
1976 33 22 11 33 10.2
1977 40 26 14 46 14.0
1978 39 20 19 39 9.2
1979 40 21 19 40 10.1
1980 50 30 20 51 15.8
1981 61 44 17 62 24.1
1982 49 39 10 49 19.5
1983 51 30 21 51 24.6
1984 63 43 20 63 31.2
1985 43 35 8 43 26.0
530 357 173 537
(67.4%) (32.6%)
Notes




Dismissal and Discipline Cases 1974-1985 (incl)
(Arbitration and Mediation)
Year Total No. For For Penalty Penalty
1 o Not0 S













































































£l Split decision - more
than one employee]










1 Applies to Discipline Cases only.
2 Applies to Dismissal Cases only.




















































































[l Split decision - more
than one employee[







1 Totals 359 when 2 split decisions are included.
APPENDIX III
SURVEY OF ACAS ARBITRATION SERVICE 1988-1989
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
OF PARTIES TO ARBITRATION IN 1988
INTRODUCTION
Questionnaires were issued over a one year period (July 1988 to June 1989) to parties involved in
Arbitration during the year 1988. A total of 223 Questionnaires were issued to parties involved in
Single Arbitration and Boards of Arbitration. No Questionnaires were issued in respect of Mediation,
Police Arbitration Tribunals or the Central Arbitration Committee. In view of the specific nature of
references to Arbitration from the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), where reference to an Independent
Person is the final stage of their disciplinary procedure, a separate form was issued.
Before proceeding with the survey, pilot Questionnaires were distributed to a sample group of parties
involved in Arbitration, and I am grateful to all those who took part in this preliminary exercise for
their helpful suggestions. I should like to record my thanks also to my colleagues at Edinburgh
University Professor Frank Bechhofer (Research Centre for Social Sciences), Ian Sams (Business
Studies) and Phil White (Business Studies) for their constructive and useful comments.
The administrative and professional support of ACAS staff was indispensable to the project and I would
like to record my thanks to Alastair Campbell, Richard Harrison and Moira Shirra. I should also like
to express my gratitude to Dr Jim Smyth (Edinburgh University) who assisted with the analysis of the
Questionnaires.
Finally, my thanks to those who, in spite of increasing work pressures, gave their time to completing
and returning the Questionnaire.
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RESPONSE RATE:
A total of 223 Questionnaires were issued 161 Single and Board cases
62 ESI cases
203 Questionnaires were returned completed 91.0% response rate
An additional 3 responses were received, where forms could not 92.4% response rate
be completed, making a total of 206 responses in all






A total of 198 Questionnaires were analysed. Five responses were excluded from the analysis, in view
of the particular nature of the case which involved a dispute between 5 unions regarding union
representation on a Negotiating Body.
Of the 198 responses 96 from Employers 48.5%
100 from Trade Unions 50.5%
2 'Other' 1.0%
Of the 198 responses 139 Single Arbitration 70.2%
5 Boards Arbitration 2.5%
54 Electricity Supply 27.3%
3




(a) Union request 31 21.5%
(b) Employer request 10 6.9%
(c) Joint union and employer request 94 65.3%
(d) ACAS suggestion 2 1.4%
(e) Other* 7 4.9%
*Most referred to inclusion of arbitration in procedure agreements.
4




(a) General Pay and Conditions 36 25.0%
(b) Grading 30 20.8%
(c) Other pay matters and conditions of employment not part of 35 24.3%
general pay claim
(d) Trade Union Recognition
(e) Changes in Working Practices 7 4.9%
(0 Other Trade Union matters 1 0.7%
(g) Redundancy 2 1.4%
(h) Dismissal/Discipline 21 14.6%
(i) Other Issues 11 7.6%
No Response 1 0.7%
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(a) Managerial/Administrative 21 14.6%
(b) Scientific/Professional 26 18.1%
(c) Clerical 23 16.0%
(d> Supervisory 26 18.1%
(e) SkilledWorkers 34 23.6%
(f> Semi-skilledWorkers 46 31.9%
(g) Unskilled Workers 35 21.3%
00 Others 19 13.2%
[More than one category applies to some cases]
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(a) Undo-20 81 56.3%
(b) 21-49 15 10.4%
(c) 50-99 14 9.7%
(d) 100-199 13 9.0%
(e) 200-499 11 7.6%
(f> 500-999 4 2.8%
(g) 1000+ 2 2.8%
No Response 2 1.4%
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Question 5: "Did the dispute involve any industrial action?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Total No. %
(a) Yes, strike action was taken 11 7.6%
(b) Yes, but only action short of a strike was taken 7 4.9%
(c) No, but industrial action was threatened 27 18.8%
(d) No action was threatened or taken 98 68.1%
No response 1 0.7%
Question 6: "If strike action was taken, when was it taken?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Total No. %
(a) Before the agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration 12 8.3%
(b) Between then and the arbitration hearing itself 3 2.1%
(c) Between the hearing and the issue of the award by the
Arbitrator
(d) After the award was issued
8






No Response 2 1.4%




(i) Required 29 20.1%
(ii) Permitted 74 51.4%
(iii) NotMentioned 25 17.4%
(iv) No Response 16 11.1%
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(i) Required 28 19.4%
(ii) Permitted, at the request of one party only 19 13.2%
(iii) Permitted by agreement between the parties 70 48.6%
(iv) Not Mentioned 11 7.6%
(v) No Response 16 11.1%
(c): "If ACAS arbitration is required or permitted by the
procedure agreement, does the agreement place specific
restrictions on the arbitrator?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Total No. %
(i) Yes, the arbitrator can only decide either for the employer's 16 11.1%
or for the union's final position (pendulum arbitration)
(ii) Yes, there are other restrictions on the arbitrator's decision 8 5.6%
(iii) No, the arbitrator is free to award as he/she thinks 91 63.2%
appropriate
No response 29 20.1%
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Question 8: "Was there a conciliation meeting under ACAS auspices

























Don't know 1 0.7%
No response 46 31.9%




Don't know 1 0.7%
No response 52 36.1%
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No response 46 31.9%
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Question 9: "The following questions concern the attitude of the parties
towards arbitration and the issues in dispute"
Excluding ESI cases:
(a) Both parties were keen to use arbitration:
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 37 38 75 52.1%
No 24 20 44 30.6%
Don't Know 4 4 8 5.6%
No Response 6 11 17 11.8%
(b) The relationship between the two parties was very hostile:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 8 17 25 17.4%
No 51 33 84 58.3%
Don't Know 1 - 1 0.7%
No response 11 23 34 23.6%
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(d) There were important matters of principle at stake in this dispute:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 47 48 95 66.0%
No 16 10 26 18.1%
Don't Know - 1 1 0.7%
No response 8 14 22 15.3%
15








* Sample answers to this question:
"It was agreed after conciliation and following industrial action."
"It was proposed by the union as an alternative to strike action."
"It was arrived at after a number ofmeetings with the parties and ACAS."
Employers T.U.s Total No,
(a) It was agreed at conciliation 26 33 59
(b) It was agreed between the parties
before ACAS involvement
17 14 31
(c) It was laid down in the procedure 25 21 46
(d> Other * 3 4 7
No response - 1 1
16
















Question 12: "Did the terms of reference:"
Excluding ESI cases:
(a) require the arbitrator to choose
the employer's or the union's
final position?
(b) restrict the arbitrator's award in
other ways?
(c) leave the arbitrator free to award









No response 1 0.7%
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Question 13: "Did the terms of reference cover all the issues which needed
to be settled by the reference to arbitration?"
Excluding ESI cases:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 65 66 131 91.0%
No 6 4 10 6.9%
No response - 3 3 2.1%
Question 14: "Where did the arbitration hearing take place?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Total No. %
(a) On ACAS Premises 61 42.4%
(b) On employer's premises 79 54.9%
(c) On Trade Union premises
(d) Other 4 2.8%
18





No Response 3 2.1%
Question 16: "The following questions concern the organisation of the
arbitration"
Excluding ESI cases:
(a) The other party's written submission was received in time to study it before the
hearing:
Employers T.U.s T<?tal N<?, %
Yes 65 59 124 86.1%
No 5 10 15 10.4%
No response 1 4 5 3.5%
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(b) The hearing was arranged promptly:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. &
Yes 62 61 123 85.4%
No 7 4 11 7.6%
No response 2 8 10 6.9%
The practical arrangements for the hearing were satisfactory:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %.
Yes 67 65 132 91.7%
No 2 1 3 2.1%
No response 2 7 9 6.3%
The award was issued promptly:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 58 61 119 82.6%
No 10 8 18 12.5%
No response 3 4 7 4.9%
20
Question 17: "Who chose the arbitrator?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Total No. %
(a) The parties 23 16.0%
(b) ACAS, after consulting the parties 60 41.7%
(c) ACAS 55 38.2%
No response 6 4.2%
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Question 18: "The following questions concern the role of the arbitrator in
the arbitration proceedings."
All cases:
(a) Made clear his/her role in the dispute:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 94 100 194 98.0%
Partly Agree 1 - 1 0.5%
Disagree 1 - 1 0.5%
No response - 2 2 1.0%
(b) Allowed you sufficient time to state your case:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 91 97 188 94.9%
Partly Agree 2 1 3 1.5%
Disagree - 1 1 0.5%
No response 3 3 6 3.1%
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(c) Allowed you sufficient opportunity to question the other party:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 89 97 186 93.9%
Partly Agree 3 1 4 2.0%
Disagree 1 1 2 1.0%
No response 3 3 6 3.1%
(d) Addressed questions to both parties:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 92 96 188 94.9%
Partly Agree 1 2 3 1.5%
Disagree - 1 1 0.5%
No response 3 3 6 3.1%
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(e) Conducted the hearing to your satisfaction:
Emnlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 81 92 173 87.4%
Partly Agree 11 6 17 8.6%
Disagree 2 2 4 2.0%
No response 2 2 4 2.0%
(f) Independent Person made clear the role of the Assessors (ESI cases only):
Employers T,Ufs Total No. %
Agree 19 27 46 85.2%
Partly Agree 4 - 4 7.4%
Disagree 1 2 3 5.6%
No response 1 - 1 1.9%
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Question 19: "The following questions concern the characteristics of the
arbitrator in the proceedings."
All cases:
(a) Acted impartially:
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 87 89 176 88.9%
Partly Agree 7 5 12 6.1%
Disagree 1 3 4 2.0%
No response 1 5 6 3.1%
(b) Handled matters confidently:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 84 95 179 90.4%
Partly Agree 10 4 14 7.1%
Disagree - 1 1 0.5%
No response 2 2 4 2.0%
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(c) Had your trust;
Errrolovers T-Uis Total No. %
Agree 85 71 156 78.8%
Partly Agree 9 20 29 14.6%
Disagree 1 4 5 2.5%
No response 1 7 8 4.0%
Had sufficient experience/ knowledge about industrial relations;
Eirrolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 69 81 150 75.8%
Partly Agree 21 15 36 18.2%
Disagree 1 - 1 0.5%
No response 5 6 11 5.6%
(e) Sufficiently understood the issues involved:
Employers T.U.s Total No, %
Agree 74 78 152 76.8%
Partly Agree 18 15 33 16.7%
Disagree 3 3 6 3.0%
No response 1 6 7 3.5%
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(0 Acted in a courteous and friendly manner:
Emolovers Ttv.s Total No. %
Agree 90 101 191 96.5%
Partly Agree 5 - 5 2.5%
Disagree - - 0 0
No response 1 1 2 1.0%
(g) Acted according to your expectations:
Emolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 67 85 152 76.8%
Partly Agree 20 9 29 14.6%
Disagree* 7 5 12 6.1%
No response 2 3 5 2.5%
* Those who disagreed were asked for their reasons. Some of those who partly agreed also gave
comments. Sample comments are as follows:
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1. Employer Side:
"I expected him to find for the company."
"We felt that a more thorough knowledge of our standard grading formula may have been useful."
"Disallowed Industrial Tribunal case law and precedent"
"He took a legalistic approach."
"Did not explain to the appellant how the proceedings would be handled."
"This is the first independent body of perhaps twelve I have been involved in where the co-presenters'
role has been limited."
2. Trade Union Side:
"I expected a partly favourable outcome based on the strength of the individual case."
"Did not visit site (very important in this case). Too readily accepted manager's word, allowed the
company side wider discretion."
"Arbitrator gave too much weight in his decision to the company's ability to pay. This as not within
his terms of reference and unless specifically asked should not take that into account.
"Hoped for impartiality."
"He allowed adjournment for employers to prepare case on 'fresh' evidence (one week)."
28
Question 20: "What was the outcome of the arbitration?"
All cases:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
(a) The arbitrator found for the
employer's position
(b) The arbitrator found for the
union's position














Single and Board cases only:
(a) The arbitrator found for the employer's position
(b) The arbitrator found for the union's position














(a) The arbitrator found for the employer's position 32 59.3%
(b) The arbitrator found for the union's position 4 7.4%
(c) It was a compromise award 17 31.5%




Emolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 87 92 179 90.4%
No 6 6 12 6.1%
Don't Know 2 - 2 1.0%
No response 1 4 5 2.5%
21: "The following questions concern the arbitrator's report."
It was clear and to the point:
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(b) It adequately summarised each party's case:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 88 95 183 92.4%
No 4 5 9 4.6%
Don't Know - 1 1 0.5%
No response 4 1 5 2.5%
(c) It stayed within the terms of reference laid down:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 89 95 184 92.9%
No 2 3 5 2.5%
Don't Know 2 1 3 1.5%
No response 3 3 6 3.0%
(d) It gave some indication of how the arbitrator reached his/her award:
Employers T.U.s Total No, %
Yes 79 79 158 79.8%
No 13 15 28 14.1%
Don't Know - 2 2 1.0%
No response 4 6 10 5.1%
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(e) The award was unambiguous:
(0 The award was fain
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes 79 76 155 78.3%
No 15 16 31 15.7%
No response 2 10 12 6.1%
Employers T-U.? Total No. %
Yes 67 72 139 70.2%
No 14 22 36 18.2%
Don't Know 11 3 14 7.1%
No response 4 5 9 4.5%
ESI cases only:
(g) The award was issued promptly:
Employers Total No.
Yes 18 14 32
No 5 10 15
Don't Know 1 2 3










No response 6 11.11%
* Respondents were asked to give reasons. Sample comments are as follows:
1. Employer Side:
"The ambiguous nature of the award gave scope for the TU side to dispute the Board's interpretation of
"Personal difficulties with staff in returning employee to same location - needed by agreement later to
transfer to another site."
"It was difficult to implement the proposal that the individual be given work at a certain grade since
only one post was available within the jurisdiction of the manager concerned and other managers would
be more than reluctant to take on someone who had been subject to disciplinary proceedings into a post
which would provide a promotional route for another member of staff."
"The penalty quashed a downgrading and substituted one week's suspension without pay. Due to the
length of time between the original decision and the ACAS result the loss of pay due to downgrading
was substantially more than 1 week's pay and so we actually paid money back to the offender and so it
was not perceived by others that any penalty had been suffered."
"The appellant had obtained another job almost immediately after his dismissal. The problem of
'double earnings' had to be resolved relative to the period to the date of reinstatement"
it."
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2. Trade Union Side:
"The appellant did not immediately return to his employment due to his own lethargy."
"The difficulty may arise in implementing that part of the award which calls for a 'review of the
situation after 12 months'."
""Whilst the award said Mr X should be transferred to another post at the same or another location, the
Board interpreted this as a downgrading by some 10 or so incremental points (value approximately
£2,000) plus transfer to a 'remote' site not too accessible by Mr X, further adding to his financial loss.
I have called upon the Electricity Council to seek guidance on this interpretation from Professor Y.
Question 22: "How would you describe the contribution of the award to the
settlement of the issues in dispute?"
Excluding ESI cases:
(i) So far, since the award was issued:
Emnlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Excellent 13 17 30 20.8%
Very Good 18 13 31 21.5%
Good 22 21 44 30.6%
Moderate 12 13 25 17.4%
Poor 3 7 10 6.9%
No response 3 1 4 2.8%
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(ii) In the longer term:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Excellent 13 12 25 17.4%
Very Good 16 10 26 18.1%
Good 19 22 41 28.5%
Moderate 12 13 25 17.4%
Poor 7 7 14 9.7%
No response 4 9 13 9.0%
If the answer to (i) or (ii) was Moderate or Poor, respondents were asked to explain the reason:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
(a) The terms of reference asked the - 5 5 3.5%
arbitrator the wrong question
(b) The award was deficient 5 5 10 6.9%
(c) There was another reason * 14 12 26 18.1%
Not applicable 103 71.5%
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* Respondents were asked to state reasons, although some who answered (a) or (b) also commented.
Sample comments are as follows:
1. Employer Side:
"The workforce were not satisfied with the outcome and this has led to claims for payment for duties
previously regarded as part of the normal conditions of employment."
"First time use of arbitration and union lost. Now it will be difficult to get their acceptance to try
again."
"The award offered a solution to the problem but not the principle concerned."
"The Conciliation Board asked for a response to a matter of dispute on the agreement. The award has
been used by the union as a tool for a broader settlement"
"Award will force company to restructure their operations."
"It establishes the principle of one group of workers receiving more holiday entitlement."
"It settled the immediate dispute but has incorporated a structural problem into our pay scales."
2. Trade Union Side:
"Company found itself later unable to fund the award."
"Management undermined the award."
"Total package too black and white and because the loss of the decision may influence against the
choice of pendulum in the future."
"The company has given notice of intent to tear the agreement up anyway on the grounds that the
balance of power is theirs and so who needs arbitration."
"It has given scope to management to deal with this type of issue in a less detailed and fair manner."
"Arbitration gives a 'result' - it does not necessarily solve the problem - a 'dispute' still lingers on."
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Question 23: "Would you use ACAS arbitration again if a similar dispute
arose in the future?"
Excluding ESI cases:
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %.
Yes 59 65 124 86.1%
No* 9 3 12 8.3%
Possibly 1 4 5 3.5%
No response 2 1 3 2.1%
* Respondents were asked to give a reason fa* their answer. Sample comments are as follows:
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1. Employer Side:
"Insufficient understanding of background to the dispute."
"The company believes that the binding arbitration clause in the procedure has a 'chilling' effect on the
negotiations which has resulted in arbitration in two of the last three years' negotiations.
"Logic of the award was wrong. Want to be our own master."
"Inconsistency of witnesses not under oath, with limited opportunity to cross-examine."
"There was and remains a feeling that an arbitrator is inclined to be sympathetic to and find for the
underdog (ie employee) whatever the long-term ramifications of the problem are for the employer."
"Union side have nothing to lose in that they don't have to give anything even if arbitration goes
against them."
2. Trade Union Side:
"The merits of the case are irrelevant if arbitrators take on face value that the company is unable to
afford an award."
"We renegotiated the part of the agreement which gave rise to the problem in the first place."
"Possibly, if we could not get the necessary industrial action."
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Question 24: "Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following
statements."
Excluding ESI cases:
(a) Management representatives are generally reluctant to put a dispute to arbitration:
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 43 52 95 66.0%
Disagree 20 11 31 21.5%
Don't Know 6 9 15 10.4%
No response 2 1 3 2.1%
(b) Union representatives are generally reluctant to put a dispute to arbitration:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 21 22 43 29.9%
Disagree 35 45 80 55.6%
Don't Know 14 4 18 12.5%
No response 1 2 3 2.1%
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(c) The stronger party in a dispute will not usually want to go to arbitration:
Eirralovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 34 44 78 54.2%
Disagree 22 23 45 31.3%
Don't Know 13 4 17 11.8%
No response 2 2 4 2.8%
(d) An organisation which agrees to arbitration improves its public image:
Employers T.U.S Total No. %
Agree 33 45 78 54.2%
Disagree 15 15 30 20.8%
Don't Know 22 12 34 23.6%
No response 1 1 2 1.4%
(e) Arbitration should not take place until all agreed procedures for negotiations have been
exhausted, or a deadlock in die negotiations reached:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 68 69 137 95.1%
Disagree - 1 1 0.7%
Don't Know 2 2 4 2.8%
No response 1 1 2 1.4%
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(0 Arbitration should not take place until an attempt has been made to resolve a dispute
through conciliation:
Employers T.y.? Total No. %.
Agree 56 60 116 80.6%
Disagree 12 8 20 13.9%
Don't Know 1 2 3 2.1%
No response 2 3 5 3.5%
(g) Arbitration should not take place while industrial action is occurring:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 46 16 62 43.1%
Disagree 16 51 67 46.5%
Don't Know 7 5 12 8.3%
No response 2 1 3 2.1%
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(h) Arbitration should be written into procedure agreements:
Employers








































(j) Arbitration is a valuable way of resolving some disputes:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 65 71 136 94.4%
Disagree 1 - 1 0.7%
Don't Know 3 - 3 2.1%
No response 2 2 4 2.8%
(k) Without ACAS arbitration the number of stoppages in industry would increase:
Emplovers T.Vts Total No. %
Agree 37 49 86 59.7%
Disagree 3 10 13 9.0%
Don't Know 29 13 42 29.2%
No response 2 1 3 2.1%
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Question 25: "The Arbitrator should:-"
All cases:
(a) See his/her primary job as settling the dispute:
EmDlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 78 89 167 84.3%
Disagree 14 4 18 9.1%
Don't Know 2 5 7 3.5%
No response 2 4 6 3.0%
(b) Not have any recent direct association with management:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 70 85 155 78.3%
Disagree 12 7 19 9.6%
Don't Know 10 1 11 5.6%
No response 4 9 13 6.6%
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(c) Not have any recent direct association with a union:
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 70 78 148 74.7%
Disagree 12 11 23 11.6%
Don't Know 10 3 13 6.6%
No response 4 10 14 7.1%
Excluding ESI cases:
(d) In disputes over pay, take into account:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
(i) ability to pay:
Agree 62 41 103 71.5%
Disagree 3 21 24 16.7%
Don't Know 3 6 9 6.3%
No response 3 5 8 5.6%
(ii) comparability:
Agree 56 60 116 80.6%
Disagree 8 6 14 9.7%
Don't Know 4 2 6 4.2%
No response 3 5 8 5.6%
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the rate of inflation:
Agree 40 51 91
Disagree 20 12 32
Don't Know 6 2 8
No response 5 8 13
the general public interest:
Agree 37 15 52
Disagree 21 42 63
Don't Know 7 8 15











(e) Give an indication of how he/she arrived at the award:
Emplovers T.U.s Tetal Nq, %
Agree 92 91 183 92.4%
Disagree 1 3 4 2.0%
Don't Know 2 1 3 1.5%
No response 1 7 8 4.0%
(f) Make recommendations to one or both sides if he/she sees other problems between the
parties not covered by the terms of reference:
Errrolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Agree 55 82 137 69.2%
Disagree 32 13 45 22.7%
Don't Know 6 - 6 3.0%
No response 3 7 10 5.1%
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Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 91 94 185 93.4%
Important 4 4 8 4.0%
Not important - 1 1 0.5%
No response 1 3 4 2.0%
(b) Industrial or commercial experience:
Emolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 53 45 98 49.5%
Important 40 41 81 40.9%
Not important 2 13 15 7.6%
No response 1 4 4 2.0%
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(c) Knowledge of industrial relations and collective bargaining:
Errrolovers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 55 78 133 67.2%
Important 36 20 56 28.3%
Not important 3 1 4 2.0%
No response 2 3 5 2.5%
Knowledge of the particular industry involved in the dispute:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 15 18 33 16.7%
Important 38 36 74 37.4%
Not important 41 45 86 43.4%
No response 2 3 5 2.5%
Independence:
Employer? T.U.s Total No. %.
Essential 77 84 161 81.3%
Important 18 15 33 16.7%




































(i) An ability to understand complex problems quickly:
Emnlovers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 66 73 139 10.2%
Important 29 26 55 27.8%
No response 1 3 4 2.0%
(j) Originality of ideas:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 10 20 30 15.2%
Important 58 55 113 57.1%
Not important 26 23 49 24.7%
No response 2 4 6 3.0%
(k) Determination:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Essential 24 32 56 28.3%
Important 58 49 107 54.0%
Not important 13 15 28 14.1%
No response 1 6 7 3.5%
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(1) Other qualities:
Employers T.U.s Total No. %
Yes* 29 23 52 26.3%
No response 67 79 146 73.7%
Total No. %
Union Representative 100 50.5%
Management Representative 94 47.5%
No response 4 2.0%
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Question 28: If you are a Union Representative..























(b): What proportion of the workforce does your union have in
membership in the establishment(s) covered by this
particular arbitration?"
Total No





(vi) No response 28
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Question 29: If you are a Management Representative...
(a): "In which industry is your main business?"
Total No. Total No.
Fishing 1 Paper, Printing &
Publishing
7
Oil Processing 1 Rubber & Plastics 3
Water Supply 5 Other Manufacturing
Industries
1
Metal Manufacture 4 Transport 2
Non Metal Minerals 2 Sea Transport 1
Chemical Industry 2 Banking & Finance 1
Manufacture of Other
Metals
1 Business Services 1
Mechanical Engineering 3 Real Estate 1




Instrument Engineering 1 Health Services 1
Food, Drink, Tobacco 7 Other Public Services 3
Textile Industry 3 Recreation and Cultural
Services
5
Foot & Clothing 1 No response 30
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(c): "How many people work in the establishment(s) covered by
this particular arbitration?"
Total No,









(d): "Is your organisation - Single plant ?"








(e): "Which Trade Unions, if any, do you recognise in the
establishment(s) covered by this particular arbitration?"
Total No. Total No.
TGWU 21 NUFLAT 1
EEPTU 18 NUJ 1
GMB 20 BETA 1
NALGO 10 NGA 2
NUPE 1 AUT 1
MSF 9 SOGAT 1
ACTTS 1 BOA 1
AEU 4 MU 2
BALPA 1 RCN 1
ISTC 3
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(f): "What proportion of employees in that establishment(s) are
union members?"
Total No.







Question 30: "Before this dispute have you personally been involved in





No response 7 3.5%















Question "How satisfied are you with reference to an independent
(to ESI cases only) person as the final stage of the industry's disciplinary
procedure?"
Emplovers T.U.s Total No. %
Not Satisfied * 6 3 9 16.7%
Satisfied * 14 15 29 53.7%
Very Satisfied * 4 10 14 25.9%
No response 1 1 2 3.6%
* Respondents were asked to give reasons for their answers. In general the trade union side were more
satisfied with the arrangement. The main criticisms from the employers' perspective were that (a)
there was a tendency for automatic reference to ACAS even when there was no hope of success; and (b)
that the appellant still has the opportunity to take the case to an Industrial Tribunal. Sample
comments are as follows:
1. Employer Side:
"Very Satisfied - The independence demonstrated and impartiality renders the ultimate verdict easier to
live with. It is also much preferable to the expenditure in terms of management time and money to
going to a Tribunal and more often than not saves going to this stage since both parties feel they have
been dealt with fairly."
"Satisfied - The independent person stage has the merits of being relatively informal, cheap and avoids
legalism."
"Not Satisfied - The independent person hearing should be the final stage in the disciplinary procedure.
However, more and more dismissed employees are taking their cases to Industrial Tribunals. Boards are
bound by IP decisions - an employee is not."
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2. Trade Union Side:
"Very Satisfied - In my view it is the best system around, especially compared to (a) the industry's
internal appeal system and (b) the Industrial Tribunal experience, (a) is not impartial and (b) is too
legalistic."
"Satisfied - The very fact that both sides can identify an independent and hopefully impartial individual
makes the decision more acceptable, particularly to the unsuccessful party."
"Not Satisfied - The truly impartial 'independent person' does not exist. In my experience they - in
varying degrees - exhibit an inbuilt bias towards maintenance of the status quo."
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Question "Please look back through Questions and identify below any
(to ESI cases only) aspects where your general experience was different from
your experience in the most recent case."
Total No.































Respondents were invited to make additional comments regarding their personal experience with ACAS
and in particular make any suggestions for possible improvements in its effectiveness.
All cases:
Total No. %
Comments Made * 81 40.9%
No response 117 59.1%
A wide range of comments were given and reference made to specific cases. In particular respondents
commented on the efficient and professional service of ACAS. There were some criticisms of the time
involved in the process and the employment of academics and lawyers as arbitrators. Again the type of
case influenced the comments. Sample comments are as follows:
1. Employer Side (ESI):
"Experience gleaned from colleagues suggests that the results can be unpredictable in that ACAS
independent persons do not always appear to be bound by accepted rules of procedure or standard tests of
proof of guilt or innocence."
"After careful consideration I believe that the independent person appeal is not appropriate to a
privatised industry. Employment law imposes a sufficiently high standard of reasonableness on large
employers to act fairly. There is no right of appeal for Boards against an independent person's decision,
no matter how perverse that decision may appear."
"A widening of the source of recruitment to include experienced managers or trade union officials (not
involved with the industry) might improve the service."
"In terms of the final stage in the procedure, it has been my experience that the impartiality of the
ACAS independent persons has provided the essential platform for resolving disciplinary matters
usually to the satisfaction of both parties."
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2. Trade Union Side (ESI)
"I think the system works quite well. In general the members have confidence in the impartiality of
the arbitrators but I sense myself that a legalistic tendency seems to be appearing among some
arbitrators who are influenced by Industrial Tribunal decisions in similar kinds of cases."
"Having been to two appeals with an independent chairman I found that I had nothing but praise for
this type of appeal that gave both sides a fair hearing and in my experience gave an award to fit the
evidence as submitted."
"Such an internal appeal structure has avoided cases going to Industrial Tribunals and because of the
binding' nature of the award I think all sides accept the value of the machinery."
"Its effectiveness can be improved by the speeding up of holding the appeal and by the sending of the
report."
3. Employer Side:
"Arbitrators should be prepared to give some detailed explanation as to how they arrived at their
decision. The only aspect of my company's recent arbitration experience that I considered less than
fully satisfactory was the brevity of the arbitrator's findings."
"I feel that the use of the same arbitrator can be very beneficial for obvious reasons."
"I consciously felt that the whole conduct of the exercise was courteous, thorough and fair."
"Problem of the ACAS arbitration is the over dependence on academics as arbitrators. Most people at
plant level see the value of arbitration but are not happy with the academic/legal bias."
"Very impressed with the slick ACAS organisation."
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4. Trade Union Side:
"I have generally found it to be extremely useful, the procedure fair and conduct courteous and helpful.
My major criticism is that from the appearance of the problem to the final award can be a very long
time."
"To some extent ACAS has become more pro-employer because of the obvious threat to their
existence."
"Arbitrators should be drawn from a wider field rather than the predominance of university/college
academics. Legality should not have a high profile in submissions and deliverations."
"In my experience ACAS have provided an essential service to industrial relations practitioners who
find themselves unable to resolve difficulties via the normal procedure. Whilst I agree that
arbitration/conciliation should only be necessary in exceptional circumstances, the mere fact that the
safety valve exists is helpful. The standard of service provided by ACAS and its arbitrators is high and
perfectly satisfactory. Comment on the quality of individual arbitrators would be invidious as I suspect
the judgement would be a little coloured by the size of the award granted. In general I am more than
satisfied with the impartiality shown."
WHERE RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO MAKE COMMENTS, THESE ARE OUTLINED IN
DETAIL BELOW. ALSO FULL RESPONSES UNDER 'FINAL COMMENTS' ARE DETAILED.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q l[e]
How did this particular dispute come to be referred to ACAS arbitration?
Other [please specify]
1 Our negotiation procedure calls up pendulum arbitration on a failure to agree on the annual wage
negotiation.
2 Job Evaluation Committee.
3 The option of going to ACAS is written into our grievance procedure.
4 Arbitration is written in to procedural agreements as last stage of negotiating procedure.
5 In accordance with Company/TU agreements.
6 Specified in our collective agreement.
7 Part of grading procedure.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q l[e]
How did this particular dispute come to be referred to ACAS arbitration?
Other [please specify]
1 Voluntary last stage of grievance procedure.
2 An agreement exists which provides for this.
3 Part ofEmployer/TU Grievance procedure.
4 Last stage of dispute procedure reached.
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ACAS ARBITRATION - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q 2[c]
Which of the following was the main subject of the dispute?
Other pay matters and conditions of employment not part of a general pay claim [eg questions over
hours, holiday entitlement, shift or overtime premium payments, equal pay, bonus payments, piece
work rates, sick pay, etc]
1 Application of premium rate.
2 Confirmation ofmanagement right to transfer shift workers within their shift rota.
3 Payments for the introduction of new technology.
4 Restructuring proposals following a management review, and interpretation of recognition
agreement and definition of bargaining unit
5 Interpretation of an agreement.
6 Job change payment.
7 Whether pay should be 6% now and and lower bonus potential via VA scheme, or 4.5% now and
higher VA potential.
8 Shiftworkers holiday entitlement.
9 Interpretation of local agreement.
10 Compensation for loss of supplementary payment as a result of regrading.
11 Interpretation of agreements covering bank holiday working.
12 Bonus [pay rates).
13 Qualification for severance under agreement.
14 Right of management to change the personnel from shift to shift.
15 Unpaid time in split shifts.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q 2[c]
Which of the following was the main subject of the dispute?
Other payments and conditions of employment not part of a general pay claim [eg questions over
hours, holiday entitlement, shift or overtime premium payments, equal pay, bonus payments, piece
work rates, sick pay, etc]
1 Holidays for shift workers.
2 Eligibility for London weighting.
3 LondonWeighting.
4 Two hour maximum unpaid meal break.




9 Change of Shift
10 Equal pay.
11 Overtime payments to senior staff.
12 Compensatory increase to monthly staff as a result of increase in hourly-paid holiday
entitlement.
13 Payment for time recording.
14 Individual's grievance regarding entitlement under 1988/89 pay award.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - RESPONSES TO Q 2[f] AND Q 2[i]
[MANAGEMENT AND TRADE UNION]
Which of the following was the main subject of the dispute?
[a] 2[f]
Other trade union matters [eg disclosures of information for collective bargaining purposes, time off for
trade union duties,etc).
Management:
1 Recognition of a particular shop steward.
Trade Union:
1 Efficiency bar on salary scale [single case).
[b] 2[i]
Other issues [please specify]
Management:
1 Retirement at 65 [as part of a response to a wage claim).
2 One employee was aggrieved in respect of the way a pay award had been interpreted in his
particular case.
3 Interpretation of agreement.
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Trade Union:
1 Entitlement to voluntary severance.
2 Recognition of shop stewards facilities.
ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - RESPONSES TO Q 3[h]
[MANAGEMENT AND TRADE UNION]
Which types of occupation were directly involved in the dispute?
Others [please specify]
Management:
1 All staff excluding managers.
2 PSV Drivers.
3 All employees, exception Management.
Trade Union:
1 Journalists.
2 Club Steward at Labour Club.
72
ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - RESPONSES TO Q 10[d]
[MANAGEMENT AND TRADE UNION]
How was the method of arbitration decided?
Other [please specify]
Management:
1 It was agreed between the parties after conciliation failed.
2 It was proposed by the MU as an alternative to strike action.
3 It was agreed after Conciliation and following industrial action.
Trade Union:
1 The company requested use of pendulum arbitration as per the procedure. The union put the
request to the members who balloted to accept pendulum.
2 Outlined by arbiter himself at hearing, both parties agreed.
3 It needed strike action by the department to obtain arbitration.
4 It was arrived at after a number of meetings with the parties and ACAS.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q 19[g]
The following questions concern the characteristics of the arbitrator in the proceedings
The arbitrator acted according to your expectations
1 Disallowed Industrial Tribunal case law and precedent.
2 We expected a different end result given the way the hearing was conducted.
3 I expected him to find for the company.
4 We felt that a more thorough knowledge of X's standard grading formula may have been useful.
We felt the more fundamental issues were not given too much relevance at the hearing.
5 X is a voluntary organisation/charity. It is not fair to say the arbitrator did not understand the IR
difficulties in this sector, but I thought this may be so. He took a legalistic approach - the
issues on the agreement were clearer than the general aspects of the problem.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q 19 [g]
The following questions concern the characteristics of the arbitrator in the proceedings.
The arbitrator acted according to your expectations
1 Did not visit site [very important in this case). Too readily accepted manager's word. Allowed
the company side wider discretion.
2 I expected a partly favourable outcome based on the strength of the individual case.
3 Partly Agree - As stated he decided one way or the other. I wish now we had allowed him to
give recommendations as well but this was not asked for in my terms of reference.
4 Partly Agree - Moved away from pendulum at one stage and suggested, as we were very near, to
look for acceptable compromise. Union agreed, company disagreed. I felt afterwards that we
may have lost the 'short head' verdict on a 'judgment of Solomon' situation, ie the company
appeared more convinced of their conviction than the union.
5 Agree, but note, however, that arbitrator gave too much weight in his decision to the company's
ability to pay. This was not within his terms of reference and unless specifically asked should
not take that into account.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q 22[i] AND Q 22[ii]
How would you describe the contribution of the award to the settlement of the issues in dispute?
[i] So far, since the award was issued
[ii] In the longer term
1 [i] -Moderate; [ii] - Poor;
[b] The award was deficient;
Involved retention of a manager already with relationship problems with another union
2 [i] - Moderate; [ii] - Moderate;
[c] The workforce were not satisfied with the outcome and this has led to claims for payment for
duties previously regarded as part of the normal conditions of employment.
3 [ii] - Moderate
[c] First time use of arbitration and union lost! Now it will be difficult to get their acceptance to
try again.
4 [ii] - Moderate;
c] The award offered a solution to the problems but not the principle concerned.
5 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] Both parties felt that we should have been able to settle it ourselves and therefore ACAS was
seen as useful but negative solution.
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6 [ii] - Moderate;
[c] It postponed the argument between us on the question of all-round or percentage awards by
declining to move from the recent all-round awards or percentage awards which the company
wishes to end, but giving the reason only as 'past practice'.
7 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] Workforce disgruntled that they ' lost'.
8 [i] and [ii] - Poor
[a] and [c]
The X Conciliation Board asked for a response to a matter of dispute on the agreement. The
award has been used by the union as a tool for a broader settlement.
9 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] This workplace is generally problematic.
10 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[b] Grading given with proviso of more responsibility and extra hours. X did want no regrading as
the commitment to these two areas was ruled out. Award given without the provisos
implemented.
11 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] Witnesses to the disciplinary hearing changed their story at the arbitration.
12 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[c] Award will force company to restructure operations.
13 [i] and [ii] - Moderate
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[b] The award did not cover all questions in the terms of reference.
14 [i] - Moderate; [ii] - Poor;
[b]
15 [ii] - Moderate;
[c] It establishes the Principle of one group of workers receiving more holiday entitlement.
16 [i] - Moderate; [ii] - Poor
[c] It settled the immediate dispute but has incorporated a structural problem into our pay scales.
17 [i] - Moderate; [ii] -Poor;
[c] The award makes past pay negotiation procedures impractical in future modified procedures may
involve withdrawal of recognition of that union.
18 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[b]
19 [ii] - Moderate;
[c] The question of retirement at 65 remains unresolved.
20 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] The union side was encouraged to insist on arbitration for many subsequent disagreements.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q 22[i] AND Q 22[ii]
How would you describe the contribution of the award to the settlement of the issues in dispute?
[i] So far, since the award was issued
[ii] In the longer term
1 [ii] - Moderate;
[a] Total package too black and white; and
[c] Because the loss of the decision may influence against the choice of pendulum in the future.
2 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[a]
3 [ii] Moderate;
[c] Because company found itself later unable to fund the award.
4 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[c] Management undermined the award.
5 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[c] The arbitrator gave weight to the ability to pay not the substance merits of the case thereby
undermining any future reference. Because any award on the grounds of ability to pay can be
overridden.
6 [i] - Poor;
79
[b] and [c] - It has given scope to management to deal with this type of issue in a less detailed
and fair manner.
7 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[b] The increase was not large enough.
8 [i] - Moderate;
[c]
9 [i] - Moderate;
[c] Employer has failed to settle - matter referred back to Tribunal and High Court for enforcement.
10 [ii] - Moderate;
[a]
11 [i] - Poor, [ii] - Moderate;
[c] Management's oral evidence was deceptive and the arbitrator was bound to believe them.
12 [i] - Moderate; [ii] - Poor
[c] The Company has given notice of intent to tear the agreement up anyway on the grounds that
the balance of power is theirs and so who needs arbitration?
13 [i] - Moderate; [ii] - Poor;
[c] Economic dictates and inflation wiped most of it away.
14 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[b]
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15 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[b] Again not the fault of the arbitrator but the agreement, especially the first offer and the first
request
16 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[c] Arbitration gives a 'result' - it doesn't necessarily solve the problem - a 'dispute' still lingers
on.
17 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[a]
18 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[a]
19 [i] and [ii] - Moderate;
[a]
20 [i] - Moderate;
[b]
21 [ii] - Moderate;
[b] Possibility that individual may continue to look for means of redress.
22 [i] and [ii] - Poor;
[c] The Employer has not stood by the award.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q 23
Would you use ACAS arbitration again if a similar dispute arose in the future?
1 No- Insufficient consideration to peripheral matters.
2 No - Insufficient understanding of background to the dispute.
3 No - Hopefully our contracts will be altered to use the relevant council for local government
employees who have all relevant details of work in this area, ie 'Purple Book'.
4 No - The company believes that the binding arbitration clause in the procedure has a 'chilling'
effect on the negotiations, which have resulted in arbitration in two of the last three years'
negotiations. The company believes this is unacceptable and defeats the object of having such a
clause.
5 No - Inconsistency of witnesses not under oath, with limited opportunity to cross-examine.
6 No - There was and remains a feeling that an arbitrator is inclined to be sympathetic to and find
for the underdog [ie employee] whatever the long-term ramifications of the problem are for the
employer.
7 No - Logic of a ward was wrong, want to be our own master.
8 No - In general industrial relation terms emphasise 'winner' v. 'loser' relationship. Also union
'side' have nothing to lose in that they don't have to 'give' anything even if arbitration goes
against them.
9 Not necessarily - the finding is going to make future negotiations more difficult.
10 Would depend on the circumstances of the case.
11 Yes, because I have to according to our procedure, but otherwise I wouldn't.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q 23
Would you use ACAS again if a similar dispute arose in the future?
1 No [No reasons given).
2 No - For the reasons outlined above, the merits of the case are irrelevant if arbitrators take on
face value that the company is unable to afford an award.
3 No - We renegotiated the part of the agreement which gave rise to the problem in the first place.
4 Possibly - We renegotiated the part of the agreement which gave rise to the problem in the first
place.




ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO Q 26[i]
In your view, which of the following qualities are important for effective arbitration?
Other Qualities:
1 Common Sense!
2 Good presentation of self, good interpersonal skills, effective listener, firmness in controlling
proceedings, ie good 'chair skills'.
3 The ability to communicate effectively at all levels.
4 "Perceived Justice" - and that will depend on arbitrator's ability to sense and and respond to
varying organisational cultures.
5 Ability to sum up situation as he/she sees it as the time of the arbitration without necessarily
making a decision. This allows the parties to ensure that all their points have been understood.
6 To grasp the underlying aspects of the arbitration from the facts presented.
7 Ability to deal with often heated exchanges between parties.
8 Patience and good listener.
9 Sense of common justice and fairness.
10 Understanding of the consequences of arbitration decisions.
11 A good background knowledge of how organisation runs - a visit should be a requirement to see
firm or organisation on a normal working day.
12 Some experience in the type of organisation.
13 Ability to earn confidence and respect.
14 Ability to recognise and state common ground at arbitration.
15 Trustworthiness.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO Q 26[i]
In your views, which of the following qualities are important for effective arbitration?
Other Qualities:
1 Disciplined mind of the academic/lawyer type.
2 Ability to seek the right questions.
3 Be street wise and have a basic understanding of fairness.
4 A free hand to compromise.
5 A cordial approach to both parties which I have found to be so in all cases in which I have
participated.
6 Ability to keep parties to the point at issue.







ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION RESPONSES - MISCELLANEOUS
[MANAGEMENT AND TRADE UNION]
1 3[h] - Journalists. [M]
2 7[a] - Excluded. [M]
3 9 - All can apply - much depends upon the personalities involved, and from the employers point
of view whether there would be a significant knock-on effect in conceding an upgrading. [M]
4 17 - We had been told we could choose 1 of 3 - this did not happen. [M]
5 Q18 -1 felt he was insufficiently well briefed on the sector of employment involved. He did not
seem to have a firm grasp of the background to the issue, as it related to the way in which our
members worked. [TU]
6 Q18 - The Company threatened to tear up the agreement if the arbitrator's award favoured the
unions claim. I believe this affected the arbitrator. [TU]
7 Q24[k] - It certainly avoided a dispute in this case as the union members had voted 7-1 for
industrial action by secret ballot and the Company were talking 'No Surrender', even cancelling
move to a new site, moving out of area if dispute occurred. [M]
8 Q25[d] - No experience of this - we would not allow an external party to take decisions which
could affect our commercial viability. [M]
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO SECTION D
FINAL COMMENTS
1 In a matter of discipline leading to dismissal which this case was, the threat of industrial action
by the union takes the matter away from the Industrial Tribunals into arbitration. The
guidelines for arbitration are not established by legal precedent and can therefore arbitrate only on
the dispute not the cause of the dispute.
2 Very satisfied with service given by ACAS in both conciliation and arbitration.
3 There was an undue delay between the conciliation hearing on 9.11.87 and the arbitration hearing
on 3.2.88.
4 Problem of the ACAS arbitration is the over-dependence on academics as arbitrators. ACAS are
aware that far too many of their arbitrators do not have industrial or commercial experience and
would like to present employers with a choice that includes individuals with sound industrial,
commercial experience. However they feel that employers would not accept arbitrators with
union backgrounds and unions would not accept individuals with management backgrounds. In
my opinion ACAS should test employers' unions' reaction and train suitably experienced people
from outside of the academic/legal field.
Most people at plant level see the value or arbitration but are not happy with the academic/legal
bias.
5 The hearing was very informal which caused a great deal of argument directly between the two
parties. This led to a fairly confused situation at times. The arbitrator was clearly seeking a
compromise from the start as a result he did not tackle the principle at stake. He did not explain
fully and logically the reason for his award.
6 I was very impressed with the work of the arbitrator in our recent case, he handled a difficult
situation extremely well, and his decision was acceptable to both parties.
Additionally, because our dispute was one which had dragged on for as long time, the arbitrator,
at the request of both parties, provided an extremely quick decision, which meant we were able to
get the workforce settled back into normal working very quickly.
In all an extremely good and efficient service, which I hope I won't call on again for some time
to come.
7 Since the mid 1970s I have been directly involved in about 20 differences which have been
settled by arbitration by ACAS and have the highest regard for the contribution towards good
industrial relations, ie if it is laid down in the formal procedure as a means of avoiding industrial
action.
Whilst both parties have always accepted the arbitrator's Award I would have more confidence in
the arbitrator's ability to make the "correct" decision if he was not always an "academic".
8 Very impressed with the slick ACAS organisation.
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9 Selection of chairman/arbitration officer should have industrial experience at senior level.
When making an extreme award of whatever nature this should be supported by a detailed report
as to the reason for the decision.
10 Delighted with 'local' officer's assistance - would have liked the whole procedure to have been
handled by him. The sudden dislocation between conciliation [ie 'local'] and arbitration [ie
national] was somewhat worrying. However, the system, as is, functions adequately.
11 Please excuse the delays in responding. This questionnaire has been completed in respect of the
most recent arbitration, not that at Blackpool Airport to which your original questionnaire
referred. The second arbitration was far more difficult because it required a thorough
understanding of a job evaluation scheme. The arbitrator did not, to my belief, fully grasp the
TU or management understanding of its application.
12 Ours was only a minor dispute, which was handled extremely well, with as much attention to
detail a if it had been a major issue.
13 ACAS arbitration is generally a very useful vehicle but should only be used when normal
discussions have reached a stalemate. We have found it more useful than conciliation as we
would make every effort to reach a mutually acceptable compromise within our normal
procedures [the role that conciliation would try to repeat).
I have no important suggestions concerning improvements.
14 In general ACAS is extremely useful in resolving our grading disputes, but it is certainly
valuable to have consistency by using the same arbitrator wherever possible, in order that he/she
is familiar with the complexities of the scheme.
15 I have only dealt with one arbitration hearing and therefore can only comment on this.
We felt that the hearing was undertaken very efficiently and professionally but felt that the
arbitrator had very little knowledge of how a students union works. Student unions are a very
different organisation to say those of industrial management companies. Often staff have to
undertake tasks that are over and above their job description. At this hearing we felt that the
arbitrator took little account of the effect a Grade 3 appointment in this area would have on our
staffing structure.
The outcome of the hearing was that the arbitrator felt that the job description of the person
applying for a re-grading had increased to a certain extent but no more than any other member of
our staff. Staff in our organisation have to be extremely flexible and this is the ground on
which our case was presented.
We have however awarded a scale 3 to this employee, but very little of the other
recommendations and provisos attached to this award by your arbitrator have been followed. We
did not want a commitment from her to work longer hours, more weeks or be a senior person in
the office and this was the way your arbitrator felt we should move.
This is the main reason I answered some of the questions, in that a visit to the organisation may
be of significant importance to an arbitrator in this case I felt that she had very little idea of how
most students unions run their organisations.
I hope these comments are of use to you. Overall, however, from the ACAS point of view, the
hearing was to our satisfaction and only one or two points already made seem to be relevant.
We would in future, however,try and alter our contracts so that staff can go through the local
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government committee as we feel that they at least have the knowledge of the 'Purple Book'
requirements relevant to polytechnics and colleges and local government organisations.
16 In general I would be reluctant to use arbitration again in the disciplinary area.
I would however use and will use it again in single issue areas of collective bargaining.
17 There appears to be a view that both sides are reluctant to go to binding arbitration since they
feel that they should be capable of resolving disputes through their own joint procedures. In
view of this, perhaps more emphasis could be given to the 'conciliation' service offered by
ACAS. Publicity tends to attach to the 'arbitration' role.
In general, my experience of ACAS is that they are both effective and efficient when the need to
consult or involve them arises. ACAS does serve a useful purpose.
18 Arbitrators should be prepared to give some detailed explanation as to how they arrived at their
decision. The only aspect of my company's recent arbitration experience that I considered less
than fully satisfactory was the brevity of the arbitrator's findings.
19 Ref 8[b] In our view the conciliator did not fully attempt to resolve the dispute.
[b] Ref 24 [c] - In the content of this question we did not know what was meant by the term
'stronger party'.
[c] Ref 26[h] - We believe previous experience of arbitration is essential, however, we would be
interested to know how arbitrators gain experience.
20 [a] I was pleased with our most recent, and only experience of arbitration which was
professionally handled and we would be pleased to go through the process again.
[b] I am concerned that the union may feel in future that this is an easier way to resolve
difficulties and may be used regularly.
[c] The next negotiations this coming July/August should prove interesting.
21 The situation dealt with at this company concerned an employee who had been caught smoking
in a paper storage warehouse which was clearly defined as a non-smoking area. The company
has had in the past few years two serious fires [not due to smoking] and the smoking allowed on
the factory floor is limited to designated smoking areas.
In view of the seriousness of the offence the company, in line with a warning published several
years ago, dismissed the employee for a breach of rules. After assessing the facts the arbitrator
agreed that the employee had been smoking in a dangerous area and had breached company safety
rules, but on a technicality of the warning notice having been removed from the notice board,
changed the decision to 2 weeks' suspension.
In the report, the company felt that the arbitrator had shown some sympathy for the employee at
the expense of the company to be able to have firm control over smoking in the workplace.
This bias towards the 'underdog' and the constant desire to compromise [or 'fudge'] ignores the
basic rights or wrongs of an issue. Quite cynically our employees have been told that if they
wish to smoke anywhere in the factory they can do so at the inconvenience of two weeks unpaid
leave.
22 I feel that the use of the same arbitrator can be very beneficial for obvious reasons.
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23 [a] The arbitration service is essential.
[b] It must be independent and be seen as such by the parties.
[c] The arbitrator must understand industrial relations practices and procedures.
24 I consciously felt that the whole conduct of the exercise was courteous, thorough and fair.
Most importantly, I should say that that was my spoken impression before declaration of
the award!, ie the experience inspired a feeling of confidence. It promoted a promise of 'justice' -
whichever way the arbitrator's views ultimately fell.
25 As I have said I was asked to act in this dispute because I do not act for the union. I am, as it
happens, a member [very inactive] of MSF. Arbitration was suggested by both parties
following their failure to reach agreement. There was a threat of industrial action principally
since the employee's length of employment would not have enabled him to apply to an
Industrial Tribunal.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
SINGLE ARBITRATION - TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO SECTION D
FINAL COMMENTS
1 The decision to take the case in question to arbitration was taken by my members against my
advice. Being men of honour they will abide by the decision reached. Although the pill is now
well swallowed, the apprehension of other changes to come under the decision is still there,
although both sides seem to be working at keeping relationships good.
Of the decision, I am sorry to say that I had a good idea that any professional arbiter would have
come down on the employer's side on the quasi-legalistic basis of managements's right to
manage'. Had that view not been constantly challenged by trade unions over the past two
centuries, industrial relations would most probably never have changed since 1788. Too often in
arbitration or in industrial relations the trite prevalent views are trotted out as virtues. Disputes
are a normal part of industrial relations and whilst I believe that the ACAS role of conciliation
is beneficial that of arbitration only allows the weaker party an honourable way"off the hook".
Otherwise, as we see by the actions of this present government, power prevails as it naturally
will.
2 Generally satisfied with current practices and standards.
3 In the case of pay awards where the parties are close in their final positions, pendulum is
probably as good as any other way to resolve the pay dispute.
The arbitrator should have the opportunity of deflecting away from strict pendulum before the
formal meeting, perhaps to suggest a compromise, if he feels that the written submissions are
very close in merit.
It is not a good idea to get cold feet in the middle of the exercise and invite the parties to
compromise. The party who agrees may feel they have weakened their case. Pendulum must
voluntary as the employer will not be pressurised into making realistic attempts to solve the
problem after several usages.
Voluntary pendulum is a handy 'escape lane' after procedure is exhausted and an industrial action
ballot is positive. Members can have a rethink on their action without losing face.
I agree with Dr X that future terms of reference should examine the case item by item rather than
a package. Where one party gets nothing, it could discourage use of pendulum in future.
4 The appointment of the senior ACAS official is a political appointment which will always
mean a wary eye towards the masters when making an award. I always remember a remark made
to me by a very senior arbitrator. "Right is on your side but if I award in your favour I will be
removed from this job." Having said that I believe they do the best they can.
5 All right as it is.
6 There are two general problems which relate to conciliation officers which I have extensive
experience. Although generally the conciliation officers perform well, I have experienced that
often they accept that the problems which are referred to them are at an impasse and they spend
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little time trying to mediate between the parties. Also I have had experience of a conciliation
officer advising management independently of the union that the terms of reference already agreed
should be altered because the terms of reference could prejudice the arbitration; I consider this
action less than impartial.
However, bearing in mind the general performance of ACAS conciliation officers is acceptable,
perhaps the recruitment and monitoring of performance of officers should be considered.
Additionally I am concerned that when complaints are made about officers they should be
properly investigated which is not the response I received when complaining to ACAS about the
performance of a conciliation officer.
7 I would just like to say that I found the service of ACAS was very good and reasonably fair, but
thought there was a slight move to the company's plead. I guess this is because we did not
improve on the company's offer.
8 In all previous arbitration cases with X Ltd the company has attempted to restrict the scope of
the investigation and to control proceedings. Previous arbitrators have made it clear that the
restriction would hamper a fair review of the case. The last arbitrator accepted most of the
company's limitations. The arbitration was conducted in a manner similar to an Industrial
Tribunal which acted against those less able to deal with formal situations. It should be
mandatory for all arbitrations to be held on independent territory. They should be conducted in a
less formal manner but should prevent interruptions. It would help if arbitrators familiarised
themselves with the sites, the company and the company/union relationships.
Arbitrators should be drawn from a wider field rather than the predominance of university/college
academics. Legality should not have a high profile in submissions and deliberations.
9 In the previous arbitration in 1987, the arbitrator came down strongly in favour of the trade
union claim which added to his very limited explanation of his reasons, a degree of resentment
was evident on the management side which caused some minor problems in the following
months. However, Professor X's handling of the 1988 arbitration seems to have corrected the
situation.
10 I have generally found it to be extremely useful, the procedure fair and conduct courteous and
helpful. My major criticism is that from the appearance of the problem to the final award can be
a very long time.
11 Attempts should be made to arrange arbitration more quickly.
12 In my experience ACAS have provided an essential service to industrial relations practitioners
who find themselves unable to resolve difficulties via the normal procedure. Whilst I agree that
arbitration/conciliation should only be necessary in exceptional circumstances, the mere fact that
the safety valve exists is helpful.
The standard of service provided by ACAS and its arbitrators is high and perfectly satisfactory.
Comment on the quality of individual arbitrators would be invidious as I suspect the judgment
would be a little coloured by the size of the award granted. In general I am more than satisfied
with impartiality shown.
13 At the time of the arbitration I was a relatively new full-time official of the trade union,
although I had lengthy experience as a lay member activist I had no previous experience in
terms of using ACAS arbitration and quite frankly most of my colleagues to whom I had spoken
to previously about arbitration were not very keen on its use, although the majority did admit
that it could be useful at times.
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In terms of the particular case that was referred to independent arbitration I was totally convinced
that the employer was in the wrong, although I was well aware that our member was not totally
without blame. Our member had been dismissed and in my opinion was being used by the
management as an example to the rest of the workforce and as such was being penalised more
severely than the alleged offence warranted.
On the basis that the employer was willing to go to arbitration rather than face potential
industrial action, I was willing to give it a try; and bearing in mind that the employer was
blatantly in the wrong, I had every confidence that the arbitrator would find in our favour.
As far as this particular arbitration is concerned and bearing in mind that this has been my only
experience of arbitration to date, I was well satisfied with the outcome and cannot fault it in any
way. On that basis I am unable to suggest any possible improvements.
14 The major problem with arbitration is a basic simple fact that from a TU point of view failure
to gain satisfaction tends to discredit the system and creates resistance to the use of arbitration in
the future. There is, therefore, a marked reluctance to use arbitration except in extreme
circumstances.
15 We have used ACAS not only in respect of failures to agree at grading panels but also in local
disputes where conciliation is needed. We have always found the service very valuable. We
have had four different personnel from ACAS over the last 10 years, and we have always been
satisfied even though the decision has not always been in our favour. Carry on the good work.
16 On the whole I would say that my experience of ACAS arbitration has been good and that it
certainly can be an important mechanism in resolving industrial problems. However its time is
probably already over. The present government and the current economic climate has meant that
employers see less relevance in going to ACAS in the first place. Employers clearly believe
that they have all the weapons that they need in order to fully support their contention that
"management will manage and we don't need anybody else making our decisions for us - be it
ACAS or unions."
To some extent ACAS has become more pro-employer because of this obvious threat to their
existence.
At the moment, the jury is out as to whether the trade unions will survive - ACAS's future is
dependent on that.
17 We are submitting our annual wage claim to day [21.2.89] and already we have heard that
management are already geared to go to arbitration, owing to a financial revenue deficit.
This management see arbitration as a simple exercise. We get what we may consider a 'fair'
award and all we get in return is departmental budget cuts to 'off-load' the difference between
their offer and the ACAS award, so in real terms its very hard to 'WIN' anything really
irrespective of the ACAS decision, but as a Trade Unionist I find the services of ACAS highly
commendable when in the situation of arbitration.
18 At arbitration the use of an Arab interpreter is sometimes called for. This causes some delays
due to the fact that it would appear that it is very difficult to obtain the services of this type of
person. I would, therefore, suggest for the future that a list of interpreters be kept within the
ACAS offices, in order to prevent further delays, should these interpreters be required.
19 My personal view of our experience with last year's arbitration encounter is that it is a waste of
time with the rule of management, ie first offer and first claim. It leaves the arbitrator no room
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to carry out a fair conclusion. We have asked management to change this rule but they have
stated "no way".
20 If possible, occasionally visit factories to meet shop stewards for general discussion problems
which sometimes appear to be recurring and frustrating and though not in themselves causing
industrial action, very often build up to resentment and a deterioration in good industrial
relations.
21 I believe arbitration is only of value in resolving small disputes, ie gradings of individuals. In
more collective cases I would not recommend to members the use of arbitration - it diffuses
anger, calms down the dispute and allows the management time to undermine what may be a
strong TU position.
My experience with arbitration has been on grading cases only. In the industries with which I
deal there are usually ways of resolving the problem before the final stage. The only case where
arbitration could have been used on a collective case finally ended up as a 3 week strike
[successful!) over the regrading of 35 members. In that case arbitration would not have achieved
the success that the strike did!
22 I was personally very happy and satisfied with ACAS and all its procedures and of course its
results.
23 Since the establishment of ACAS I have used both the conciliation and arbitration service on a
number of occasions. It has provided an opportunity of resolving disputes when no other course
was available and also gave additional time to both sides to reflect and evaluate the situation.
The 'face saving' involved by the introduction of ACAS should never be underestimated.
24 Pendulum arbitration is too much for TU's to swallow. Industrial relations contains too many
grey areas for it to be effective in the long-term.
Arbitrators must be "free-thinkers" and wherever possible terms of reference should be drawn up
in such a way as to allow for originality on the arbitrator's part to show through - new and
sometimes novel answers are required to solve some old deep-seated problems.
25 A brief background to our dispute -1 am a member of a eight man job evaluation committee,
who after many hours of discussion were split 50-50 regarding a grade. We called in ACAS who
were quite happy to help us, they informed us they would have to get union agreement first, this
was done but the union put one restriction in our way, whoever put the case for up-grading had
to be a union member. As I was the only trade union member in my group of four, I had no
other choice but to put the case for upgrading. My criticism is that within my group there were
people more qualified to present the case. I think this restriction imposed by the union was
detrimental to the case for upgrading.
26 It will be obvious that my experience of ACAS arbitration is limited. This is because the
public services in which NALGO mainly organises its members has its own machinery for
settling disputes. I have been involved in conciliation with ACAS usually in disciplinary
matters.
27 The service which ACAS can provide has now been limited by interference from government and
because of the anti-trade union legislation employers can reject the use of ACAS arbitrators
while willing to accept the conciliator's role. The independence of the original service has been
undermined as has the authority which the service commanded.
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28 Both the role of ACAS and the quality of the arbitrator in this and subsequent arbitration could
not have been bettered. The same applies to the organisation and style of the arbitration
proceedings.
29 Without arbitration as a part of any settlement of differences procedure then there will be a much
increased level of industrial action. I consider that the continued involvement of ACAS is
essential and in everyone's interest. Our own management are now seeking to remove, from our
agreement, the ability to refer unilaterally any dispute to ACAS. The only reason is that their
managerial prerogative is eroded and the TTJ position weakened.
30 By its nature arbitration tends to the status quo. It is therefore, not helpful in new areas of claim
or organisation. This is where more disputes are happening: a too rigid view of comparators
and terms of reference prevents the use of arbitration in areas where it could be most helpful.
31 The ability to enforce their decision legally as in the case of X Club where mon member has
still not been paid his award.
32 Impressed with the efficiency and professionalism of ACAS staff, and with the performance of
the arbitrator both at the hearing and his written award.
95
ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
Boards OfArbitration - Management and Trade Union Responses
A Management:
1
3 [h] - Warehouseman
11 [c] - Single arbitrator failed
21 [a] - To ensure that all relevant points are discussed.
[b] - Avoids one man decision.
[c] - Any inequality in strength of character or direct knowledge of particular industry could
influence the decision.
25 - No. Would prefer to use Industrial Tribunal.
2
2 [i] - Change in managerial organisation
[h] - Nurses
11 [c] - To enable there to be person [s] with specialised knowledge.
21 [a] - To assist in extracting relevant factual information and to contribute specialised
knowledge to the forming of the judgement.
[b] - They give breadth of experience and perspective.
[c] - It takes longer. There is a risk of partiality when the members are nominated by one of
the parties.
25 - Yes.
D - The most significant failure in the case in question was lack of speed, both in setting




3 [h] - Drivers and warehousemen
21 [a] - To assist the chairman to form a view based on their industrial knowledge and to
ensure that all relevant points are explored.
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- At least one of them should have an understanding of your point of view even if he/she
does not agree with you.
- Chairman has no-one to discuss the case with unless there are side members. Debate
ensures proper consideration of the issues.
-Yes
- Frequently valuable for ACAS as an 'outsider' to impose a solution which parties
would not be able to concede easily. Particularly important where management integrity
is challenged and senior managers would naturally tend to give loyal support to colleague
under challenge.
- To determine if a member of NUPE or a member of the REN should be appointed to a
particular post. Management supported the REN.
- NUPE/REN? own nominated members
- To provide a view on the particular trade/profession,
knowledge of profession/trade.
unless appointed by both parties may not have relevant knowledge.
-Yes.
- Failure to take up new appointment
-Yes
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ESI Cases - Responses to Q1 [f]
The independent person conducted the hearing to your satisfaction
1 Disagree - The independent person allowed the TU side assessor to give his views - at length -
on the case in the hearing, I consider this was outside the assessor's role. The independent
person's control of the hearing was in some respects too tight in my opinion. There were two
presenters of the Board's case, myself and the line manager. Although the latter was present
throughout, he was only allowed to contribute as a witness - this was unnecessarily restrictive.
[M]
2 Appeared over formal in disallowing evidence. [M]
3 He allowed the trade union assessor to advocate and to introduce information and comments not
relevant to the case. [M]
1 He allowed adjournment for employers to prepare case on 'fresh' evidence [1 week], [TU]
2 Wanted to speed up hearing after lunch - cut short questioning of Board representatives. [TU]
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Responses to Q 2[g]
The independent person acted according to your expectations
1 Disagree - The chairman had very definite ideas about what evidence he wanted to view and
allowed no deviation. This worked well with the case concerned but could have been dangerous
in other circumstances. [M]
2 Disagree - Gave undue weight - in my view - to the fact that the person's future pension value
[as well as present earnings] would be reduced, yet agreed that the misconduct had occurred as
stated and that current penalty was appropriate. [M]
3 Partly Agree - The reason for the answer to [g] above is that the independent person pursued a
line of questioning which in my opinion dealt with the side issues of the case. Having said this
he did in the final analysis agree with our conclusion. [M]
4 Disagree - as in [f] above. This is the first independent body of perhaps twelve I have been
involved in where the co-presenters' role has been limited. [M]
5 Disagree - Did not explain to the appellant how the proceedings would be handled. [M]
1 Disagree - hoped for impartiality. [TU]
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Management Responses to Q 5
Did any difficulties arise in the implementation of the award?
1 Yes - The hearing chaired by Professor X was particularly difficult, twice new evidence was
presented before the hearing was due to commence and on the first occasion this led to a two
week adjournment. On the second occasion, ten minutes before the hearing began, the Board
side was presented with a statutory declaration from the appellant's solicitor. In dealing with
these unusual procedural difficulties, I consider that Professor X acted in an exemplary manner
and did not allow himself to be intimidated by the formal nature of the new evidence which was
submitted.
The hearing itself was unusual in that the facts as presented represented completely contrary
views of what actually happened. The outcome therefore depended upon the veracity of the
evidence given by the individuals elicited through skillful cross-questioning on the part of
Professor X and the two assessors. Several untruths were posed which called into question the
honesty of the appellant involved in the hearing. Therefore some of the flavour of the hearing
and the reasons that led Professor X to his judgment are probably not wholly reflected in the
independent person's report
2 Yes - It was difficult to implement the proposal that the individual be given work at a certain
grade since only one post was available within the jurisdiction of the manager concerned and
other managers would be more than reluctant to take on someone who had been subject to
disciplinary proceedings into a post which would provide a promotional route for another
member of staff.
3 Yes - The penalty of dismissal was varied to transfer/downgrading. The downgrading takes effect
retrospectively to the date of dismissal, meaning that the reduced salary is also paid from that
date. This point was questioned by the full-time trade union officer but confirmed by the
Electricity Council and [by telephone] the independent person.
4 Yes - The penalty quashed a downgrading and substituted one week's suspension without pay.
Due to the length of time between the original decision and the ACAS result the loss of pay due
to downgrading was substantially more than 1 week's pay and so we actually paid money back
to the offender and so it was not perceived by others that any penalty had been suffered. This
was despite the clear agreement by the independent person that serious misconduct had occurred.
5 Yes - The appellant had obtained another job almost immediately after his dismissal. The
problem of 'double earnings' had to be resolved relative to the period to the date of
reinstatement
6 Yes - The ambiguous nature of the award gave scope for the TU side to dispute the Board's
interpretation of it.
7 Yes - Personal difficulties with staff in returning employee to same location - needed by
agreement later to transfer to another site.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Trade Union Responses to Q 5
Did any difficulties arise in the implementation of the award?
1 Yes - Whilst the award said Mr X should be transferred to another post at the same or another
location the Board interpreted this as a downgrading by some 10 or so incremental points [value
approximately £2,000] plus transfer to a 'remote'site not too accessible by Mr X, further adding
to his financial loss. I have called upon the Electricity Council to seek guidance on this
interpretation from Professor Y.
2 Yes - The difficulty may arise in implementing that part of the award which calls for a 'review
of the situation after 12 months'.
3 Yes - Member lost job.
4 Yes - Only insofar as the award which concerned a lowering of status and salary was judged after
further reference to be retrospective to the point of the original dismissal.
5 Yes the appellant did not immediately return to his employment due to his own lethargy.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ESI Cases - Management response to Q 7 [1,2,4 & 5] re General Experience
1
Q1 Over the years I have been involved in a number of cases. The majority of independent persons
have decided cases on their merits. I have noticed however in more recent times a tendency to try
to arbitrate by changing the penalty, not because a change is warranted, but more to give
something to both parties - see note in relation to 8 [h],
Q2 With one or two exceptions, the answers to question [2] give a fair reflection of my experience.
As virtually all are academics [which gives them the independence and clarity of thought] they
tend to be somewhat removed from industrial and commercial life.
Q4 In general well written and many occasions scant reasons given for decision.
Q5 In general straightforward. A few cases where it has been necessary to seek clarification
following receipt.
2
Q1 My general experience does not differ from this latest case, in respect of the attributes listed for
an independent person. In other words, they were present.
Q2 Were, in this latest case, very similar to those of other IPs to whom I have presented cases -
with the exception of the previous independent person. He did not, in my view, demonstrate in
his judgement the required objectivity, or alternatively, so misconstrued the facts as to vitiate his
conclusions.
Q4 Was not unexpected in the latest case and satisfied the criteria I look for in such reports. This
has been my general experience except for the previous case in which I was involved, where the
outcome resulted in the reinstatement of a dismissed employee, who was, in our judgement,
manifestly guilty of the offence for which he was dismissed.
Q5 Did not cause any difficulty in this most recent case, which has been our experience, generally.
However, the implementation of the award in the previous case referred to in Q4 did nothing to
help reinforce the message we were attempting to convey to our workforce, about the
seriousness and potential consequences for those staff committing the particular disciplinary
offence, for which the offender was dismissed.
3
Q1 It is par for the course to have trade union assessors who feel it incumbent on them to refute or
disprove the employer's case. This is not their role and one expects the arbiter to enforce his
control on all parties.
Q2 In general I would agree that the characteristics outlined in 2[a] to 2[g] are observed.
Q4 Normally clear, concise and logical.
Q5 There is a tendency to seek a compromise rather than decide if a penalty is 'fair' in terms of the
employer's rules and the law.
4
Q1 In my experience, for the most part, independent persons have conducted hearings most correctly.
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Q2 As above, I could not fault the handling of hearings, but my view is that independent persons
should have had recent experience in industry or commerce. A major criticism I have is that
invariably the independent person is either an academic or a lawyer. This seems wrong in that
this stage in the procedure precedes appeal to an Industrial Tribunal [dismissal cases only],
Q4 Reports are adequate in content although they always take far too long to appear [typically 3
weeks]. It is in all parties interests for the result of a hearing to be revealed more quickly so that
it can be implemented speedily.
Q5 Generally no problem - although see 5.
5
As Above Response for different case
6
Q1 In an attempt to keep matters as informal as possible, there seems to be a growing tendency to
conduct proceedings in a way which makes direct questioning of the appellant extremely
difficult. In some recent cases, the appellant has not actually spoken at all. Surely the
behaviour, demeanour and truthfulness of the appellant should be factors which an independent
person should take into account?
Q2 No differences of any consequence.
Q4 The report in the latest case was excellent but with one crucial proviso. The independent person
gave a list of the considerations on which he based his decision but he did not say how much
weight he gave to each of the points he raised before arriving at his decision. Some sort of
rationale on how he judged the considerations would have been helpful.
Q5 The questioning of the implementation of the award in this case was due to a misunderstanding
by the trade union officer rather than any ambiguity in the independent person's decision.
7
Q1 The independent person allowed the appellants to lead and only allowed me to reply to
appellants' point, ie I could not emphasise points not raised by appellants because they were
unfavourable to them.
Q2 No change.
Q4 Only reasonably adequate.
Q5 Very awkward. Downgraded a craftsman to a lower grade yet indicated that he should continue
with his existing craft employment.
8
Q1 I believe there is a tendency in some cases for the independent person to see his role as that of an
arbitrator. This leads the independent person to seek a compromise solution rather than sticking
to what I believe is his formal remit, ie to assess whether management's decision was reasonable
in the light of the circumstances and the requirements of the law. It should be stressed that it is
not the independent person's job to seek/to get a solution that is acceptable to all sides.
Q2 Occasionally an impression is left that the independent person is too academically biased and
does not have a proper understanding of the difficulties of managers in industry enforcing
disciplinary procedures.9
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Q1 I have dealt with 2 cases in 1988 [including Mr X]. On both occasions the role was made very
clear as was the structure of the actual hearing. However, on both occasions I did not feel there
was sufficient opportunity to question the appellant - only the appellant's representatives.
9
Q1 I have dealt with 2 cases in 1988 [including Mr X], On both occassions the role was made very
clear as was the structure of the actual hearing. However, on both occassions I did not feel there
was sufficient opportunity to question the appellant - only the appellant's representatives.
10
Q1 All but one case followed the normal pattern. In one case the independent person used a very
novel approach. He obtained from the advocate the views that witnesses were expected to
provide - he then called in witnesses and questioned them himself.
11
Q1 Acted more as a chairman controlling proceedings.
Q2 Very much more firm with definite ideas about how the hearing should be conducted and
the evidence to be examined.
12
Q1 No, previous experience was also good. Arbitration professional and constructive.
13
As above - same person answering questionnaire for different case.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Trade Union Responses to Q 7 [1,2,4 & 5] re General Experience
1
Q1 I have found dealing with a number of ACAS arbiters that most are fair minded and have a good
knowledge of industrial relations. If they were not I would have raised this through ACAS.
Q2 Most arbiters have shown me courtesy and dealt with the appeal in a very professional way.
I have been an EETPU official for 10 years and have taken many appeals in that time to the
arbiter within the Supply agreement and up to now have not had any complaint except
sometimes I wait above 6 weeks for the report.
Q4 Sometimes I wait above 6 weeks for the report. [I don't know if that is the fault of the arbiter
or when he refers the report to ACAS who then refer to the Electricity Council.]
2
Q1 The answers given in question 1 of Section A adequately summarises the role of the independent
person in all cases in which I have been involved.
Q2 Generally speaking, I have had no complaints or misgivings about the independant person under
the circumstances, However, I refer to my comments in question 8[1] and 10.
Q4 I have never had cause for complaint with regard to the reports in terms of punctuality and
clarity.
Q5 Have had no problems.
3
Q1 I tend to feel that some assessors are allowing themselves to be unduly influenced by case law
and philosophy of the Industrial Tribunals.
Q2 All of the assessors conducted the appeals in a fair and flexible manner.
Q4 The majority are clear and unambiguous.
Q5 No problems as far as I am aware.
4
Q1 More competent than some experienced.
Q2 Seemed familiar with inquiries.
Q4 Condoned Board's incompetence in case, no observations or criticisms.
Q5 To be expected.
5
Q1 Some have difficulty in appreciating the terms and conditions set out in the NJIC agreements.
Some do a 'one man show' and ignore the assessors.
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Q2 Generally speaking most conduct hearing in an informal and relaxed setting although one or two
adopt a 'courtroom' approach.
Q4 No problem with the actual report although some appear to take a long time to prepare and
publish.
Q1 Sections lc-f found to be unsatisfactory.
Q2 Proficient in a, d, e, g
Q4 90 per cent acceptable.
Q5 Satisfactory.
7
Q2 The last case I had before Mr X for arbitration was my second heard by him and my experience
in the first case gave me no confidence that I would succeed because I felt, and do still feel, that
in the first case the Board's decision to dismiss should not have been upheld. I felt that Mr X
really leaned towards the employer's view rather than look at the case on its merits. I feel that
his view of arbitration on disciplinary matters is too near the Industrial Tribunal system of
dispensing 'justice' and too legalistic in outlook.
Q4 It did not go into any detail as to how he had arrived at his decision.
Q5 Having had the dismissal upheld by Mr X it was no problem.
Q1 On one occasion he appeared not to understand the points raised.
Q4 Late and not enough detail "I find in favour of the company/union" is not enough.
Q1 I believe this "independent" acted too much like a judge/recorder.
Q2 Jocular - but with humour nobody understood!
Q4 Brief to the point.
Q5 As directed.
11
Q1 Was persuaded by one of the assessors [electrical] not to permit the precedent award in a similar
case which went to Industrial Tribunal.
12
Q1 Permitted father of appellant to state a case on behalf of his son.
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13
Q5 In the main I have been satisfied with this aspect on all counts in all cases.
14
Q4 The Award. Should give more information how arrived at decision
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ESI Cases - Management Responses to Q 8 [1] re Other Qualities
1 Must prepare themselves beforehand on the basic issues and arguments.
Should not allow broad generalities about what other employers have done in other
circumstances, particularly as these assertions are heresay.
2 In relation to [h] above it is important that he/she concentrates on making a judgement, on the
merits of the case, and does not try to satisfy both parties by arriving at a compromise decision.
An ability to distinguish, and to concentrate, on main points at issue.
3 Clarity, succinctness, control of hearing to evaluate main issues and avoiding sidetracking.
4 The experience of settling disputes by arbitration can be counter productive. This is not a
process of arbitration. The object is to assess "was management's judgement fair and
reasonable", it is not to get a solution acceptable to all sides.
5 Ability to be decisive, rather than to arbitrate.
6 As above
7 Ability to assess reasonableness of Board's decision not to substitute their own decision.
8 Acknowledging that for the appellant this is a "unique" occasion requiring sensitivity and a full
explanation of how things will happen.
9 Experience of chairmanship.
10 Knowledge of ACAS Code of Practice and Employment Law. Wisdom.
11 A sense of realism in examining/suggesting reasonable penalties.
12 Complete objectivity and a moderate degree of skepticism.
13 Report of comment 5. As 5 above.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Trade Union Responses to Q8 [1] re Other Qualities
1 A reassurance that the independent person and the assessors have studied the documents before
the hearing.
2 To convey to appellant that he has read the papers and has understood them.
3 To identify issues from reports submitted prior to hearing.
4 To be able to understand human relationships at all levels in industrial environments.
5 Able to communicate with all types and to demonstrate arguments understood.
6 Ability to communicate.
7 Ability to inspire confidence.
8 They should not have any case law on their minds when arbitrating. The influence of the
Industrial Tribunals should not prevail in any way. They should not look at matters
legalistically.
9 I feel that it is essential that the independent person should have in-depth knowledge of Industrial
Law/Case Law.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ESI Cases - Management Responses to Q 10
How satisfied are you with reference to an independent person as the final stage of the industry's
disciplinary procedure?
I
1 Very Satisfied - The Board's case was conducted within the agreed guidelines of the industry's
national agreements and ACAS code of conduct on disciplinary matters. As such it would not
have proceeded to final stage unless the Board were confident of the upholding of the decisions
taken by management at earlier stages.
2 Very Satisfied - The independence demonstrated and impartiality renders the ultimate verdict
easier "to live with". It is also much preferable to the expenditure in terms of management time
and money to going to tribunal and more often than not saves going to this stage since both
parties feel they have been dealt with fairly.
3 Very Satisfied- Introduces the element of independent impartiality into what can often develop
into complex disciplinary cases which are dealt with under the ESI Formal Procedures.
4 Very Satisfied - It is difficult to envisage a more suitable backstop. The independent person has
no vested interest in the case and at least in theory should be acceptable to all concerned - albeit
perhaps more acceptable to the victor.
II
1 Satisfied - But I am concerned that there are 4 stages of appeal [including Industrial Tribunal].
Management only have to fail once and there is no second chance. The system appears to be
loaded in the employee's favour.
2 Satisfied - The process is a bit bureaucratic and there is perceived to be a tendency for the
majority of staff to appeal automatically. The hearings themselves are a reasonably satisfactory
way of reviewing decisions.
3 Satisfied -1 think the key problem is a tendency to apply an 'arbitration' type style with results
which favour the appellant by comparison to the employer's likely success at the Industrial
Tribunal. If this became ever more prevalent the employer would ultimately abandon the system
in favour of IT references.
4 Satisfied -1 believe that the outcome is almost a lottery due to the influence of the personalities
of the two advisers, and to the loose structure of the proceedings, ie one day you may be able to
present your case well whereas another day there will be undue stress placed upon some
emotional pleading and the result will go the other way.
Also there is nothing to prevent or discourage persons from going to appeal on the off chance of
success even though they know that the original penalty was fair and reasonable.
5 Satisfied - From both my personal involvement and observation I regard the Independent stage an
essential part of the process; to both sides it can be seen as a 'Tribunal in itself' indeed, in the
two most recent cases heard in the Area for dismissal, both ex-employees proceeded no further
with their unfair dismissal applications.
6 Satisfied - One comment I have about the independent person stage of the disciplinary procedure
is that it is not necessarily the final stage. A person who is dismissed will still have recourse
to an Industrial Tribunal.
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Recently a tendency has been growing for people accused of misconduct to take the appeal
through all its stages regardless of the strength of the case, on the basis that they have, in effect,
nothing to lose. The procedure therefore begins to look as if it is loaded in the employee's
favour and as a consequence dealing with disciplinary cases becomes very time consuming. It is
worth noting that management have no right of appeal and can in effect lose the case at many of
the stages of the procedure.
7 Satisfied - But it could be construed as being unfair to the employer inasmuch that he is bound
by the independent person's decision in respect of a dismissal case, whereas the employee has the
further right of taking his case to an Industrial Tribunal.
8 Satisfied - The initial appeal stage in the industry's procedures is to a higher management
official. This individual is not usually viewed by the union as being impartial, eg they see him
as a management man who is bound to be biased. The independent person is clearly seen to be
independent as he is generally not known to both parties.
9 Satisfied - The reference to the independent person [following the initial appeal] provides, and is
seen to provide, clear protection against unfair treatment. Most cases are resolved within the
ESI agreements with little recourse to Industrial Tribunals. The problem is that the procedure is
weighted in favour of the employee who can exercise his legal right to appeal to an Industrial
Tribunal if the arbiter finds against him. The employer is bound totally by the arbiter's decision
even if in law he could prove 'fair' treatment.
10 Satisfied - Based on my experience I am persuaded that the IPs who hear appeals are, for the
most part, sufficiendy detached, yet sympathetic, to reach judgments objectively.
11 Satisfied - Generally satisfied except in one case where the independent person had none of the
qualities referred to above and reached a perverse decision. The independent person's
involvement would be most valuable if it was recognised by Industrial Tribunals to a greater
extent.
12 Satisfied - The independent person stage has the merits of being relatively informal, cheap and
avoids legalism.
13 Satisfied - Please see answers to Question 7.
Ill
1 Not Satisfied - There is a tendency for many cases to go to ACAS even when there is clearly no
hope of success. Whilst I fully support the need for fair treatment, I believe the independent
person should have the right to nave a preliminary assessment on the merits of hearing a case.
The current agreements in ESI means that the employer has to defend himself however frivolous
the case. Where dismissal is concerned I believe the applicant should be required to sign a COT3
form to remove the case from IT jurisdiction.
I am happy with the theory of this final internal stage, but believe the practice has led frequently
to abuse of the system by some representatives who are not prepared to tell members they will
not support a case. This, of course, is a fault with our system and not the fault of the ACAS
arbitrator.
2 Not Satisfied - In my experience independent persons either 'arbitrate' and choose a middle
course, which is generally unhelpful, or they apply an award based on how they personally
would have acted in a manager's situation. In my view, in determining whether the Board's
actions are 'fair and reasonable' they should not apply more stringent criteria than that adopted by
an Industrial Tribunal. That is, if the Board's action is within a range of reasonable responses
of 'average' employers, it should be confirmed as applied.
Ill
3 Not satisfied - as above.
4 Not satisfied - The Independent Person hearing should be the final stage in the disciplinary
procedure. However, more and more dismissed employees are taking their cases to Industrial
Tribunals. Boards are bound by IP decisions - an employee is not. Either the IP should be able
to award all of the penalties available to an Industrial Tribunal [this would enable Boards to
obtain the appropriate exemption - ie no appeal to a Tribunal would be allowed] or the
Independent Person appeal stage should be scrapped for dismissal cases. The costs to Boards of
defending both IP and Industrial Tribunal cases are enormous.
5 Not Satisfied - The industry's disciplinary procedures are very exacting and prolonged. I feel
that our system gives more than adequate protection to employees against unfair penalties and
references to independent persons are not necessary.
IV
1 Not categorised - From my experience of these hearings arbitrators generally act fairly and
impartially. I am however, concerned at the number of appeals going through and would quite
like some form of pre-assessment process to limit the number going forward to a full hearing.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Trade Union Responses to Q 10
How satisfied are you with reference to an independent person as the final stage of the industry's
disciplinary procedure?
I
1 Very Satisfied - The first stage of appeal is to a "higher management official" -1 totally oppose
this part of the procedure for obvious reasons. If the arbiter does his job as given in my
answers I would be very satisfied with the outcome.
It is also my policy that if I lose the ACAS appeal, it is very unusual to then go to an Industrial
Tribunal, which of course is my and the individual's right
2 Very satisfied - Because my members are likely to get a better hearing than in an Industrial
Tribunal which is a system which no TU official has any confidence in. Also any
recommendation for reinstatement is mandatory.
3 Very Satisfied - Because the principal officers [union and Board] have a good working knowledge
of the ESI disciplinary agreement. I am confident that a 'fresh - impartial' set of eyes and ears
can readily see both sides of the argument and not be persuaded by the ramifications of making a
fair decision/award.
4 Very Satisfied - On each occasion the independent person has appeared to be just that
'independent' and one felt that all aspects of the appeal were fully considered.
5 Very Satisfied - In my view it is the best system around - especially compared to [a] industry's
internal appeal system and [b] Industrial Tribunal experience, [a] is not impartial and [b] is too
legalistic.
6 Very satisfied - the independent person can/does apply a fresh set of ideas to the case without
being bound by an employer's 'party line'.
7 Very Satisfied [no reasons given],
8 Very satisfied - Because its independent, therefore outside management influence and can be seen
to be fair.
9 Very Satisfied - [1] non legalistic compared to Tribunal; [2] gives protection to employees with
less than 2 years service.
II
1 Satisfied -1 found that the independent person was very fair and he could see that there was a
clash of personalities between myself and management. Also management brought forward
information that was not in the written evidence that was submitted to the appeals board and the
Chairman made comments on this after I protested. He stated that he would not let this colour
his final award and this proved to be so.
2 Satisfied - As a final stage where reference to an Industrial Tribunal is not available it's a useful
final step. The independent arbitrator is much more likely to give an individual the benefit of
the doubt than a senior manager.
113
3 Satisfied - I have only in my experience in the industry had any doubts about one particular
arbitrator and I have expressed them in this questionnaire.
4 Satisfied - The very fact that both sides can identify an independent and hopefully impartial
individual makes the decision more acceptable, particularly to the unsuccessful party.
5 Satisfied - When internal procedures have been pursued and found not to resolve the issue then an
independent third party becomes the only acceptable solution.
6 Satisfied - Having gone through numerous appeals I am satisfied that the independent person is
not clouded in his judgement by management strategy in terms of commercial/contractual issues.
7 Satisfied - At least gives the employee the view that someone other than his employer is
considering his position.
8 Satisfied - In spite of the member doing everything which could have "lost" his case the
"independent" did decrease the penalty. I cannot complain about this!!
9 Satisfied - Very difficult to judge anyone after such limited experience to any independent body.
10 Satisfied - Provides for an independent and unbiased approach and decision.
11 Satisfied - If the 'independent person' was from the industry or the trades union he could not be
seen to be impartial.
12 Satisfied - With the exceptions stated before.
13 Satisfied [No reason given].
III
1 Not Satisfied - In my experience the appeals to the independent body are dealt with purely on the
facts of the case and on the procedure. Very little weight seems to be placed on any legal points
raised. Since the outcome of such hearings could influence decisions at an Industrial Tribunal I
have reservations as to the relevance of this stage in the procedure.
2 Not Satisfied - As a lay representative, and one who appreciates real justice, have two instances
where justice was not carried out
3 Not Satisfied - The truly impartial 'independent person' does not exist. In my experience they -
in varying degrees - exhibit an inbuilt bias towards maintenance of the status quo.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ES1 Cases - Management Responses to Section E - Final Comments
1 A better briefing to ensure independent persons see their role to make a judgement on the case
in question, not to try to split the difference. It would be interesting to know how many cases
have resulted in the penalty being increased.
A widening of the source of recruitment to include experienced managers or trade union officials
[not involved with the industry] might improve the service.
2 The independent person stage is useful to the extent that it provides an alternative to Industrial
Tribunals with the benefit of an input from assessors familiar with the practices of the ESI. If
Industrial Tribunals reach decisions that are inconsistent with those of independent persons, then
the independent person stage is simply a waste of time for everybody - particularly for the
employer who has no appeal beyond the independent person stage.
3 The number of cases handled by an independent person under the ESI disciplinary procedures is
few. My own personal involvement as the Board's advocate has been limited to two cases
[including the one the subject of this questionnaire]. Both have been handled in an exemplary
manner by the independent person to the entire satisfaction of the Board.
4 Please see comments under 10. After careful consideration I believe that the independent person
appeal is not appropriate to a privatised industry. Employment law imposes sufficiently high
standard of reasonableness on the large employers to act fairly. There is no right of appeal for
Boards against an independent person's decision, no matter how perverse that decision may
appear. To a dismissed employee, it is simply an additional appeal before he exercises his
statutory right to appeal to an Industrial Tribunal.
At the very least, the independent person appeal stage should only be applicable where an
employee has no statutory rights [ie penalties less than dismissal or dismissal where
employment is less than 2 years].
5 It would be helpful if there was a standard format for the conduct of the independent person stage
rather than leaving this to the discretion of the chairman. In practice the chairman makes his
own rules of procedure which makes it difficult when preparing submissions. For example,
management do not know whether they will be required to present their case first or whether they
will be required to respond to the case presented by the trade union side. Similarly, they do not
know in advance whether they will have the opportunity to ask questions of the other side or
whether all questions will have to be conducted through the chair.
6 I believe the system looks good superficially but the outcome is unsafe - it is too subject to the
skill of the appellant's representative because he can introduce arguments not used at the original
hearings and make sweeping statements about the harshness of the penalty compared with the
monetary loss to the employer.
7 Main concern is as 10. I think terms of reference could include general statements that the
principles of employment law would be applied.
8 Experience gleaned from colleagues suggest that the results can be unpredictable in that ACAS
IPs do not always appear to be bound by accepted rules of procedure or standard tests of proof of
guilt or innocence.
9 [i] Beyond the comments made above there should be the facility for the arbitrator to impose a
penalty on the applicant in frivolous cases.
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[ii] The arbitrator should receive a full statement from both sides [not just management] putting
forward the basis of their case and should be able to have an initial assessment of the merits of
the case.
[iii] No case should be heard that does not have the express support of the full-time union
official and representation by that official [after all, the agreement was made between TUs and
the management],
[iv] Where an applicant has the right to appeal to an Industrial Tribunal, ACAS should not
arbitrate unless the applicant signs a COT3 binding the applicant to abide by the ACAS
decision.
[v] All measures to speed up the process and reduce the frequency of patently unnecessary
hearings should be taken.
[vi] The ability to review decisions should be introduced.
In terms of the final stage in the procedure it has been my experience that the impartiality of the
ACAS independent persons has provided the essential platform for resolving disciplinary matters
usually to the satisfaction of both parties.
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ACAS ARBITRATION SURVEY - QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
ESI Cases - Trade Union Responses to Section E - Final Comments
1 I have left questions in Section A unanswered because, though the arbitrator appeared during the
hearing to be perfectly fair and competent, what I can only describe as a totally illogicality was
requested of the parties upon the hearing reconvening after he had heard all the representations.
The arbitrator requested representatives of both parties to accompany him to see the appellant's
GP to ascertain what was meant on a medical certificate by the words "get out and about". Both
the employer representative and ourselves were agreed that this was totally irrelevant to the case
and indicated that the arbitrator had completely "missed the point".
2 Independent persons give too much credence to Board's evidence. Tampering cases presumed so-
called expert Board witnesses were infallible. Subsequently totally discredited.
When inquiry takes place a percentage indication of reversals of decisions would be informative,
as Board not always right.
Sometimes a decision based on natural justice would be proof of effectiveness, not being allowed
to hide behind NJTC constitution.
3 Such an internal appeal structure has avoided cases going to Industrial Tribunals and because of
the 'binding' nature of the award I think all sides accept the value of the machinery - however the
Boards, I know, are concerned that the appellantmay still take his case [of dismissal] which then
duplicates the final stage which is the subject of this document.
4 Its effectiveness can be improved by the speeding up of holding the appeal and by the sending of
the report.
As indicated earlier, I have taken many appeals during the last 10 years and to give you some
idea: within the NWEB there are some 3,900 NJIC employees and I represent 2,600 of them.
5 I think the system works quite well. In general the members have confidence in the impartiality
of the arbitrators but I sense myself that a legalistic tendency seems to be appearing among
some arbitrators who are influenced by Industrial Tribunal decisions in similar kinds of cases.
I have had a great deal of experience at a senior TU level in this industry and I make that
comment with regret.
It may help if academics, who, during the course of their job are entangled in Industrial
Tribunals, are not considered for appointment.
6 Having been to two appeals with an independent chairman I found that I had nothing but praise
for this type of appeal that gave both sides a fair hearing and in my experience gave an award to
fit the evidence as submitted.
7 Suggest that it is better for the issue to be resolved informally between the appellant and his
representative and the management. Shop floor workers are not accustomed to court room
scenarios, only have half an hour or so with their trade union official before the appeal.
Management have all the time and resources in the world to prepare their case and are familiar
with the system. The appellant is therefore at a considerable disadvantage.
8 Evidence given at hearings should be assessed as if in a court of law, and subjected to the same
degree of examination you would expect there. It is too often the case that 'disciplinary notes'
prepared and presented by management are given the status of an official record of the earlier
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stages of the disciplinary process. In my opinion notes of previous hearings, should only be
submitted if they have been agreed as a correct record by both parties.
9 Thought will need to be given as to how the NJIC agreement might change in respect of appeals
following privatisation.
10 Better understanding of the terms and conditions laid down in the NJIC agreement
11 I am not unhappy with the system.
12. Conclusion - system very good.
13 Assuming that the final stage of the procedure is designed to obviate the need to proceed to an
Industrial Tribunal, then I believe that where legal points are raised, then expert legal opinion
should be sought before decisions are made.
14 As I am a recently appointed officer and only had the one experience of the industry's procedure I











(a) Where did you receive your secondary education?
(b) At what age did you leave full-time education?
(c) Did you receive post-school education, e.g. at College or
University? Please specify.
3. Qualifications:
(If your answer is 'Yes' to any of the following, please elaborate.)
Do you have:

















(If your answer is 'Yes' to any of the following, please elaborate.)
Do you have:
(a) industrial/commercial experience? Yes No
□
(b) management experience? Yes No
□ □
(c) experience as a trade union official? Yes No
(d) legal experience? Yes No
□ □
Have you:
(e) ever been employed by ACAS or the Department of
Employment in a full-time capacity? Yes No
□ □
(f) been in HM Forces? Yes No
□ □
(g) had other relevant industrial experience,
for example, consultancy work? Yes No
u
Occupation:
(a) Are you currently in employment or have you retired?
- 3 -
(b) If you are in employment, please give a brief description of
the post held.
(c) What was your employment at time of becoming an ACAS
Arbitrator?
(d) Please list previous posts held.
6. Recruitment:
How were you recruited as an Arbitrator for ACAS?
(a) Did ACAS approach you?
(b) Did you contact ACAS with a view to offering your services?
(c) Were you encouraged to approach ACAS by a third party?
(d) If other than the above, please specify.
_ 4 -
(B) ARBITRATION
7. How long have you acted as an Arbitrator for ACAS?
8. In addition to working for ACAS, have you acted as an Arbitrator
for any of the following:
(a) CAC? Yes No
□ □
(b) Institute of Arbitrators? Yes No
□ □
(c) Privately? Yes No
□ □
9. Single Arbitration:
(a) Approximately how many ACAS voluntary arbitration cases have you
dealt with as a Single Arbitrator?
(b) Have you been assisted by Assessors in any cases you
have dealt with? Yes No
□ □
If yes,
(c) what did you find to be the advantages of their service?
(d) what did you find to be the disadvantages of their service?
10. Board of Arbitration:
(a) Approximately how many ACAS voluntary Arbitration cases have
you dealt with as Chairman of a Board of Arbitration?
If none, please proceed to question 11.
- 5 -
(b) what did you find to be the advantages of having side members
on the Board?
(c) what did you find to be the disadvantages of having side
members on the Board?
11. Single or Board of Arbitration:
(a) Have you observed any distinction between the type of
cases going to Single Arbitration and the type going to
a Board? Yes No
□ □
If yes, please specify
(b) Should there be criteria for choosing Single Arbitration
rather than a 3oard? Yes No
□ □
Please explain your answer.
12. Agreements:
(a) Have you ever been asked to interpret substantive
agreements? Yes No
□ □
(b) If yes, did you encounter any particular problems
in interpretation? Please explain your answer.
- t> -
(c) In your experience, were the agreements themselves in
need of revision?
13. Written Statements of the Parties:
(a) Did you always receive written statements from both
parties?
(b) Did you find these to be satisfactory in most cases?
(c) If not, did this inhibit the Arbitration and award
making process?
14. Terms of Reference:
(a) Are you satisfied with the quality of the terms of
reference presented?
(b) To what extant have you felt restricted by the terms of
reference ?




There is an implied criticism that Arbitrators always seek
to 'split the difference':
(a) What is your understanding of the term 'split the
difference'?
(b) How often have you felt under pressure to 'split the
difference' or reach some kind of compromise?
(c) Do you prefer to make a straight choice in your judgement
in favour of one side or the other?
(d) Do you consider that there is wider scope for the use of
straight choice/flip flop/pendulum Arbitration? If so,
can you suggest areas where it would be appropriate?
Reasons:
(a) What do you consider to be the advantages of giving
Reasons for your Award?
(b) What do you consider to be the disadvantages of giving
Reasons for your Award?
- 8 -
(c) Do you prefer the system of recording your 'Considerations'
to giving Reasons for your Award?
If so, why?
(d) Alternatively, do you prefer to make no comment and
just give your Award?
If so, why?
17. Recommendations:
(a) Do you consider it is part of the Arbitrator's duties to
make recommendations? Yes No
□ □
(b) What do you consider to be the advantages of giving
recommendations ?
•(c) What do you consider to be the disadvantages of
giving recommendations?
Outcome:
(a) Would you like to be informed as to how your Award was
received by the parties? Yes





(a) Have you dealt with cases where the parties' voluntary
agreement has a clause which permits reference to
Arbitration? Yes No
□ □
(b) If yes, did you find the agreements appropriate
to current circumstances?
(c) What do you consider to be the advantages
of writing-in Arbitration and/or the use of
ACAS itself into Procedure Agreements?
(d) What do you consider to be the disadvantages
of writing-in Arbitration and/or the use of
ACAS itself into Procedure Agreements?
(e) Do you have views about the use of Arbitration in the
public sector, and in particular 'essential services'?
(for example, the use of standing bodies of Arbitration)
Voluntary or Compulsory Arbitration:
(a) What are the advantages of voluntary Arbitration?
(b) What are the disadvantages of voluntary Arbitration?
(c) What are the advantages of compulsory Arbitration?
(d) What are the disadvantages of compulsory Arbitration?
(e) What do you consider to be the relative merits of
joint and unilateral access to Arbitration?
ACAS:
(a) Could ACAS do more than it presently does in the form
of Bulletins, Induction Training and Seminars to enhance
industrial relations Arbitration? Yes
□
(b) If yes, can you suggest ways? (For example, would you
favour obtaining professional qualifications or becoming
a member of an Institute?)
- 12 -
(c) Can the process be taken too far?
22. Conciliation:
Are you satisfied with the current arrangements for preserving
the integrity of Arbitration and the separate integrity of
Conciliation? Please explain your answer. Yes No
□ □
23. General:
Please make any other general comments that you would wish to make
on the present and/or future role of Arbitration and the Arbitrator.




24. Have you ever acted as a Mediator? Yes No
□ □
If yes, please complete the following:
25. Approximately how many cases have you conducted?
26. Which particular issues, if any, do you consider are better
dealt with by Mediation rather than by Arbitration?
27. Are you satisfied with the distinctions between Mediation and
Arbitration which are currently in practice?
28. Are there any special methods you introduce to Mediation which
you do not use for Arbitration?




EDIIBURGH HI I VERSITT SURVEY OF ACAS ARBITRATIOI
A. RECEIT EIPERIESCE OF ARBITRATIOS
First I would like to ask you about your most recent experience of ACAS
Arbitration.
In the following questions please tick the appropriate boxes.
1. Hew did this particular dispute come to be referred to ACAS
arbitration?
(a) Union request . CZ3
<b> Employer request i—3
<c) Joint union and employer request iZI3
(d) ACAS suggestion ZZ
<e) Other (please specify) uZ]
2. Vhich of the following was the Min subject of the dispute?
(tick one only)
(a) General pay and conditions claim lZj
(b) Grading CZ
(c) Other pay matters and conditions of employ¬
ment not part of a general pay claim (eg ques- CZ
tions over hours, holiday entitlement, shift
or overtime premium payments, equal pay, bonus
payments, piece work rates, sick pay, etc)
Please specify
(d) Trade union recognition HZD
(e) Changes in working practices HZ]
(f) Other trade union matters (eg disclosure of
information for collective bargaining purposes, CZ




(i) Other issues (please specify) ZZ
2
3. Vhich types of occupation were
(tick all that apply)
i'a> Managerial/administrative






<h) Others (please specify)
4. How many employees were directly involved in the dispute?
<a) Under 20 EE (e) 200-499 E
Co) 21-49 EE (f) 500-999 EE
(c> 50-99 EE (g) 1000 + EE
<d) iOO-199 [ 1
Did the dispute involve any industrial action?
(a) Yes, strike action was taken EE
Co) Yes, but only action short of a strike was taken EE
(c) So, but industrial action was threatened EE
<d) Ho action was threatened or taken EE
6. If strike action was taken, when was it taken?
(tick all that apply)
(a) Before the agreement to refer the dispute CD
to arbitration
(b) Between then and the arbitration hearing CD
itself
(c) Between the hearing and the issue of the EE)
award by the Arbitrator
(d) After the award was issued EE]
directly involved in the dispute?
CD
CD
7. Do you have a procedure agreement for dealing with this type of
dispute
YES ED 10 EZJ
If Yes
Ca) Is ACAS conciliation explicitly required or
permitted by the procedure agreement?
Required EZ3 Permitted CZ] lot mentioned CZI
<b) Is ACAS arbitration explicitly required or
permitted by the procedure agreement?
<i) Required ZZ
(ii) Permitted, at the request of one party only ZZ
(iii) Permitted by agreement between the parties ZZ
(iv) Not mentioned. [ZD
(c) If ACAS arbitration is required or permitted by
the procedure agreement, does the agreement place
specific restrictions on the arbitrator?
(i) Yes, the arbitrator can only decide
either for the employer's an for the union's ZZ
final position (pendulum arbitration)
(ii) Yes, there are other restrictions on ZZ
the arbitrator's decision
(iii) No, the arbitrator is free to award as
he/she thinks appropriate
ZZ
Vas there a conciliation meeting under ACAS auspices before the





YES 10 DOJ' T OOV
>a) Explain the various methods
available (eg single arbitrator,
Board of Arbitration, Central CHI EC HO
Arbitration Committee (CAC))?
Co".' Adequately explain the arbitra¬
tion procedure (eg written
submissions, oral hearing, CD CCD lH
written award)?
(c> Explain the binding nature of CD EC EC
arbitration?
(d) Assist with the wording of the CD EC EC
terms of reference?
The following questions concern the attitude of the parties
towards arbitration and the issues in dispute.
YES 10 DOI'T OOV
(a) Both parties were keen to EC EC CD
use arbitration
(b) The relationship between the EC CD CD
two parties was very hostile
(c) The differences separating the CD CD
parties were very large
<d) There were important matters
of principle at stake in this CD EC EC
dispute
10. How was the method of arbitration decided?
a> It was agreed at conciliation CD
^b'1 It was agreed between the parties CD
before ACAS involvement
(c> It was laid down in the procedure CD
»'d> Other (please specify) CHI
11. Vere there agreed terms of reference?
YES CD SO CD
12. Did the terms of reference
(a) require the arbitrator to choose the CD
employer's or the union's final position?
<b) restrict the arbitrator's award in other ways? CD
(c) leave the arbitrator free to award as he/she CD
thought appropriate?
13. Did the terms of reference cover all the issues which needed to be
settled by the reference to arbitration?
YES CD SO CD
14. Where did the arbitration hearing take place?
(a) On ACAS premises CD
(b) On employer's premises CD
<c) On Trade Union premises CD
(d) Other (please specify) CD
15. Did the arbitrator make a site visit as part of the
reference?
YES CD SO CD
16. The following questions concern the organisation of the arbitration.
YES SO DOS' T MOV
<3j The ether party's written
submission was received in CD CD CD
time to study it before the
hearing
'-'b> The hearing was arranged CD CD CD
promptly.
<c> The practical arrangements
for the hearing were CD
satisfactory.
(d) The award was issued promptly CD
17. Yho chose the arbitrator?
<a> The parties CD
id) ACAS, after consulting the parties CD
<c> ACAS CD





<a) Xade clear his/her role in CD CD CD
the dispute?
(b) Allowed you sufficient time CD CD CD
to state your case
<c) Allowed you sufficient oppor¬
tunity to question the other CD CD CD
party?
(d) Addressed questions to both CD CD CD
parties?
<e) Conducted the hearing to CD CD CD
your satisfaction?
If DISAGREE to (e), please explain
The following questions concern the
arbitrator in the proceedings.





•' a > Acted impartially □ □ =n
; "o > Handled matters confidently =□ E=3 =□
<c) Had your trust O 1=3 =j




<e > Sufficiently understood
the issues involved
1=3 =□ =□
(f') Acted in a courteous and
friendly manner
EZD £= L=
<g> Acted according to your C=3 C=3 =J
expectations
If DISAGREE to <g), please explain
Vhat was the outcome of the arbitration?
<a) The arbitrator found for the employer's [=3
position
Co) The arbitrator found for the union's =□
position
<c) It was a compromise award. CH
s
21. The follovriiig questions concern the arbitrator's report.
YES HO DOI'T OOV
<a'> It was clear and to the point ) EH ' ;
\cI*. adequately summarised each Dj lHj i i
party's case
<c> It stayed within the terms of CD HZ HZ
reference laid down
>d) It gave some indication of
how the arbitrator reached in HZ CD
his/her award
<e> The award was unambiguous. HZ HZ HZ
<f> The award was fair HZ HZ HZ
22. How would you describe the contribution of the award to the
settlement of the issues in dispute?
(i) So far, since the award was issued
Excellent Very Good Good Moderate Poor
CD CD CD CD CD
(ii) In the longer term
Excellent Very Good Good Moderate Poor
CZ1 CD EZl CD ED
If the answer to (i) or (ii) is Moderate or Poor, why was this?
(a) The terms of reference asked the CD
arbitrator the wrong question.
(b) The award was deficient. HZ
(c) There was another reason. [HI
If (b) or (c) please explain.
23. Vould you use ACAS arbitration again if a similar dispute arose
arose in the future?
YES £D
If ID. please explain
10 CD
9
B. GEFEEAL VIEV OF ARBITRATIOI
Sow I would like to ask you about your general view of ACAS arbitration and
the role of arbitrators.
24 Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements.
AGREE DISAGREE DOS'T KIOV
<&> Management representatives
are generally reluctant to EH CU ED
pux a dispute to arbitration
•b> Union representatives are
generally reluctant to put i I EE) EH
a dispute to arbitration
<c> The stronger party in a
dispute will not usually EH CHI EH
want xo go to arbitration.
An organisation which agrees
to arbitration improves its O i—I EZ3
public image.
<e> Arbitration should not take
place until all agreed proce¬
dures for negotiation have tZD EH EH
been exhausted, or a deadlock
in the negotiation reached.
(f) Arbitration should not take
place untii an attempt has lZj HE i i
been made to resolve a dispute
through conciliation.
<g> Arbitration should not take
place while industrial action TEH EH EH
is occurring
<h> Arbitration should be written
into procedure agreements:
(i) As a final voluntary stage Cj CD HZ
(ii) As a final stage either EH EH HE
party can invoke.
(iii) As an automatic final stage. EH EH EH
vi> A disadvantage of arbitration is
that parties sometimes become HE HE EH
addicted to its use.
<j> Arbitration is a valuable way of EH EH EH
resolving some disputes.
<k> Without ACAS arbitration the
number of stoppages in industry EH EH EH
woUid increase.
25. The arbitrator should
AGREE DISAGREE DON' 7 OOV
<a> See his/her primary job as
settling the dispute
(b> Rot have any recent direct
association with management:
EZ3
<c> Not have any recent direct
association with a union
<d) In disputes over pay, take
into account:
(i) ability to pay lZD
iii) comparability a
(iii) the rate of inflation □ r=3
<iv> the general public
interest
CD CD CD
(e) Give an indication of how he/
she arrived at the award.
(f) Make recommendations to one or
both sides if he/she sees other
problems between the parties not
covered by the terms of reference.
CD]
u
In your view, which of the following qualities are important
for effective arbitration?
ESSENTIAL IMPORTAIT IOT IMPORTAIT
<a> Impartiality CD CO EC
ib) Industrial cr Commercial TC3 lC CD
experience
(c) Knowledge of industrial
relations and CD
collective bargaining
(d) Knowledge of the partic¬
ular industry involved EC CD
in the dispute.
<e> Independence CD CD id
(f) Authority CD CD EC
<g) A sense of humour CD CD CD
(h) Experience in settling EC EC EC
disputes by arbitration
(i) An ability to understand EC CD CD
complex problems quickly
(j ) Originality of ideas





To help us analyse the information you provide, can you tell us:
27. Are you - a union representative? CD (please go to Q28)
- a management representative? CHI (please go to Q29)
28. If you are a union representative
(a' what is the name of your trade union?
(b) what proportion of the workforce does your union
have in membership in the establishment(s) covered
by this particular arbitration?
<i> Under 10% HZ] (iv> 50-74% ZD
(ii) 10-24% ZD (v) 75-100% ZD
(iii) 25-49% ZD
(Please go to Q30)
29. If you are a management representative
(a) In which industry is your main business!
(b> Is your organisation a member of an employers federation?
YES ZD SO ED DOS' T KJOV CD
(c) How many people work in the establishment(s)
covered by this particular arbitration?
(i) Under 20 CD (v) 200-499 CD
(ii) 21-49 CD (vi) 500-999 CD
(iii) 50-99 CD (vii) 1000 + ZD
(iv) 100-199 ZD
(d) Is your organisation
Single plant? CD Multi-plant? CD
(e) Vhich trade unions, if any, do you recognise in
the establishment(s) covered by this particular
arbitration?
(f> Vhat proportion of employees in that establishment(s)
are union members?
(i) Under 10% CD (iv) 50-74% CD
(ii) 10-24% CD (v) 75-100% CD
(iii) 25-49% CD
13
30. Before this dispute have you personally been involved in any
other dispute which went to ACAS arbitration?
YES CD 10 ZD
If YES
Vhen was the last such time?
Before 1350 ' i 1362 i i 1365 ZD 193S * j
i960 ZD 1933 ZD 1936 ZD DOU'T KNOW ZD
1931 I i 1984 i ' 1987 ! 1
D. FIIAL COKXEITS
Please use the space below to make any comments you wish about your
personal opinions of, or experience with, ACAS arbitration. In particular,
io you have any suggestions for possible improvements in its effectiveness?
























Amalgamated Association of Card Blowing and Ring Room
Operatives
Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners and
Twiners
Automobile Association Staff Association
Association ofBroadcasting and Allied Staff
Association of Cine Technicians
Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied
Technicians
Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staffs
Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied
Technicians
Amalgamated Engineering Union
Association of Head Postmasters
Amalgamated Moulders and Kindred Industries Union
Association ofPost Office Executives
Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer
Staff
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights,
Blacksmiths and Structural Workers
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen
Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians
Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs
Amalgamated Society ofWoodworkers
Association of Scientific Workers
Amalgamated Society ofWood-Cutting Machinists
Amalgamated Society ofWire Drawers and Kindred Trades
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ASWDKW Association of Shop Workers, Distributive and Kindred Workers
ASWM Amalgamated Society ofWoodcutting Machinists
AUBTWGBI Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of Great Britain
and Ireland
AUEFW Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
BAEA British Actors Equity Association
BAEA British Aerospace Employees Association
BALPA British Airline Pilots Association
BESO Bank of England Staff Organisation
BFAWU Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union
BFWA British Funeral Workers Association
BMA British Medical Association
BMISSBS Boiler Makers, Iron and Steel Ship Builders Society
BRTTT British Roll Turners Trade Society
CAWU Clerical and AdministrativeWorkers Union
CBSSA Cheshire Building Society Staff Association
CEU Constructional Engineering Union
CFGB Coopers Federation of Great Britain
CIASSC Central Institutions Academic Staffs Salaries Committee
CSSSC/IOAO/LEA Committee on Salary Scales and Service Conditions of
Inspectors, Organisers and Advisory Officers of Local Education
Authorities
DATA Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing
Union
EPEA Electrical Power Engineers Association
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ETA Entertainment Trades Alliance
ETU Electrical Trades Union
FCDPA Federal Council ofDepartmental Police Associations
FSCNC/ITL Factory Supervisors Central Negotiating Committee of Imperial
Tobacco Limited
FTATU Furniture, Timber and Allied Trade Union
GMBATU General Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union
GMWU General and MunicipalWorkers' Union
GSSNSO/NJC/ Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel of the National
CAT Joint Council for Civil Air Transport
HCWU Hotel and Catering Workers Union
HDEU Heating and Domestic Engineers' Union
IBOA Irish Banks Officials Association
IPCS Institution of Professional Civil Servants
ISTC Iron and Steel Trades Confederation
JIC/FCI Joint Industrial Council of the Floorcovering Contracting
Industry
JIC/FSQI Joint Industrial Council for the Freestone and Sandstone
Quarrying Industry
JIC/NFI Joint Industrial Council for the Narrow Fabrics Industry
LCB/TT London Conciliation Board for the Tailoring Trade
MAPA Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association
MATSA Managerial, Administrative, Technical and Supervisory
Association
MDFA Master Dyers' and Finishers' Association
MHDFA Master Hosiery Dyers' and Finishers' Association
NACSS National Association ofClerical and Supervisory Staffs
NALGO National and Local Government Officers' Association
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National Association of Theatrical and Kine Employees
National Society of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media
Personnel
National Association of Theatrical, Television and Kine
Employees
Navigating and Engineer Officers' National Sectional Panel of the
National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport
National Federation ofBuilding Trades Operatives
National Graphical Association
National Joint Committee for Local Authorities' Fire Brigades
National Joint Council for the Pottery Industry
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry
National Joint Industrial Council for the Gas Industry
National Joint Industrial Council for the Passenger Transport
Industry
National Joint Industrial Council of the Electricity Supply
Industry
National League of the Blind
National Association of Licensed House Managers
National Society of Brass and Metal Mechanics
National Union of Agricultural Workers
National Union of Blastfurnacemen, Ore Miners, Coke Worker
and Kindred Trades
National Union of Domestic Appliance and General Metal
Workers
National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers
National Union of Enginemen, Firemen, Mechanics and
Electrical Workers
National Union of Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades
NUG National Union ifGlovers
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NUGMW National Union of General and Municipal Workers
NUHKW National Union of Hosiery and KnitwearWorkers
NUMIM National Union of Musical Instrument Makers









National Union of Public Employees
National Union of Seamen
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers and Braziers
National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths,
Heating and Domestic Engineers
National Union of Tailors and GarmentWorkers
National Union of Vehicle Builders














Retail Book, Stationery and Allied Trades Employees
Association
Rugby League Professional Players Association
Shipbuilding and Allied Industries Management Association
Supervisory, Administrative and Technical Association
Sign and Display Trade Union
Scottish Horse and Motormen's Association
Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and
Process Workers
Scottish Joint Negotiating Committee for Teaching Staff in
School Education
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades
Sawmakers Protection Society
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STC Steel Trades Confederation
STSCC Scottish Teachers' Service Conditions Committee
STUWU Scottish Transport and General Workers Union
SUBAW Scottish Union of Bakers and Allied Workers
SWMAESTA South Wales and Monmouthshire Allied Engineering Skilled
Trade Association
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union
UBSSO Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives
UCATT Union ofConstruction, Allied Trades and Technicians
UKAEAWC United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Whidey Council
UPA United Patternmakers Association
URTU United Road Transport Union
USBISS United Society of Boilermakers and Iron and Steel Shipbuilders
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and AlliedWorkers
WLBTU Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen and Bargemen's Union
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